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PART IV.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

TURKISH WAR.

241

January 1913.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

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CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting the Turkish War.

Part IV.

[26] No. 1.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1913.)

(No. 217. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, December* 26, 1912.

A WEEK ago M. Coromilas expressed the opinion that the visit of King Ferdinand to Salonica would not alter the situation; to-day he admits that His Majesty's professions were excellent—very different, in fact, from the language used in the Sobranié. I remarked that the language to which he referred (concerning the indivisibility of Macedonia) had not been used by responsible statesmen, to which he agreed, adding that in Greece also people, M. Theotoky, for instance, were beginning to wonder what the Government was about—as I understood him to mean—in not opposing Bulgarian pretensions more openly and categorically.

The departure of King Ferdinand and the Bulgarian Princes from Salonica is a great relief to the Greeks, which would be increased if the report were confirmed that most of the Bulgarian troops are to follow them. The reduction of Janina is proving a more difficult matter than was anticipated, and every available man ought to be transported from Macedonia to Epirus in order to establish the necessary superiority of numbers. M. Coromilas lays to the door of the Bulgarians the blame for the necessity of hard fighting at Janina. If, he says, we had gone straight on at Chatalja and had not listened to any demand for an armistice, we should have settled the matter once for all; Janina would have been given up as one of the conditions of peace, the Albanian question would not have arisen, and all would have been well. Now that Europe has decided to create an autonomous Albania, where is the compensation for Servia to come from? The armistice has been the cause of endless difficulties, even in our present operations; but for it, we should provision our troops in the neighbourhood of Korytsa from Monastir; but the armistice prevents that.

We do not even know, said M. Coromilas, how to deal with the new Albania. We wanted to cut the cable from Valona to Italy, and Ismaïl Kemal Bey protested, saying that Albania was not a part of Turkey. We are, in fact, to wage war for the benefit of the Mussulman Albanians, who have always been our enemies.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

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[8] No. 2.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1913.)

(No. 1117.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December* 27, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a despatch addressed to me by Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell reporting the views of one of the officers in charge of the military attachés as to the necessity of a continuation of the war.

The views therein expressed are, I believe, generally held in military circles.

Many officers hold that the troops that will, in the event of a renewal of hostilities, be opposed to the enemy are fresh troops who, far from being influenced by the panic that assailed their comrades, are determined to rehabilitate the honour of the Turkish army.

How far this is possible cannot be judged until conclusions are tried, a contingency which it is devoutly to be hoped will be avoided.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 2.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 91.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December* 26, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to report that Kaimakam Izzet Bey, the officer in charge of the foreign military attachés with the Turkish army, came to visit me to-day. He explained that he was paying his congratulatory visits on Christmas Day instead of on New Year's Day, as is more usual here, because he supposed that by the latter day hostilities would have recommenced, and that by then neither he nor I should be here. He said that next Saturday would see the break up of the Peace Conference in London, as the terms which the allies were insisting on were quite unacceptable, and he did not imagine for a moment that his Government would consent to them, but would resume hostilities at once.

He appeared to think that we would go this time to Gallipoli, as operations there were likely to be more interesting than at Chatalja.

Though I was surprised by his visit, I was not astonished by what he said, as it has been my impression for some little time past that the body of officers of the Turkish army would prefer to continue the war, and expect to do so, rather than give way on the question of Adrianople and the other besieged towns. They feel that they have little more to lose, and that things can hardly be worse than they are now; and while they consider the position at Chatalja to be now absolutely secure, the effect of the recent naval actions, though indecisive, has been to raise the moral of the fleet and to remove the apprehension that the allies might, owing to the command of the sea which the Greek fleet was supposed to enjoy, make a successful attack on the Gallipoli peninsula as a preliminary to forcing the passage of the Dardanelles.

Whether the country can support a continuation of the war, or whether it can be carried on without money, are questions to which they attach no importance.

I have, &c.
G. W. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

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[11] No. 3.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1913.)

(No. 1120.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December* 28, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy, reporting on intrigues which are being carried on in the army by the military league, and on the consequent cleavage between the latter and Nazim Pasha, who is said to be becoming reconciled with Mahmud Shevket.

I am, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 3.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 92.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December* 27, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to recall the fact that not long ago certain changes occurred in the Ministry of War which excited some interest at the time, though the reasons for

them were obscure, and to inform you that I have lately found an officer who was willing to give me information, on which this despatch is based.

It may be remembered that when Nazim Pasha left Constantinople to direct the operations of the army in Thrace, he left his Mustesbar, Fuad Pasha, as acting Minister of War. Certain officers belonging to the military league or group of saviour officers, about which we heard a good deal five months ago, being anxious to crush the opposition party (the adherents of the Committee of Union and Progress), commenced a series of intrigues which resulted in the supersession of Fuad Pasha as acting Minister of War by Ahmed Fevzi Pasha, who thereupon proceeded to make certain changes agreeable to himself and to the officers of the military league. The first and most important of these were among the officers constituting the permanent court-martial which, owing to the perpetual state of siege, has become almost a part of the Turkish constitution. A general called Aarif Pasha, who had recently been dismissed from the command of the 29th Nizam Division, became president of the court-martial, which then began to order the arrest of all prominent unionists, with a view to their expulsion. Another important change was the substitution of Hassan Pasha, a friend of Ahmed Fevzi's and a man whom he had known at Salonica, for Nazim's adherent, Safvet Bey, as commandant de place, a post which carries with it the exercise of considerable political influence. It was some little time before Nazim Pasha, who was up at Chatalja, grasped that a sort of revolution was going on at the Ministry of War, and he at once sent peremptory orders for the reinstatement of Fuad Pasha as acting Minister of War, and for the removal of all the officials appointed by Ahmed Fevzi. Hassan Pasha was removed to the Dardanelles to command a redif (division, the court-martial was reconstituted, and Suleiman Pasha, a retired cavalry general, became its president, while the release of the arrested committee leaders followed in due course.

I am told that the prime mover in these intrigues was Ferid Pasha, a military officer at present unemployed, whose appointment, on the fall of Said Pasha's Cabinet, to be Vali of Salonica, had excited so much adverse criticism that the Government could not maintain him there long.

The above narrative seems to point to a cleavage between Nazim Pasha and the military league, to whose efforts he was mainly indebted for Mahmud Shevket Pasha's fall and his own elevation to the Ministry of War. It also shows that the orders against army officers taking part in politics are of little effect.

An almost inevitable effect of the present unsuccessful war has been that the Committee of Union and Progress is regaining the ground it had lost in the army, and it may be that Nazim thinks it well to be on the safe side, and I am told that a reconciliation has been effected between him and Mahmud Shevket Pasha.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

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[12] No. 4.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1913.)

(No. 1121.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December* 28, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy regarding Turkish preparations for continuing the war, as also the views of Turkish officers on the question of peace.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 4.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December* 27, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a general report on recent military movements. Since the conclusion of the armistice the military authorities have continued to make preparations for carrying on the war if necessary. In addition to reinforcing the army at the Chatalja lines and to sending some more heavy guns up there, preparations are being made with a view to operations at the Dardanelles and at Smyrna. These

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preparations are unfortunately shrouded by the fog of war, and I am unable to give any definite news or details of interest.

Nazim Pasha has recently visited Gallipoli. I saw him just before he left, when he gave me to understand that some important work was going on at Chatalja which rendered it undesirable for any visitors to go there, but that it would be completed in a few days' time, after which one might be allowed to go up.

He also told me that an army corps is being formed at Smyrna. We have hitherto heard nothing of this, but I have since heard that one of the new Creusot mountain batteries has been sent there, that five Syrian battalions now on the railway will be sent there from Afiun Kara Hissar, and that other troops are being transported there viâ Panderma.

The recruits of 1309, who are not legally liable for service till October 1913, are now being called up, a circumstance of which the Christian communities are inclined to make a grievance. It is, however, nothing unusual, as for some years past the Turkish army has been drawing its recruits a year in advance.

I cannot gather, from frequent conversations with all kinds of Turkish officers, that peace is desired or even contemplated. Their view is—

1. That the army has never been really beaten, its retreat being due to Abdullah Pasha and to a succession of unlucky contretemps;

2. That Bulgaria is exhausted, and has made the greatest effort of which she is capable, whereas Turkey is only just beginning;

3. That they have now had time to collect and organise their best troops;

4. That the terms of the allies are such that there is nothing more to lose, and that even a second disastrous campaign would make matters no worse than they will be if the allies' terms are accepted now.

Of these points the last is the most important, and if peace is not made it will be due to the feeling on this subject.

At the root of their feeling in favour of continuing the war is the assumption that the allies can never force the Chatalja lines or the defences of Gallipoli and the Dardanelles, and there is a further idea that their main army will be able to take the offensive successfully and to reconquer Thrace. I think that both these ideas owe something to Austrian and German encouragement. In any case, they seem to render difficult the task of the Government in concluding a peace which is likely to be unpopular, and which would certainly bring the army into the camp of its political opponents.

I have, &c.
G. W. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell.

FROM the 1st to the 23rd December about 15,000 men have proceeded to the Chatalja lines from Constantinople by rail. It has been impossible to identify these. The majority are Anatolian reservists of various denominations, who are sent up in small bodies, but I think the number may include four or five Nizam battalions from the IIIrd Army Inspection.

According to traffic returns which I have seen, 11,000 Mauser rifles (of which 5,000 are described as "quite new"), over 6,000 cases of small arm ammunition, and nine truck-loads of shell have also been sent up.

Since the 20th instant sixteen guns have been taken up, of which ten are described as large siege guns. Also a travelling crane, borrowed from the railway company.

On the other hand, about 2,000 invalids have been sent down to Constantinople, and eighteen field guns, which were shipped hence to Gallipoli on the 13th instant. Earlier in the month another twelve field guns were shipped to Gallipoli, but I do not know if these came from Chatalja.

The Independent Cavalry Brigade has come down from the front, and is now in the Daoud Pasha barracks, where the regiments are being reformed. A second group

of three Schneider-Creusot mountain batteries, which arrived from Constanza early in the month, has, I am informed, been distributed as follows:—

One battery to the Chatalja lines.
One battery to Gallipoli.
One battery to Smyrna.

The personnel and mules for these batteries were supplied by the 15th Mountain Artillery battalion from Syria.

Early in the month considerable quantities of wood for building huts, and of barbed wire were sent up to Hademkeui.

As regards the troops in the Gallipoli Peninsula and on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, these probably amount to four divisions at least, though it is impossible unfortunately to say much about them. In addition to the two local redif divisions (one of which has suffered severely, both in the retreat and from cholera), there is one of Syrian Nizams called the 27th (mixed) division, some Sivas redif battalions, and (probably) a Nizam division from the IIIrd Army Inspection.

Fakhri Pasha is now commanding at the Dardanelles vice Shevket Torghoud, appointed to the Ist Redif Inspection at Constantinople. I am acquainted with Fakhri, and should say that he was quite incompetent, while all accounts agree that the division which he was commanding in the battle of Lule Burgas (Ismid redif) certainly did not distinguish itself.

Of the four Nizam divisions of the IIIrd Army Inspection which have been or are being mobilised, I am only able to say definitely that the 29th is at the Chatalja lines. The 30th is probably there, but a part of it may be at the Dardanelles. The 31st appears to be *en route* for Panderma, and the 32nd does not yet appear to have been shipped. The Sivas redif division appears to have been mobilised, as some Sivas battalions are reported to be at the Dardanelles, and I am informed that Smyrna is expecting others.

A recent report from Diarbekir mentions the moves of a couple of redif battalions which seem to point to the fact that the Mamuret-ul-Aziz division is being mobilised.

G. W. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

P.S.—Two trains a day have been run regularly to feed the army in the Chatalja lines, and there is in addition a regular service of pack animals which go by road to the troops on the right of the lines; 170,000 bread rations go up daily by train, those intended for the troops on the left of the lines being delivered at Yarim Burgas (see Austrian map).

G. W. T.

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[14]

No. 5.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1, 1913.)

(No. 1123.)

Sir, *Constantinople, December 28, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1009 of the 20th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a notice which I have received from the Sublime Porte, enclosing a memorandum by a French gendarmerie officer at Salonica with regard to the affairs of the gendarmerie and the deportation of Turkish officers.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 5.

Sublime Porte to Sir G. Lowther.

LE Ministère Impérial des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de transmettre ci-joint à l'Ambassade de Sa Majesté britannique, pour son information, copie d'un rapport du Lieutenant-Colonel Foulon Bey, instructeur de la gendarmerie ottoman à Salonique.

Sublime Porte, le 26 décembre, 1912.

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Enclosure 2 in No. 5.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Foulon Bey on Events which have occurred since November 17, 1912.

DEPUIS la date susmentionnée la situation ne s'est pas sensiblement modifiée.

En ce qui concerne spécialement la gendarmerie, il ne s'est rien passé de bien saillant. Les 2,000 gendarmes présents sont toujours hébergés tant dans un grand entrepôt de tabacs que dans les écoles de l'Alliance israélite. A force de démarches, j'ai pu obtenir l'élévation jusqu'au chiffre de 1,500 du nombre des rations journalières de ½ kilog. de pain que leur distribue l'autorité hellénique. C'est une limite que je ne saurais faire dépasser. On ne s'est pas gêné pour me dire que ces distributions n'avaient nullement un caractère obligatoire pour l'autorité hellénique. Je ne me suis d'ailleurs pas gêné davantage pour faire remarquer à mon interlocuteur, M. Ractivan, que, si ladite autorité avait su maintenir l'ordre pendant la première semaine de l'occupation, les gendarmes, qui venaient pour la plupart de toucher leur solde, n'auraient pas été dépouillés et seraient maintenant facilement en état de pourvoir à leur subsistance.

Pour permettre aux gendarmes de pouvoir manger autre chose que du pain—qui leur est, d'ailleurs, si chichement assuré—et pour aider de nombreux militaires, particulièrement des officiers, qui ont autour d'eux de nombreuses bouches à nourrir, nous avons décidé, le Lieutenant-Colonel Chevki Bey et moi, de distribuer quelque argent à ces malheureux. J'ai pu réussir à déterminer M. Ractivan à donner à la banque l'autorisation de me payer un chèque de £ T. 400 et à lui arracher la promesse de me laisser toucher un autre chèque d'une valeur au moins égale lors du départ des gendarmes. Je ne désespère pas de sauver toute la somme.

Le départ du bateau qui doit transporter les gendarmes en Asie a été retardé par suite de diverses circonstances. On a allégué, d'abord, le manque de charbon. Depuis quelques jours on assure que tous les bateaux sont maintenant requis pour le transport des troupes bulgares (vers Dédéagatch, sans doute); ce n'est que partiellement exact.

Le dépôt du régiment, situé dans l'enceinte du konak dans lequel j'avais obtenu de faire provisoirement emmagasiner les armes des gendarmes—ou plus exactement celles que j'ai pu soustraire à la rapacité des pillards militaires, isolés ou groupés, ou brigands; soit moins qu'un millier—a été forcé par l'autorité grecque et mis au pillage d'une façon honteuse. Il a été débarrassé de tous les effets qu'il contenait encore. Dans leur précipitation les voleurs officiels ont véritablement saccagé ce magasin, qui, quand je l'ai visité il y a quelques jours, présentait l'aspect d'un champ de bataille abandonné par des troupes en déroute. La plupart des fusils semblaient, toutefois, y être encore, quoique gisant pêle-mêle avec des milliers de cartouches libres ou en chargeurs (il y en avait des quantités dans la cour jusqu'à une certaine distance du magasin). J'ai prié le préfet de venir constater lui-même l'état des lieux, ce qu'il a fait. Il m'a donné mille assurances devant de nombreux témoins que ce dommage, comme tous les autres d'ailleurs (pillage du dépôt régional, vol de plus de cent chevaux) serait réparé. "Le Gouvernement grec a de l'argent; soyez sans crainte." Avec beaucoup de personnes, je doute cependant très fortement que ces belles promesses soient jamais réalisées. J'ai fait, cependant, dresser une évaluation aussi exacte que possible de toutes les pertes subies par la gendarmerie et je la présenterai sous peu à l'autorite grecque.

Je cherche de relever le courage des officiers, à les amener à visiter régulièrement leurs hommes dans leurs casernements, malgré beaucoup de difficultés; je suis maintenant parvenu à un résultat assez satisfaisant. Cependant, l'impatience de partir est chez tous extrême et j'ai du mal à la contenir.

Le 23 novembre.—Hier, à la première heure, soldats et gendarmes hellènes se sont mis à la recherche des officiers turcs et les ont arrêtés partout où ils ont pu les rencontrer—à leur domicile ou dans la rue. J'ai pu me mettre en rapport de suite avec mon collègue, le Lieutenant-Colonel Chevki Bey, dans la maison duquel se trouvait un officier d'infanterie grecque surveillant, avec quelques soldats, ses préparatifs de départ. Je me suis rendu aussitôt au consulat d'Angleterre et j'ai demandé à Mr. Lamb, doyen du corps consulaire, s'il ne trouvait pas à propos de tenter une démarche avec moi. Le consul ayant accepté, nous nous sommes rendus successivement chez le Ministre, M. Ractivan, et chez le préfet. Nous nous sommes également mis en rapport avec le Prince Nicolas par l'intermédiaire d'un lieutenant-colonel, son aide de camp. Nous avons été ainsi informés que l'on reprochait à un certain nombre d'officiers turcs d'avoir, en utilisant des passeports distribués à des émigrés rejoignant

leurs foyers, quitté Salonique pour organiser des bandes dans le vilayet de Monastir, et que, pour couper court à toutes ces velléités, le Gouvernement avait décidé d'expulser tous les officiers. Nous fîmes observer en vain que cette mesure prise ainsi d'une manière générale serait certainement interprétée comme une violation de la convention militaire réglant le sort de l'armée de Hassan Pacha. Pour mon compte, je remarquai spécialement qu'il me paraissait infiniment peu probable que des officiers de gendarmerie eussent agi de la façon susmentionnée. Le préfet me répondit vivement que la mesure ne s'étendait pas aux officiers de gendarmerie et que, s'il y en avait eu d'arrêtés, c'était par erreur. Je citai le cas de Chevki Bey et j'insistai particulièrement à plusieurs reprises auprès de l'aide de camp du Prince, qui me promit de faire son possible pour me donner satisfaction.

J'ai pu revoir Chevki Bey deux heures plus tard à l'appontement de la Tour Blanche, où l'on avait embarqué les officiers pour les conduire à bord du vapeur "Thémistocle." Il m'a déclaré être, à son connaissance, le seul officier de gendarmerie arrêté. Trois cents officiers au moins auraient ainsi été saisis. Parmi eux se trouve le Général Ghalib Pacha, commandant la division de Serrès. On ne connaît pas la destination définitive du bateau. On croit qu'il touchera d'abord Le Pirée.

Pour mon compte, comme je l'ai, d'ailleurs, dit au préfet, je considère que, si des officiers se sont mis dans le cas dont il s'agit, ce ne peut être que l'infime exception.

Ces arrestations en masse ont plus que jamais jeté le doute et la suspicion dans l'âme des officiers et hommes de troupe. Tout le monde, même les femmes turques, se précipite chez moi pour me demander aide et protection. Je cherche à donner courage et confiance à tous ces pauvres gens. Je fais également ce que je puis pour secourir les prisonniers de l'armée de Hassan Pacha, dont la misère est navrante. J'ai eu l'occasion d'écrire à ce sujet au Prince Nicolas une lettre dont je vous enverrai la copie.

Je suis aussi intervenu auprès du Ministre au sujet des émigrés (mouhâdjir).

La tranquillité est encore loin d'être revenue en ville. Il y a de fréquentes paniques. Les troupes continuent à faire des perquisitions à domicile pour la recherche des armes. Des malandrins revêtent un costume militaire, se donnant une qualité qu'ils n'ont pas, s'introduisent dans les maisons et les dévalisent. Des femmes turques ont été violées.

L'autorité hellénique ne considère pas comme impossible un massacre des musulmans par des bandes bulgares—celles de Sandansky ou autres. Le préfet m'a déclaré avoir fait consigner l'avant-dernière nuit deux bataillons pour intervenir en cas d'événements de ce genre.

La situation est si troublé et si incertaine qu'un grec notable de Salonique m'exprimait hier le regret de n'être pas en situation de pouvoir quitter le pays pour deux années au moins.

FOULON.

Salonique, le 23 novembre, 1912.

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[129] No. 6.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 1*, 1913.

AUSTRIAN Ambassador gave Minister for Foreign Affairs message from Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs, expressing the hope that Russian Government would not attribute Austrian armaments to any hostile intention against Russia any more than he regarded military preparations taken by Russia as directed against Austria. Latter could not demobilise, as she had never mobilised. All that she had done was to raise the strength of her companies from 60 to 130, so as to bring up the peace effective to the same standard as that of Russia. This measure she intended to maintain permanently, as it was necessary for her to have a peace effective more or less equal to that of her neighbours. Though she had concentrated troops near the Servian frontier, she had not moved any towards Russian frontier. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs added, were Imperial ukase issued, he would explain to military authorities that it was not directed against Austria.

Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told Austrian Ambassador that he did not see how Austria could maintain her army on its present footing.

His Excellency told me that Imperial ukase will be issued and reservists maintained

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with the colours so long as Austrian concentration continues near the Servian frontier. He also said that he gathered from conversation with Austrian Ambassador that there would be no great difficulty about the eastern frontier of Albania, and that question of Scutari was the only really serious one.

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[136] No. 7.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 1, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 251 of 27th December: Roumania.

Prime Minister, whom I have just seen, informed me that he is much exercised about attitude of Roumanian Government.

Roumanian Minister called yesterday and told him confidentially that his Government would be willing to join the allies against Turkey under certain conditions. Roumanian Minister added that these conditions were known to M. Danef, and were being discussed in London between him and the Roumanian Minister.

Prime Minister was careful not to ask for any details as he is anxious to avoid, if possible, entering into really serious conversations with Roumanian Minister in order to gain time.

I gather that he has telegraphed to M. Danef to proceed very diplomatically with Roumanian Minister, who is far the abler man, and that he has also instructed him to point out to you and to any of the Ambassadors in London whom he believes to be favourably disposed the impossibility of Bulgaria making any important territorial concessions to Roumania.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

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[130] No. 8.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 1, 1913.*

BOTH the King and the Prime Minister seem somewhat hopeful respecting peace negotiations with Turkey.

They believe that Adrianople cannot hold out for more than three weeks.

The Prime Minister stated to me that the Bulgarian Government would not hastily break off negotiations.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

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[131] No. 9.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 1, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 250 of 27th December.

M. Kalchef has returned from Constantinople. General Savof passed him through the lines because his son married the general's daughter. M. Kalchef is a well-known moneylender and rich. Prime Minister tells me that he saw Minister for Foreign Affairs entirely on his own account, and that his visit to Constantinople has not affected the situation in any way.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

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[132] No. 10.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 1, 1913.*

ITALIAN Ambassador learns from the Italian agent at Sophia that the King of the Bulgarians has instructed M. Danef to break off peace negotiations, and has informed him that he will exact his terms from the Turks on the lines of Chatalja.

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[125] No. 11.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 1, 1913.*

AT his weekly reception yesterday I remarked to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I had noticed a very warlike atmosphere here lately. His Excellency disclaimed for the Government any warlike feeling, but intimated that it was necessary that Bulgaria should realise that the negotiations must not be longer delayed. His Excellency expressed much annoyance at the delay which had already occurred, though he said that possibly it has been due to inadvertence on the part of Bulgaria. At the time of M. Danef's visit, Minister for Foreign Affairs had urged, and it had been understood, that the negotiations should be continued as soon as possible. Three weeks had passed [two groups undecypherable] Minister for Foreign Affairs had been able to elicit nothing satisfactory from the Bulgarian Minister here or from Sophia. He had, however, just learnt that full powers had been now sent to M. Danef to negotiate.

Minister for Foreign Affairs again said Roumania would not mobilise, but added, "unless Bulgaria provokes her."

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[126] No. 12.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 1, 1913.*

A BUCHAREST newspaper stated yesterday that the Minister of Finance had announced to a meeting of senators and deputies that Roumanian troops would very probably cross the Danube next week.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me this newspaper lied.

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[2] No. 13.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 1.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 1, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 744 of yesterday.

Allies having refused to treat on last basis proposed by Turks, namely, reference to Europe except as regards Adrianople, the Porte this evening sent instructions to delegates authorising them to treat on a basis of cession of territory west of vilayet of Adrianople, autonomy for Albania, and a régime for archipelago to be settled with Powers.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[55883] No. 14.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1913.

SALONICA telegram of 31st December.

Enquire of Servian Government on whose authority the duties are being levied, and how it is sought to justify such action.

(Repeated to Salonica, and Constantinople, No. 2; also to Berlin, No. 2; Paris, No. 2; Rome, No. 2; Vienna, No. 2; and St. Petersburgh, No. 3, with the following addition: "Inform Government to which you are accredited.")

[55733] No. 15.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 496 of 30th December.

I have already given support about Scutari by what I said to German and Italian Ambassadors before Christmas, and I propose to hold the same language to them again and also to support generally the Russian line about eastern frontier of Albania.

It is of course understood that I cannot promise more than diplomatic support, as it would be considered here that these questions are not, if taken by themselves, sufficient cause for a European war.

We should of course have no objection to the settlement which Minister for Foreign Affairs now suggests and shall be very glad if it can be adopted at meeting of Ambassadors, but before deciding to make any definite proposal at the meetings I think it would be well to ascertain what instructions the German and Italian Ambassadors have and what the ideas of their Governments are as to a compromise. This I will do as soon as German Ambassador returns.

On other points raised by memorandum communicated confidentially by Russian Ambassador I think Servia must be represented as one Power interested in the control of the international railway to the neutral port, and Austria would, if at war with Servia, be able to seize at sea all munitions of war destined for Servia and thus prevent them from reaching the neutral port at all. It should be for Austria to say why this would not give her sufficient security.

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[37] No. 16.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1913.

M. DE ETTER said on the 27th December that he understood that there had been some misapprehension as to the language recently held by Russia at Constantinople. She had not said that if hostilities were resumed she would be unable to "continue to maintain her hitherto peaceful attitude," or that "she would abandon her neutrality." What she had said was that if hostilities were resumed and if in consequence disturbances were to occur on the Russo-Turkish frontier in Asia, she was not in a position to declare "dès à présent" that she would be able to guarantee her neutrality.

The French chargé d'affaires gave Sir A. Nicolson to understand that the step taken by Russia at Constantinople had surprised M. Poincaré, who had heard only of the more drastic and not of the modified warning, and he thought that Russia should have previously consulted with Paris.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[33] No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1913.

THE Italian Ambassador called on the 27th December, 1912. As to Scutari he said that Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs trusted that the discussion on that question would be postponed till a later date, when the atmosphere was clearer, and when an agreement had been practically reached on other questions. It would then be easier to obtain a settlement of the Scutari problem. Marquis Imperiali added that Italy was in a delicate position, as she was, on the one hand, bound by her agreements of 1897 and 1900 with Austria-Hungary; and, moreover, it could not be denied that Scutari was Albanian, or, as he put it, was "l'âme de l'Albanie"; and on the other hand there was the supreme necessity of maintaining agreement among the Powers, and, if possible, also of avoiding any danger to the dynasty in Montenegro.

Marquis Imperiali was a little troubled as to the islands. Russia might maintain (though this view is not shared by the French chargé d'affaires) her desire that the four islands near the Straits should remain Turkish, and the German might require that Mitylene and Scio, commanding the entrance to the Gulf of Smyrna should also be under Turkish sovereignty.

Marquis Imperiali mentioned that he thought of proposing at the next Ambassadorial meeting that at the termination of each sitting the Ambassadors should agree on an identic telegram to be dispatched to their respective Governments, summarising what had passed at the sitting. This was the course adopted at Ambassadorial sittings at Constantinople, and would not be of so formal a character as a *procès-verbal*, while having the advantages of that species of record.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[39] No. 18.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1913.

THE French chargé d'affaires told Sir A. Nicolson on the 27th December that M. Bompard had telegraphed that the impression which had been produced on the Turkish Cabinet by the various warnings and advice of the Ambassadors as to peace negotiations had already been effaced, and that the advocates of further resistance were gaining the upper hand.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[38] No. 19.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 1, 1913.

M. DANEF came to see Sir A. Nicolson on the 27th December. He said that he had had some conversations with Nizami Pasha, and he thought that he had convinced the latter that Adrianople would be of no strategical importance to Turkey. Nizami Pasha had alluded to the sentimental and religious interests which the Turks had in regard to Adrianople, and M. Danef had given him to understand that if there were certain mosques possessing a special interest to Turkey, they might be exterritorialised and placed under the religious care of the Turks. As to the exact frontier line, the allies had made a large demand, but were ready to negotiate on it, and evidently they are willing that the Enos–Midia line should be accorded, thus leaving the shores of the Marmora to Turkey. M. Danef was evidently hopeful that a settlement would be reached eventually, though it might be necessary at a later stage for the Powers to put pressure at Constantinople, and not on the Turkish delegates here.

As to the allies, M. Danef appeared to anticipate some little difficulties as regards Salonica, which Bulgaria was determined should not become Greek, and perhaps also

[ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE]

in regard to some localities in Macedonia and Albania. They would probably be solved after some hard bargaining. He intimated that both Servia and Greece would obtain more in any case than they could have expected. Greece, he said, was not making headway in Epirus, and was on the defensive. He intended to have a good talk with M. Venizelos. He did not mention Roumania, but talked of the great future of Bulgaria, &c. He mentioned that when in St. Petersburgh in May he had endeavoured to persuade Russia to join with Bulgaria, as he wanted to have "une vraie bonne guerre," but the Emperor had declined to be enticed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[523] No. 20.

Memorandum.

COUNT BENCKENDORFF called at the Foreign Office on the 1st January and read to Lord Onslow the Austrian *aide-mémoire* in regard to the proposals at the conference of Ambassadors, of which the following is a translation, together with the observations of the Russian Government:—

Commercial Access for Servia.

(*a.*) The special neutralisation of the port seems useless; since the whole of Albania being neutralised, such special neutralisation would only make the value of neutralisation accorded to the whole country appear doubtful.

Russian Observations.

The Imperial Government would be ready to adopt this point of view if the exact kind of neutralisation proposed were established. There are two kinds; one which involves the destruction of all fortresses, &c., and the other which permits their retention. If the Powers decide upon the second alternative, the port would have to be placed under special regulations.

(*b.*) *International Railway.*—In what exact terms does the Imperial Russian Government understand this phrase? Count Berchtold supposes that it is only meant that the construction and exploitation of this railway should be in the hands of the six Powers; and that by a stipulation of the Great Powers it should be guaranteed that the use of the railway conceded by the Albanian Government and constructed by an international company, as well as the port, should be open to all States for all time on equal conditions. If this definition of an international railway should correspond with the views of the Russian Government, the Viennese Cabinet on their side would raise no objection to the phrase "reserved to Servia" contained in the Russian proposal made at the first meeting of the Ambassadors.

Russian Observations.

Count Berchtold understands the words "international railway" in the sense that the Great Powers guarantee the free use of the railway and the port to all countries on equal conditions and for all time. The concession for the railway will be given to an international company. This is the meaning which the Imperial Government attributes to the formula adopted by the Conference of London, but they consider that the phrase "international railway" should be defined in the sense that the concessionaires of the railway must be a company which is really international, and in which capital from all the Great Powers and from Servia is allowed participation. The necessity of Servian participation has already been admitted by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

(*c.*) Count Berchtold agrees that the railway in question as well as the port should be placed under the control of the Great Powers (Signatory Powers), and that the railway should enjoy international defence and protection. This last duty, in the view of the Austro-Hungarian Government, should be entrusted to an Albanian police. This police should be under European control, and could also be employed to protect the preliminary work of tracing the line and of construction.

Russian Observations.

Count Berchtold agrees that the railway in question and the port should be placed under the control of the Signatory Great Powers and also, as the Russian Government understand, of Servia. He agrees at the same time to international defence and protection. This protection should be entrusted for preference to an Albanian police under European control, which can also be employed in protecting the preliminary work of tracing the line and its construction. The Imperial Government accepts with satisfaction this new assurance of the consent of the Austro-Hungarian Cabinet to an international control of the enterprise, and considers that the best way of giving effect to it would be the creation of a permanent force formed according to the spirit of Article 8* of the Suez Convention of 1888. It must of course, be understood that this artitle is not intended to be applied absolutely literally.

The Imperial Government also has no objection in principle to an Albanian police, but it doubts the possibility of creating this organisation sufficiently quickly. The Imperial Government thinks that the question of the police might be solved in the following manner, viz., by the replacement of the Servian troops now in occupation by detachments from each Power distributed along the line under the command of a general from a small neutral State. These detachments might at the same time be charged with the organisation of the Albanian police, which would replace the European troops by degrees.

(*d.*) The choice of the track of the line should be left to the company, which would have to come to an agreement on this subject with Servia.

Russian Observations.

In the opinion of Count Berchtold the choice of the track should be left to the company, which should come to an agreement on the subject with Servia. The Imperial Government accept this proposition on condition that a favourable decision is arrived at in regard to the point raised under (*b.*) and (*c.*).

A supplementary clause specifying this condition should be drafted by the conference.

(*e.*) Since Servia will have a share in the company she will also naturally enjoy control over the enterprise devolving from this circumstance. It is in this sense that the Austro-Hungarian Government wish that the phrase contained in the Russian proposal at the third meeting, "the right of Servia to participate in the international control of the line and the port," should be construed.

Russian Observations.

The point of view as regards Servian co-operation has been explained above under (*b.*) and (*c.*).

(*f.*) As regards liberty of transit over the railway, it must be laid down that this liberty must not be a special prerogative of Servia, but that all Powers should enjoy it under equal conditions.

The Imperial Government fully recognises the liberty of transit for all nations, but consider that this right only exists on that part of the line included in Albanian territory.

(*g.*) The stipulations in question being made to assure Servia's liberty of commercial relations, Count Berchtold considers that it cannot be understood as implying liberty of transit for warlike material except during time of peace.

Russian Observations.

This last proposition limits the transit of warlike material to times of peace. This limitation in the opinion of the Imperial Government does not correspond with the

* Attached for convenience of reference.

formula accepted by the Government. The Imperial Government can only consider it as contrary to the end proposed (but *projeté*).

It is evident that in case of war with Servia the Austro-Hungarian fleet would be able to exercise belligerent rights against contraband of war.

Foreign Office, January 1, 1913.

Article 8 of the Suez Canal Convention.

Les agents en Égypte des Puissances signataires du présent traité seront chargés de veiller à son exécution. En toute circonstance qui menacerait la sécurité ou le libre passage du Canal, ils se réuniront sur la convocation de trois d'entre eux et sous la présidence du doyen, pour procéder aux constatations nécessaires. Ils feront connaître au Gouvernement Khédival le danger qu'ils auraient reconnu afin que celui-ci prenne les mesures propres à assurer la protection et le libre usage du Canal. En tout état de cause, ils se réuniront une fois par an pour constater la bonne exécution du traité.

Ces dernières réunions auront lieu sous la présidence d'un commissaire spécial nommé à cet effet par le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman. Un commissaire Khédivial pourra également prendre part à la réunion et la présider en cas d'absence du commissaire ottoman.

Ils réclameront notamment la suppression de tout ouvrage ou la dispersion de tout rassemblement qui, sur l'une ou l'autre rive du Canal, pourrait avoir pour but ou pour effet de porter atteinte à la liberté et à l'entière sécurité de la navigation.

[55902] No. 21.

Conference of St. James.

PROTOCOLE No. 8.

Séance du 19 décembre 1912 (1er janvier 1913).

Étaient présents :

Pour la Bulgarie :

MM. Danev, Madjarov et le Général Paprikov ;

Pour la Grèce :

MM. Vénizélos, Skouloudis, Gennadius et Streit ;

Pour le Monténégro :

MM. Miouchekovitch, le Comte de Voïnovitch et Popovitch ;

Pour la Serbie :

MM. Novakovitch, Nicolitch et Vesnitch ;

Pour la Turquie :

Réchid Pacha, Osman Nizamy Pacha et le Général Salih Pacha.

La séance est ouverte à 3 heures ½, sous la présidence de M. Vénizélos.

Le protocole de la séance précédente, lu par le secrétaire, M. Tchaprachikov, est adopté.

Le Président donne la parole à Réchid Pacha.

Réchid Pacha donne lecture du document suivant contenant la nouvelle contre-proposition ottomane :—

"Parmi les propositions que MM. les délégués des États alliés nous ont faites, il y en a certaines qui ne peuvent et ne pourraient être réglées que par l'assentiment et l'adhésion des Grandes Puissances.

"Comme l'Europe entière attend avec impatience la fin de cette guerre et que le temps ne doit pas être consacré à de longues discussions, nous sommes autorisés à déclarer que la Sublime Porte est prête à s'en remettre pour ces questions à la décision des Grandes Puissances.

"Les délégués alliés nous ayant demandé, sur une déclaration faite en ce sens lors de la séance précédente, de la formuler par écrit, en précisant les points, nous résumons les propositions comme suit :—

"1°. Tous les territoires occupés à l'ouest du vilayet d'Andrinople seront cédés, mais la détermination des limites et du statut politique d'une Albanie autonome devra être soumise à la décision des Grandes Puissances.

"2°. Le vilayet d'Andrinople restera comme auparavant en possession directe de l'Empire ottoman, avec faculté pour la Turquie et la Bulgarie de s'entendre directement sur les rectifications des frontières qui pourraient être reconnues nécessaires entre elles.

"3°. La Turquie ne peut céder aucune des îles de la mer Egée, mais elle envisagera au besoin les questions y relatives avec les Grandes Puissances.

"4°. La Turquie est disposée à consentir à toute résolution que les Puissances Protectrices prendraient à l'égard de l'île de Crète d'un commun accord.

"5°. Les quatre points qui précèdent sont connexes et forment un ensemble indivisible."

Le Président suspend la séance pour permettre aux délégués des alliés de prendre copie de ce document et de délibérer sur la réponse qu'il convient d'y faire.

La séance, suspendue à 3 heures ½, est reprise à 5 heures 20.

Le Président donne lecture de la réponse des alliés, qui est ainsi conçue :—

"1°. Les alliés prennent acte de la cession des territoires situés à l'ouest du vilayet d'Andrinople sous l'expresse réserve que cette cession comprenne aussi bien les territoires occupés que ceux qui ne le sont pas encore complètement.

"Quant aux limites et au statut politique de l'Albanie, les alliés s'en tiennent à leur proposition antérieure.

"2°. La réponse ottomane au sujet du vilayet d'Andrinople est inacceptable :

"quant à la forme, puisqu'elle vise à des accords séparés ;

"quant au fond, puisqu'elle n'accorde pas la cession territoriale demandée.

"3°. Sont également inacceptables les propositions ottomanes concernant les îles de l'Égée et l'île de Crète. Les alliés maintiennent leurs demandes antérieures au sujet de la cession des îles de l'Égée et du désistement de la Turquie de tous ses droits sur la Crète."

Le Président propose d'ajourner la discussion de ce document à une séance ultérieure afin de laisser aux délégués ottomans le temps d'en examiner le contenu.

Réchid Pacha demande copie de la réponse des alliés et se déclare prêt à formuler dès à présent quelques observations.

Il indique au sujet de l'objection de forme faite par les délégués alliés au deuxième point de leur réponse que le gouvernement ottoman, en proposant une entente directe avec la Bulgarie, relative à la rectification de frontière dans le vilayet d'Andrinople, a cédé au désir de faciliter les négociations. Il a cru d'ailleurs se conformer à la tendance qui s'est manifestée dans la conférence, où les États alliés n'ont pas toujours formé un tout indivisible, car leurs premiers délégués président à tour de rôle et parlent souvent chacun au nom du pays qu'il représente.

Le Président déclare que les faits indiqués par Réchid Pacha ne portent nullement atteinte à la solidarité des alliés dans la poursuite des négociations. S'il est loisible à chacun d'eux, hors de la conférence, de s'entretenir des intérêts qui lui sont propres avec le gouvernement ottoman, il n'est pas possible d'admettre officiellement, à la conférence, que la Turquie traite séparément avec chacun des États alliés.

Osman Nizamy Pacha insiste sur le désir qui a inspiré son gouvernement d'aboutir le plus rapidement possible à une entente durable et dit que ce n'est qu'afin de faciliter les négociations qu'on a parlé de traiter directement avec la Bulgarie.

M. Danev fait observer que la manière dont les délégués ottomans envisagent cette question ne repose pas sur des faits avérés. Les États alliés ayant fait la guerre ensemble ont la ferme intention de faire aussi la paix ensemble. On ne peut pas leur objecter l'alternance de la présidence car, si les délégués ottomans ont accepté cette règle posée dès le début des travaux de la conférence, ce n'est pas parce qu'ils ont méconnu la solidarité des alliés, mais bien parce qu'ils ont voulu faire une concession de courtoisie. Si tous les délégués parlent, c'est suivant la règle générale pour tous les congrès que tous leurs membres ont le droit de prendre la parole. Les propositions des alliés faites en leur nom collectif concernent chacun d'eux et les délégués bulgares ne se désintéressent d'aucune d'elles car ils ont voulu dès le début démontrer la solidarité des alliés en insistant sur la participation à la conférence des délégués hellènes.

Exprimant la même pensée que le président, *M. Danev* ajoute que, si hors de la conférence les alliés peuvent, pour faciliter les négociations, procéder à des ententes privées, ils ne peuvent être considérés dans la conférence que comme un tout indivisible.

Réchid Pacha déclare que, en présence des explications qui viennent d'être données, les délégués ottomans sont prêts à discuter de suite la question avec tous les alliés et que s'ils ont employé le terme *Bulgarie*, c'est dans le but de faciliter les négociations, étant donné que cette rectification de frontière, à son avis, intéresse la Bulgarie seule.

Le Président estime que, en vue de ces éclaircissements, la question de forme, soulevée par les plénipotentiaires des alliés dans leur réponse, est résolue et l'incident clos.

Passant à l'examen du fond du premier point de cette réponse, *Réchid Pacha* donne suite à la demande d'éclaircissements au sujet des territoires non encore occupés et déclare que, pour faire preuve de l'esprit de conciliation qui anime la Sublime Porte, il consent à ce que dans le paragraphe premier de la contre-proposition ottomane le terme *occupés* soit remplacé par le terme *situés*.

Le Président prend acte de cette déclaration et constate que, sur ce premier point, l'entente est faite entre les alliés et la Turquie.

Osman Nizamy Pacha attire l'attention de la conférence sur la deuxième partie du premier point de la réponse des alliés concernant l'Albanie et demande quelle en est la signification.

Le Président explique que les délégués ottomans ont proposé de soumettre la détermination des limites et du statut politique de l'Albanie à la décision des Grandes Puissances. C'est pour la Turquie un point de vue compréhensible. Elle n'est pas directement intéressée à la question, puisqu'elle n'aura pas de frontière commune avec l'Albanie. Mais le point de vue des alliés est tout autre, car la fixation des limites de l'Albanie les touche directement. C'est pourquoi ils maintiennent leur proposition première, qui d'ailleurs n'exclut pas l'intervention des Grandes Puissances.

M. Mirtchéfsritch appuie cette explication et ajoute que la Turquie, par le fait qu'elle remet entre les mains des Grandes Puissances la question de l'Albanie, se désiste de ses droits sur ce pays, tandis que les alliés au contraire se réservent le droit de la discuter avec les Grandes Puissances.

Réchid Pacha observe qu'il n'est pas exact de dire que la Turquie se désiste de ses droits sur l'Albanie, puisque l'Albanie sera organisée en province autonome sous la souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan.

M. Danev fait observer que ce point de vue n'apparaît pas dans la contre-proposition ottomane, qui au contraire semble remettre la question sans aucune réserve entre les mains des Puissances. Il faut donc se mettre d'accord sur une formule qui explique plus clairement la manière de voir des délégués ottomans.

Osman Nizamy Pacha trouve que la rédaction de la contre-proposition des alliés laisse également à désirer sur ce point, car elle semble rejeter totalement l'intervention des Grandes Puissances.

M. Danev répond que l'attitude des alliés n'est pas en contradiction avec celle de la délégation ottomane vis-à-vis des Grandes Puissances. Il ne s'agit donc que de se mettre d'accord sur une formule.

Le Président constate qu'à la suite de ces explications il sera possible de tomber d'accord sur une formule donnant satisfaction à tous les intéressés.

La conférence passe ensuite à l'examen du deuxième point de la réponse des alliés concernant le vilayet d'Andrinople.

Réchid Pacha fait remarquer qu'il n'est pas exact de dire que la Turquie n'accorde pas de cessions territoriales dans le vilayet d'Andrinople, puisqu'elle offre de s'entendre, soit avec la Bulgarie, soit avec tous les alliés, sur une rectification de frontière.

Osman Nizamy Pacha observe que le malentendu sur la question de forme ayant été dissipé, il reste la question de fond, sur laquelle il appartient à la Bulgarie de donner une réponse.

M. Dance réplique que, la contre-proposition ottomane étant catégorique, la réponse de la Bulgarie l'est aussi. En effet, il est question dans cette contre-proposition d'une rectification de frontières, mais pour la Turquie ce n'est qu'une faculté et à cause de ce mot la concession ottomane est comme si elle n'existait pas. Quant à la première phrase du même paragraphe, il y est dit que "le vilayet d'Andrinople restera comme auparavant en possession directe de l'Empire ottoman." Pour la Bulgarie, cela est inadmissible.

Osman Nizamy Pacha explique que sur cette question, qui n'est pas d'intérêt international, la Turquie ne s'en remet pas aux Grandes Puissances. Elle tient à la régler avec les alliés et elle est prête à discuter toute proposition qui lui serait présentée par eux. Voilà ce qu'elle entend par le terme *faculté*. Il espère que les alliés n'y voient pas d'objection.

M. Danev déclare que les alliés y voient des objections, car la conférence ne s'est pas réunie pour se réserver la *faculté* de trancher des questions mais bien pour les trancher. Il ajoute que les alliés ont déjà formulé leur demande et n'ont pas d'autre proposition à faire. C'est au contraire aux délégués ottomans de faire une contre-proposition claire et précise.

Les délégués ottomans déclarent qu'à la prochaine séance ils feront à ce sujet des déclarations plus précises.

Abordant la question de Crète, *Osman Nizamy Pacha* fait ressortir que c'est par déférence envers les Grandes Puissances, qui s'occupent depuis si longtemps de cette île et se sont sommises à des sacrifices pour elle, que la Turquie ne peut traiter directement avec les alliés.

Le Président pense que la Turquie peut très bien accéder à la demande des alliés de se désister de tout droit sur la Crète, laissant aux alliés le soin de traiter cette question avec les Puissances.

Réchid Pacha observe que la Crète se trouvant en dépôt entre les mains des Puissances Protectrices, la Turquie ne peut sans leur consentement renoncer à ses droits sur cette île.

M. Dance remarque que tous les droits à l'exception des droits inaliénables sont des droits dont on peut se désister et ne voit pas d'inconvénient à ce que la Turquie se désiste de ceux qu'elle a sur la Crète.

A *Réchid Pacha*, qui prévoyait le cas où il ne conviendrait pas aux Puissances Protectrices que la Turquie se désistât des droits en question,

M. Danev répond que si ce cas se présente la question devra être réglée entre les alliés et ces Puissances.

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Réchid Pacha observe que les Puissances Protectrices ont pris l'engagement de maintenir la souveraineté de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan en Crète. Il serait donc plus courtois que la Turquie s'adressât aux Puissances.

M. Dance demande aux délégués ottomans s'ils se sont déjà adressés aux Puissances à cet effet.

Osman Nizamy Pacha répond que non, car il est nécessaire d'abord que les alliés se prononcent sur cette question.

M. Novakovitch observe que les Puissances s'étant engagées à maintenir la souveraineté de la Turquie en Crète, les alliés demandent à la Turquie de renoncer à cette souveraineté. Cela fait, il sera facile aux alliés de s'entendre avec les Puissances.

Réchid Pacha demande quel inconvénient voient les alliés à remettre cette question entre les mains des Puissances.

Le Président explique qu'au commencement de la guerre le gouvernement ottoman avait demandé la médiation des Puissances pour y mettre fin. Ensuite le gouvernement ottoman s'est adressé à Sa Majesté le Roi des Bulgares en vue de la conclusion d'un armistice pour traiter de la paix directement avec les alliés. Pourquoi alors faut-il que la conférence remette aux Puissances la question de la Crète et exclue par là du domaine de sa compétence une question dont la solution lui appartient? Il voit là une inversion de rôles.

Réchid Pacha observe que les Puissances étant dépositaires de la Crète, il ne serait pas bienséant de régler cette question sans les consulter.

Le Président remarque que les délégués ottomans demandent aux alliés de remettre la décision de la question à l'accord unanime des Puissances et rappelle que les alliés n'ont pas fait la guerre aux Puissances mais bien à la Turquie. Il demande donc que la Turquie renonce à ses droits sur la Crète et laisse aux alliés le soin de s'entendre avec les Puissances sur le sort de cette île.

Réchid Pacha dit que les délégués ottomans ne sont pas en mesure de faire la déclaration qu'on leur demande, n'ayant pas d'instructions à cet effet, mais que, si la conférence le juge utile, ils peuvent en référer à leur gouvernement.

La conférence, passe ensuite à la discussion de la partie du troisième paragraphe de la réponse des alliés qui concerne les îles de la mer Égée.

Réchid Pacha dit que les alliés sont déjà en possession de la réponse de la Turquie sur ce point, qui est un refus catégorique.

Le Président déclare que les alliés aussi maintiennent catégoriquement leur demande sur ce point.

Les délégués ottomans objectent que les îles, faisant partie intégrante de l'Asie Mineure, ne peuvent pas être cédées.

Le Président observe que l'argument basé sur la proximité des îles à la côte asiatique ne supporte pas l'examen. Les frontières mettent nécessairement en contact les États qu'elles séparent et si la frontière était placée entre les îles et la côte asiatique, ce contact serait, entre l'État possesseur des îles et la Turquie d'Asie, moins intime que ne le sont nécessairement les frontières terrestres, car la mer s'interposerait entre les deux.

Réchid Pacha observe que les frontières terrestres entre la Turquie et la Bulgarie existent déjà, tandis qu'il s'agit ici de créer une frontière nouvelle.

M. Dance demande quel est le sens de la proposition ottomane portant que la Turquie envisagera, au besoin, avec les Grandes Puissances les questions relatives aux îles.

Réchid Pacha répond qu'il y est fait allusion à une question de réformes d'ordre intérieur.

M. Nicolitch déclare que les contre-propositions ottomanes équivalent à un double refus—un refus vague pour ce qui regarde Andrinople, un refus clair pour ce qui regarde les îles.

Osman Nizamy Pacha répond que la déclaration ottomane n'est pas vague pour ce qui regarde le vilayet d'Andrinople.

S'il en est ainsi, observe *M. Dance*, n'implique-t-elle pas également un refus sur ce point?

Réchid Pacha répond que non, étant donné que les délégués ottomans, par le terme *rectifications des frontières*, entendent une cession territoriale.

M. Dance demande que dans ce cas la délégation ottomane présente une proposition concrète illustrée par la carte.

Réchid Pacha déclare devoir s'en référer à Constantinople.

Le Président résume les débats.

Il constate que l'accord est établi sur le premier point de la contre-proposition ottomane, dans laquelle le mot *situés* est substitué au mot *occupés*. Quant à l'Albanie, il reste à trouver une formule d'entente.

Sur le deuxième point, la question de forme étant tranchée par la substitution du mot *alliés* au mot *Bulgarie* et la suppression du mot *directement*, qui n'a plus sa raison d'être, il a été décidé que la délégation ottomane proposera, à la prochaine séance, une ligne de frontière précise dans le vilayet de l'Andrinople.

Sur le troisième point, les délégués ottomans demanderont à la Sublime Porte des instructions au sujet du désistement de la Turquie de ses droits sur l'île de Crète.

Sur le quatrième point, relatif aux îles de la mer Égée, bien que chaque partie conserve son point de vue un rapprochement ne paraît pas impossible.

La prochaine séance est fixée au vendredi, 21 décembre, 1912 (3 janvier, 1913), à 4 heures de l'après-midi.

La séance est levée à 6 heures ½.

Le Président:

E. K. VENISELOS.

Les Secrétaires:

H. NORMAN.
S. TCHAPRACHIKOV.
A. C. VOUROS.
S. Y. GROUITCH.
D. NORADOUNGHIAN.

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[142] No. 22.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2, 1913.)

(No. 218.)

Athens, December 28, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 214 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith the continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, from the 21st to the 27th December.

It is remarkable for nothing excepting the great detail in which the operations leading to the occupation of Korytsa are given, exceeding anything with which the public have hitherto been favoured. The official reports do not mention the death of Javid Pasha.

The Garibaldians have been disbanded and "General" Garibaldi has returned to Italy. An enquiry is being held into the failure of the operations directed by him and the conduct of the men under his command. The disbanded men (except the few foreigners), whether liable to military service or volunteers, have been called upon to present themselves at one of the recruiting offices in order to complete the term of their service.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 22.

Diary of the War, December 21–27, 1912.

December 21st.—1,700 prisoners are at this moment being embarked at Molyvo.

Dated at Petra (Mitylene), viâ Chios.

TSOUKALAS.

December 21st.—On the 19th, part of Major-General Damianos' force occupied Korytsa after a battle. The troops advanced by three routes: the 6th division followed the high road, the 5th the Vranitsa–Phasa road, and the 3rd the Baba–Kalyvia road. The Turks are flying in disorder southwards.

Dated from Saloniea.

DOUSMANI.

December 22nd.—Official announcement by the Ministry of Marine.

According to a telegram from the Governor of Tenedos, at 10 this morning the Turkish ironclad "Turgut Reis" and the cruiser "Medjidieh," with three destroyers, appeared at the entrance of the Dardanelles. The two ships remained under the protection of the forts, while the destroyers hurried towards the town of Tenedos, against which they fired twenty shots. On the appearance of the destroyers the Turks in the town hoisted Turkish flags, and some of them hastened in boats to receive them with cheers. The naval brigade, under the governor, drew up and fired on the Turkish destroyers and the rebels in the boats, three of whom were killed and twelve wounded. The Turkish destroyers, after the exchange of shots, left for the Dardanelles. The Governor of Tenedos, having put down by force all attempt at revolt on the part of the Turkish population, received orders from the Ministry to apply military law with all severity against all offenders.

The fleet at Lemnos, being advised by the two Greek destroyers guarding the straits, left immediately to pursue the raiders, the "Averoff" leading. Rear-Admiral Coundouriotis telegraphs that the Turkish fleet provides the best news for the Greeks, as by its movements, in which only the "Turgut Reis" (later information says the "Peik Shefket") and the "Medjidieh" took part, it is revealed that the "Barbarossa," "Messoudieh," and "Assar-i-Tewfik" were put out of action in the battle of the Dardanelles, and therefore took no part in the affair to-day.

December 22nd.—Official announcements by the Ministry of War.

The attack made two days ago on the left wing of the army of Epirus was repulsed with great success. Yesterday our troops victoriously repulsed an attack along the whole front. To-day the Turks attacked the centre, but were repulsed. Our brave soldiers were consequently successful during the three days. Strong reinforcements have been sent in order that our army may soon be in possession of Yannina.

Lieutenant Moutousis made a second most successful flight to-day. Leaving Nikopolis at 2, he flew to a height of 1,200 metres over Bizani and Gastritsa. The Turks fired at the aeroplane, the base of which was slightly scratched by a fragment of shell.

According to intelligence from our troops operating in the Korytsa district, the Turkish force which was defeated at the Tsongoni defile was broken and pursued towards the south of Korytsa for many kilometres on the road to Yannina. We captured three guns.

December 23rd.—Official announcement by the Ministry of War.

A detachment of the army occupying Korytsa expelled the enemy yesterday from the Kiari defile and repeatedly overcame the resistance of their infantry and artillery in front of and in the defile. The pursuit was followed up actively towards Liaskoviki.

December 24th (night).—Official announcement by the Ministry of War respecting operations in Epirus.

To-day the artillery duel was intermittent. The 2nd division was engaged in an advanced guard combat, but did not advance beyond its positions. The left wing, being reinforced by a part of the troops which have been sent, carried out a reconnaissance with complete success. One hundred and twenty Turkish dead were found on the positions examined.

December 25th.—Communication by the Press Bureau.

Javid Pasha, the commander of the retreating Turkish army, being emboldened by the presence at Viglitsa of our cavalry only, advanced from Korytsa, and, after occupying Viglitsa, entrenched himself at the entrance of the defiles near the village of Vambeli.

On the 18th December three Greek divisions attacked the enemy. The 6th, advancing from Florina and passing rapidly through the Pisaderi and Bresnitsa defiles, attacked the left wing of the Turks and compelled them to retreat on Kapetsista after a stubborn resistance of four hours. At the latter place the Turks found themselves confronted by the 5th division, which was coming from Kostenetse in the direction of Viglitsa. The rapid advance of these two divisions turned the retreat of the Turks into a flight.

The 3rd division supported our left by advancing from Kastoria and Novoselo to Koluskani. On the night of the 18th the three Greek divisions encamped at Viglitsa and Poloska. On the morning of the 19th General Damianos, who commanded the three divisions, ordered a general advance on Korytsa.

The 3rd division climbed the snow-covered heights of Norova and was ordered to advance on Disnitsa, the 5th on Pliaska, and the 6th to force the Pelioun and Tsagoni defiles by the high road. The enemy had entrenched themselves in these defiles with a force of two divisions, which were, however, without a proper proportion of artillery. The conflict was short but stubborn. The 6th division, with the 5th on its left, attacked the enemy's position with such vigour that Javid Pasha was compelled to retreat to the last defensive line before Korytsa, viz., Pliasa. There, however, our field artillery was awaiting him, as it could not be employed either at Pelioun or Rumbeli.

Two hours after the forcing of the Pelioun defiles, the 6th division found itself confronted by a strongly-entrenched Turkish army at Pliasa. Javid Pasha received the division with a severe fire from his machine-guns. The advanced guard of the division, however, developed in time, and our guns replied immediately. The battle was doubtful for two hours and was truly furious. Victory began to declare itself in our favour when the enemy's infantry were compelled to abandon their first lines and to occupy second lines further back.

This temporary cessation of the infantry fire was taken speedy advantage of by our troops. Disregarding the rapidity and accuracy of the enemy's artillery fire, the infantry and evzones rushed forward, while the guns of the division played upon the already-wavering enemy. In a short time the Turks were obliged to move their guns, but the advance of the 5th division on their flank obliged them definitely to retreat on Korytsa. Unfortunately for Javid, before he reached Korytsa the 3rd division was seen to be descending on Disnitsa, and the advanced guard came up in time to attack the flank of the retreating Turks, who thereupon left the high road and scattered towards the plain. If the resistance of the Turks at Pelioun and Pliasa had lasted longer, the whole of the 3rd division would have come down and would have cut off their retreat. We took three field guns, a quantity of stores, and 200 prisoners. On the morning of the 20th our forces entered Korytsa in triumph, and, by order of General Damianos, Javid Pasha was at once pursued by our troops, who had already crossed the defiles of Kiari towards Kolonia. We had 200 men put out of action; the enemy's loss was much greater.

ALLY WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE

[143] No. 23.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2, 1913.)

(No. 210.)

Athens, December 28, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my despatch No. 210 of the 17th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a report from the British military attaché with the Greek field forces in Epirus.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 23.

Major Cunliffe-Owen to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 9.)

Philippiada, Epirus, December 23, 1912.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to report that I arrived at Philippiada, the head-quarters of the army of Epirus, and 62 kilom. distant from Yanina, on the 18th instant, being followed at intervals by the other military attachés.

The commander-in-chief, General Sapountzaki, proceeds to the front daily in an automobile, but the attachés have only been permitted to move further forward on one occasion, and were then stopped at Cserie Bey (not marked on the map), which is about 28 kilom. from Yanina, and 16 from Bezani. Consequently nothing has yet been seen of the actual fighting, and it is very doubtful whether any better facilities will be accorded later, unless events proceed more favourably for the Greek forces than has been the case during the week just past.

Apart from the question of witnessing operations, the treatment of the attachés generally in regard to their welfare and accommodation is not such as one might expect as a properly accredited military representative of a foreign country with full permission from Athens to proceed to the present theatre of war. Nevertheless and notwithstanding these difficulties, I propose remaining here near the zone of actual fighting, rather than to return to Athens.

2. In respect to the actual operations, there appears to be little likelihood of the capture of Yanina by the Greeks for some, possibly considerable, time. According to all accounts, the advance was made in somewhat optimistic expectation that the place would fall on the approach of the field army; the difficulties attendant upon the capture of a semi-permanently prepared position do not appear to have been realised. The army has only four (or by some accounts eight) pieces of heavy artillery, and the total forces at present available are little, if at all, superior to the Turkish garrison, which has been reinforced by the remains of the Monastir army. The place is not invested on the north or west, and the fighting around the Bezani positions all this last week has not been favourable for the Greeks. Their casualties have been exceedingly heavy, and every available vehicle returning from the front is employed to transport the wounded to this place or to Prevesa.

The Turkish artillery has made good practice, while that of the Greeks finds difficulty in occupying suitable positions.

The bulk of the original army of Epirus is operating against the Bezani heights to the east of the main road, the irregulars and volunteers moving round by the north-east.

Two battalions of Evzones, originally in occupation of the Grevena district, have arrived viâ Metzovo, and it is said that the 3rd and 5th divisions from Koritsa and Kozani respectively are on the march now as re-inforcements, as also the 4th division viâ Prevesa.

The advent of these troops must, however, take time, and meanwhile it seems possible that the Turks may undertake an offensive movement. Hence, all things considered, it may be that the Greeks will regret not having participated in the armistice, in so far as the question of Yanina may be concerned.

3. The Greeks have the advantage of a comparatively good line of communication from Prevesa, and have some fourteen motor lorries, as well as Red Cross cars, for the transport of the wounded, on the road. But, as has before been reported, the services in rear of the army are badly conducted. No properly organised convoys are formed, vehicles and animals proceeding independently in small parties or singly under no control. The march discipline of troops proceeding likewise to the front

is extremely lax, and stragglers with rifle and ammunition freely accompany the wounded to the rear. In fact, there is little supervision on the line of communication, and little control by officers. Any movement of the enemy on the road to Philippiada will cause grave disaster. On the other hand there is full connection by both telegraph and telephone.

4. In addition to the reinforcements as noted in paragraph 2, the casualties are being made good by drafts from Athens; thus to-day 650 men joined here, half of whom had previously performed their proper period of service and the remainder had received training for two months only.

I have, &c.
F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN.
Acting Military Attaché.

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[146] No. 24.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2, 1913.)

(No. 101.)

Bucharest, December 29, 1912.

Sir,

WITH reference to my two telegrams Nos. 43 and 44 of the 24th and 25th instant, I have the honour to report that there is still persistent and increasing talk in Bucharest of impending mobilisation. There was even a day or two ago a widespread report that Roumania was about to occupy Silistria, and an immediate occupation of Bulgarian territory was advocated in the Chamber yesterday by an Independent deputy with, I am told, general applause. In a separate despatch I report that the Government have now asked the Chamber for extraordinary credits for the army to the amount of 151,000,000 fr. Though these credits are, as I understand, only to pay for military supplies already ordered, their announcement at this moment is hardly calculated to exercise a quieting influence.

The rumours of mobilisation have from time to time been contradicted by Government. I enclose the most recent *démenti* published by the "Epoca,"* a Government organ. As you will see, it is not altogether of a reassuring character, and that talk of mobilisation should continue, notwithstanding official *démentis*, and that M. Take Ionesco, the most prominent member of the Government, should (see my telegram No. 45) allow an article to appear in his paper urging that Roumania, owing to the solution in principle by the Ambassadors in London of the Albanian question, and to the consequent mitigation of the menace of a European conflagration, can now act with greater freedom, would seem to show that war talk at this moment is not entirely unwelcome to Government. It may be that it is looked upon with favour as a means of bringing Bulgaria to terms while the result of the peace negotiations is still in doubt. However this may be, it is unfortunate that talk of mobilisation should have been revived at this moment, not only because it will make it difficult for Roumania to draw back and to avoid attempting to extort terms from Bulgaria should she fail to obtain them by negotiation, but also because it may well have an unfortunate effect on the peace negotiations in London, for the prospect of a conflict between Roumania and Bulgaria can hardly fail to stiffen Turkey.

I should mention that there are some persons here who attribute this sudden revival of talk of mobilisation to Austrian influence. It may, of course, be merely a coincidence, but it is perfectly true that the revival of this alarmist talk synchronised with the return of the Austro-Hungarian military attaché after a short visit to Vienna a few days ago.

Prince Charles Fürstenberg, Austrian Minister, has been on leave in Austria for Christmas.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

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* Not printed.

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[144] No. 25.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2, 1913.)

(No. 400.)
Sir, *Rome, December 29, 1912.*

WITH reference to previous correspondence I have the honour to report that the papers, especially those of Naples, are once more busy with rumours of preparations in progress for a force of 30,000 men to be held in readiness for despatch to Albania in case of necessity. I mentioned these rumours to the Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation this afternoon and his Excellency described them as quite fantastic and devoid of any foundation.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

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[138] No. 26.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2, 1913.)

(No. 543.)
Sir, *Paris, December 31, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I addressed a note to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in the sense of your despatch No. 587 of the 5th instant, on the subject of the payment of M. Zaïmis's indemnity.

I enclose herein copy of M. Poincaré's reply, which is to the effect that the French Government entirely share the views of His Majesty's Government, and that the French Minister at Athens will receive instructions at the proper time on the subject of a collective representation to the Greek Government.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 26.

M. Poincaré to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 27 décembre, 1912.*

VOTRE Excellence a bien voulu me faire part, le 7 de ce mois, des vues nouvelles du Gouvernement britannique en ce qui concerne le payement de l'indemnité de 140,000 fr. allouée à M. Zaïmis, ancien Haut Commissaire en Crète.

Il apparaît à Sir Edward Grey que les dispositions prises par les Puissances protectrices à l'effet d'opérer elles-mêmes ce versement, à titre d'avance, n'ont pas été communiquées à la Commission exécutive crétoise, au mois de juillet dernier, que la liberté des Puissances protectrices reste entière et qu'elles sont fondées, dès lors, à tenir compte de la transformation radicale qui s'est produite dans les affaires de Crète. La décision des quatre Puissances était dictée par le souci de se substituer au Gouvernement crétois, qui ne se trouvait pas en mesure de disposer des ressources nécessaires pour verser à l'ancien Haut Commissaire la juste indemnité qui lui était due en raison du préjudice matériel et moral qu'il avait subi par suite de l'interruption de son mandat. Tel n'est pas le cas depuis que le Gouvernement hellénique a déclaré l'union de l'île à la Grèce.

Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique propose, en conséquence, aux quatre Puissances, de ne pas procéder pour le moment au versement des 140,000 fr. alloués à M. Zaïmis et d'adresser, le moment venu, une communication collective au Gouvernement hellénique à l'effet de déclarer qu'il appartient à la Grèce de prendre à sa charge le payement de cette indemnité et d'en poursuivre, si elle le juge à propos, la restitution sur les revenus de l'île.

J'ai l'honneur de faire connaître à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de la république partage pleinement à ce sujet les vues du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique et que le Ministre de France à Athènes recevra, en temps voulu, les instructions nécessaires en vue de la démarche collective à effectuer à cet effet auprès du Gouvernement hellénique.

Agréez, &c.
R. POINCARÉ.

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[264] No. 27.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 2, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 1st January to Belgrade.

I asked Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether Austro-Hungarian subjects had had any trouble with regard to customs duties levied by Servian authorities in the occupied districts. He replied in the negative, but said that if any complaint reached him he would make a representation at Belgrade. In the case mentioned in your telegram he was of opinion that the duties were probably levied without authority from Belgrade by some officials for their own use.

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[265] No. 28.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, January 2, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that he has just received a telegram from Belgrade to the effect that Prochaska consular case may now be considered closed, as Servian Government have accepted conditions demanded by Austria. Consul will shortly return to his post, and when he reaches it Austrian flag will be saluted by military detachment.

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[249] No. 29.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 2, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 1st January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs says that Greeks are at fault in levying duties at Salonica on goods dispatched for Servia or territory in Servian occupation. I understand from him that instructions are to levy at Ghevgheli duties at the rate of former Turkish duties on goods destined for new Servian territories, whilst duties on goods for Servia proper will be levied at former Servian frontier or in Belgrade.

I said that it was incumbent on the Servian Government to arrange matters with Greek authorities so that irregularities of the kind should not occur. Minister for Foreign Affairs promised to make enquiries and to take steps to have matters rectified.

At his request I am addressing a note to Servian Government.

(Repeated to Salonica (for observations); Berlin, No. 3; Paris, No. 3; Rome, No. 3; Vienna, No. 3; St. Petersburgh, No. 4; and Constantinople, No. 4.)

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[262] No. 30.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 2.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 2, 1913.*

SALONICA telegram of 31st December and your telegram No. 2 of 1st January to Belgrade: Customs duties at Salonica.

German Government have received similar report and are considering advisability of making representations at Belgrade, and will inform me of decision.

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[263] No. 31.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.- (Received January 2.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, January 2, 1913.*

IN conversation with me yesterday, the Emperor said that he was rather concerned at attitude of Turks in peace negotiations. He had therefore instructed German Ambassador to suggest to you that England and Germany, as the Powers least directly interested, should exercise some gentle, but firm, lead at Constantinople in favour of a more accommodating tone and less dilatory methods.

His Majesty seemed to think that, as the peace conference is being held in London, it would be somewhat disagreeable for His Majesty's Government should it prove abortive.

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[533] No. 32.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 2, 1913.*

IN the course of the conversation with the Ambassadors to-day, I took an opportunity of telling them that M. Misu had come to see me, and that he had informed me positively that he and M. Take Jonesco, who was on the point of arriving, would discuss their affairs direct with Dr. Danef. M. Misu had shown no desire to discuss any of the questions with me. I had informed him that the general agreement with regard to the conversations of the Ambassadors was that, though at present they were occupied by questions which concerned directly the Great Powers, who were neutral and signatories of the Treaty of Berlin, some means would be taken of consulting Roumania if the Ambassadors entered upon the discussion of questions directly affecting her interests. M. Misu had said that this was what his Government and he had understood was the arrangement.

The Austro-Hungarian Ambassador said that it would create a very good effect if M. Misu were asked to be present at one of our meetings.

The French Ambassador observed that this was a matter of some delicacy, as the Bulgarian delegates might also expect to be invited to a meeting.

I said that, at present, M. Misu would be fully occupied with his discussions with Dr. Danef, and for the moment this would suffice.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[569] No. 33.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.†

(No. 2. Secret.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 2, 1913.*

THE Ambassadors met me this afternoon.

I expressed my keen regret, which I was sure was shared by them all, at the death of Herr von Kiderlen, and also the very sincere sympathy which we all felt.

The Ambassadors individually joined in this.

The German Ambassador thanked us, and said that he would tell his Government of the expression of our sympathy.

I then said that, with regard to the question of Albania, there were some points of minute detail and other points too important to be called points of detail that still

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 6), Sir E. Goschen (No. 5), Sir R. Rodd (No. 3), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 5).
† Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 7); Sir E. Goschen (No. 4); Sir R. Rodd (No. 4); and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 6).

remained unsettled. I had gathered that some of the Governments were still considering these points, and that we were not all fully instructed respecting them.

This being confirmed by one or two of the Ambassadors, it was unanimously agreed not to discuss the question of Albania to-day.

The Russian Ambassador said that he had a further declaration to make about the Ægean Islands. He made it in the following terms:—

"La Russie ne s'oppose pas à la réunion de toutes les îles de la Mer Egée à la Grèce, sous la réserve pour les quatre îles voisines des Dardanelles d'une neutralisation comportant les dispositions suivantes:

"1. Engagement de la part de la Grèce de raser les fortifications existantes, tant militaires que navales.

"2. Engagement de ne jamais ériger de nouvelles fortifications ou autre construction de défense.

"3. Engagement de ne pas utiliser les îles pour des opérations militaires ou dans des buts stratégiques, quelle que soit la Puissance avec laquelle la Grèce serait en guerre.

"4. Engagement de ne céder à aucune autre Puissance les droits de possession, d'exploitation, ou d'autres droits qu'obtiendra la Grèce par le fait de la réunion des îles avec le royaume."

The German Ambassador "fait observer que son Gouvernement n'a qu'un intérêt secondaire dans ces îles, et qu'il adhérera, pense-t-il, à toute décision des Puissances à leur sujet; mais dans le cas où toutes ces îles seraient attribuées à la Grèce il lui paraît qu'elles devraient être neutralisées dans les mêmes conditions que celles qui sont voisines des Dardanelles."

On this, the French Ambassador and I declared, on behalf of our Governments, "que nous ne nous opposons pas à l'annexion de toutes les îles à la Grèce sur des conditions à déterminer."

The Ambassadors of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy "se réservent de référer à leurs Gouvernements la déclaration russe actuelle."

The French Ambassador asked if the Island of Thasos should not be given to Bulgaria because of its proximity to the coast, which will became Bulgarian by the terms of peace.

The Russian Ambassador "ne fait pas d'objection à l'attribution de Thasos à la Bulgarie."

The French Ambassador said that he made an identic declaration.

I said that I thought the Greeks and Bulgarians must be left to arrange this point between them.

With regard to Crete, I said that we were disposed to propose that Crete should be given to Greece. I understood that, in the peace negotiations, the Turks had made some question of their inability to dispose of Crete, because it was *en dépôt* with the four Powers. It might therefore be opportune that we should declare our readiness to hand Crete to Greece.

The French and Russian Ambassadors said "que leurs Gouvernements étaient dans la même disposition."

The Italian Ambassador said "que son Gouvernement était dans la même disposition, mais qu'il s'attendrait à ce que la Grèce modère ses prétentions au sud de l'Albanie."

The German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors did not anticipate that their Governments would make any objection, but said that they must refer the matter to them.

We had some general discussion respecting the progress of the peace negotiations. We understood that, at yesterday's meeting of the delegates, the question of Adrianople was left acute, but nearly everything else except the islands was disposed of. It was possible that some compromise might be arranged between the Bulgarians and Turks about Adrianople, and an agreement reached to-morrow; or the Bulgarians or the Turks, or both, might appeal to us. In view of the possibility of this happening, it was felt that we ought to make no delay in referring to our Governments. Even if no appeal was made to us, and the question of Adrianople still remained acute, and the rupture of the peace negotiations was thereby threatened, we felt that the question whether the Great Powers should make representations in some quarter to avert a recommencement of the war should be considered by us the day after to-morrow (the 4th instant).

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We agreed, therefore, to meet in any case on Saturday next at 11 o'clock in the morning, to consider the information which we might then have respecting the meeting of the peace delegates to-morrow.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[250] No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 2, 1913.*

THE Russian Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 28th December. As his Excellency had the telegram with him, Sir A. Nicolson asked him to read again the telegram from M. de Giers at Vienna recording his conversation with Count Berchtold, and of which M. de Etter had read to Sir A. Nicolson a summary on the 27th December. Sir A. Nicolson found that his record of yesterday was on the whole accurate, though there were some addenda which M. de Etter had not given. Firstly, Count Berchtold had said that no one should doubt the pacific intentions of Austria-Hungary. The military measures had been taken two months ago, and no additional ones had been adopted. They were simply defensive and not aggressive. Secondly, Austria-Hungary might be able to disarm in ten or fifteen days. Count Berchtold hoped that during that period the serious questions now before the ambassadorial meetings and the negotiations with Servia would be concluded, and, if so, he would then disarm. Servia had been obstinate, and it had been necessary to take military preparations. Thirdly, Russia had 500,000 reservists under arms—far more than Austria-Hungary. Would Russia be prepared to send them home?

It may be noted that there was no mention as to the "guarantee" Austria-Hungary required, as mentioned in the French version of the interview.

Count Benckendorff then read to Sir A. Nicolson the reply of M. Sazonof to Count Berchtold. The substance was as follows:—

M. de Giers was to tell Count Berchtold that M. Sazonof was not convinced by Count Berchtold's arguments as to the necessity of maintaining the military preparations. M. Sazonof further did not understand how Servia's alleged "obstinacy" could be adduced as a reason, as Servia had been most subservient. M. Sazonof would like to know what were the negotiations with Servia to which Count Berchtold alluded. As to the necessity of maintaining military preparations during the discussion of the Ambassadors of serious questions, this was not an argument which Russia could in consonance with her dignity as a Great Power admit. M. Sazonof did not understand the allusion to the danger in Galicia, nor could he admit that Austro-Hungarian military preparations were solely defensive. The whole number of Russian reservists under arms in European and Asiatic Russia did not exceed 350,000 men. If Austria-Hungary would reduce her military preparations, Russia would send her reservists home. M. de Giers was to explain to Count Berchtold how desirable it was that the question of armaments should be promptly solved on account of the impression which was being produced on Russian public opinion and the effect it produced on good neighbourly relations.

In another telegram M. Sazonof desired Count Benckendorff to point out to me the reference of Count Berchtold to the necessity of maintaining military preparations during the ambassadorial conversations. M. Sazonof was also disquieted by what Count Berchtold had said as to Servian obstinacy. The Vienna Cabinet might be wishing to impose on Servia the grant of some special privileges, even if they were only economic. Russia maintained her point of view that no Great Power should endeavour to obtain special privileges, and M. Sazonof hoped that His Majesty's Government held the same opinion. Russia did not wish to exacerbate the present situation, and was ready to make every allowance for the *amour-propre* of Austria-Hungary. M. Sazonof would therefore be quite satisfied if the recall of the military measures were taken at Austria-Hungary's own initiative without any pressure.

M. Sazonof was of opinion that the limits of Albania should not be discussed at the ambassadorial meetings till the Powers were assured that Austria-Hungary was disarming. Perhaps Sir E. Grey might devise some reason for postponing that question—as, for instance, proposing that further local information is needed. By the time further information is obtained, the question of Austro-Hungarian armaments

may have been decided in a satisfactory way, or it may be in such a position as would require that the three Powers should consult together.

Sir A. Nicolson told Count Benckendorff he could report the above to me. So far as Sir A. Nicolson could see, Count Berchtold said that he would put away his revolver when all questions as to Albania, &c., had been solved, and M. Sazonof said that he did not want to discuss Albania till the revolver had been put away. Count Benckendorff said that was shortly the position.

Count Benckendorff also told Sir A. Nicolson confidentially that Russia, under certain conditions, would be ready to hand over the four islands near the Dardanelles to Greece. M. Venizelos had accepted three out of the four conditions at once, and had referred the fourth to his Government. Russia in return expected Greece to abandon her sovereignty over the latter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[254] No. 35.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 2, 1913.*

THE Greek Minister called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 31st December to express the hope that His Majesty's Government would support the claims of Greece to all the islands. If we did so, he said, we should find the Greeks most faithful, trustworthy, and useful friends. He was very eloquent on the great advantages which England would derive from having on her side a future maritime Power in the Levant. Sir A. Nicolson told him that the wishes of Greece were well known, and would without doubt be carefully considered when the question of the future lot of the islands came up for final decision.

M. Gennadius said that there was a difficult question between Greece and Bulgaria over Salonica, and that he was afraid that a direct arrangement between the two was improbable. It was therefore likely that Greece would have to appeal for the good offices of His Majesty's Government, and, if the latter would espouse the Greek cause, Greece would be ready to grant England any special advantages, commercial or other, which His Majesty's Government might like to specify.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Gennadius that Greece must try to settle matters with Bulgaria—and, in any case, it was of no use appealing to the good offices of one Power alone—but, should it be found absolutely impossible to solve the difficulty directly with Bulgaria, it would be to all the Powers that it should properly be referred.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[524] No. 36.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 2, 1913.*

M. VENIZELOS called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 2nd January. He spoke about the future of the islands, and said that he had arranged with Russia as to the four islands near the entrance to the Dardanelles, and expressed the hope that the other Powers would consent to their transfer to Greece under certain restrictions. He also hoped that Greece would receive the support of His Majesty's Government in obtaining the cession to her, under conditions, of all the islands, Sporades and others. Sir A. Nicolson said that he did not imagine we should oppose such a solution, which personally he thought would prove to be the only practical one, but that of course the opinions of all the Powers, who like the allies formed one bloc, would have to be sought. Sir A. Nicolson did not think that the question had as yet been discussed among the Great Powers, but it was one of the questions which was on their programme. M. Venizelos asked if Germany was likely to make any difficulty as to Mitylene and Scio, on the ground that they formed part of Asia Minor. Sir A. Nicolson said that he was not acquainted with the views of Germany. M. Venizelos said France and Russia were ready to fall in with Greek desires, but he was unaware of the views of the Triple Alliance Powers. Sir A. Nicolson said that he was in similar ignorance. M. Venizelos was on the whole satisfied with the

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sitting of the peace conference on the preceding day. He said he would send to Sir A. Nicolson a memorandum which he has drawn up as to Greece's claims in Albania, which he trusted would make it evident that in certain districts the Albanians were in reality Greeks, though they had forgotten the Greek language. Sir A. Nicolson said I would read the memorandum with much interest.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[376] No. 37.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 3, 1913.*

I SAW the Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday evening, and found him very hopeful as to the outlook. He told me that he had made strong representations at Constantinople, and had advised Turkey to make almost any concessions rather than allow a renewal of the war. From what he said, I gathered that he bases his hopes for a peaceful solution of the crisis on your bringing pressure to bear on both sides to show themselves conciliatory.

His Excellency told me that he had had an interview a few days ago with M. Misu, the Roumanian Minister in London, and that he had understood from him that Roumania attached the greatest importance to the incorporation of the Kutzo-Vlach country in Albania. Roumania would strongly object to these people being placed under Greek domination. His Excellency thought that Roumanian representative should be admitted to the Ambassadors' meeting to put forward his view with regard to this point.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he did not apprehend any real trouble over the Scutari question. He was still of opinion that it was advisable to create as large an Albania as possible.

With regard to the islands, his Excellency said that he recognised the objection raised against creation of an autonomy for them, which would be but a temporary step to their final annexation by Greece, but he was still of the opinion that to give all the islands to Greece straight away was objectionable. He thought that those close to the Asiatic shore would become centres of agitation amongst Greek population in Asia Minor, which might give rise to much trouble. With the possession of the islands, Greece would soon become an important naval Power in the Mediterranean, and to give her full possession of the islands, especially those at the entrance to the Dardanelles, would be dangerous.

Relations with Russia, he told me, were normal, and, in his opinion, these relations would be in no way disturbed if Russia should see fit on 14th January to retain with the colours the men who ought to be discharged on that date.

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[383] No. 38.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, January 3, 1913.*

THE King asked me to forward to you an urgent appeal for support in asserting the Montenegrin claim to Scutari and Drin River as frontier. He says that his people can never voluntarily consent to renounce it, and could not do otherwise than oppose Austrian veto by all means in their power.

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[384] No. 39.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, January 3, 1913.*

SIR F. CARTWRIGHT'S telegram No. 201 of 21st December and Sir G. Buchanan's telegram No. 493 of 24th December.

Mismanagement of the war has undoubtedly produced much discontent. I believe the King to be much frightened at prospect of situation which will be created when

Servian frontier will be in contact with that of Montenegro. There will inevitably be a strong movement for union with some Prince supported by numerous malcontents from this country, and the position of the dynasty, already compromised, will be menaced by it (please see my despatches Nos. 45 and 46).

Acquisition of Scutari would of course help to restore the King's lost prestige, but may lead to serious difficulties. There is practically no Slav or Orthodox element in the place. Moslems would be presumably hostile, while I know nothing to show that the Catholics would welcome Montenegrins more.

During the last few days the King has been making desperate efforts to find support. Rectification of the frontier above Cattaro desired by Austria cannot be accepted without provoking patriotic sentiment and risking a catastrophe. Advances to Italy have been more successful; they may have been accompanied by promise of eventual concessions at Scutari similar to those given Italy at Antivari. Appeal similar to that conveyed to you in my immediately preceding telegram of to-day has been addressed to the Czar.

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[380] No. 40.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 3, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Uskub to-day:—

"I hear that Servian custom-house at Ghergheli, between here and Salonica, is applying Servian customs duties, and is refusing to admit goods, such as petroleum, which are a Government monopoly in Servia.

"I am making enquiries of the local authorities, and, if either report prove correct, am I authorised to protest against violation of international law? There is a petroleum famine here."

(R.) I have informed vice-consul that matter has already been brought to the notice of the Servian Government by myself, but that he is authorised also to bring the matter to the attention of the local authorities.

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[368] No. 41.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Athens, January 3, 1913.*

GARRISON of Chios surrendered after engagement.

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[382] No. 42.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 3, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Minister tells me that he was informed at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to-day that Servian troops would be shortly leaving Durazzo. He appeared much pleased, and said that he thought that as soon as Servian evacuation commenced demobilisation would begin in Austria.

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[757] No. 43.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 3, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador has communicated to me substance of Austrian Ambassador's communications to Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs respecting Austrian military measures. As Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs will accept Russian retention of reserves and explain it as natural under the circumstances, I do

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not anticipate any unfavourable developments in near future. Servian officers at Durazzo talk childishly of refusing to withdraw, but no doubt they will withdraw from Adriatic littoral after peace with Turkey is concluded, in accordance with declaration of Servian Government that Servia will accept decision of Powers. Austria will then slacken her preparations on Servian frontier.

Meanwhile it would be very undesirable to bring on Albanian question at meeting of Ambassadors before we see our way to a settlement. The important point seems to be to find some means of satisfying Montenegro. I understand that Austria and Italy are discussing Albanian question, and that German Ambassador has instructions to support them when they have come to an agreement. I propose to tell Italian Ambassador that some means must be found of satisfying Montenegro respecting Scutari, and that Italy and Austria must find it before we resume discussion, though I cannot postpone discussion indefinitely.

An agreement once reached on this point, we can safely proceed to discuss eastern frontier of Albania, for we practically know for certain that Austria will give way about Prisrend and Ipek, and probably on some other points.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 4.)

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[639] No. 44.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 2, 1913.*

M. CAMBON told me to-day that the Austrian Ambassador in St. Petersburgh had explained that the number of men in an army company in Austria had hitherto been far less than in the Russian and German armies, and that to maintain a corresponding military strength the number had now been raised to 130, and must be kept so as regards troops near the Russian frontier. On the Servian frontier, the strength had been raised to 200, but that would be diminished after Servia evacuated the Adriatic littoral, and the frontiers of Albania were settled. As, however, Count Berchtold realised the difficulty of making public opinion understand the real meaning of the Austrian increase, he would, if Russia retained her reservists with the colours, accept this as inevitable, and if need be explain it. This had made M. Sazonof desire to hurry on the discussion of the Albanian question at the meetings of Ambassadors. M. Cambon considered it quite unnecessary to take this alarmist view, and thought that we should proceed at leisure, undisturbed by what Austria was doing. In fact, we might say presently that we could not discuss the Albanian question if Austria maintained this form of pressure.

I said that the Servian officers in Durazzo were talking childishly of staying there; but of course they would evacuate the Adriatic littoral after peace was made. I did not propose to bring on the Albanian question at the meetings of Ambassadors till we saw our way to a settlement. I proposed also to tell the Italian Ambassador, whose Government were discussing the question with the Austrian Government, that Italy and Austria must find some way of satisfying Montenegro. I assumed that Russia would not be more Montenegrin than Montenegro, and that if Montenegro was satisfied it would not matter to Russia how this was effected. Once the Montenegrin question was settled, we could discuss the eastern frontier of Albania, for we knew that Austria would yield as regards Prizrend and Ipek, and possibly about Djakova.

M. Cambon agreed to this procedure.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[534] No. 45.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 3, 1913.*

DR. DANEF spoke to me this morning of the difficulty about the Ægean Islands, and of the impression that the Powers would insist upon some of them being left to Turkey.

I said that I thought it probable that the Powers would not oppose the cession of all the islands by Turkey, but would insist upon conditions of neutralisation.

Dr. Danef said that, in the event of the Powers not objecting to the cession of all the islands, Bulgaria would claim Thasos and Samothrace.

I observed that, in that event, this would be a matter to be arranged between Bulgaria and Greece.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[535] No. 46.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 3, 1913.*

DR. DANEF told me this morning that there would be little difference between Greece and Bulgaria as to frontiers.

I asked whether they had come to an agreement about Salonica.

He replied that they had not. M. Venizelos admitted that Salonica in the hands of Greece would dwindle and perish, because it would have no "hinterland." But the question involved the honour of Greece, and he had talked of referring it to the friendly Powers.

I said that it would be a somewhat invidious question for the friendly Powers to decide.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[536] No. 47.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 3, 1913.*

DR. DANEF came to see me to-day, and told me that he hoped that the Turks would this afternoon put forward a proposition about Adrianople that could be discussed. He could hardly expect that they would propose a line which would give Adrianople to Bulgaria; but, whereas last Wednesday (the 1st instant) they had claimed the whole vilayet of Adrianople, they might now suggest a line of less extent. If so, a basis for discussion would be provided; but if not, he had warned the Turks that he would break off the negotiations.

I asked whether he had discussed with the Turks any proposal for leaving them the mosques, or any compromise of that kind.

He replied that he had not done so. The fall of Adrianople was expected every day, and he would rather reserve proposals of that kind till after Adrianople had fallen. He was hopeful that peace would be made without a recommencement of hostilities.

I said that the Ambassadors were meeting here at 11 o'clock to-morrow morning. I hoped that he would not, this afternoon, break off the negotiations in a way which made it impossible for them to be resumed, and inevitable that the war should recommence.

He assured me that, whatever happened, though he might have to speak strongly this afternoon, he would not pronounce the irrevocable words.

I asked him whether he had seen Sir Richard Crawford.

Finding that he had not, I told him that Sir Richard Crawford had been discussing with the Turkish delegates some compromise about Adrianople, which he thought might be acceptable to Bulgaria.

Dr. Danef said that he would like to see Sir Richard Crawford, and suggested that he should arrange this through Reshid Pasha.

I said that this would be the best course, as I knew that Sir Richard Crawford had been discussing matters with the Turkish delegates, and he was in the service of Turkey.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[537] No. 48.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 5.)

Foreign Office, January 3, 1913.

Sir,

DR. DANEF having, in conversation with me to-day, expressed a hope that British financiers and British capital would take an interest in Bulgaria and help to develop her territory, I said that much would depend upon commercial relations. After the peace, if we were confronted by a high tariff in territory which had previously enjoyed the low Turkish tariff, British commercial interests would be offended. If, on the other hand, Bulgaria could arrange her tariff so that the duties were not unduly high on articles in which British export trade was especially interested, British financiers and capital would no doubt be well disposed. Where there was the prospect of the development of trade British capital went readily.

Dr. Danef said that the Bulgarian tariff, though higher than the Turkish, was lower than the Servian and Greek, and, as the chief articles of British trade in Bulgaria were things which were not produced in Bulgaria herself, he thought that a satisfactory tariff might be arranged.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[538] No. 49.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 6.)

Foreign Office, January 3, 1913.

Sir,

DR. DANEF spoke to me to-day about Roumania. Herr von Kiderlen had assured him that Germany had promised only diplomatic support. Dr. Danef did not think that Austria would encourage Roumania to go to war, though Austria would like to get some favour for Roumania, owing to her past services. As, however, the Austrian Ambassador in Constantinople had been pressing the Turks to make peace, it was clear that Austria did not wish to cause trouble by pushing Roumania to any lengths. If, therefore, Roumania was not encouraged by any Power, Dr. Danef thought that she would not go to war. Bulgaria could not cede territory, but she was ready to agree to every other act of friendship on the frontier. He thought that the Powers might point out to Roumania how much more important it was to her for the future to have the friendship of Bulgaria than a mere strip of frontier territory.

I told him what had passed when I saw M. Misu last Wednesday (the 1st instant). M. Misu had asked nothing, and had shown no disposition to discuss any question.

Dr. Danef said that, if Roumania was consulted by the meeting of Ambassadors, Bulgaria would expect a similar consultation in questions which directly concerned her.

I observed that the Ambassadors were not likely at present to deal with the Roumanian question.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[680] No. 50.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 7.)

Foreign Office, January 3, 1913.

Sir,

I SPOKE to Count Benckendorff to-day in the same way as I had just spoken to M. Cambon, as to the Austrian mobilisation, Servia and the Adriatic, Albania, and Montenegro.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[55374] No. 51.

Foreign Office to India Office.

Foreign Office, January 3, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 22nd November, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, for submission to the Marquess of Crewe, copy of a despatch received from His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople reporting the result of private enquiries made of the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the reply of the Ottoman Government to the British memorandum of the 18th July last.

Sir E. Grey is of the opinion that no action can usefully be taken until the Turkish Government renew their demand for the customs increase, which, he is given to understand, is likely to occur at no distant date.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[55845] No. 52.

Foreign Office to London Chamber of Commerce.

Foreign Office, January 3, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your letter of the 30th ultimo, respecting the trade in tobacco in Macedonia and the possibility of the imposition of taxes by a Balkan State, I am directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to state that the matter will not be lost sight of by His Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
A. LAW.

[55902.] No. 53.

Conference of St. James.

PROTOCOLE No. 9.

Séance du 21 décembre (3 janvier) 1913.

Étaient présents :

Pour la Bulgarie :

MM. Danev, Madjarov et le Général Paprikov ;

Pour la Grèce :

MM. Vénizélos, Skouloudis, Gennadius et Streit ;

Pour le Monténégro :

MM. Miouchekovitch, le Comte de Voïnovitch et Popovitch ;

Pour la Serbie :

MM. Novakovitch, Nicolitch et Vesnitch ;

Pour la Turquie :

Réchid Pacha, Osman Nizamy Pacha et le Général Salih Pacha.

La séance est ouverte à 4 heures ½, sous la présidence de M. Miouchekovitch.
Le protocole de la séance précédente, lu par le secrétaire, M. Vouros, est adopté.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Le Président donne la parole aux délégués ottomans pour faire connaître les instructions qu'ils auront reçues de Constantinople.

Réchid Pacha dit qu'il a reçu en effet de son gouvernement les instructions demandées. Elles sont contenues dans le document suivant, dont il donne lecture :

"Les délégués des États alliés nous ayant demandé de leur indiquer une ligne de frontière pour servir de base aux négociations en cours, nous avons l'honneur de proposer pour le vilayet d'Andrinople la rectification suivante, qui constitue une nouvelle cession territoriale :

"Cette ligne frontière partira de l'ancienne frontière jusqu'à l'Arda et continuera à suivre ce fleuve jusqu'à Ada, situé sur l'embouchure de la rivière Suyudlu-Tchaï, affluent de l'Arda. De là, en laissant Gumuldjina à l'est, la ligne frontière arrivera à un point du lac Borou-Gheulu, suivant un tracé dont les détails pourront être discutés par les délégués militaires.

"En ce qui concerne la Crète, le gouvernement Impérial renoncera, vis-à-vis des Grandes Puissances, à ses droits sur cette île, dont le statut et le régime futurs sont subordonnés à la décision desdites Grandes Puissances, à la condition toutefois que la cession d'aucune autre île ne soit demandée."

Sur la proposition du *Président*, la séance est suspendue pour permettre aux délégués alliés de prendre copie de la nouvelle proposition ottomane et de se concerter.

A la reprise de la séance,

Le Président annonce qu'en réponse à la proposition ottomane les délégués alliés font la déclaration suivante :

"Les délégués alliés constatent avec regret que les délégués ottomans ne tiennent pas compte des résultats de la guerre. Ils seraient, par conséquent, fondés à rompre les négociations. Toutefois, pour donner une nouvelle preuve de leur esprit de conciliation, ils demandent aux délégués ottomans de leur faire à la séance du lundi, 24 décembre (6 janvier), à 4 heures, une proposition contenant :

"1°. Le désistement de la Sublime Porte de ses droits sur l'île de Crète ;
"2°. La cession des îles de la mer Égée ;
"3°. Quant au vilayet d'Andrinople, l'indication d'une frontière laissant la ville d'Andrinople aux alliés,

"Faute de quoi, les négociations seront considérées comme rompues."

Le Président propose, en conséquence, que la prochaine séance soit fixée au lundi prochain, 24 décembre (6 janvier), à 4 heures.

Réchid Pacha déclare que la prochaine séance peut avoir lieu le lendemain, samedi, puisque les délégués ottomans seront en mesure de donner dès lors leur réponse.

La prochaine réunion est donc fixée au lendemain, samedi, 22 décembre (4 janvier), à 4 heures de l'après-midi.

La séance est levée à 7 heures ½.

Le Président :

L. MIOUCHEKOVITCH.

Les Secrétaires :

H. NORMAN.
S. TCHAPRACHIKOV.
A. C. VOURos.
S. Y. GROUITCH.
D. NORADOUNGHIAN.

[447] No. 54.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—Received January 4, 1913.)

(No. 118.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December 28, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 109 of the 17th instant, and the discrepancies between the information in Sir F. Cartwright's telegram No. 197 and my telegrams Nos. 49 and 86, I gather after some conversation yesterday with M. Stefanovitch, the new Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, the facts to have been as follows :—

Professor Masaryk came to Belgrade in the first instance on his own initiative. Whilst here M. Pasitch charged him with a message for Count Berchtold to the effect that if Austria would consent to the territorial possession by Servia of a port on the Adriatic the Servian Government would in return be prepared to make considerable economic concessions to the Monarchy, and that if Count Berchtold were disposed to treat upon this basis M. Pasitch would himself proceed to Vienna for the negotiations.

As Count Berchtold refused to entertain the Servian request for a port, this overture on the part of Servia failed, and was not pursued further.

It seems from the above that Sir F. Cartwright's information was more correct than mine, and that M. Pasitch and M. Yovanovitch must have deliberately misled me when stating that Professor Masaryk had come here with proposals from the Austrian Government.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

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[448] No. 55.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey. (Received January 4, 1913.)

(No. 119.)

Sir, *Belgrade, December 31, 1912.*

M. PASITCH called upon me on the morning of the 28th instant evidently somewhat perturbed in his mind. He had received news from London—I gather from the peace delegates—that the Austrian Government intended to press for a frontier of Albania, including Lake Ochrida and Prizrend, Djakova, and Ipek. His Excellency protested that Servia could never submit to such a frontier. He had proved his good disposition by giving way about Durazzo and the coast, a concession which was already creating sufficient discontent in the country, but the Servian nation would never tolerate such a frontier as proposed by Austria, it would be an injustice to the Serbs whom Servia freed from the Turkish rule to subject them now to Albania, and if the Austrian Government persisted in its view, Servia would have no option but to resist by force. He added that in so far as he was concerned himself he could always resign, but this would not solve the difficulty, as no one would be found to take office under such conditions. He therefore requested me to telegraph and urgently beg your intervention on behalf of Servia when the delimitation came to be discussed.

I have since ascertained that M. Pasitch the same day visited all my colleagues and similarly requested them to ask the good offices of their respective Governments. To the Austrian Minister, however, he simply expressed the hope that the Servian claims would receive due consideration. As his Excellency also telephoned to the Servian Minister in Sophia to ask Sir H. Bax-Ironside to telegraph to you in the same sense, and the same request was possibly made also to other foreign representatives there, it seems as though he had been seriously alarmed, and had determined to spare no effort to enlist the Powers on his side.

I have the honour to enclose translation of an article on this subject which appeared in the "Samouprava" of the 28th instant.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[446] No. 56.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4, 1913.)

(No. 103.) *Bucharest, December 31, 1912.*

Sir,

THE enclosed article, which appears in the conservative democrat organ "La Roumania" this morning, may be of interest, as I know from my conversations with M. Take Jonesco that it expresses that Minister's views. Indeed, it may possibly have been written by him before his departure from Bucharest.

The article purports to explain the grounds on which Roumania bases her demands. These grounds may be briefly stated as follows:—

The question of the rectification of the frontier is not the only one. There is a more important question which must be linked with it—a question of sentiment and honour. The territorial expansion of the allied States resulting from the war with Turkey must inevitably involve in course of time the loss to the Roumanian cause of the Koutzo-Vlachs, and this sacrifice demands compensation. This compensation must be sought in a rectification of the Dobrudja frontier, a frontier which is neither logical nor strategical, nor easy to administer, and which was forced upon Roumania by the Treaty of Berlin owing to her refusal to endorse the loss of Bessarabia. Roumania might easily when Bulgaria began to mobilise have obtained all she wanted by demanding it as a condition of her neutrality. Indeed, it is not known whether there was not some tacit understanding of the kind between the two countries; but, even if there was not, it is thanks to Roumania's neutrality that the allied States have been victorious, and even to-day it is thanks to that neutrality that Turkey will be compelled to yield, if yield she does.

The article concludes by emphasising the altruistic nature of Roumania's policy. She has been only too ready to subordinate her own special interests to the greater interest of the maintenance of the general peace, and she is therefore entitled to the support of all the Great Powers without exception, as all the Great Powers have profited and are profiting by the maintenance of general peace.

It will be noticed that the article refers to the possibility of there having been some kind of tacit understanding between Roumania and Bulgaria at the time of Bulgaria's mobilisation. In this connection I should mention that, when I last saw M. Take Jonesco, just before his departure for London, his Excellency told me that, during M. Daneff's recent visit to Bucharest, the latter had pointed out to M. Take Jonesco that it would have been easier to obtain favourable terms on the eve of the war than it was now that the allied armies had been successful, and that M. Take Jonesco had replied by reminding him that M. Kalinkof, the Bulgarian Minister at Bucharest, had returned from leave in September bringing assurances from King Ferdinand and M. Gueschof that peace would not be disturbed, and that the attempt at that time to obtain from Bulgaria favourable terms in return for benevolent neutrality in a war, the imminence of which was so categorically denied, would have been to impute mendacity to King Ferdinand and M. Gueschof.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

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[419] No. 57.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, January 3, 1913.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 1 of 2nd January.

Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs appears to be misinformed and his explanation fallacious.

I have not yet heard any question arising with Greeks in regard to goods in transit for Servia, for there has not yet been any possibility of through-forwarding. Complaints made to me concerned goods purchased from wholesale merchants in Salonica, which had necessarily paid 11 per cent. on landing, when their ultimate destination could not possibly be known. Duty levied at Gheyghueli was not former Turkish duty, but Servian maximum tariff.

Our contention is that Servian Government has no right to establish new customs zone on the ground of annexation.

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[546] No. 58.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 2.) *St. Petersburgh, January 4, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.)

I HAVE communicated to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of your telegrams Nos. 1 and 3 of 1st and 3rd January.

In the course of conversation I expressed the hope that his Excellency would not commit himself too far on the question of Scutari, as it was not of sufficient importance to form the subject of a European war, while it was one on which you could not promise him more than diplomatic support. His Excellency replied that it was a matter, no doubt, of secondary importance, but that Russia was always having to support Montenegro or Servia on questions in which she herself had no direct interest. He quite agreed that we must wait until we knew the views of the German and Italian Governments, but it was always possible that Austria might suddenly raise the question. From conversation with the Austrian Ambassador he gathered that her object was to make Scutari the capital of Albania, so as to make it easier for her to exercise a predominant influence by means of her protectorate over the Catholics. He had called the attention of the Italian chargé d'affaires to this probable move on the part of Austria, and had pointed out that it would not be to Italy's interest to see the centre of government in the extreme north of Albania. He had further urged in the interest of the dynasty that Italy should insist on Scutari being given to Montenegro.

I do not think that there is any danger of his pressing the matter too far. He would, he said, think it over and telegraph his views to the Russian Ambassador in London. The one point, however, on which he insisted was that some material satisfaction must be given to Montenegro. He spoke of the possibility of her retaining San Giovanni di Medua, or of her being given the two banks of the Boyana with some of the adjacent territory, but begged that you would keep what he had said to yourself until he had had more time to reflect on what it was best to do.

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[578] No. 59.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 3.) *Berlin, January 4, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.) R.

MY telegram No. 1 of 2nd January: Customs duties levied by Servian authorities.

German Minister at Belgrade has been instructed to enquire into the circumstances, and if necessary to enter protest.

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[544] No. 60.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 4.) *Constantinople, January 4, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.)

FOLLOWING to-day from His Majesty's vice-consul, Dardanelles:—

"Whole of the Turkish fleet went out early this morning."

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[549] No. 61.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 4.)

(No. 3.) *Athens, January 4, 1913.*

(Telegraphic.) *Decode.*

FOUR Turkish ships, believed to be "Turgut Reis," "Hamidieh," "Medjidieh," and another, with six destroyers, came out of the Dardanelles this morning towards Tenedos. Exchanged long shots with patrolling destroyers, but retired within the Dardanelles on the approach of the Greek fleet from Lemnos.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[419] No. 62.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.*

SALONICA telegram of 3rd January: Customs duties levied by Servians.

Sir R. Paget has been instructed to inform Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs of substance of above.

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[263] No. 63.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 2nd January:

Ambassadors are transmitting a suggestion for a collective representation at Constantinople, should peace negotiations break down. I have also conveyed advice to Turkish delegates, of which German Ambassador will inform his Government. All this is devised with same object that Emperor has in view, and I am most anxious to co-operate in any further suggestion that German Government may wish to make to give effect to the Emperor's wish. I fear that nothing short of very strong pressure at Constantinople will have any result.

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[419] No. 64.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.*

SALONICA telegram of 3rd January: Customs duties levied by Servians.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of substance of above.

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[380] No. 65.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 3rd January: Servian customs duties.

I approve.

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[113] No. 66.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.*

YOUR despatches Nos. 1059 of 12th December, and 1065 of 13th December: Ottoman Public Debt.

I agree that the Greek authorities are not entitled to sequester any portion of the ceded revenues so long as they fall short of amount required for this year's coupons. Before forming a final opinion as to whether we should protest, and, if so, to what extent, against the confiscation of the 75 per cent. of the surplus allotted in 1903 to the Turkish Government, and since pledged by them to other creditors, I should like to have Sir Adam Block's arguments in favour of that course most fully before me.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 2, and Salonica.)

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* Also to Sir G. Lowther (No. 10), Sir F. Bertie (No. 9), Sir R. Rodd (No. 5), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 11), and Sir F. Cartwright (No. 6).

[1103] No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.*

AMBASSADORS are transmitting to their Governments a suggestion for strong collective representation at Constantinople should peace negotiations break down.

I have advised Turkish Ambassador that as long as Turks are not open to any compromise about the town of Adrianople they have nothing to expect from the Powers except pressure to give way, but that if Turks will bring the discussion at the peace negotiations into the *terrain* of some compromise about the town of Adrianople the Powers may then be willing to exercise their influence with Bulgaria to overcome difficulties. This is for your information in case Minister for Foreign Affairs appeals to you.

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[973] No. 68.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.*

IT is most important that Italy and Austria should find some means of getting over difficulty about Montenegro. If this is done I can bring on question of Albania at meetings of Ambassadors with every hope of a settlement that will remove last serious difficulty between Great Powers. But until some means are found of satisfying Montenegro by some compromise about Scutari, in which perhaps railway or commercial concessions might play a part, we are faced with possibility of a deadlock and consequent breakdown of meetings of Ambassadors. I am convinced that Russia cannot throw Montenegro over if latter appeals for support. What Russian Government can do in interest of peace has been exhausted over Servian access to Adriatic, and, if other questions become acute, I cannot press that Russia should be the Power to urge or make further concessions, and must give her support at meetings of Ambassadors. I suppose that Italy would regret as much as any Power a rupture over Montenegro, and I hope that Italian Government, who have intimate relations with Montenegro, will devise some settlement that will satisfy Montenegro and that Austria will accept.

Till this is done I can make no further progress with Albanian question here, and everything depends upon it. I have spoken in this sense to Italian Ambassador. You should speak privately to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 12; Vienna, No. 7; Paris, No. 7; and Berlin, No. 7, for information only.)

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[974] No. 69.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day I recounted what information I had about the meeting of the peace delegates yesterday, and said to the Ambassadors that we ought to decide whether the Great Powers should be advised to make a collective representation in Constantinople if they were prepared to take any steps to avert a resumption of hostilities. I then sketched to the Ambassadors six points which might form the substance of a collective representation in Constantinople if the peace negotiations broke down.

Finding that these suggestions were well received, I asked the French Ambassador to make a draft from my notes, which he did as follows:—

"Après la séance de la conférence d'hier les Ambassadeurs ont été amenés à envisager une rupture des négociations. Ils se sont demandés si, pour éviter une reprise des hostilités, les Puissances ne devraient pas intervenir, soit qu'elles soient invitées par les belligérants, soit qu'elles prennent l'initiative d'une médiation.

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 12), Sir E. Goschen (No. 9), Sir R. Rodd (No. 5), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 9)

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

"Alors Sir E. Grey a émis l'avis qu'on pourrait se livrer à une démarche auprès de la Sublime Porte en formulant les six observations suivantes :—

"1. Les Turcs ne tiennent pas suffisamment compte des résultats de la guerre et des futures conséquences d'une reprise d'hostilités.

"2. Dans ce dernier cas les Puissances seraient obligées d'envisager la situation future de Constantinople et les développements de la guerre en Asie Mineure.

"3. Les Puissances seront obligées d'intervenir en Turquie pour la protection de leurs intérêts financiers.

"4. D'autre part, la paix étant conclue, la Turquie sera en état d'obtenir des financiers une assistance pour consolider sa situation à Constantinople et en Asie Mineure—seule partie de son Empire qui jusqu'ici n'a pas été pour elle une cause de faiblesse.

"5. Quant à la cession des îles, les Puissances useront de leur influence pour assurer que les îles qui seraient cédées aux alliés et qui auraient une importance stratégique soient pourvues d'une administration soumise à des conditions de neutralisation telles qu'elles ne puissent constituer une menace pour la Turquie.

"6. En ce qui concerne la ville d'Andrinople, qui paraît devoir capituler, les Puissances useront de leur influence pour que les termes de la cession définitive de la ville aux alliés soient conçus de façon à préserver les intérêts musulmans relatifs aux mosquées et aux biens religieux, et pour assurer leur sauvegarde.

"Les Ambassadeurs pensent que les Gouvernements pourront être amenés à des mesures de pression pour faciliter l'adoption de leurs vues. Ces mesures pourraient prendre à Constantinople la forme d'une démonstration navale pour la protection de nos nationaux et de nos intérêts.

"D'après les renseignements, si la rupture des négociations se produit aujourd'hui, les hostilités devraient être reprises jeudi prochain, 9 courant."

The Ambassadors agreed to telegraph this draft to their Governments.

The suggestion of pressure upon Turkey in the form of a naval demonstration was made by the French Ambassador. Not everyone was very favourable to such a step, but I felt that none of us ought to refuse to participate in any strong measures which the Powers generally were prepared to take to prevent the continuance of the war.

While the meeting was taking place, I was told that Sir Richard Crawford wished to see me. I heard from him that it was feared in Constantinople that a cession of Adrianople would lead to revolution and assassination. I gathered, however, that some compromise about the town of Adrianople might be possible, and I told him that, as long as the Turks were not open to any compromise about Adrianople, they had nothing to expect from the Powers except pressure to give way; but, if they would bring the discussion at the peace negotiations on to the *terrain* of some compromise about the town, the Powers might then be willing to exercise their influence with Bulgaria to overcome difficulties. I requested him to transmit this advice to the Turkish peace delegates.

Subsequently, I informed the meeting of Ambassadors of the advice which I had given. They took a note of it, and, so far as I could judge, they regarded it as satisfactory.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[975] No. 70.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.*

THE Turkish Ambassador came to see me this afternoon, and I informed him of the advice which I had given through Sir Richard Crawford, making it clear that it was not an offer which I was authorised to make by the Powers, but an impression which I had derived from the meeting of Ambassadors this morning as to the attitude of the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[976] No. 71.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 4, 1913.*

WHEN I was speaking to the Italian Ambassador to-day in the sense of my telegram No. 6 of to-day's date to your Excellency, about the necessity of finding some means of satisfying Montenegro, the Ambassador again referred to the impossibility of Montenegro ceding Mount Lofchen to Austria. He explained, speaking confidentially and privately, that such a cession would make it possible for Austria to develop Cattaro into a strong naval station; and Italy objected strongly to this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[553] No. 72.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January 5, 1913.*

SALONICA telegram of 31st December, your telegram No. 2 of 1st January to Belgrade, and Belgrade telegram No. 1 of 2nd January: Servian customs claims.

Italian Government has addressed similar enquiries to Belgrade, and has received similar answers.

I have accordingly informed them of the further information in Salonica telegram of 3rd January.

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[554] No. 73.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January 5, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs tells me that he has impression that the Turkish Government would welcome some pressure from the Great Powers to enable them to regulate the situation, and he has instructed Italian Ambassador, if his colleagues receive similar instructions, to urge them to meet the views of the Balkan allies.

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[545] No. 74.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 5, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 4 of yesterday.

Engagement [outside the Dardanelles] was unimportant, lasting fifteen minutes.

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[550] No. 75.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 5, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consul at Uskub yesterday, No. 2 :—

"Director of Ottoman Public Debt informed me on 27th December that he addressed to General Putnick a request that the offices of the Debt, which the Servians have been using as finance office, should be handed over to him, together with revenue stamps and cash in hand which the Servians have appropriated. This has not been done."

My French colleague has received no information on the subject from his consular officer.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[547] No. 76.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 5, 1913.*

IN conversation yesterday the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs took pessimistic view of the Roumanian question, and spoke with much asperity of the present attitude of the Bulgarian Government. They were, he said, now repudiating what M. Danef had told the Russian Ambassador in London that they were ready to do as regards ceding some twenty villages to Roumania, while the Bulgarian Minister had come to him with a ridiculous suggestion that Athos and Chalcidean peninsula should be given to Roumania.

Bulgarian Minister, whom I saw immediately afterwards, also spoke to me of the possibility of compensating Roumania with some territorial acquisition outside Bulgaria. He declared that his Government, while willing to make the Roumanian frontier stronger strategically, would not surrender any territory inhabited by Bulgarian subjects.

I warned him that, if the Bulgarian Government did not show more conciliatory spirit, they would find themselves in a very dangerous position, should war with Turkey be resumed.

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[560] No. 77.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, January 5, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 14 of 18th December received to-day.

Attitude of Greek authorities is in general correctly stated, but sequestration is provisional on all receipts, and they collect duties on alcohol direct at the custom-house.

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[561] No. 78.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, January 5, 1913.*

MY telegram of 4th January.

Servian authorities appear to have reduced their claim to 11 per cent. on general merchandise, but to maintain prohibitive duties on tobacco, salt, petroleum, and sugar.

Greeks do not tax produce of territory in Servian occupation, nor do the Servians themselves tax goods sent from Salonica to Monastir.

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[581] No. 79.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)
Sir, *Berlin, January 2, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Ambassadors accredited to the Court of Berlin attended at the palace yesterday for the purpose of presenting their good wishes to their Majesties the Emperor and Empress on the first day of the New Year.

The Emperor, who appeared to be in excellent health, said a few gracious words to each of the Ambassadors in turn. To me, after expressing the pleasure with which he had received the cordial messages addressed to him by the King and the Royal Family, he said that it had caused him the greatest gratification that England and Germany had become closer friends, and that the two countries had worked so harmoniously together in the cause of European peace. This cordial co-operation had been, he might venture to say, of the greatest benefit to the whole of Europe. Much good work had been done, but there still remained some thorny questions, for the solution of which the two countries could still work together with great advantage. He could not say, for instance, that the prospects of the Peace Conference looked very

bright. The Turks seemed to be in a most obstinate and uncompromising mood, and, unless they changed their attitude, there was every probability that hostilities would be renewed, in which case the situation would be full of dangerous possibilities. He felt this very strongly. He had therefore taken it upon himself, and the Chancellor had expressed his concurrence with his action, to instruct Prince Lichnowsky to suggest to you that England and Germany, as the Powers least directly interested in Balkan affairs, should exercise some gentle, but firm, pressure on the Ottoman Government with a view to rendering them more reasonable in their negotiations with their victorious opponents. His Majesty added that, personally, he was of the opinion that the Turkish Government would welcome, rather than otherwise, a little pressure of this sort. In conclusion, the Emperor said that it would be a thousand pities if the Peace Conference broke up, both because of the dangerous possibilities entailed by a renewal of hostilities, and also because, London having been selected as the meeting place of the conference, an abortive result would no doubt be somewhat unpleasant for His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

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[609] No. 80.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Bucharest, January 2, 1913.*

IN my despatch No. 103 of the 31st ultimo I forwarded an article from M. Take Jonescu's organ "La Roumanie," purporting to give the grounds for Roumania's demands for compensation from Bulgaria. Those grounds were, in brief, that Roumania's neutrality during the war had alone made possible the successes of the allies; that owing to the impending territorial changes Roumania would have in time to lose her hold on the Koutzo-Vlachs, for which sacrifice she was entitled to compensation in a rectification of her frontier.

I now have the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs in conversation with me at his weekly reception on the 31st ultimo gave more different version of the grounds on which the Roumanian Government considered it was entitled to a rectification of frontier. His Excellency stated most emphatically that Roumania was not demanding compensation from Bulgaria for her neutrality, and that Bulgaria had taken the initiative in sending M. Danef to Bucharest. His Excellency, so far as I can remember, made no mention of the Koutzo-Vlachs, and, as I understood his argument, it was that, notwithstanding the declarations of the allies previous to the war disclaiming territorial aims, their frontiers fixed by the Treaty of Berlin were about to be revised, and that therefore Roumania, whose frontier was also fixed by the Treaty of Berlin—and fixed most unfavourably for Roumania—was also entitled to revision.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs always disclaims the idea that there has been any demand on Roumania's part for compensation, though one would have thought he might by this time have abandoned the fiction of spontaneous negotiation on Bulgaria's part, especially in view of the talk of mobilisation and of seizing Bulgarian territory which has marked the past fortnight.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

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[610] No. 81.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bucharest, January 3, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, military attaché at this legation, reporting recent orders for guns, &c., for the Roumanian army.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

The extraordinary military credits mentioned in Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon's despatch, amounting to 151,000,000 lei (6,040,000*l.*), were voted unanimously on the 31st ultimo.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 81.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 4R. Confidential.)

Bucharest, December 29, 1912.

Sir,

I REPORTED in a despatch which I addressed to Sir Walter Townley on the 5th March, 1912, that the Roumanian Government had just concluded orders for:—

15 batteries of 105-cm. howitzers from Krupp.
2 „ 15 „ „ „ Schneider.
4 „ mountain guns „ „

These were to be delivered early in 1913, and I understand that the batteries of 105-cm. howitzers have been received.

2. Recent events have stimulated the Government into giving further important orders for armaments during the present month as follows:—

3 batteries of 15-cm. howitzers from Schneider.
15 „ 105 „ „ „ Krupp.
20 „ 75 „ field guns „ „
100,000 Mannlicher rifles from Steyr (Austria).
30,000 „ carbines „ „ „
50,000 automatic pistols „ „ „
100 machine-guns from Maxim (Berlin).

Each of the batteries is to be of four guns, and ammunition is to be delivered as follows:—

With each field gun 1,000 rounds of combined shrapnel and high-explosive shell, making a total of 80,000 rounds.
With each 105-cm. howitzer 750 rounds, making in all 45,000 rounds.
„ „ 15 „ „ 300 „ „ „ 3,600 „

3. In addition to the above, separate orders have been given to the German firms of Krupp and Erhardt for:—

160,000 combined shrapnel and high-explosive shell for the field artillery.
36,000 rounds for the 105-cm. howitzers.
200,000,000 „ of small-arm ammunition have also been ordered from various firms.

4. The 20 field batteries which have been ordered are to provide artillery for the 40 reserve battalions.

These battalions are in time of war to be formed into 5 divisions, but they are at the present time unprovided with artillery. The 30 batteries of 105-cm. howitzers, half of which have just been received and the order for the remainder just given, will admit of 6 batteries being allotted to each army corps.

At the present time there are only 257,000 rifles in the Roumanian army, so that the 100,000 now ordered are badly needed. Other less important orders, such as one for 100,000 sheepskin coats, and another for 400,000 field dressings, indicate that serious preparations for war are being made.

5. The greater part of the armaments ordered are to be delivered by the end of 1913, but the rifles and pistols are to be handed over in batches. The first of these is to be delivered in July next, and the last in October 1914.

6. Money to pay for these orders is being voted in Parliament, the amount required being 137,000,000 lei. Only a portion of this large sum is at present available, and it is derived from the surplus revenue of 1911–12. This is allowed to

be appropriated next month. The remainder, according to the "exposé des motifs" of the Minister of Finance, is to be provided by future surpluses.

7. A further sum of 14,000,000 lei is also to be given to the Minister of War for the construction of barracks, hospitals, and depots. It is provided "from any sources giving the necessary amount."

I have, &c.
F. LYON, *Military Attaché.*

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[611] No. 82.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 3. Confidential.)

Bucharest, January 5, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE the honour to transmit a despatch from Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, military attaché at this legation, regarding the military situation and regarding feeling in Roumania as to the prospect of war with Bulgaria.

Notwithstanding the increased clamour respecting the claims of Roumania, and the menacing tone of utterances in Parliament and in the press which have marked the past fortnight, and by which Roumania has in some measure forfeited her claim to rank as a factor of peace, I agree with Colonel Lyon in thinking that there is no eagerness for war amongst the public. Still there is a pretty general feeling in political circles that Roumania made a mistake in not coming to terms with Bulgaria before the war. The desire to repair this mistake is strong. *Amour-propre* to an excessive degree has been called into play by the recent bellicose tone of the press in Bucharest, and unless Bulgaria can see her way to make some sacrifice to this *amour propre* a dangerous situation will arise. The belief of the Roumanian Government that Bulgaria is exhausted by the war is an unfortunate factor in the outlook.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 82.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir G. Barclay.

(Confidential.)

Bucharest, December 30, 1912.

Sir,

DURING the past few days I have had some opportunity of getting into touch with the feeling that there is in Roumania regarding the prospect of war with Bulgaria.

On the 1st October, when Bulgaria commenced mobilising for war against Turkey, Roumania was taken by surprise. The Government had been led to believe by their representative in Sophia that there would be no war. The Roumanian military attaché had also reported that Bulgaria was unable to put more than 200,000 men into the field, and the general staff here had no idea that the Bulgarian army was as efficient as it has since proved itself to be.

For many years Roumania has been spending money in Macedonia for the benefit of the Koutzo Vlachs. This was done in order that she might claim some compensation if and when, owing to Turkey having to give up the government of Macedonia, the Koutzo-Vlachs became the subjects of another Power.

Such a change became possible when the Balkan allies went to war with Turkey. The time had therefore come for Roumania to urge her claims. This, however, she was unable to do, as the critical moment found her unprepared for war, and therefore not in a position to bargain with Bulgaria. Inaction on the part of Roumania could also be justified on the plea that there existed the possibility that the allies would suffer defeat. In that case the military position of Roumania with reference to Bulgaria would be better after than it was before the war.

The unpreparedness of the Roumanian army was due partly to defects in organisation and partly to want of ammunition. An officer who commands a battery, and who told me in February that his reserve had been depleted, now informs me that the war secretary, at any rate, replenished them, even if it has done nothing more.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

During the last three months every endeavour has been made to prepare the army for war, and I have given in another despatch a list of various orders that have been given. The defences of the Danube near Galatz have been improved, and an additional work has been constructed for the defence of the Cernavoda bridge.

The armistice between the Balkan allies and Turkey, and the peace negotiations that are taking place in London, have caused Roumania to feel that another opportunity has arrived for making her claims for compensation. The situation is different from what it was three months ago. Bulgaria has gone through a short war, after which, though victorious, she found herself at the end of a month in a state of serious exhaustion.

I have already stated, in a despatch to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Sophia, that I believe that the effect of this exhaustion is at present exaggerated. It is probable that the rest that the army has had during the last five weeks has done much to rehabilitate it. This, however, is not believed to be the case in Roumania, and in conversations that I have had with M. Take Jonesco and with General Averesco, the Chief of the General Staff, they have both laid stress on the exhausted state of the Bulgarian army, and wished me to agree with them.

I am therefore under the impression that they are still receiving information from their military attaché at Sophia which is in accordance with what they wish to believe. General Averesco also told me that he considered that the Bulgarians had not proved their military worth, and that their victories were due to the demoralised state of the Turkish army.

The demands of Roumania do not now appear to be based on the Koutzo-Vlachs. They seem to be made on the plea that, as the provisions of the Treaty of Berlin which apply to the frontiers of Turkey and her neighbours are being revised, Roumania has a right to the revision of her southern frontier in the Dobrogea. Frequent mention is made of the desire to have a "strategic frontier," and the "strategic" value of Silistria is also referred to. There appears to be no military value in extending the frontier of the Dobrogea to the south, and the word strategic seems to have no meaning when applied to Silistria. It is claimed that at the latter place there are hills that command the channel of the Danube. But along the greater part of its length, as the river flows between Roumania and Bulgaria, the right bank commands the left, so that, as far as the hills are concerned, there is no particular advantage to be gained by Silistria changing hands. The place would possibly have value as an up-river base for torpedo- or gun-boats engaged in the defence of Cernavoda bridge.

There appears to be no eagerness to go to war either in the officers or the people, though many of them appear to think that war is most probable. One officer, whom I know well, told me that it would be difficult to kindle enthusiasm in the Roumanian peasants for war in Bulgaria. He added that it would be a very different matter if they were asked to march across the Carpathians, on the other side of which they would find men of their own race speaking their own language.

In a conversation with M. Take Jonesco, whom I found more pugnacious than anyone else with whom I have spoken, I mentioned the want of enthusiasm for war in the army. He replied that it was not the business of the army to be bellicose. Their duty was to go to war when told to do so by the Government, and he had told this to General Averesco. M. Take Jonesco added that Roumania can put 250,000 infantry into the field, and I believe that this figure corresponds with the number of rifles that there are in the country.

A few comparisons between Roumania and Bulgaria are of interest. Roumania differs from Bulgaria in that it is not proposed, as far as I am aware, to make fresh "cadres" on mobilisation. Moreover, the operation of mobilising and keeping her army mobilised does not need the same effort in Roumania as it does in Bulgaria. In the former country the expansion in numbers is less than fourfold, and in Bulgaria it is sevenfold.

One of the weak points in the Roumanian army is the shortage of company officers. This shortage also exists in Bulgaria at the present time, the losses in officers during the war having been large in proportion to those in the rank and file. This was due to the light blue cloaks worn by the officers, which made them conspicuous, and enabled the Turks to pick them off. I have not yet got accurate information regarding the number of officers in Roumania, but it is probable that not more than two per company would be available on mobilisation. With the low standard of education that obtains in the army this number is not sufficient.

The number of trained men in Bulgaria at the commencement of the war was only 360,000, as compared with more than 600,000 in Roumania. In the case of Bulgaria,

men were taken up to 46 years of age, but in Roumania only those up to 42 are liable.

I informed you a few days ago that I had heard that it is intended to mobilise the Roumanian army in ten days' time. This information was given to me confidentially by the aide-de-camp to General Averesco. If this intention is carried out with the idea of making Bulgaria yield to the demands that Roumania has presented to her I believe that it will not have the effect desired. The Bulgarians have a very low opinion of the Roumanian army, and their success against Turkey has not put them into the frame of mind to give up anything.

Roumania has but little that she can offer in return for anything that Bulgaria might be willing to give her. The only concession that I have heard suggested is that she should permit Bulgaria to build a bridge over the Danube. In any case it appears impossible that Bulgaria would be willing at the present time to hand over to Roumania men of her own race who have so recently been fighting her battles.

The form which a war between the two countries might take must vary considerably according to whether Austria and Russia also take part, and also to whether Bulgaria concludes peace with Turkey. Two points of military interest stand out at the present time:—

1. The value of the line of the Sereth as a means of holding back a Russian army.

2. The number of men that Bulgaria could put into the field at the present time against Roumania if she does not make peace with Turkey.

I have no precise information regarding the present state of the Focsani-Namoloasa-Galatz line of fortifications. I am, however, informed by the Russian military agent here that, although the works are not quite modern, they may be regarded as a serious obstacle to the advance of an army. The weakest part of the line was near Galatz. This has been recently strengthened and the defence of the river made more efficient. It is, however, doubtful if the line could be held by less than 100,000 men.

The number of men that Bulgaria could spare from Turkey at the present time cannot be computed with any certainty. It depends largely on the terms on which she is with her allies, and on whether Greece and Servia would be willing to watch the Turks at Chatalja and take over the investment of Adrianople. If there is any understanding between Roumania and Austria, and Austria made an offensive movement against Servia, Bulgarian troops would have to take the place of the two Servian divisions now at Adrianople until the fortress fell.

There are at the present time, according to the latest information that I have, 7 Bulgarian divisions at Chatalja, 2 at Adrianople, and 2 not allotted to either of these places, making a total of 11 divisions, amounting to about 300,000 men. There are also Macedonian regiments to the number of about 30,000 men, who have until recently been co-operating with the Bulgarians.

A rough estimate is that 120,000 men would suffice, if evenly distributed between the two places, to invest Adrianople and to hold the Turkish army opposite the lines of Chatalja.

The plan of attack that Roumania would probably adopt would be an advance across the southern frontier of the Dobrogea against Varna. This is indicated by the fact that they are at work on a strategic railway from Medjidia to Cobadin, and also on two roads running south and west from the latter place. This plan could not have the decisive effect that would result from a successful attack against Sophia. But the latter could only be carried out by crossing the Danube further west at Giurgiu or Turnu Magurele. Such an operation would be difficult in winter if there was much ice in the river. It would also necessitate a large number of troops being absorbed in guarding a line of communications more than 100 miles in length.

An advance through the Dobrogea would also offer the advantage of keeping the Roumanian invading army in closer touch with troops defending the line of the Sereth than if they were operating further west.

I have, &c.

F. LYON, *Military Attaché.*

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[599] No. 83.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Vienna, January 3, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith an interesting despatch which I have received from the military attaché at His Majesty's Embassy, reporting on the military situation in Austria-Hungary and the recent movements of troops on the frontier.

I have, &c.

(For the Ambassador),

A. AKERS DOUGLAS.

Enclosure in No. 83.

Major Sir T. Cuninghame to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Vienna, January 1, 1913.*

I.—*General.*

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of your Excellency, that, commencing the first week in November, certain measures have been taken to increase the strength of the Austro-Hungarian army, as a consequence of the changes in Servia and Macedonia brought about by the successes of the Balkan allies in the present war with Turkey.

I regret that I am at present unable to state the exact nature of the measures taken, in the absence of any official communication on the subject, and owing to the natural reluctance of those concerned to refer to them, but their apparent object is the provision of mobile forces capable of use at short notice both in the provinces of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia and in Servia. I am aware that whenever official reference has been made to military changes, movements, or reinforcements, and especially to the calling out of certain classes of reservists, the employment of the term "mobilisation" has been avoided, and stress has been laid upon the fact that the measures considered necessary have been undertaken with no offensive intention, but merely as measures of precaution and defence.

The nature and extent of the measures so taken, however, leave in no doubt whatever the fact that such reassuring statements are conventional formulæ of little real meaning.

The Austro-Hungarian army has been partially mobilised in the sense that measures have been taken to decrease the margin between peace and war conditions.

II.—*The Measures taken.*

From information at my disposal, I estimate that the following steps have been taken:—

1. The provision of mobile forces at war strength in Dalmatia, Herzegovina, and Bosnia by the completion of the existing garrison and the dispatch of additional units.
2. The provision of a large covering force of cavalry in Austrian-Silesia and Galicia by the completion of the existing cavalry units to war strength and the dispatch of further units.
3. The partial mobilisation of all units in the 1st Krakau, 10th Przemysl, 6th Kassa, and 11th Lemberg corps, to form a barrier against any possible counteraction by Russia.
4. The partial mobilisation of the 13th Agram, 7th Temesvar, and 4th Budapest corps, to hold the line of the Drave and Danube, and to form the nucleus of an expeditionary force from Hungary into Servia.
5. The transfer of artillery from Bohemia, the Italian border, and from mid-Hungary to the forces in the annexed provinces and along the line of the Danube.

6. The partial concentration of the 4th Budapest corps in the southern area of that district.
7. The provision of all accessories likely to be required by the mobile forces already referred to, including light railway material, aeroplanes, horses, arms, ammunition, food and supplies generally, of all kinds.
8. The guarding of railways and bridges by infantry, cavalry, and gendarmerie.
9. The rapid passage of certain laws facilitating the completion of general mobilization.
10. The necessary credit transactions to provide ready money for the charges incurred.

III.—*The Forces under Arms.*

The numbers that have been called from the reserve are not easily assessed, and the figures given in this paragraph are therefore intended more as an illustration of the approximate position than as an attempt at calculation of strength and percentages.

Every year certain classes of reserves and Ersatz reserves are called for training and manœuvres in the summer, being retained nominally for twenty-eight days but often for less.

It appears that in August 1912 the reservists so called in the 15th and 16th corps, were permanently retained and not dismissed. In September similar detachments of reservists were retained in the 15th, 16th, 7th, 13th, and part of the 12th corps. The same procedure was adopted in these corps in October and November. It is impossible to assess the numbers so retained, but the idea that whole year classes of reserves and Ersatz reserves were called is unlikely. On the 3rd November further steps were taken to augment the garrison of Bosnia, &c., both by calling three whole classes of reserves and Ersatz reserves to battalions stationed in or destined for these provinces and by the commencement of the process of conveying units. About the 17th November the order was given to extend the calling of three-year classes of reserves and Ersatz reserves to all corps. About the end of the 2nd November further classes were called for the 1st, 10th, 11th, and part of the 6th corps, and latterly about the 28th December two further classes have apparently been called for the 1st, 10th, 11th, and part of the 6th corps in order to replace men allowed to return home for Christmas leave.

Certain points remain obscure:—

1. It is not known what the approximate total of a year class of Ersatz reserves is. From general opinion it would appear to be about twenty a battalion and proportionately in other arms.
2. The normal total of a year class of reservists, according to past contingents, is from thirty to thirty-five per company, and proportionately in other arms, but as a matter of fact efforts have been made to avoid recourse to subsistence for families of reservists by leaving out those who are bread-winners, and after making further allowance for absentees and casualties, it is thought that a total of twenty-five per company for reservists and Ersatz reservists on the average is approximately correct and proportionately for other arms. Ten year classes serving therefore represents approximately war strength for a unit.
3. It is not known what value is ascribed to the 1913 year class of recruits, but there is evidence, as far as Bosnia is concerned, to support the supposition that they are regarded as not available for service, since the fact is well established that battalions there are 1,200 strong.
4. It is not known whether the 1910 class, who finished their service in November 1912 have been retained in all cases or not, or whether this class is included in the three classes called universally or not.
5. It is not known whether reservists have been called to particular regiments or simply "pooled." In the case of Slav regiments there is reason to believe that the latter is the case.
6. It is not known whether the programme as originally intended has been carried out in its entirety or not.

Excluding the navy and the gendarmerie, and from the information so far at disposal, it is believed that Table (A) gives an approximate distribution of the Austro-Hungarian forces in Bosnia, Hungary, Galicia, and elsewhere respectively at the present date.

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

Corps, &c.	Bosnia, &c.		Bulgarian Group.	Galician Group.	Elsewhere.	Total.
Corps.	15th, 16th.		6th, 7th, 13th.	1st, 10th, 11th, 6th.	2nd, 3rd, 5th, 8th; 9th, 12th, 14th.	
Battalions and estimated percentage of strength ..	Battalions. 50 normal, 112 %, 60,520 63 added, 112 %, 53,028 3 22nd regiment, 1,200		Battalions. 10 to Bosnia .. 45, 105 %, 46,125 19, 75 %, 14,016	Battalions. 18 to Bosnia .. 69, 80 %, 56,350 21, 75 %, 10,134	Battalions. 25 to Bosnia, 190, 60 %, 116,736	
Total infantry ..	.. ..	121,967	.. 60,731	.. 72,724	.. 116,736	371,598
Other arms in proportion	.. ..	51,500	.. 32,000	.. 16,000	.. 93,000	223,500
Reserves of 22nd Regiment	.. ..	2,400	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	2,400
Departments and Staffs	.. ..		.. ..	.. ..	.. 22,072	22,072
Honved—						
Peace strength ..	.. ..	..	.. 20,000	.. 6,400	.. 13,600	40,000
Reserves	.. ..	..	.. 12,000	.. 4,000	.. 8,000	24,000
Landwehr—						
Peace strength ..	5 ..	5,000	.. ..	.. 10,750	.. 29,250	50,000
Reserves	.. ..	2,000	.. ..	.. 11,250	.. 18,750	32,000
Bosnia-Herzegovina—						
Troops	4 ..	1,750	.. 1,750	.. 1,750	.. 1,750	7,000
Reserves	.. ..	2,000	.. ..	.. ..	.. ..	2,000
Total ..	114	185,057	.. 126,181	.. 167,874	.. 305,138	774,570

In various other responsible quarters the total has been calculated higher. The Russian military attaché, for example, considers the total under arms to be in excess of 900,000, and believes five corps, in addition to the troops in Bosnia, &c., to be completely mobilized. But inasmuch as there is a natural tendency to exaggerate in such matters, it is thought best to be on the safe side.

IV.—*Reservists of the Common Army.*

As your Excellency is doubtless aware, the 15th and 16th army corps, whose head-quarters are at Sarajevo and Ragusa respectively, are composed of battalions detached from the other corps of the army. The completion of these battalions to war strength involves therefore the calling of reserves in the corps from which they are detached. Inasmuch as, apparently, it was thought necessary to increase immediately the low peace cadres of these units by trained men, drafts from the affiliated battalions have been dispatched to the annexed provinces, the depletion in such battalions being made good by calling up reservists to the battalions in Austria and Hungary. And, further, as the possibility of a general mobilisation has throughout been kept in view, the peace strength of the battalions in Austria and Hungary has also been increased in order to provide an establishment capable of carrying out the various additional duties that are imposed by extraordinary circumstances of the kind under notice. For these purposes three classes of reserves throughout the army and two classes of Ersatz reserves in certain cases have been called up for service. The general effect of this measure is to raise the establishment of one battalion per regiment to war strength (259 men per company) and the remaining three battalions to an increased peace strength of 160 men per company, including both the recruit class of 1913 (151,000 men), and the three years service men (103,000 men), who, in natural course, would have been sent home, but have been, as supposed, everywhere retained.

V.—*The Garrisons of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia.*

The normal Austrian regiment of the common army has four battalions, two regiments making a brigade and two brigades a division. But the necessities of peace distribution, and the existence of such units as Kaiser Tiroler Jäger regiments and Field Jäger battalions, which are differently organised, result in an unequal allotment of battalions to the division as at present constituted for war. The disadvantages of such a lack of homogenity from a tactical and administrative point of view are obvious, and there is reason to think that in war a normal of twelve battalions per division only will be taken, the remainder being available for such purposes as are required.

Without definitely committing myself I incline to the opinion that the garrisons of the annexed provinces will be formed from the battalions so available, and that their number gives the clue to the present and future strength of the garrison.

The peace strength of the garrison, with the exception of one infantry regiment, and the Landwehr regiments which are wholly stationed there, has consisted, so far, of single battalions detached from four battalion regiments, and, in no case, has more than one battalion from any one regiment been so detached, and, up to the present date, no verified case of departure from this rule can be quoted throughout the process of reinforcement that has lately taken place.

If this basis of reckoning is correct the number of battalions in Bosnia will be:—

	Battalions.
1 battalion from 101 regiments	101
22nd Regiment of 4 battalions	4
4 battalions, Bosnian-Herzegovinian troops	4
37th Landwehr Infantry Regiment	3
2 battalions 23rd Landwehr Infantry Regiment	2
Total	114

In assessing the extent to which this number of battalions might be increased without upsetting the organisation of the ordinary divisions, regard must be had to the total number of battalions in the Austro-Hungarian army, and to the number of divisions available for ordinary field service. The total number of battalions of all descriptions maintained is 681. The total number of divisions into which they are at present divided is forty-eight, of which four (1st, 18th, 47th, 48th) are already in the annexed provinces.

If a general average of twelve battalions to the division be allowed a total of 528 battalions will be required for forty-four divisions in Austria and Hungary, leaving 153 battalions available for the garrisons of Bosnia, &c.

As has already been remarked the organisation of the existing divisions and brigades composing them is not uniform, and as many of the units included in the foregoing total are of special nature, such as Kaiser Tiroler Jäger battalions and Landeschutzen regiments, it is not likely that so large a number as 153 battalions will actually be located in the annexed provinces.

It is thought, therefore, that a total of from 120 to 125 battalions will hardly be exceeded, giving an infantry force of from 125,000 to 130,000 men, or a total force of all arms of 180,000 to 200,000 men in the three provinces.

VI.—*The Distribution of Troops in Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Dalmatia.*

The troops in the annexed provinces are distributed roughly in three main groups:—

1. *In Bosnia* in the area facing Servia and the sanjak of Novi Bazar, where in all there appears to be a total of about fifty-four battalions distributed over the following centres:—

(*a.*) Banjaluka, Doboj, Tuzla.
(*b.*) Sarajevo (twenty-four battalions).
(*c.*) Vizegrad, Goradza, Foco.

2. *In Herzegovina* in the area facing Montenegro, where there appear to be about twenty-five battalions distributed over the following centres:—

(*a.*) Mostar.
(*b.*) Bilec, Trebinje.

3. *In Dalmatia*, along the coast, where there appear to be about thirty-five battalions at the following points:—

Mitrovic, Gravosa, Ragusa, Castelnuovo, Cattaro, Teodo, Budua.

The object of this large concentration is at present not well understood, and is the subject of much speculation. In a report by an officer of the British army, who recently

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visited Bosnia, stress is laid upon the difficulties of road communications there, and the opinion is generally expressed that an advance into Servia by the group given in I (above) is not to be expected. It is undoubtedly the case that great fears are entertained concerning a possible rising in Bosnia, and the official assurance that the troops lately dispatched are for protective purposes only may be, in the main, true. The fact that they are, for the most part, located near the frontier does not necessarily imply an offensive intention, since it may be claimed that the best way to prevent a rising in rear is to interpose a striking force in front; but it is also thought as well to refer to the opposite view held by many well-informed people here that the difficulties of the roads are exaggerated, and that similar difficulties were overcome by the Bulgarians in their advance on Kirk Kilisse; that the Bosnian troops are equipped for mountain warfare; that the troops themselves look forward with confidence to an offensive campaign, and that the size of the force collected indicates an offensive intention. The object of the large concentration of troops in the area Mostan Trebinje, Ragusa, Cattaro (groups 2 and 3) is by no means clear either. Lately there has been a tendency to speak about the "capture of the great mountain which menaces our harbour of Cattaro," and it must be admitted that there are still doubts concerning the eventual attitude of Montenegro which may account for the preparation of a force wherewith to invade that country. When the determination of Austria to prevent the Montenegrins from having Scutari becomes clear to the latter it is conceivable that they may throw in their lot with the Servians, in which case the force under consideration may be used in the direct invasion of Montenegro. At any rate in this case it can hardly be urged that the assembly of so large a body of troops is for the purpose of defence, inasmuch as Dalmatia, in this region, is no more than a narrow strip of coast territory.

An alternative object, however, might be a descent upon the coast of Albania if it becomes necessary to secure by force the abandonment of that country by Serbs and Montenegrins alike.

It may be claimed that an expedition for this purpose might more conveniently and with greater secrecy be carried out from the ports of Trieste, Pola, and Fiume, and, in reply, it can only be urged that further reinforcement may, as a matter of fact, be transported from these ports later, if the international situation permits the withdrawal of units for this purpose.

It can, in any case, be assumed that half the force gathered in Herzegovina and Dalmatia can be transported by sea without unduly weakening the garrisons of the provinces, that is to say, an expeditionary army of thirty-six battalions, equivalent to three divisions.

It is not claimed, of course, that such an expedition has been actually organised, but it is desired to point out the possibilies of the situation.

VII.—*The Concentration in Hungary.*

The difficulty of obtaining reliable news has been even greater in Hungary than in Bosnia, but it may be taken as fairly well established that the force destined for the invasion of Servia from this direction consists of a total of ten divisions, namely, the 4th, 7th, and 13th army corps (each of two common and one Honved division) and the 28th Division of the 3rd corps from Graz.

It cannot be stated with anything approaching accuracy at what percentage of war strength the units of these corps stand, but the balance of well-informed opinion places it for the common army division from 112 to 100 per cent., while the calling of reserves for the Honved brigades has only just begun. The 13th corps, whose head-quarters are at Agram, consists of units in which there are a large proportion of Slavs, and it has been rumoured that these units have been partly or wholly replaced by Austrian and Hungarian units. While this may turn out to be the case, there is a more likely alternative, namely, that while the cadres remain the same the reservists sent to them have been either Austrian or Hungarian. These forces are at present grouped as follows:—

7th Corps.—Head-quarters, apparently Temesvar, with posts along the Danube from Weisskirchen to Semlin.

4th Corps.—Head-quarters, apparently Theresienopol, round Ujvdek, Zombor, and near Theresienopol.

13th Corps.—Head-quarters, apparently Esseg, with posts from Semlin to Brod.

From the fact that a great collection of rolling-stock is maintained at Brod, and from reports concerning reconnaissances of crossings made opposite Belgrade and the Island of Ostrov, the conclusion is drawn that the total forces in Hungary are destined to concentrate along the Danube, between Belgrade and Ostrov, to advance into Servia southwards in parallel columns.

The valley of the Morava offers the easiest and most natural entry into the interior of Servia, being comparatively accessible, the nature of the country being more suitable for the movement of troops not equipped for mountain warfare.

The information concerning the allotment of the 28th Division from Graz is derived from a good source, but it is not to be considered as verified. The total eventual strength of these forces may be taken approximately as 21,000 per division, or 210,000 at war strength, their present strength being roughly 90 per cent. for common army units, and 60 per cent. for Honved, or 130,000 men in all.

VIII.—*The Situation in Galicia.*

8. In order to form a barrier against Russia, and to anticipate any possible Russian mobilisation, measures of preparation have been taken in Galicia also, namely:—

(1.) The concentration of a large covering force of cavalry.

(2.) The partial mobilisation of the three frontier corps: 1st Krakau, 10th Przmysl, 11th Lemberg.

(3.) The partial mobilisation of the 6th (Kassa) corps in rear of the centre, to support the frontier troops if necessary.

The exact state of these troops is also a matter of considerable doubt. The Russian military attaché states positively that he has verified the fact that these troops, including the Landwehr divisions of the frontier corps, are at war strength. My own information does not support this view, and in my opinion, remembering that Russia has not mobilised at all, the situation does not demand it. I am therefore inclined to think that the percentages of war strength may be given approximately as follows:—

Cavalry, 90 per cent.; common army, division of 1st, 10th, 11th corps, 80 per cent.; 6th corps, 75 per cent; Landwehr division of 1st, 10th, 11th corps, 60 per cent.; Landwehr division of 6th corps peace strength.

At war strength, counting the cavalry at 30,000 men, approximately, this would give a total covering force of 250,000 men, of which the present strength, according to the averages assumed, is 160,000.

The cavalry is organised in three main groups or cavalry corps, with head-quarters at Krakau, Jaroslav, and Lemberg respectively. The immediate object of these forces is to form a screen behind which to mobilise and concentrate the main Austrian army, which, including Landwehr and Honved, but excluding the forces detached in Bosnia and Herzegovina, amounts to forty-four infantry divisions.

IX.—*General Mobilisation and the Distribution of the Army.*

9. Although for the reasons already given, all corps are affected by the decision to send reinforcements to the annexed provinces, it is not suggested that anything further than preliminary preparations for general mobilisation have been undertaken, but it is convenient here to sum up the situation that would be created if general mobilisation were ordered.

Owing to the present attitude of Italy and Roumania, it will not be necessary to make large detachments for those frontiers. A total of two divisions or an equivalent of twenty-four battalions will probably suffice.

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The approximate distribution will therefore be:—

1. Cavalry: Approximate total strength			50,000
2. Available against Russia—	Divisions.		
(*a.*) In Galicia, partly mobilised	9		
(*b.*) In reserve in Hungary	3		
(*c.*) Available for general deployment	20		
	32		672,000
3. Required for the Italian border	2		30,000
4. Required for Servia, northern force	10		210,000
	44		
5. In the annexed provinces a maximum of 153 battalions available			200,000
6. Twenty-nine infantry brigades to be formed from Ersatz cadres and Landsturm on mobilisation			200,000
Total			1,362,000

X.—*Comments on the Significance of the Measures taken.*

From the foregoing review, it will be appreciated that the measures taken are very far-reaching, and cannot truthfully be said to be confined to purposes of defence in the common restricted meaning of that expression, in view of the fact that up to the present date Russia has not mobilised her forces, and that the Servian divisions, with the exception of the Ibar army, are one and all out of Servia.

The object would appear to be less the defence of home territory than the ultimate defence of interests by preventing the development of a neighbour likely, in the future, to prove a danger. Whatever may be asserted to the contrary, such an object is offensive in character.

In the measures that have been taken we may then assume the following purposes:—

1. To prevent anything in the nature of a Slav rising in the Slav provinces of the Dual Monarchy.

2. To prevent any invasion of Austrian territory by the Servians having as its object the stirring up of such risings.

3. To bring pressure upon Servia in order to confine her to limits which will prevent her future expansion.

4. To prevent Russia from supporting Servia.

At the time of writing it would appear that the foregoing objects have in the meantime been secured.

Whether the results achieved are commensurate with the sacrifices made is a matter of opinion. On the one hand, the Austrians may claim that if they had not taken the the steps they have the attitude of Russia and Servia might have been different. On the other hand, both Russia and Servia can point to the fact that from first to last they have taken no military measures, offensive or defensive, whatever. And though for the moment the aspirations of Servia seem to be checked, it remains for consideration whether the advantage obtained by Austria shows signs of permanency. And this is a matter of importance, because there exists in Austria itself an influential group of people who consider that the only secure guarantee of future peace is to destroy the power and ability of Servia to develop in the future by making war upon her at once upon any pretext or none.

It is significant in this connection that, in spite of the supposed amelioration of the position, the preparations of Austria show no sign of cessation. That the details of settlement may yet cause anxiety may be considered sufficient reason for persistence in war preparation, and it is essential, from the point of view of the well being of the army, that those who have been recalled to the colours should be in no doubt concerning the successful results achieved by their sacrifices; but, on the other hand, the cost of maintaining the present increases in armament is very great, and indirectly the commencement of actual demobilisation would ease the commercial strain immediately and prevent unnecessary loss.

It is not unnatural, then, that people should give credence to rumours concerning "guarantees" to be obtained from Servia by force at a later period, including, it is stated in some quarters, the limitation of the Servian army. Uneasiness has been increased by the fact that the appointment of General Baron Conrad von Hoetzendorf has been at once followed by fresh movements and reinforcements, and as that general is believed to be the real driving force behind the war party, the inference that some

real use is to be made of the army before it is allowed to disperse again is not unnatural. It cannot be said that the measures so far taken by Austria, either in their nature or in their sequence, give much evidence of clear purpose or firm direction. The initiative has been with her throughout, but disinclination to make use of it has been marked.

Conflicting aims and interests and indecision concerning the amount of pressure to be exercised have resulted in a compromise, which has in a certain measure detracted from the moral impression the measures taken were intended to create. The impress of two mutually destructive policies are to be traced throughout. On the one hand are those who desire to absorb Servia, or at least to render her innocuous, by means of trade intercourse mutually profitable, and, on the other, those who wish at one and the same time to benefit Austria and to destroy Servia by an immediate appeal to arms.

The effect of these rival policies upon the destiny of the Balkan forces is of the greatest importance. It would seem that sooner or later the Balkan confederation must throw in their lot either with the Triple *Entente* or with the Triple Alliance.

A policy then, which seeks to conciliate Servia and to detach her from Russian influence, and to unite her with Austria for intimate mutual advantage, is more dangerous to the Powers of the Triple *Entente* than the contrary policy of absorption by conquest, which can only be temporary at best, cannot affect the attitude of the other members of the league, and will create eternal antagonism and resentment.

The existence in the future of a consolidated Balkan force of from 750,000 to 800,000 rifles is a possibility which must be taken into consideration. The pressure of such a force, opportunely exercised in a sense antagonistic to Austria, along her southern border, must have a profound influence upon the balance of weight in Poland, and therefore ultimately in Lorraine. The defection of the Balkan States from Russian influence would therefore be a great weakening of the Triple *Entente*.

From what can be judged by events as far as they have proceeded the effect upon the Serbs has been to create ill-will without any compensating solution of the underlying difficulties. But the most important factor has still to find equilibrium, namely, the choice of the Servian people between Austrian and Russian friendship, and the value they attach to both which will decide their future attitude.

In conclusion, the internal difficulties of Austria have influenced her action in no small measure. The rivalry between Austria and Hungary and the general scramble for individual political interest have lately become acute, and have proportionately justified the views of an influential body of men who desire some change in the existing form of Government, but who despair of obtaining it in times of peace, and who therefore see in a war with Servia the last hope of rallying the patriotic elements in the country in a common cause in times of national danger. The Archduke Franz Ferdinand is believed to sympathise in some degree with this party, and their aims and activities may always be a menace to general peace.

On the other hand the influence of the Emperor remains consistently thrown on the side of peace, and in addition to his natural disinclination to go to war towards the end of his reign, he is also credited with the view that Austria would run great risks of disaster in an encounter with Russia.

I have, &c.
T. M. CUNNINGHAME,
Military Attaché.

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[697] No. 84.

Note communicated by M. Cambon, January 6, 1913.

IMMÉDIATEMENT après la réouverture des communications sur le Chemin de Fer de Salonique, le Gouvernement serbe aurait établi à la gare frontière de Gevgheli une ligne de douanes percevant le tarif turc sur les marchandises à destination des provinces nouvellement occupées.

Comme ces droits s'ajoutent à ceux qui sont perçus par l'administration grecque à Salonique, le Ministre d'Angleterre à Belgrade a été prié de s'enquérir au sujet des autorités chargés de percevoir ces taxes et des raisons qui les justifient.

D'autre part, le Ministre d'Allemagne en Serbie a été chargé de protester contre l'établissement de droits qui sont préjudiciables au commerce allemand.

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Le Gouvernement français serait désireux de savoir si le Gouvernement britannique serait disposé à faire en même temps que lui, dans la forme convenue, les démarches appropriées.

Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 4 janvier, 1913.

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[566] No. 85.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January 5*, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 6 of 4th January.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs fully appreciates the gravity and difficulty of the question with Montenegro. He had urged upon the Austrian Government the withdrawal of their opposition to Scutari becoming Montenegrin in general interests, though somewhat against his own instincts, because, the town of Scutari being wholly Albanian, he foresees difficulty in a small State being saddled with the future focus of Albanian irredentism. Hitherto, however, he has not been able to move the Austrian Government. Montenegro is equally persistent in maintaining the claim to Scutari. He is continuing to work for a compromise in the sense of ceding a portion of the plain of Scutari while leaving the town to Albania and offering commercial and railway facilities. I urged the necessity of arriving without delay at some concrete proposal which the Powers could reasonably press the acceptance of on Montenegro. He admitted that public opinion here was favourable to Montenegro receiving adequate satisfaction, and for that reason he may be counted on to do his best to advance a solution. Should such a compromise, to which he has reason to hope Austria-Hungary will not be indisposed, be submitted, he feels that Russia would have most influence in inducing the King of Montenegro to agree, as he is financed by Russia. He said that the Austrian Government were now indisposed to leave the issue of Scutari to the end, and were anxious that it should be settled forthwith. Their position was very difficult, because they had imposed such sacrifices on the country that they were compelled to have tangible results to show for them. Italy's agreement with Austria regarding Albania precluded her from going further in resisting Austrian opposition to the surrender of Scutari, as it was of essential interest to Italy that that agreement should be recognised as binding on both parties.

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[812] No. 86.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 6*, 1913.

MY telegram No. 495 of 30th December.

Minister for Foreign Affairs tells me that a paragraph in the laws which had been overlooked empowers the Emperor to retain the reservists with the colours for a further period of six months when reasons of national defence render it necessary. Reservists will therefore be retained without an Imperial ukase being issued.

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[814] No. 87.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, January 6*, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 11 of 4th January.

I have communicated to the Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of Salonica telegram of 3rd January. His Excellency said that communication which I had made to him in accordance with instructions sent me in your telegram No. 3, repeating telegram No. 2 of 1st January to Belgrade, had unfortunately slipped his memory, but that he would have the matter seen to at once.

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[815] No. 88.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 8. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 6*, 1913.

MY telegram No. 2 of 4th January.

On my asking Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether he had yet thought of any alternative solution of the Scutari question, his Excellency replied in the negative, adding that he would accept anything that would satisfy Montenegro.

As he recently mentioned to me quite privately a personal suggestion thrown out by the Austrian Ambassador that Montenegro should be given the low lands between Montenegrin frontier and Scutari, while that town should be left to Albania, I enquired whether he would now inform you of it. He replied that he did not know whether Montenegro would accept it, and that he could not in any case put it forward himself.

As his Excellency did not authorise me to report the above to you, I only do so for your private information. I gather that he would accept this solution if Montenegro could be induced to accept it.

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[625] No. 89.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 6*, 1913.

I AM informed that the Cabinet to-day discussed a message from the Ottoman Ambassador in London, to the effect that, as interpreted by them, you had said that Russia and France were prepared to insist on the cession of Adrianople to Bulgaria, but that it might perhaps be possible to retain it against a neutral strip between Dedeagatch and Adrianople, with facilities of transit, &c., to the Bulgarians. One of the Ministers wished to interpret this in the opposite sense, viz., that Turkey should receive such facilities against the cession of Adrianople.

Ottoman Ambassador is being instructed to continue the conversation with you, with a view to and hope of preventing definite rupture to-morrow.

Ottoman Ambassador appears also to have conveyed hope that Turkey may retain the islands.

Porte adheres to Western Thracian point being Kara Agatch (lagoon). They would seem still to be unable to face hard facts of the situation and divest themselves of bargaining tendencies. Should, however, an actual rupture take place, they would be forced to adopt a more businesslike attitude before expiration of four days and resumption of hostilities. In the latter eventuality, the Turks would presumably have to take the offensive at Chataldja; and though many of the younger officers profess to be keen to do so in the hope of scoring a victory, and thus retrieving the prestige of the Turkish army at home and abroad rather than relieving Adrianople, it would seem that neither the Government nor the army generally is anxious to renew hostilities, even if Adrianople had to be sacrificed under European pressure exercised in the interval between the rupture of the negotiations and renewal of state of war.

It would appear that Herr Zimmermann, in conversation with Ottoman chargé d'affaires in Berlin, counselled moderation in the matter of Adrianople, while the Turkish Ambassador at Vienna, quoting opinions of certain press circles there, and Austrian refusal to demobilise, urges an unyielding attitude generally.

Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day gave his colleagues a very gloomy *exposé* of the financial situation, and urged consequent necessity of a pacific solution.

I hear that my German and Russian colleague have suggested as a compromise that if Turkey cedes Adrianople fortifications might be dismantled on lines stipulated in 52nd article of the Treaty of Berlin.*

(Repeated to Sophia, Vienna, and Athens.)

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* This provides for the razing of fortresses and fortifications from the Iron Gates to the mouth of the Danube.

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[809] No. 90.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 6.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 6, 1913.*

I LEARN confidentially that the Porte is about to conclude a contract through a Jew called Izedor Pasha for the purchase of a Dreadnought and some destroyers on credit basis. As negotiations are secret I have not ascertained details, but it would appear to concern ships building for an American State—perhaps those referred to in your despatch No. 544 of 28th November, and that negotiations are in some way connected with a Central American port.

This might interest Sir R. Crawford.

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[974] No. 91.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 6, 1913.*

THE Governments of the Six Powers have all agreed, through the Ambassadors in London, that in the event of a rupture of the peace negotiations a collective *démarche* should be made by the Powers at Constantinople.

The following text has been proposed :—

"1. Les Turcs ne tiennent pas suffisamment compte des résultats de la guerre et des futures conséquences d'une reprise d'hostilités.

"2. Dans ce dernier cas, les Puissances seraient obligées d'envisager la situation future de Constantinople et les développements de la guerre en Asie Mineure.

"3. Les Puissances seront obligées d'intervenir en Turquie pour la protection de leurs intérêts financiers.

"4. D'autre part, la paix étant conclue, la Turquie sera en état d'obtenir des financiers une assistance pour consolider sa situation à Constantinople et en Asie Mineure, seule partie de son Empire qui jusqu'ici n'a pas été pour elle une cause de faiblesse.

"5. Quant à la cession des îles, les Puissances useront de leur influence pour assurer que les îles qui seraient cédées aux alliés et qui auraient une importance stratégique soient pourvues d'une administration soumise à des conditions de neutralisation telles qu'elles ne puissent constituer une menace pour la Turquie.

"6. En ce qui concerne la ville d'Andrinople, qui paraît devoir capituler, les Puissances useront de leur influence pour que les termes de la cession définitive de la ville aux alliés soient conçus de façon à préserver les intérêts musulmans relatifs aux mosquées et aux biens religieux, et pour assurer leur sauvegarde."

You should be ready to take part in a collective *démarche* consisting of these six points textually, but you should note that at present French Minister for Foreign Affairs has agreed only to the first three points, and has expressed a preference for a *démarche* limited to the cession of Adrianople, and the settlement of the question of the islands by the Powers. You and your colleagues must therefore arrange the text with the French Ambassador.

Peace negotiations have not yet come to a rupture, but ended to-day in some confusion.

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[974] No. 92.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 6, 1913.*

IF a *démarche collective* has to be made, the question of supporting it by a naval demonstration has been discussed. French and Russian Governments are favourable to the idea. German Ambassador has said that he thinks his Government thinks it premature to take it into consideration at present.

I have said that, in view of the general expression of opinion about a naval demonstration, we should probably send two ships to Besika Bay if the collective *démarche* takes place.

This would enable us to be ready for emergencies or future developments.

[1167] No. 93.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 6, 1913.*

AT the meeting of the Ambassadors this afternoon, the Russian Ambassador gave the following revised version of the conditions which he wished to see applied to the four islands near the mouth of the straits :—

"Engagement de la Grèce :

"1. De raser les fortifications existantes et démolir tous les établissements et ouvrages militaires ou navals.

"2. De ne jamais en ériger de nouveau.

"3. De ne jamais utiliser les îles dans un but de guerre ou pour des besoins stratégiques quelconques.

"4. De ne jamais céder à aucune Puissance le droit de souveraineté ou d'occupation ou tout autre droit sur les îles."

The German Ambassador stated on behalf of his Government that they adhered to the proposal for a *démarche collective*, and to all the six points which I had suggested for it. He then gave, *à titre personnel*, some observations on three other points. Of his proposals on these three points he then handed copies to those present :—

"1. Il ne paraît prématuré d'envisager dès à présent une pression ou démonstration navale à Constantinople qui suivrait, le cas échéant, la démarche collective des Puissances.

"2. Il me paraît indiqué de s'associer à l'idée émise par M. Poincaré vis-à-vis de M. Jonesco de faire suivre la démarche collective susmentionnée par une démarche analogue à Sophia en faveur d'une attitude conciliante vis-à-vis des réclamations de la Roumanie.

"3. Il me semble que des considérations d'équité et de neutralité s'opposent à l'idée d'enlever à la Turquie et Andrinople et toutes les îles, et que, dans le cas où elle cède sur la question de cette ville, il faudrait lui assurer la possession des quatre îles situées près des Dardanelles ainsi que de Mytilène et de Chios, selon la proposition du Cabinet italien, ou au moins faire entrevoir à la Sublime Porte la possibilité d'en retenir quelques-unes."

I said that we could not discuss every point at once, and I suggested that we should hear what the respective Governments had to say about a *démarche collective* and a naval demonstration.

The Italian Ambassador said that his Government agreed to a *démarche collective*. The proposals which had been drawn up at the last meeting of the Ambassadors had been sent to the Italian Ambassador in Constantinople, and he had been instructed to "adhérer aux demandes que les autres cinq Ambassadeurs feront à la suite des instructions identiques qu'ils ont reçues." The Italian Government, however, wished to observe, in giving their adherence to point 5 of the *démarche collective*, that "il doit être entendu et interprété dans le sens que la demande relative aux îles n'implique pas de notre part le consentement à la cession de toutes les îles à la Grèce, mais ne s'applique qu'à la seule cession de la Crète."

I asked the Italian Ambassador whether his Government had said anything about a naval demonstration.

He replied that they had not expressly mentioned it; but, as they had sent the document including it to the Italian Ambassador in Constantinople, he presumed that they raised no objection to it.

The French Ambassador stated that M. Poincaré approved the *démarche collective* as regards the first three points, and made no objection to supporting the *démarche* by ships of war; indeed, he had already instructed one ship to remain for that purpose. He added, however, the following observation :—

"Il préfère sur meilleur avis que l'action des Puissances se borne aux deux points suivants :—

"1. Cession d'Andrinople.

"2. Règlement de la question des îles par les Puissances.

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"Quant à présent, il ne lui semble pas utile de parler de la question financière ou de la situation future de Constantinople et du développement possible de la guerre en Asie Mineure."

On this we had some discussion. The French Ambassador pointed out that M. Poincaré did not seem quite to have understood exactly what was meant by some of the six points.

On being asked my opinion I said that the object of the six points was, on the one hand, to point out to the Turks that they had much to lose by not making peace, and, on the other hand, the advantages of making peace: to give them, in short, the incentive of fear on one side and of hope on the other; and I thought that the *démarche* would be weakened by cutting it down.

The Russian Ambassador said that his Government approved of the *démarche collective*, and were prepared to support it by a naval demonstration. They agreed to the six points with the substitution of the word "Musulmans" for "Turcs" in point 6. This verbal alteration was at once agreed to by everyone. On point 5 the Russian Government made the following verbal reserve:—

"Le Gouvernement russe verrait des inconvénients à appliquer aux autres îles qui pourraient être cédées à la Grèce le régime destiné aux quatre îles près des Dardanelles. Il importerait seulement de maintenir pour ces îles l'obligation de ne pas les céder à aucune autre Puissance."

The Austrian Ambassador had not yet received instructions, but concluded that they were on the way.

As a result of the expression of all these views, I stated that I would instruct the British Ambassador in Constantinople to be ready to take part in a *démarche collective* consisting of the six points textually, but I would point out to him that he should note that, at present, M. Poincaré had agreed to only the first three points, and had expressed a preference for a *démarche* limited to the cession of Adrianople and the settlement by the Powers of the question of the islands. Our Ambassador and his colleagues must, therefore, arrange the text with the French Ambassador.

I pointed out that the French and Russian Governments certainly, and the Italian Government presumably, were favourable to a naval demonstration, and the objection of the German Ambassador was limited only to saying that such a demonstration was premature. I therefore stated that, in view of the general expression of opinion about a naval demonstration, the British Government would probably be ready to send two war-ships to Besika Bay if the *démarche collective* took place. I explained that to send ships to Besika Bay was not in itself a naval demonstration; it was what we had done before, when there was thought to be fear of a crisis and danger to the embassies in Constantinople. But if the other Powers also sent ships to Besika Bay they could of course be used for a naval demonstration if one was desired.

The German Ambassador said, with regard to the second of the three points on which he had made observations to us to-day, that this suggestion or one akin to it had been made to M. Take Jonesco by M. Poincaré.

The French Ambassador observed that M. Poincaré had not told him anything to this effect.

I remarked that Bulgaria would probably ask, before yielding to our wishes about Roumania, what steps we proposed to secure for her in Constantinople a favourable result about Adrianople, and whether we were prepared to support our *démarche* by a naval demonstration. In fact, Dr. Danef had already urged upon me the need of a naval demonstration, and had said that it would certainly be effective, a point on which I had said that some of the Powers might express doubt.

Finally, the Italian Ambassador having pointed out that we might simply express a hope that, if our intervention in Constantinople was successful, Bulgaria would, in return, be conciliatory to Roumania, the following expression of opinion was drawn up by the French Ambassador and agreed to:—

"Après entretien sur l'observation de l'Ambassadeur de l'Allemagne, la réunion s'est demandé si, dans le cas où la Bulgarie obtiendrait, grâce aux démarches des Puissances à Constantinople, des conditions de paix conformes à ses désirs, il n'y aurait pas lieu de l'engager à se montrer conciliante avec la Roumanie."

On the third point raised to-day by the German Ambassador, the Italian Ambassador stated that he was not authorised to make, nor did he know that his Government had made, this proposition. The words "selon la proposition du Cabinet italien" were therefore struck out, and it was agreed to refer to our respective Governments what the German Ambassador had given us.

At the end of the meeting news was brought that the Peace Conference had adjourned in some confusion, without fixing a day to meet again; but it was an adjournment, and not a rupture.

The Ambassadors agreed, therefore, to meet to-morrow to consider the situation when they had full information as to what had passed at the meeting of the peace delegates to-day.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[807] No. 94.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 6, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Minister called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 1st January. The object of his visit appeared to be to enlist our sympathies in favour of Bulgaria obtaining Adrianople, and to beg us to put some pressure on Turkey to cede it. He certainly gave no indication that the Bulgarians were in any way weakening on the subject, as Tewfik Pasha had rather hinted. Sir A. Nicolson told the Bulgarian Minister that we had spoken more than once at Constantinople in the sense of impressing on Turkey to recognise facts, and to give no cause for a renewal of hostilities.

M. Madjarof did not appear at all inclined to consider that Roumania had any claim to territorial compensation, and remarked that it would be impossible for Bulgaria to cede any territory to her.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[977] No. 95.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 6, 1913.*

I SAW Dr. Danef this morning, and found him very anxious that the Powers should intervene and use pressure in Constantinople to make the Turks give way.

After some conversation, I said that the position apparently was that if, at this afternoon's meeting, the Turks maintained their attitude of last week, there would be nothing more to discuss, but if the Turks altered their attitude so as to bring the question of the town of Adrianople within the scope of discussion, the allies would discuss the proposition.

Dr. Danef said that in that case they would certainly continue the discussion, and would probably adjourn till Thursday (the 9th instant) to do so. He seemed surprised that Austria had not yet taken the initiative in proposing a naval demonstration.

I observed that I could not say what the Powers would think of a naval demonstration. Some of them might say that, being a demonstration, and nothing more, it was not likely to be effective.

Dr. Danef contended that it would be effective, as all that the Turks wished was to save their face.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[806] No. 96.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 6, 1913.*

M. MISU, the new Roumanian Minister, called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 1st January. No actual political discussion ensued, but Sir A. Nicolson enquired of him as to political parties in Bulgaria, a country of which he has an intimate knowledge. M. Misu said

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that King Ferdinand was supreme. All notable men had died or had disappeared, and therefore King Ferdinand could deal with his Ministers more or less at his own sweet will. They all stood in awe of him, and moreover, as the past records of most of them were rather shady, King Ferdinand kept their respective dossiers, and if any proved recalcitrant, a threat to disclose unpleasant details was a sufficient deterrent. M. Misu made an exception in the case of M. Danef, of whom he spoke in the highest terms, and who was adroit in keeping in the favour of his sovereign.

There was one question on which M. Misu thought King Ferdinand always blundered, and that was his inability to avoid whispering in confidence to any interlocutor biting criticisms on those with whom he had dealings.

The Bulgaro-Roumanian question was scarcely touched upon in this conversation.

In a subsequent conversation with me M. Misu said that he and M. Take Jonesco, who was to arrive that day, would deal with M. Danef direct about Roumanian questions, and he assented with some amusement to my statement that there would thus be three conferences proceeding at once in London, the Ambassadors, the peace delegates and the Roumanian-Bulgarian.

I told him that the Ambassadors as representatives with myself of the neutral signatories of the Treaty of Berlin had hitherto only discussed questions affecting the Great Powers, but that if we discussed questions directly affecting Roumania we should take some means of consulting her. He said this was the arrangement that he and his Government had understood was arrived at.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[978] No. 97.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 2.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 6, 1913.*

M. TAKE JONESCO came to see me to-day, and told me that he had asked the German Ambassador to propose that, if the Powers intervened in Constantinople to make the Turks give way to Bulgaria about Adrianople, they should also express an opinion or a wish in Sophia that Bulgaria should make reasonable concessions to Roumania. When he had seen M. Poincaré last Wednesday (the 1st instant), M. Poincaré had said that it might be possible to link the question of getting Adrianople for Bulgaria with the consideration of the Roumanian demands. That was before M. Take Jonesco had found the attitude of Dr. Danef to be so stiff as it now was in London. At the same time, negotiations were not broken off between Bulgaria and Roumania; in fact, they had hardly yet begun officially in London.

I said that the Ambassadors would no doubt discuss whatever the German Ambassador brought forward. But my experience was that, when the Powers began to consult about intervention, things moved very slowly. It also seemed to me that, until they decided to make some real intervention in Constantinople, the occasion for saying anything about Roumania in Sophia would apparently not arise.

M. Take Jonesco said that certainly it was only in the event of the Powers intervening in Constantinople that his present suggestion could take effect.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1174] No. 98.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 9.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 6, 1913.*

THE German Ambassador gave me to-day the accompanying note of a verbal communication as to Russian military preparations.

I said that I did not understand that the Russian Government contemplated more than retaining the military reserves that would otherwise have been dismissed on the 13th of this month. My information was that this was thoroughly understood by Count Berchtold, as, indeed, appeared now from a semi-official note in the "Neues Wiener Tageblatt," quoted in the "Times" this morning.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 98.

Note communicated by Prince Lichnowsky.

THE Russian General von Tatitschef, who is attached to the German Emperor, informs His Majesty confidentially, under instructions from the Czar, that the Russian Government has proposed to the Austrian Government to cancel the orders which provide for reinforcements of troops near the Russian frontier. Should the answer to this proposal not be satisfactory, the Czar would be obliged to increase the military forces of the Kiew district.

The British Government is surely aware of the fact that the Russian military measures, consisting in keeping under arms 400,000 men of reserve, preceded the steps taken by Austria. If Russia at the present moment, instead of considering the opportunity of redressing her armaments, even contemplates a further step of readiness for war, it is evident that such a proceeding will hardly support the mutual endeavours of Great Britain and Germany—successful up to now—to smooth existing differences.

Austria holds the view that her military measures near the Galician frontier are but a completing of her regiments to their normal peace establishment, because they were by far below that footing. Therefore she seems only to make up for a fault which Russia never was guilty of.

[55902] No. 99.

Conference of St. James.

PROTOCOLE No. 10.

Séance du 24 décembre 1912 (6 janvier 1913).

Étaient présents :

Pour la Bulgarie :

MM. Danev, Madjarov et le Général Paprikov ;

Pour la Grèce :

MM. Vénizélos, Skouloudis, Gennadius et Streit ;

Pour le Monténégro :

MM. Miouchekovitch, le Comte de Voïnovitch et Popovitch ;

Pour la Serbie :

MM. Novakovitch, Nicolitch et Vesnitch ;

Pour la Turquie :

Réchid Pacha, Osman Nizamy Pacha et le Général Salih Pacha.

La séance est ouverte à 4 heures ½, sous la présidence de M. Novakovitch.

Le protocole de la séance précédente, lu par le secrétaire, M. Tchaprachikov, est adopté.

Le Président donne la parole au premier délégué ottoman pour lui permettre de répondre à la déclaration des délégués alliés faite à la séance précédente.

Réchid Pacha déclare que, toute réflexion faite, la délégation ottomane a préféré ajourner la séance actuelle à la date proposée tout d'abord par les alliés, c'est-à-dire au lundi, 24 décembre (6 janvier), au lieu de la fixer au samedi précédent, en conformité de la première proposition ottomane.

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En réponse à la déclaration des alliés, faite à la séance précédente, il lit la nouvelle proposition suivante:

"Dans la note qu'ils nous ont remise au cours de la séance précédente, MM. les délégués des États alliés ont exprimé l'opinion que nous n'avons pas tenu compte des résultats de la guerre. Nous devons faire remarquer que nous avons consenti de si importantes concessions territoriales que—sauf deux points—nous avons accepté tous les *desiderata* des États alliés. En nous demandant de remplacer dans la proposition par laquelle nous cédions les territoires occupés à l'ouest du vilayet d'Andrinople, le terme *occupés* par celui de *situés*, les alliés ont reconnu eux-mêmes qu'une partie du territoire dont ils demandent la cession ne se trouve actuellement pas entre leurs mains. Dans un large esprit de conciliation nous avons également accédé à cette demande. En échange de toutes ces concessions les alliés n'en ont fait aucune. Si nous refusons la cession d'Andrinople c'est que la cession de cette ville est, entre autres raisons, impossible au point de vue de la sécurité de Constantinople et des Dardanelles.

"En outre, nous devons ajouter que nous sommes venus ici avec la ferme intention d'établir une paix durable dans des conditions propres à assurer des relations amicales et des facilités commerciales profitables aux deux parties. Nous sommes aujourd'hui encore prêts à discuter sur une ligne frontière entre la Turquie et la Bulgarie, mais cette frontière doit laisser Andrinople en territoire ottoman.

"Pour donner une nouvelle preuve de notre esprit de conciliation nous consentons à nous désister de nos droits sur l'île de Crète à condition, bien entendu, que l'abandon d'aucune des autres îles ottomanes de la mer Égée ne soit réclamé par les États alliés.

"Si, malgré ces énormes sacrifices, les alliés, en rejetant toute idée d'entrer dans la voie des concessions, veulent rompre les négociations, toute la responsabilité des conséquences de cette rupture retombera sur eux, et dans cette éventualité nous déclarons nulles et non avenues toutes les concessions que nous avons faites jusqu'à ce jour."

M. Dimov propose de suspendre la séance pour que les délégués alliés puissent prendre connaissance de cette proposition et préparer leur réponse.

A la reprise de la séance,

Le Président lit la déclaration suivante:

"Les propositions de leurs Excellences les délégués ottomans ne répondant pas aux demandes formulées par les alliés dans la séance précédente et les négociations sur la nouvelle base proposée n'étant pas de nature à aboutir à une entente, les délégués alliés se voient obligés de suspendre les travaux de la conférence."

Le Président déclare que, par suite de la déclaration qui précède, la séance est levée.

La séance est levée à 4 heures ½.

Le Président:
ST. NOVAKOVITCH.

Les Secrétaires:
H. NORMAN.
S. TCHAPRACHIKOV.
A. C. VOUROS.
S. Y. CHOUITCH.

NOTE.—La délégation ottomane proteste contre la levée inopinée de la séance et demande la parole pour faire ses observations. A son avis, les travaux de la conférence ne sauraient être suspendus qu'après délibération en règle des parties opposées, et cette suspension une fois décidée devrait être annoncée par le président du jour en sa qualité de président de la conférence et non pas en celle de porte-parole des délégations alliées.

La délégation ottomane se trouve en conséquence dans l'impossibilité d'approuver le présent protocole.

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[830] No. 100.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7, 1913.)

(No. 153.)

Sir, *Sophia, December 26, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 144 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the reply which I have now received from the Bulgarian Government, in which an assurance is given that no attempt has been made by the Bulgarian authorities to confiscate any funds deposited in the Ottoman Bank agencies in Macedonia, and that such funds belonging to the Ottoman Government as have been sequestered have been left in the custody of the agencies themselves.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 100.

M. Gueshof to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

M. le Ministre, *Sophia, le 10 (23) décembre, 1912.*

EN réponse à la note en date du 28 novembre (11 décembre), se rapportant à la requête de la Banque ottomane par laquelle cette institution se plaint de ce que les autorités Royales de Serres l'ont invitée à verser entre leurs mains les fonds appartenant au Gouvernement turc, j'ai l'honneur de communiquer à votre Excellence les explications ci-dessous que le Département des Finances vient de me fournir:

Les autorités Royales n'ont procédé à la confiscation d'aucune somme dans les agences de la Banque ottomane qui se trouvent sur les territoires occupés par les armées bulgares; elles n'ont fait que mettre sous séquestre, jusqu'à nouvel ordre et en confiant la garde aux agences elles-mêmes, les sommes qui reviennent au Gouvernement turc—sommes dont ces autorités n'ont du reste fait aucun usage.

Le but de cette mesure, qui ne lèse en rien les intérêts de la Banque ottomane, est de prévenir la remise des fonds en question au Gouvernement de Constantinople, ce qui constitue une opération dont votre Excellence reconnaît elle-même le bien-fondé.

Je vous prie, &c.
I. E. GUÉSHOF.

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[831] No. 101.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7, 1913.)

(No. 154.)

Sir, *Sophia, December 31, 1912.*

ON receipt of your telegram No. 198 of the 12th instant, I telegraphed to the British vice-consuls at Cavalla, Dedeagatch, and Rodosto, instructing them to inform the military authorities that the revenues assigned to the Ottoman Public Debt are under the protection of the Powers. I also addressed a note to the Bulgarian Government inviting them to bring the matter to the attention of the Bulgarian military authorities throughout the country.

The British vice-consul at Dedeagatch informs me that he addressed a note in the desired sense to the military commander at Dedeagatch, which was formally acknowledged.

I also enclose copy of a further letter addressed by him to Colonel Ghirgief, enclosing a complaint made by the inspector of the Ottoman Public Debt regarding the action of Messrs. G. D. Protopapas and Co.

I have received no reply from Cavalla or Rodosto, but I learn from telegrams from Constantinople that the British vice-consul at the latter port is in Constantinople and has been prevented by the Bulgarian authorities from returning to his post, in which connection I have made representations to the Bulgarian Government.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

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Enclosure 1 in No. 101.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Colonel Ghirgief.

M. le Colonel, *Dédéagatch, le 26 décembre*, 1912.

JE me permets de vous remettre sous ce pli copie d'une requête qui m'a été adressée par l'inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane, et vous prierai de vouloir bien prendre son contenue en considération, en vertu des ordres reçus de Sophia et que je vous ai communiqués le 25 courant.

La façon d'agir du Moulin G. D. Protopapas et Cie. me paraît par trop arbitraire. Aussi voudriez-vous, colonel, inviter ces messieurs à régler leur situation dans le plus bref délai possible vis-à-vis l'administration dont les intérêts se trouvent sous la protection des Grandes Puissances.

Veuillez, &c.
G. BADETTI.

Enclosure 2 in No. 101.

Inspector of Ottoman Public Debt to Vice-Consul Badetti.

M. le Vice-Consul, *Dédéagatch, le 24 décembre*, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre en date du 23 décembre.

Malgré mes démarches réitérées auprès des autorités bulgares, tant militaires que civiles, je n'ai pu jusqu'à présent parvenir à sauvegarder qu'en partie les intérêts de la Dette publique ottomane, institution internationale sous la protection des Grandes Puissances.

Ainsi, dès l'origine de la mainmise sur notre dépôt des dimes, dont l'affectation concerne la garantie kilométrique du Chemin de Fer Salonique–Dédéagatch, je m'étais présenté à la municipalité pour faire valoir les droits de la Dette. Mon intervention ne fut même pas reconnue. Depuis lors tous les produits de la dime ont été enlevés par le Moulin Protopapas sans que lors de la livraison l'assistance de notre préposé fût demandée, ni que l'on nous délivrât un reçu des céréales enlevés.

Je ne parlerai pas ici du revenu du timbre. Le Gouvernement bulgare ayant occupé toutes les branches des administrations locales, il ne peut être question dans ces conditions de l'application de la Loi sur le Timbre.

Les droits sur pêche ont été enlevés à notre fermier Papaïanach par le capitaine du port. Ma démarche auprès de ce fonctionnaire resta infructueuse.

Dans un entretien que j'avais eu avec le directeur bulgare des douanes, il avait convenu que notre agent sur la surtaxe douanière continuerait à remplir ses fonctions. Deux jours après on notifiait à notre agent que sa présence à la douane était inutile.

J'ai eu cependant l'assurance du directeur des douanes que sur les alcools étrangers les droits revenant à la Dette seraient perçus. Mais comme depuis lors aucun arrivage d'alcool n'a eu lieu, j'ignore si cette assurance verrait son application.

Dimanche dernier un avis informait les débitants de boissons alcooliques qu'une patente dorénavant serait payée au Gouvernement local. C'est encore une branche du revenu des spiritueux qui nous est enlevée. Quant au droit de fabrication des spiritueux, nous n'avons pas encore commencé à les exiger des producteurs. Je doute fort qu'on veuille nous reconnaître le droit de les encaisser.

Les affermeurs de la dime des céréales de Dédéagatch et Énos n'ont pas acquitté les échéances mensuelles venues à terme. Nous ne pourrions parvenir à entrer dans ces créances sans l'assistance des autorités bulgares.

Pour le moment nous n'avons le droit de vendre que du sel.

Hier je me suis rendu chez le Colonel Graitchief, qui m'a fait l'accueil le plus courtois. Grâce à lui, j'ai pu obtenir l'autorisation pour nos agents d'Énos et de Musselim de rejoindre leurs postes.

Nos agents de Feredjik et de Moustapha Pacha se trouvent ici dans l'impossibilité de se rendre à leurs postes.

J'apprends que tout le personnel de Sougli a quitté cette ville.

Dans ces conditions nos services ne peuvent fonctionner normalement.

Veuillez, &c.
L'Inspecteur de la Dette publique ottomane,
ÉMILE DUGIV. [?]

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[833]

No. 102.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 1. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, January 1*, 1913.

THE period under review in the present despatch has been entirely occupied with the peace negotiations in London on which centre the eyes of Europe have consequently been focussed.

That it has been a period not only of anxiety, but of indecision to King Ferdinand is obvious when one realises that the fear of losing his Throne was one of the most potent factors in bringing this Monarch over to the side of the Balkan Alliance. Unable to return in triumph to his capital, heartily disgusted with his head-quarters, which, although securely removed from the front with its attendant dangers, did not cease to inspire him with morbid fears of infection. His Majesty eventually decided on a visit to Salonica which was carried out to the no small disquietude of his advisers. The visit which as a matter of fact passed off without the occurrence of any untoward incident, was noticeable for an interesting conversation between King Ferdinand and the Queen of Greece, who endeavoured to persuade His Majesty that the city must form an integral part of the Greek Dominions. His Majesty replied that this was a question for future discussion between the two Governments.

The Bulgarians have turned the delay caused by the peace negotiations to good account forwarding trains carrying provisions and ammunition to the front by way of Adrianople station at the rate of ten a-day.

Complete solidarity has continued to exist among the members of the different parties in the Sobranjé with regard to the war, and the absolute necessity of Bulgaria acquiring Adrianople and its vilayet, although it appeared probable that the Bulgarian Government would be ready to compromise as regards the frontier in the acceptance of a line from Enos on the Ægean Sea to Midia on the Black Sea passing south of Baba Eski and Lule Burgas.

I should also wish to touch on the equally important question of compensation to Servia for her concession as regards her access to the Adriatic which has been brought to your notice in telegrams from His Majesty's Minister in Belgrade and myself. The Prime Minister, speaking quite unofficially, has informed me that it would be impossible for Bulgaria to make any concessions to Servia over and above those contained in the convention signed on the 13th March last, although Servia might, he thought, be led to demand Perlépé ("Prilep") which has considerable historic interest for her.

I am not personally inclined to share the apprehensions expressed in Belgrade telegram No. 119 on this subject, nor do I anticipate any serious trouble in this quarter, the Servian Government being more likely to seek compensation in the limitation of Albania on its northern frontier. As I had the honour to report to you in my telegram No. 253, Very Confidential, of the 28th ultimo, the Servian Minister called on me on the 27th, and informed me that the Prime Minister of Servia had just telephoned to him asking him to request me to telegraph to you the motives which had guided Servia in her recent attitude towards Austria. The gist of this message was that although Servia had given way on two important points, namely, on the question of the Austrian consul at Prisrend and as regards her acquisition of an Adriatic port it must not be thought that she was ready to make further concessions. Her motive had been rather to strengthen by her submissive and conciliatory attitude on these two points the arguments she was ready to adduce with regard to the delimitation of the northern frontier of Albania. I need not enter into the geographical details of her conception of this frontier as you will be in possession of them before this despatch reaches its destination. The "crux" of the question is, however, the inclusion of Dibra, for which, in the words actually used by M. Spalaikoviteh, Servia would be prepared "to go to war." Exaggerated as such an expression of opinion may possibly be, and taking into proper consideration Servia's natural desire to communicate her intention of making trouble in this connection, it would, I think, nevertheless be dangerous, in view of reports received from His Majesty's Minister in Belgrade regarding the attitude of the Servian army to leave altogether out of consideration the strength of this warlike attitude on the part of the Government of the country to whose ambition and instigation the war was originally due.

The above views were to be communicated to the Ambassadorial Council in London, through the Russian Ambassador, assisted by a special agent in the person of M. Petraief,

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formerly Russian vice-consul at Prisrend, while the Servian and Bulgarian delegates in London were further to have the assistance of M. Rakitch, formerly Servian vice-consul at Prishtina.

In view of the particular insistence of the Servian Minister, I could not refuse to make the desired communication to you, although I pointed out that the channel of communication was in itself somewhat irregular.

The Kaltchef incident, first brought to my notice in Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 733, would appear, as far as I am able to ascertain, to amount to nothing more than an intrigue on the part of the Ottoman Government to sow dissension between Bulgaria and her allies by giving the latter to understand that Bulgaria was secretly negotiating with Constantinople. On receipt of the above-mentioned telegram, I immediately enquired of the Prime Minister, with whom I had already had a long conversation that morning, whether there was any truth in the report that M. Kaltchef had been sent on a confidential mission by his Government to Constantinople. M. Gueshof denied any knowledge of such a mission, although the idea had been mooted at the beginning of December, when it was, however, dropped, and after further consultation with his colleagues he categorically denied that the Bulgarian Government had anything to do with the matter, adding, at the same time, that he had mentioned this visit to His Majesty the King, who expressed himself as entirely ignorant of its purport.

M. Kaltchef is a rich usurer resident in Sophia, and must have proceeded to Chatalja on a private mission, having obtained a pass from General Savof, with whom he is connected by marriage to proceed through the Bulgarian lines. An official denial of his having received any commission from the Government has also appeared in the press.

The attitude of Roumania naturally exercises the minds of the Bulgarian Government. The Roumanian Minister, Prince Ghika, has recently returned from Bucharest with instructions to sound the Bulgarian Government regarding any cessions they might be willing to make to Roumania as a reward for her neutrality.

M. Gueshof, in his reception of the Prince, mentioned the possibility of several minor concessions, but returned elusive and evasive answers regarding the cession of Silistria to Roumania. Prince Ghika alluded to an improvement of feeling in Roumania towards Bulgaria, both in general society as well as in governmental circles, stating particularly that the idea of demanding the quadrilateral had been entirely dropped. As regards the Koutzo-Vlachs, the preoccupation of the Roumanians was confined, he continued, to the hope that none of the villages inhabited by them should come under Greek domination.

The telegraphic report from London to the effect that the Roumanian Minister was to be admitted to the council of Ambassadors created an unfavourable impression here, as it is considered not only that it would create a precedent, but also that Roumania would gain an advantage in being able to state her case on occasions when Bulgaria would not be directly represented. The position of the Prime Minister would become practically untenable were he to grant any concessions of territory to Roumania.

M. Gueshof has large commercial interests in that country, having been left a fortune invested in a banking business there which is reported to bring him in an income of 50,000*l.* a-year. Should Roumania make any such demands officially, he would, he informed me, be forced to resign office, unless he categorically refused them *in toto*. No Bulgarian territory can in any case be ceded to a foreign Power without the consent of a Grand Sobranjé, and it is most improbable that such a body would cede territory to Roumania just after a victorious war.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

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[835] No. 103.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 3.)

Sir, *Sophia, January 1, 1913.*

IN my despatch No. 150 of the 16th ultimo I had the honour to transmit copy of the Speech from the Throne delivered by the Prime Minister on the occasion of the opening of the Sobranjé on the 14th ultimo.

The reply to this speech, which was delivered on the 23rd ultimo to a crowded House, consists principally of a panegyric of the Bulgarian people and their courageous army. The determination of Bulgaria to continue the war is firmly insisted on in

the reply, and met with approval on all sides of the House. If, as the result of the negotiations in London, "it becomes necessary to continue the war, the representatives of the people declare that they are ready to continue it," runs the official statement.

After the reply to the Speech from the Throne had been read, M. Gueshof, the Prime Minister, rose to make an announcement regarding the policy of the Government, in which, after again praising his countrymen and referring to the delays in the peace negotiations at London caused by the obstructive and dilatory tactics of the Turks, he made the following declarations:—

"Peace is desired by all the Great Powers and by the public opinion of the world, and if the pretensions of our adversaries should unhappily bring about a renewed declaration of hostilities, we may rest convinced that our country will have the sympathy of all that is most important in international affairs, and that our allies will stand firmly by our side.

"A short time ago, whilst the task of preserving peace was still being pursued, a certain apprehension was created by the assertion, made with mischievous intent, that the alliance was beginning to break up. This was a transparent falsehood, and was refuted by the evidence of facts and events. Between the members of the alliance the most complete harmony prevails, and this fact is the best guarantee for the attainment of results not less brilliant than those already secured on the battlefield. In the near future we shall know whether the negotiations now going on in London will bring us to the end of the war, for which we are hoping, or not. One thing only may now be prophesied with confidence. When peace is concluded, of those who in the past were Turkey's immediate neighbours we alone still remain.

"The Ottoman Government have every interest in not continuing with her future neighbours a war which offers no chance of success to them, but which can only cause unhappiness to thousands of families. Our interest is in the attainment of a lasting peace.

"The representatives of the nation can be assured that the Government, which rejoices in your confidence, will do everything it can to conclude a peace that will be commensurate with sacrifices made by Bulgaria, and one that will establish firm and durable relations with her allies."

The Government express considerable satisfaction respecting the financial condition of the country. The position of the Treasury, the Minister of Finance declared in a recent speech in the House to be "at least quite satisfactory in view of the economic strength of the country, which, being an agricultural one, is capable of furnishing in time of war all that the army needs."

As a consequence of the war the Treasury receipts had diminished by about 1,000,000*l.*, but, on the other hand, the suspension of works in hand and the reduction of the personnel will result in economies sufficient to avoid any deficit in the budget. Besides the 3,360,000*l.* (84,000,000 fr.) voted in September, and the 2,000,000*l.* now demanded by the Government, another 2,000,000*l.* would be required to pay for material requisitioned. All these payments would be covered by a loan to be concluded after the war.

Independently of the 1,000,000*l.* worth of Treasury bonds already issued for the construction of railways and the purchase of rolling stock, the Government have already disposed of Treasury bonds abroad to the amount of 2,600,000*l.* (65,000,000 fr.) at a price very favourable to the Treasury.

The army was consequently, the Minister of Finance continued, amidst loud applause, fully provided with arms and munitions, and was capable of continuing the war for another six months.

The Bills introduced by the Government with regard to providing money consist at present of—

1. A Bill for a provisional credit of 280,000*l.* for the period from the 28th December to the end of March, for the organisation and administration of finances, agriculture, ways and communications in the newly conquered countries.

2. A Bill to vote three-twelfths of budget for 1913.

3. A sum of 2,000,000*l.* to be put at the disposal of the War Minister for the army.

4. A small sum of about 30,000*l.* to add to the pay of the employés sent into the newly conquered territories.

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All these sums have been voted, although considerable discussion occurred regarding the voting of the sum of 280,000*l.* for the administration of the newly conquered territories, technical and somewhat irrelevant arguments being adduced regarding the actual and constitutional status of the territory in question, which can be considered neither as a part of Bulgaria nor as a foreign country.

Although the Government have a majority in the Sobranjé and the whole of that body is united with regard to the principal issues in connection with the war, it must not be imagined that business is conducted without any criticism from the Opposition. It is true that no sign of such criticism appears in the press, on account of the vigorous censure, with the result that the newspaper accounts of the debates appear singularly one-sided. The Government have admitted, in reply to an interpellation, that the imposition of a censorship is an unconstitutional measure, but one which was necessitated by the military obligations of the country, and this explanation has been accepted by the Chamber. There have also been several occasions recently on which attacks have been directed against the Minister of Railways in particular, M. Franghia, whose financial integrity has long been suspected of being incapable of withstanding a very serious pressure exerted on the side of his personal interest. The principal accusation against him was in connection with the order of some railway equipment, which he refused to one firm on the ground that it was not necessary, and which he subsequently granted to another firm on terms less favourable to the Government.

The Minister of War was also attacked in the House on the 23rd instant by a Socialist member, M. Sokozof, who declared that the country was badly prepared for the war, that the sanitary condition of the army was deplorable, and that the victories had been won in spite of these various and serious shortcomings. The method of requisitioning articles necessary for the conduct of the war has also been criticised, as well as the nature of the articles commandeered, such as abnormally large quantities of ink and paper, which were recently seized without payment for some unknown military purposes.

One of the results of the call to arms in Bulgaria was the denudation of the various Government offices of the majority of their permanent functionaries. The administration of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, for instance, is being carried on by about one-third of the regular staff. At the beginning of the war the heads of the various departments formally dismissed all their officials, retaining only those who, for one reason or another, were not obliged to perform military service. These officials continue to receive their full pay, although they have to pay an exemption tax based on the amount of their incomes. To those who proceeded to the front the Government decided to pay one-third of their salary, an amount which was considered sufficient to support their families. It was, however, necessary to obtain the sanction of the Sobranjé to this measure, and its discussion has produced some heated debates, the opposition of various shades expressing the opinion, probably with no higher motive than the desire to make political capital, that the officials who are fighting for their country in the ranks deserve as well of their fatherland as those who remain behind in safety and comfort. The reply of the Government was, that there was not sufficient money in the Treasury to meet these demands, and their action was duly sanctioned.

The present session, which is in reality the first half of the regular session, was specially prolonged for a few days until the 18th (31st) December, when an adjournment was made until the 15th (28th) February. This adjournment is in itself unconstitutional, the 15th (28th) January being the day constitutionally set for the reassembly of the Sobranjé, but the special circumstances of the case induced the members to postpone their next session until a month later.

I have, &c.
H. G. BAX-IRONSIDE.

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[847] No. 104.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Belgrade, January 3, 1913.*

I DULY brought to the notice of the President of the Council of Ministers the circumstances reported in the telegram from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica that the Servian authorities were levying at Ghevgheli prohibitive import duties on goods forwarded from Salonica which had already paid 11 per cent. at that port. I enquired whether this report were correct, and, if so, how the Servian authorities justified their action.

M. Pasitch did not appear to have any precise information regarding the duties imposed at Ghevgheli, but he said evidently the fault lay with the Greek authorities, who had no right to collect at Salonica duties on goods destined for territory in Servian occupation. This should be collected by the Servians at Ghevgheli.

I pointed out that it seemed incumbent on the Servian and Greek authorities to make such arrangements as would preclude irregularities of this sort, but I understood from the telegram I had received that the duties now being collected at Ghevgheli were in excess of the duties allowed under the Turkish tariff, and were probably the duties as stipulated by the Servian tariff. I said this constituted an infringement of treaty rights until the definite incorporation of the new territories into Servia had been recognised by the Powers. Until that time only the Turkish rate could be collected, and, with regard to goods destined for Servia proper, the duties according to the Servian tariff could not be collected until arrival at the Servian frontier.

M. Pasitch acquiesced in this view, but urged that the present state of affairs is giving rise to speculation on the part of firms in Servia, as large stocks of merchandise are being imported into the new territories at the Turkish rate, so as to escape the duties payable under the Servian tariff once the territory definitely forms part of Servia. From the fact of his bringing forward such an argument, it seems probable that the Prime Minister was already, when I spoke to him, aware an irregularity was being committed. His Excellency, however, said I might inform His Majesty's Government that orders would be given to collect duties at the Turkish rate only at Ghevgheli, and requested me to send in to him a note for communication to the Minister of Finance.

This I accordingly did, and have the honour to enclose copy of the note herewith.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 104.

Sir R. Paget to M. Pasitch.

M. le Président du Conseil, *Belgrade, January 2, 1913.*

HIS Majesty's Government have received information to the effect that the Servian authorities are levying at Ghevgheli high import duties on goods forwarded from Salonica which have already paid 11 per cent. at that port.

I have the honour to request your Excellency to be so good as to acquaint me whether this information is correct, and, if so, I am to enquire how the Servian authorities justify their action.

I avail, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

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[848] No. 105.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Belgrade, January 4, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 147 of the 24th December last, my Austrian collegue told me yesterday that, although M. Prohaska and M. Tahy were returning to their respective posts at Prisrend and Mitrovitza, they would very shortly be relieved and be replaced by new consular officers, as the Austrian Government appreciate the fact that the presence of M. Prohaska and M. Tahy is distasteful to the Servian authorities since the recent incidents.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

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[934] No. 106.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

TEVFIK PACHA présente ses compliments à Sir E. Grey, et a l'honneur de revenir à la charge auprès de son Excellence sur le contenu de la note qu'il lui a adressée le 28 décembre dernier, au sujet du traitement inhumain des populations

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musulmanes de la Turquie d'Europe par les bandes de francs-tireurs bulgares, serbes et grecques. La série sanglante de ces cruautés continue, malheureusement, d'une façon effrayante et provoque ainsi une surexcitation d'esprit et d'indignation dans l'opinion publique en Turquie et dans le monde islamique en général, dont les conséquences pourraient être fâcheuses.

Pour y obvier et calmer les esprits, une enquête consulaire ou par une commission impartiale s'impose de plus en plus dans l'intérêt même de l'humanité, et il y a urgence à y procéder sans perte de temps afin de ne pas laisser aux auteurs de ces forfaits la possibilité matérielle d'en faire disparaître les traces.

Tevfik Pacha aime à espérer que son Excellence Sir E. Grey, appréciant la nécessité de l'enquête, voudra bien faire donner à cette suggestion, sans plus de délai, la suite qu'elle comporte dans l'intérêt de l'humanité et de la tranquillité des esprits.

Ambassade Impériale ottomane, Londres,
le 6 janvier, 1913.

[1000] No. 107.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received January 7.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, January 7*, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to request you will inform the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that it has been necessary for administrative reasons to withdraw His Majesty's ship "Diana" from Crete, and, as it appears that no disturbances are to be expected in the near future, she has not been immediately replaced by another vessel. The "Dartmouth," however, now at Smyrna, will visit Suda Bay occasionally, and can proceed there at short notice if specially required at any time.

2. The commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, reports that the "Oleg" is expected to remain at Suda Bay for about six weeks, and that the stationnaire "Khivinetz" is remaining there indefinitely. It would appear therefore that the Protecting Powers are adequately represented for the moment without the presence of a British ship.

3. It is requested that my Lords may be informed at an early date whether Sir E. Grey is satisfied that no further immediate steps need be taken to dispatch one of His Majesty's ships to Crete.

I am, &c.
O. MURRAY.

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[820] No. 108.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 6*, 1913.

SALONICA telegram of 3rd January.

Servian Government have communicated with the Greek Government with a view to following arrangement: Goods in transit through Salonica for territory in Servian occupation to pay no duties until arrival at Ghevgheli, where duty will be collected according to the Turkish tariff. With regard to goods purchased in Salonica entering Servian territory, there will be no duty to pay at Ghevgheli. A refund of original import duties will be claimed by the Servian Government from the Greek Government.

It is admitted that duties were originally collected according to Servian tariff, but this was through misapprehension of official instructions by the local authorities.

(Sent to Salonica.)

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[882] No. 109.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, January 6*, 1913.

HIS Majesty's ship "Diana" left Suda Bay, having received orders to proceed at once to England. No British ship has been ordered to take her place, so far as I know.

Russia is only one of the protecting Powers whose flag is now represented at Suda Bay, and my Russian colleague tells me that he has telegraphed to his Government pointing out objections to Russian ship alone protecting the interests of the Turkish flag. He thinks that the Russian ship may possibly be withdrawn under these circumstances.

May I assure him that a British man-of-war will be sent to Suda Bay without delay?

[1003] No. 110.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 7*, 1913.

PEACE negotiations.

My telegram No. 2 of 1st January.

Prime Minister informs me that General Savof has been asked by Nazim Pasha to meet him in order to discuss important questions connected with Adrianople. Meeting will take place at village of Chataldja this afternoon.

Prime Minister will let me know result of interview to-morrow. General Savof has already seen one of Nazim's aides-de-camp, but he would give no details as to the reason for meeting except that it concerned Adrianople.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[1004] No. 111.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 5.)

(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 7*, 1913.

ROUMANIA.

My telegram No. 1 of 1st January.

Bulgarian Government have decided to send Minister of Finance to St. Petersburgh. It will be given out that his mission is undertaken on financial grounds, but he is really leaving to discuss Roumanian demands with Russian Government.

Prime Minister tells me that Bulgarian Government have been informed from St. Petersburgh that they must make considerable territorial concessions to Roumania, which they do not see their way to do. Minister of Finance will proceed later to Paris and London on financial business.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[1005] No. 112.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 7*, 1913.

PRIME Minister states that action of Austro-Hungarian Government in not demobilising is causing great dissatisfaction here. Government have to exercise strictest censorship to prevent violent press articles against Austria-Hungary. It is considered that this policy is largely responsible for Roumanian attitude. His Excellency tells me that he has discussed matter with Austro-Hungarian Minister, who stated that Austria-Hungary could not demobilise until Servia had evacuated Durazzo. Prime Minister pointed out to him that it would be impossible for Servia to take such action until peace had been officially declared, to which Austro-Hungarian Minister answered that such might be the case, but how could Austria-Hungary demobilise in view of Russian preparations on Galician frontier?

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[998] No. 113.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 7, 1913.*

AT a conference of Ministers held here on 4th January it was decided to demand from the Delegations at an early date the sum of 8,000,000*l.* for expenses incurred in connection with crisis up to date and for week immediately following. The original demands by the War Office and Admiralty amounted to 10,000,000*l.*, of which, however, 2,000,000*l.* were disallowed. It is not yet known whether this demand is in addition to or concurrent with the sum borrowed, as reported in my despatch No. 219 of 13th December. Minister of Marine took the opportunity of pressing commencement of building for new Dreadnoughts to replace ships of "Monarch" class, but his proposal was rejected.

[1007] No. 114.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 7, 1913.*

FOLLOWING received from consular officer at Ragusa to-day by telegraph:—

"Austrian squadron sailed for Teodo, including 'Kaiser Karl VI,' 'Admiral Spaun,' and 'Dalmat,' the latter having on board, I believe, the commander-in-chief of the XVth Army Corps from Sarajevo."

[1002] No. 115.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, January 7, 1913.*

RED CROSS authorities in London have sent orders to withdraw unit at once.

This step appears to me to be premature as long as result of peace negotiations is as undecided as at present. If the order cannot be revoked, cannot at least a detachment be left with stores? Were hostilities to be resumed, sudden withdrawal of all help from several important stations would be a serious blow to Montenegrin Government.

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[997] No. 116.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegrams Nos. 13 and 14 of 6th January.

I gathered yesterday from the Grand Vizier that Turkey, in the event of rupture, is likely to remain on the defensive at Chatalja. The Minister for Foreign Affairs let fall a remark apparently meant to imply that Turkey, while refusing to offer further concessions, might agree to such if imposed by Europe. With reference to my telegram No. 744 of 31st December, 1912, it may be that she would cede Adrianople on the condition that the fortifications should be razed (see my telegram No. 6 of 5th January), if the Six Powers unanimously and unequivocally urged her to do so. This might obviate the necessity for a naval demonstration, which for several reasons, judged from local point of view, would seem undesirable except in the last resort, and would be interpreted by the Turks as openly hostile to them and contrary to our neutrality.

The French Ambassador thinks that the *démarche* should be brief but categorical, and deal only with the question of the cession of Adrianople, with the stipulation that Mussulman institutions, Imperial tombs, should be guaranteed, and with the question

of the islands with the guarantee provided for in point 5. I will consult my colleagues.

I gather from Minister for Foreign Affairs that Roumania's attitude has recently altered to the disadvantage of Turkey, on the consideration that if Bulgaria acquires Adrianople she can be more generous in the matter of compensations to Roumania.

(Sent to Vienna and Sophia.)

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[625] No. 117.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 7, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 6 of 6th January.

I have never said anything about attitude of Russia and France separately respecting Adrianople. What I have said to Turkish Ambassador is contained in my telegram No. 11 of 4th January to you, and I spoke only of the Powers collectively.

Respecting islands, I said, without discussing cession or ownership, that the Powers might impose conditions that would prevent islands of strategic importance being used as a menace to Turkey.

[5894] No. 118.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 7, 1913.*

GHAZI MOUKHTAR PASHA and other personages have telegraphed to the King complaining of alleged outrages against Moslems in Macedonia. You should inform them verbally that His Majesty has given me the telegram, and, as I have received certain more specific information than that contained in their telegram as to outrages said to have been committed by Servian irregulars in some districts of Macedonia and Albania, I am bringing the matter unofficially to the notice of the Servian Government.

[1284] No. 119.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 7, 1913.*

IT was decided at the meeting of Ambassadors to-day that, in view of the possibility of a resumption of hostilities and of the trouble that might result at Constantinople, it is necessary for the Powers to prepare to assure the protection of their nationals and of their interests by sending ships of war to the Bay of Besika to be ready for any emergency.

This is not to be regarded as committing Powers to a naval demonstration, as I assume, though I have not yet communicated with Admiralty, that we should not risk ships by sending them through the Dardanelles unless we did so with the consent of Turkey, but if movement of ships to Besika has any effect in influencing Turks to give way to collective *démarche* of the Powers, this impression should not be discouraged.

[1285] No. 120.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 7, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 13 of 6th January.

The Ambassadors at their meeting to-day decided to recommend that the Ambassadors at Constantinople should be instructed to draw up a note in accordance

with the views of their respective Governments, and to proceed as soon as possible to present the note by a *démarche collective*. You should proceed accordingly.

It is not the first three points, but points 1, 5, 6, that M. Poincaré has approved; he has since proposed a form of words embodying substance of other points, which you can adopt if your colleagues agree.

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[550] No. 121.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.[a]

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 7, 1913.*

SIR R. PAGET'S telegram No. 4 of 5th January: Ottoman Public Debt offices at Uskub.

Has Government to which you are accredited received similar information?

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[566] No. 122.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 7, 1913.*

ITALIAN Ambassador suggested, as his personal opinion, that Montenegro might be given the whole of Lake Scutari, a portion of the plain, and some other territory that could be made valuable by drainage; also railway connection to Antivari, which I understood to be additional to, and not instead of, railway facilities to Adriatic offered to Servia. He asked me if I would support such a proposal. I said I was anxious to support anything that would secure agreement, but I had not sufficient information to say whether this would be a satisfactory solution. Ambassador said that Italy, being on very good terms with Russia, might suggest this at St. Petersburgh. I said it would be best for Italian Government to do this and ascertain opinion of Russian Government.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 15.)

[55894] No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 7, 1913.*

INFORMATION, which there is reason to believe is trustworthy, has been brought to my notice as to outrages committed by Servian irregulars in Albania, and which are of a very serious nature.

You should take an opportunity of mentioning the matter unofficially to Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[1209] No. 124.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 7, 1913.*

THE Austrian Ambassador impressed upon me to-day the impossibility of giving Scutari to Montenegro. The inhabitants of Scutari had neither in race nor in religion any affinity to Montenegro. They were Catholics, and Austrian sentiment would be mortally offended by Catholics being merged in, not a great State, but a quite small State, where they would find no affinity of race or religion. It was not for Austria a question of acquiring power or influence, but a question of sentiment, and Count Berchtold's position would be untenable if he gave way.

I said that on the Russian side too it was a matter of sentiment. Russian public opinion accused M. Sazonof of having thrown over Servia about access to the Adriatic.

[a] Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 10); Sir R. Rodd (No. 12); Sir F. Cartwright (No. 12); Sir G. Lowther (No. 10); and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 17).

If Montenegro was thrown over, it would be said that M. Sazonof had given way all along the line, and his position would become untenable.

The Ambassador said that Austria had given way, for instance, about the sanjak, which a short time ago everyone assumed that she would claim and occupy. He then went on to say to me privately that, though Scutari could not be given to Montenegro, there was rich land in the plain of Ipek that might be conceded to Montenegro, and the Russians might propose that the stream of the Boyana should be regulated so as to lower the level of the lake of Scutari, and thereby place new land, which would be very fertile, at the disposal of Montenegro on the Montenegrin side. If the Montenegrin difficulty could be overcome, the Ambassador thought that the eastern frontier of Albania could be arranged.

I said that this was just the point which made it so much worth while trying to find some compromise which would satisfy Montenegro. If this were done, the way would be clear for a settlement of the eastern frontier of Albania, and every serious and dangerous point of difficulty between the Great Powers would be removed. But, if I were to ask the meeting of Ambassadors to discuss the question of Scutari before we saw our way to a settlement, there would be a deadlock; the whole meeting of the Ambassadors might break down on this point, and then everything would be in confusion, and none of us would know where we were. I took note of what the Ambassador had suggested to me, about the plain of Ipek and the Boyana, as a contribution in feeling our way to a compromise; but I could not say more without knowing the views of the others concerned in the matter. I suggested that Italy might be very useful in getting the King of Montenegro to express himself favourably about whatever settlement was possible.

The Ambassador feared that the Italians were almost more Montenegrin than the Montenegrins themselves.

I observed that it would be most disagreeable to Italy if the negotiations broke down on a difference between Austria and Russia about Montenegro, and it must therefore be to the interests of the Italian Government to avert such a contingency.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1267] No. 125.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.[a]

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 7, 1913.*

THE meeting of Ambassadors to-day came to the following conclusion, for submission to the respective Governments:—

"La réunion est d'avis que les Ambassadeurs à Constantinople devraient recevoir l'instruction de s'entendre sur la rédaction d'une note en s'inspirant des observations des divers Gouvernements et de procéder le plus tôt possible à la remise de cette note par une demande collective.

"Vu la possibilité d'une reprise d'hostilités et des troubles qui pourraient en résulter à Constantinople, il est nécessaire que les Puissances se préparent à assurer la protection de leurs nationaux et de leurs intérêts en envoyant des bâtiments de guerre à la baie de Besika, afin d'être prêts à tout événement."

The French Ambassador informed us that it was points 1, 5, and 6 in the proposed collective *démarche* that M. Poincaré had approved, and that, instead of points 2, 3, and 4, M. Poincaré suggested the following form of words to be addressed to the Porte:—

"Prenez garde, si vous reprenez les hostilités, c'est la question de Constantinople et peut-être celle de l'Asie Mineure qui se poseront. Pour mettre en valeur cette partie de votre Empire, qui constituera désormais votre seule force, vous ne pourrez compter sur l'appui financier de l'Europe si par votre résistance aux conseils des grandes Puissances vous prolongez la guerre."

The Italian Ambassador suggested that there might be an addition to the collective *démarche*, telling the Turks that, if they would cede Adrianople, the Powers would secure to them the possession of some of the Ægean islands.

[a] Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 20), Sir E. Goschen (No. 11), Sir R. Rodd (No. 9), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 12).

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE LONDON

I urged that, if we were to revise further the terms of the *démarche*, we should never come to an agreement. We therefore discussed the points as to the islands separately.

The German, Italian, and Austrian Ambassadors were in favour of what they called the Italian proposal to leave at least six islands to Turkey; the four islands at the mouth of the Straits, and Mitylene and Chios, with possibly also Cos and Rhodes.

I observed that these islands could be retained for Turkey only by force. Was it proposed that Turkey should apply the force herself? That would mean Turkish troops in the islands, who would repress agitation amongst the islanders for union with Greece by the violent methods of which there had been experience in other places, and which would require the intervention of the Powers. Such a situation would certainly be disagreeable to the Powers and offensive to public opinion in Europe. If, on the other hand, the islands were given autonomy, were the Powers prepared to use force to maintain the Turkish sovereignty when the islands made use of their autonomy, as had been done in Crete, to declare for union with Greece? I doubted whether the Powers contemplated the use of force or would be willing to have resort to it in such an event. But, unless they were prepared to use force, to offer Turkey the retention of the islands would not be a honest offer, for in a short time the islands would go to Greece. I asked the Italian Ambassador whether his Government had considered these difficulties.

He replied that, as they had come to their opinion with the German and Austrian Governments, he assumed that these difficulties had been considered by all those Governments.

Finally, I said that I would bring the question before the Cabinet to-morrow. My personal impression was that we should not raise any objection of principle as regards the ownership of the islands by Turkey and Greece, but that we should say that the British Government could not be a party to reimposing Turkish control by Turkish armed force, nor should we be willing to be a party to the use of forcible measures to prevent the annexation of the islands to Greece.

On the other hand, I told the German Ambassador, in a separate conversation which I had with him, that it would be fair, if Mitylene and Chios went to Greece, to impose on them the same stringent conditions of neutralisation as were proposed by Russia for the four islands at the mouth of the Straits, and that I would support such a proposal.

Further discussion of this question was postponed.

The Italian Ambassador stated that his Government had no objection to Thasos going to Bulgaria, and the French and Russian Ambassadors raised no objection.

I said that we would raise no objection, but I understood that the Khedive had private rights in the island, and I would make a reserve on his behalf that his private rights and property should be respected and preserved.

With regard to a *démarche* in Sophia in terms which were still to be settled, the German Ambassador said that his Government were favourable to it, the Austrian Ambassador supported him, and the Italian Ambassador said that he was sure that his Government would agree.

Finally, it was decided that we should meet again on Thursday, the 9th instant, to consider these questions further and any new developments.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1022] No. 126.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 3, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from the military attaché to this embassy reporting on concentration of troops at Panderma with a view to possible resumption of hostilities.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 126.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 95.)
Sir, *Constantinople, December 31, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to state that various indications lead me to believe that the reports regarding the collection of an army at Smyrna are false, and that the troops in question are being collected at Panderma, the railway to which place, viâ Soma, has recently been completed.

In the first place, we have no news from Smyrna of the arrival of troops there. Then, I was informed that orders had been given to hold 120 waggons in readiness, for troop transport, at Smyrna. The transports which pass through from the Black Sea, though their destinations are doubtful, are not reported from Gallipoli or the Dardanelles, whereas I have ascertained that the 92nd regiment (belonging to the 31st Nizam Division) is actually at Panderma. The whole of this division has now passed, and it looks as if it had all gone to Panderma. Also five redif battalions from the district of Sivas and one nizam battalion, all shipped at Samsun, have gone to Panderma. A report has now been received from Smyrna of the passage of 4,000 men between the 20th and 23rd instant by rail for Panderma.

From hints dropped by various Turkish officers I gather that it is intended, if hostilities are renewed, to take the offensive, combining an attack on the Bulgarian army in front of the Chatalja lines with a threat on its rear or line of communications, for which purpose the troops now at Gallipoli would be available. Besides the undesirability of denuding the Gallipoli Peninsula of troops, a glance at the map will show that a force could be transported from Panderma in less time and with greater advantage. Provided it could be disembarked, its appearance about Rodosto or Eregu would seriously compromise the situation of the Bulgarian army. A preliminary to such an operation would be the collection of transports at Panderma, of which there is as yet no sign, the ships still being engaged in transporting troops from the Black Sea. But with the shipping available at this port there should be no great difficulty in carrying out such a movement at short notice.

I am not aware of any artillery having yet been taken to Panderma, the 30th regiment having apparently passed on to the Dardanelles, while the personnel of the the 31st is already at Chatalja. As regards cavalry, there are the Kurdish tribal regiments mentioned in my immediate preceding despatch, which are now at Scutari and could be readily shipped from Haidar Pasha to any desired point in the Marmora.

I am informed that the redif divisions of Adana (five battalions) and Aleppo (thirteen battalions) are included in Fakhri Pasha's army at Gallipoli and the Dardanelles. I am doubtful of the presence of "Laz" battalions there, as I cannot identify or account for them, and I notice there is a tendency to label anything wearing a "bashlik" Laz.

During the past week expeditions by rail from here to the Chatalja lines have been as follows:—

3,500 men; 3,300 cases of small arms ammunition; 12 waggon loads of shells; 1,800 Mauser rifles; 27 guns, of which 24 are described as "field" and 3 as "seige."

Nazim Pasha, whose departure for the front I reported on the 29th, is due to return to-day.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Military Attaché.*

[1025] No. 127.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 4, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1093 of the 21st December last, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, reporting the transfer to Serres of Bulgarian "Administrator of Occupied Provinces" on departure of General Andreef.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 127.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 181.)

Sir, *Salonica, December* 27, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 169 and 178 of the 6th and 16th instant respectively, I have the honour to report that General Andreef having been recalled to Bulgaria [Dubnitza ?], and General Hessabdjief never having definitely taken up the functions of "Administrator of the Occupied Territory," his appointment to which had been announced, the seat of this "administration" has now been transferred to Serres, where the duties appertaining to it appear to be discharged by General Vulkof.

General Hessabdjief indeed still remains here, but I understand that his functions continue to be merely those of "commissaire Royal auprès des autorités helléniques."

Like the visit of King Ferdinand himself, these changes appear to be an indication of the appreciation by the Bulgarian Government of the necessity of removing the evidence of, if it were not possible entirely to remedy, the lack of agreement between the Greeks and their Slav allies.

Surface relations between them are indeed to some extent improved; but it remains perfectly obvious to all that below the surface the current of animosity between the Greeks on one side and both Bulgars and Serbs on the other continues to flow with undiminished force.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[1030] No. 128.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Constantinople January* 4, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice consul at Dedeagatch reporting on the refusal of the Bulgarian authorities to allow communication by sea.

On the 1st instant His Majesty's Minister at Sophia telegraphed that the Bulgarian Government had asked their military authorities to arrange matters.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 128.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 30.)

Sir, *Dédéagatch, le 30 décembre*, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance, Sir, que depuis le 1er courant, date de ma dépêche que je vous confirme (elle se trouve encore ici à la poste française) les autorités militaires sont devenues arrogantes et intolérables. Un moment nous avons cru, sur leur déclaration, que l'incident des postes a été clos, mais rien n'a été fait. Notre ville est actuellement privée de toutes communications, puisque le fonctionnement de la poste bulgare est irrégulier et ne mérite pas de confiance—la censure se pratique sur une vaste échelle.

Les vapeurs du Lloyd autrichien qui transportaient les courriers français et autrichiens, défense leur a été faite de communiquer avec nous, malgré qu'ils soient en parfaite règle avec les mesures sanitaires.

Le 28 courant, vers les 4 heures du soir, le steamer "Achille," du Lloyd, mouille sur rade, venant de Cavak, ayant traversé le canal en contumace et subi la désinfection à Naagara.

Le capitaine de port, sur l'ordre, paraît-il, des autorités militaires, se porta au-devant du canot de l'"Achille," qui venait à terre pour pratiquer et débarquer la poste. Ordre a été intimé au second capitaine d'avoir à retourner immédiatement à son bord et d'appareiller sans retard.

Le commandant de l'"Achille" a dû s'exécuter; il quitta son mouillage à 4 heures et demie mettant le cap sur Cavalla.

Comme vous devez le penser, Sir, l'impression produite en ville a été mauvaise, d'autant plus que quatre cargos (bulgares et russes) opèrent les déchargements à leur guise pour compte de l'intendance militaire; même mieux que cela, les Turcs exécutent des corvées pour le débarquement des mahonnes.

Notre situation est loin d'être enviable, comme j'ai déjà eu l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance le fait; les réquisitions demeurent toujours en vigueur; tous les magasins sont presque vides et ne permettent pas aux vapeurs le déchargement des denrées pour ici; dans un court délai nous allons manquer de vivres, et nous serons pires que des assiégés, n'ayant pu faire à temps des provisions.

L'agent du Lloyd ne manqua pas d'aller faire ses doléances au commandant militaire, qui chercha à sauver les apparences en prétendant que le capitaine de port avait mal interprété ses instructions. Cette justification est tout à fait enfantine; nul doute que nous nous trouvons sous le coup de vexations et voir même empêcher que des rapports ne partent pas d'ici signalant la ligne de conduite de l'envahisseur, qui n'est pas correcte, tant s'en faut; et du train que cela marche, dans peu de temps toute la contrée sera dans la misère des plus affreuses, attendu que les villages indistinctement de race et religion sont mis à sac. L'armée bulgare aurait dû avoir un peu plus de tact et non dévaster et anéantir le pays comme elle le fait.

Vu, donc, ce qui précède et voyant que les autorités militaires nous mettent dans l'impossibilité de correspondre avec nos propres autorités, mes collègues prirent l'initiative dès l'instant que les communications télégraphiques avec la capitale bulgare sont rétablies de nous adresser à nos légations de Sophia, et d'un commun accord, le 28 courant au soir, nous lançâmes le télégramme collectif suivant:—

"Autorités militaires bulgares refusent donner pratique vapeurs étant en parfaite règle mesures sanitaires, empêchent débarquement embarquement courriers, ainsi que marchandises. Sommes privés toutes communications et nous nous considérons prisonniers. Vivres se font rares. Prière communiquer ambassade, Constantinople."

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

[1133] No. 129.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 11. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 7, 1913.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of War proceeded to Chatalja to-day with the intention, it is reported, to attempt to enter into direct negotiations with General Savof. I learn that my French colleague has suggested direct negotiations with the Bulgarians.

I hear from a reliable Turkish source that the German Ambassador yesterday advised yielding about Adrianople, and held out hope of saving to Turkey some of the islands. Despite agitation among a number of bellicose officers, the Turkish position in the matter of Adrianople is distinctly weakening.

I gather from my Austrian colleague that he personally is not in favour of the proposed collective *démarche* set forth in your telegram No. 13 of 6th January, or of the naval demonstration. According to private information, Adrianople can hold out only four or five days; in official circles it is believed that it can hold out for twelve to fifteen days longer.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[1163] No. 130.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January* 8, 1913.

PEACE negotiations.

My telegram No. 4 of 7th January.

The Prime Minister tells me that, at the meeting arranged yesterday between Nazim Pasha and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the one side and General Savof on the other, the Ottoman representatives made great efforts to persuade

General Savof to allow the reprovisioning of Adrianople. General Savof categorically refused, and stated that it was useless for the Ottoman Government to persistently bring up this question. Either Adrianople must be ceded or the war must be continued. After a long and not unfriendly conversation, the Ottoman representatives weakened on this point, but they insisted on the necessity of the retention of the islands.

Just as they were leaving, Minister for Foreign Affairs said to General Savof: "Just possible that we may be able to meet your wishes as regards Adrianople, in the which case peace will be certain by your New Year."

The Prime Minister is of opinion that the Ottoman Government will now give way.

(Sent to Constantinople and Belgrade.)

[1160] No. 131.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, January 8, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 2 of 1st January.

Four Turkish officers have escaped from Adrianople. They state that thirteen in all endeavoured to get through the lines, that four of the others were shot, and remaining five were recaptured. They report that much discontent prevails, and that the town can scarcely hold out for more than a fortnight.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[1169] No. 132.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 8, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs gave me to understand to-day that Austria could not yield with regard to the cession of Scutari to Montenegro. There were racial and religious grounds for not surrendering the town to Montenegro. If surrendered Scutari would become the centre of disaffection against its new rulers, which would give cause to much trouble to the Powers who guaranteed the neutrality of Albania.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that King Nicolas's declaration that the stability of his dynasty would be threatened should Scutari be denied him could be treated as theatrical and intended to deceive.

He said that Italy still supported the wish of the King of Montenegro for Scutari, but he had reason to believe that this was out of courtesy to his father-in-law on the part of the King of Italy and would not be pressed seriously. As to compensation for Montenegro, his Excellency told me that the King of Montenegro's main wish was to obtain possession of fertile country, and he thought that, by draining the Boyana marshes and cession of some of the low-lying country towards Ipek, Montenegro might be satisfied.

He said that Count Mensdorff had been instructed to speak to you in this sense.

[1170] No. 133.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, January 8, 1913.*

BELGRADE telegram No. 4 of 5th January.

I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day whether he had received any information similar to that contained in the above-mentioned telegram. He replied that this was the first news he had had of the seizure of the offices of the Public Debt at Uskub by the Servian military authorities. He told me he would make enquiries, and if the incident was confirmed he thought protest ought to be made by the Powers.

[1166] No. 134.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 8.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 8, 1913.*

I GATHER that there is an impression here that Austria is leaving Roumania in the lurch as regards the latter's demands on Bulgaria, and that she is not supporting these at Sophia with sufficient energy.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[1242] No. 135.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 8, 1913.*

THE Ambassadors agreed that their respective Governments would raise no objection to the annexation of Thasos by Bulgaria, when this point was mentioned at a meeting here.

I stated that His Majesty's Government would not object, on the condition, however, that the Khedive's property and private rights were maintained intact.

[1333] No. 136.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 8, 1913.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF told me to-day that M. Sazonof thought it might be helpful if the meeting of Ambassadors adopted some such resolution as the following, of which at my request he gave me this note:—

"La Serbie ayant officiellement déclaré se remettre à la décision des Puissances sur la question d'un accès à la mer, elle est tenue à évacuer le littoral dès que les Puissances le lui auront notifié."

He suggested that I might propose it at one of the meetings.

I informed him of the communication which the Servian chargé d'affaires had just made to me, and said that I was quite willing to make the proposal if M. Sazonof desired it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1336] No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 8, 1913.*

THE Russian Ambassador impressed upon me to-day that, in his opinion, M. Sazonof could not afford to give way about Scutari unless the Servian line was adopted for the eastern boundary of Albania.

I told him of the compromises which were being suggested by the Austrian and Italian Ambassadors; but he seemed to think that nothing would be of any use except on the condition which he had named. He admitted, however, that the southern boundary of the Servian map, which left part of the Bay of Vallona to Greece, could not be accepted.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1335] No. 138.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 8, 1913.

I SPOKE to M. Cambon to-day in the same sense as I had just spoken to the German Ambassador about the reported loan to Turkey.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1338] No. 139.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 8, 1913.

M. CAMBON urged very strongly to-day that a collective *démarche* without a naval demonstration would be of no use. He said that Russia was very strongly of this opinion, and very anxious that there should be a naval demonstration. France was prepared to send two ships to Besika Bay. Austria and Italy, he thought, might do the same. Germany was the one that was doubtful. If the war began again, as most of the ships would be at Besika Bay they might go on to Constantinople to protect it.

I said that this would hardly be a demonstration against the Turks.

M. Cambon admitted that it would then be quite the other way.

I told him that Mr. Churchill was sending instructions to-day to the admiral at Malta to have two ships ready to start for Besika Bay. We could not send them alone, but if I found at the meeting of Ambassadors to-morrow that other Powers were sending ships, instructions would be sent to the ships to start.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1334] No. 140.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 8, 1913.

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the National Bank had, I heard, been considering a large loan to Turkey, with the Ottoman Bank and the Deutsche Bank. I had hitherto stated that financiers must decide for themselves whether to lend to any of the belligerents, and that if they did so they must do it at their own risk. I had repeated this advice recently, but as we were at this moment all engaged in a *démarche collective* in Constantinople, I should be glad to know whether the German Government had been in communication with the Deutsche Bank about this matter, and, if so, what they had said, as it would be desirable that we should, as far as possible, say the same thing.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[1337] No. 141.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 8, 1913.

TEWFIK PASHA and Reschid Pasha came to see me to-day. They argued strongly as to the impossibility of Turkey giving up Adrianople.

I said that it was not a question of words, but of facts. Was the war to begin again, and, if so, could the Turks save Adrianople by continuing the war? If they could not, might not they lose much which they had not yet lost?

I gathered that they were prepared, if they could keep Adrianople, to give Bulgaria a free commercial zone, but they saw no use in convoking the Peace Conference again unless they knew that Bulgaria would be prepared to discuss this.

I said that I would mention at the next meeting of the Ambassadors here what they had said, but I thought that the Powers would not see their way to give any other advice except that which I had already given.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1332] No. 142.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 2.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 8, 1913.

THE Servian chargé d'affaires read to me to-day and left with me the following communication:—

"La Serbie, désirant prouver combien elle respecte la volonté unanime de l'Europe et combien de sacrifices elle est prête à faire dans l'intérêt de la paix européenne, fait la déclaration suivante:—

"En son temps, après la conclusion de la paix et après le règlement des questions qui s'y rattachent, la Serbie se soumettra à la volonté de l'Europe et retirera, des rivages serbes de l'Adriatique, ses troupes qui, au prix d'efforts surhumains et d'énormes sacrifices, ont reconquis ses anciens territoires bordant sur la Mer Adriatique, territoires dont la possession lui aurait garanti des communications libres avec les autres États.

"Mais en supportant ces incalculables sacrifices, représentés par tant de sang versé, par la perte de ses meilleurs fils, la Serbie s'attend à ce que les Grandes Puissances estimeront à leur juste valeur l'importance de ces sacrifices—auxquels la Serbie ne se résigne que dans l'intérêt de la paix européenne—et qu'elles ne permettront pas que d'autres sacrifices lui soient demandés, car après tous ceux qu'elle a déjà supportés elle n'aura ni la possibilité ni les moyens d'en faire de nouveaux, et lui en demander serait la forcer au désespoir et créer une situation dont les conséquences ne pourraient pas être prévues.

"*Légation Royale de Serbie, Londres,*
"*le 8 janvier,* 1913."

I asked what exactly was the meaning of "des rivages serbes."

He replied that, at one time, these shores of the Adriatic had been Servian, and the Servians had always since applied this epithet to them.

I enquired when they had been Servian.

He answered for about five centuries—from the seventh century to the break-up of the Servian Empire.

I observed that for some centuries Calais had belonged to England, and what was now the United States of North America had been English for some time.

The chargé d'affaires said that the epithet did not affect the substance of his communication, which was that the Servians would withdraw from the Adriatic littoral.

I said that I would convey this communication to the Ambassadors at their next meeting here. The Servian promise to withdraw from the Adriatic was a contribution to peace, and in the true interest of Servia.

As the Servian chargé d'affaires mentioned the Servian map of Albania, I said that there were also other maps of Albania.

He said yes, they knew that there was, unfortunately, the Austrian map; but Servia hoped that she would not be asked to make sacrifices in the interior.

I said that her withdrawal from the littoral would facilitate the discussion of remaining questions, and when everything else was settled the eastern frontier of Albania would not be found to be so unfavourable to Servia as perhaps she had sometimes feared that it would be.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1183] No. 143.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9, 1913.)

(No. 91.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, December 27, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that M. Schebounine, the Russian consul-general, having been transferred in a similar capacity to Constantinople, left Crete yesterday.

M. Toukholka, Russian consul at Bussorah, has taken his place, with the title of acting consul. It seems uncertain whether the appointment will be made a permanent one later on.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[1185] No. 144.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9, 1913.)

(No. 93.)
Sir, *Canea, Crete, December 31, 1912.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 88 of the 2nd instant, I have the honour to report that the French cruiser "Bruix" arrived at Suda Bay on the 27th instant from Salonica, and leaves again to-day for that port. The "Victor Hugo" also arrived this morning from Constantinople, and sails in a few hours for Toulon.

These two ships confine their operations to embarking stores, and have made no offer to take their share in guarding the flags on Suda Island.

After piously declaring (as reported in Sir F. Bertie's telegram No. 175 to the Foreign Office) that "les Puissances devraient maintenir une force navale dans les eaux crétoises pour représenter la continuité du mandat des Puissances," and that "les Puissances trahiraient le mandat qu'elles ont assumé vis-à-vis de la Porte si elles se désintéressaient actuellement de la Crète," it seems almost indecent that the French Government should have the French flag permanently unrepresented at Suda while Great Britain and Russia do the work for them.

The apparent withdrawal of the French from Crete gives rise to obvious deductions in Cretan circles.

I have, &c.
A. C. WRATISLAW.

[1200] No. 145.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9, 1913.)

(No. 3. Treaty.)
Sir, *Salonica, December 31, 1912.*

AS I had the honour to inform you by telegraph this morning, it has come to my knowledge that the Servian authorities at Ghovgheli (the sixth station from here on the Uskub line, which they hold conjointly with the Greeks) have for the past five or six days been levying import duties, according to the highest tariff in force in their own kingdom, upon all goods conveyed from here to Uskub or other places within the territory occupied by their troops.

Regular goods traffic has not yet been re-established on the Uskub line, but a daily passenger service, with change of trains at Ghumendja, has been in force since the 25th instant, and a certain number of merchants from the interior have availed themselves of this to take back with them such goods as it was possible to convey as luggage; but the imposition of the Servian tariff, amounting in the case of many articles to from 100 to 200 per cent. of their value, is regarded as tantamount to an attempt to strangle this incipient trade in the interests of such Belgrade middlemen as may have accumulated stocks. It seems in any case to constitute an illicit interference with commerce and an infringement of the rights secured by treaty to neutral subjects, so long as the occupied territories have not been formally annexed to the Servian kingdom.

The news has occasioned the liveliest commotion in the Salonica market, where it is regarded as presaging commercial ruin. Merchants fear not only the direct injury

resulting from the loss of custom in what has hitherto constituted the commercial hinterland of Salonica, but also the indirect injury resulting from the multiplication of bad debts. Under the system of credit prevalent in this country, the Salonica merchant is accustomed to receive payment for goods supplied simultaneously with renewed orders. A customer who has no intention of placing fresh orders loses the main incentive to the payment of outstanding debts. Import merchants here therefore fear the loss not only of future business but also of the capital already involved, especially in view of the anticipated difficulty of legal process alluded to in my despatch No. 8, Commercial, of the 27th instant, and this cannot fail to react, as therein pointed out, upon their ability to meet their obligations towards their European sources of supply.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Legation at Belgrade, and have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

[1177] No. 146.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Athens, January 3, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, extracted from the "Official Gazette," copies of a contract signed in Paris on the 19th ultimo between the Greek Minister, representing the Hellenic Government and a group of bankers, for the advance of 40,000,000 fr. The advance is made as a discount of bills drawn by the Greek Government, at the rate of 6 per cent. with ½ per cent. commission. It is repayable after six months by means of the issue of the balance of the 4 per cent. loan authorised in 1910 for 150,000,000 fr., of which only 110,000,000 fr. has yet been issued, or by the sale of bonds for 45,000,000 fr., bearing interest at 5 per cent., repayable on the 1st October, 1918, at latest. The Royal decree authorising the contract will require the sanction of the Chamber, which the Government undertake to obtain with the least possible delay.

The price at which another group of bankers hold an option for the issue of the balance of the 1910 4 per cent. loan is reduced from 84½ to 75 per cent. in favour of the bankers making the present advance, on the assumption that the former option will not be exercised. The two groups are, however, practically the same, with the omission of two English banks, which took part in the issue of the former loan of 110,000,000 fr.

The Greek Government reserve the right of renewing the bills, which fall due on the 31st July, 1913, for a further period of six months on the same conditions.

I have, &c.
E. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 146.

Extract from the "Official Gazette" of December 17, 1912.

CONTRACT FOR 40,000,000 FR. PROVISIONAL LOAN, DATED DECEMBER 19, 1912.

ENTRE le Gouvernement hellénique, représenté par son Excellence M. Romanos, Envoyé extraordinaire et Ministre plénipotentiaire de Grèce à Paris, agissant en vertu des pouvoirs à lui conférés par dépêche du 29 novembre (12 décembre), 1912, de première part, et (1) la Banque nationale de Grèce, société anonyme au capital de 20,000,000 de drachmes, dont le siège est à Athènes, agissant tant en son nom que pour le compte d'un groupe de banques et banquiers; (2) le Comptoir national d'Escompte de Paris, société anonyme au capital de 200,000,000 de francs, dont le siège est à Paris, 14, Rue Bergère; la Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bays, société anonyme au capital de 100,000,000 de francs, dont le siège est à Paris, 3, Rue d'Antin; la Société générale pour favoriser le Développement du Commerce et de l'Industrie en France, société anonyme au capital de 500,000,000 de francs, dont le siège est à Paris, 54, Rue de Provence; la Banque de l'Union parisienne, société anonyme au capital de 60,000,000

de francs, dont le siège est à Paris, 7, Rue Chauchat ; de seconde part, il a été exposé et arrêté ce qui suit :—

Le Gouvernement hellénique désirant, en attendant la fin des négociations actuellement engagées pour la paix, s'assurer des ressources financières pour une somme de 40,000,000 de francs, s'est adressé à la Banque nationale de Grèce, qui s'est déclarée disposée à se charger de cette opération et a demandé au groupe français, contractant des dernières opérations en 1910 et 1911, son concours en vue de procurer ladite somme au Gouvernement hellénique.

Il est rappelé que le Gouvernement hellénique dispose actuellement de 79,483 obligations 4 pour cent de 500 fr. restés à la souche sur les 80,000 dont la création a été autorisée suivant les lois des 6 (19) mars, 1910, et 28 mai (10 juin), 1911, sur lesquelles un droit d'option à 84½ moins 2½ pour cent de commission est concédé aux contractants des conventions des 16 juillet, 1910 (N.S.), et 4 (17) juin, 1911, pour le cas où le Gouvernement voudrait procéder à la réalisation de ces titres.

Article 1er. Le Gouvernement hellénique, ne trouvant pas le moment actuel favorable à la réalisation des obligations visées à l'exposé, a décidé la création d'un emprunt provisoire de 40,000,000, autorisé par décret Royal, à sanctionner par la Chambre hellénique lors de la première session qui suivra les présentes conventions.

Cet emprunt sera représenté par des traites délivrées par le Ministère des Finances, en appoints de 50,000 fr. ou 2,000*l.*, et 100,000 fr. ou 4,000*l.*, payables à ordre et domiciliées aux caisses désignées par les contractants. Le modèle en est annexé au présent contrat.

L'échéance de ces traites est fixée au 31 juillet, 1913 (N.S.), le Gouvernement hellénique se réservant, jusqu'au 30 juin (N.S.) au plus tard, la faculté de demander aux contractants de seconde part le renouvellement des traites pour une nouvelle période de six mois, soit jusqu'au 31 janvier, 1914 (N.S.), les contractants s'engageant à escompter les traites comme il sera dit ci-après.

Art. 2. La Banque nationale de Grèce et le groupe français s'engagent à escompter au Gouvernement hellénique lesdites traites représentant l'emprunt provisoire de 40,000,000 de francs, les traites en francs revêtues du timbre français des effets de commerce, les traites en livres sterling, du timbre anglais, et généralement toutes ces traites, du timbre grec s'il y a lieu.

Ils auront droit à un escompte calculé aux taux de 6 pour cent l'an depuis la date où le montant sera mis à la disposition du Gouvernement jusqu'à l'échéance desdites traites.

En outre, le Gouvernement hellénique leur bonifie une commission de ½ pour cent à prélever sur la première utilisation de l'avance.

Les fonds, déduction faite des escompte et commission, seront tenus à la disposition du Gouvernement après la promulgation du décret Royal, et contre remise des traites, à partir du 7 janvier, 1913.

Dans le cas où le Gouvernement hellénique userait de la faculté de renouveler lesdites traites pour une nouvelle période de six mois, ce renouvellement s'effectuerait sous escompte au taux de la Deutsche Reichsbank, minimum 6 pour cent et moyennant une commission nouvelle de ½ pour cent.

Art. 3. En vue d'assurer le complet remboursement de l'emprunt provisoire représenté par lesdites traites, le Gouvernement autorise les contractants de seconde part, après les échéances susmentionnées, à procéder ou à faire procéder pour le compte dudit Gouvernement, en temps et lieu, sur tous marchés et par tous intermédiaires, à concurrence des sommes restant dues, à la réalisation des titres non encore sortis aux tirages sur les 80,000 obligations 4 pour cent 1910 restées à la souche et, dans ce but, à faire apposer sur ces titres la signature de contrôle et le timbre des pays où l'émission devra avoir lieu, dans les mêmes conditions que pour les 220,000 obligations déjà en circulation, et ce, aux frais du Gouvernement hellénique.

Sur le produit de cette réalisation, les contractants de seconde part prélèveront les sommes nécessaires au remboursement des traites d'ensemble 40,000,000 de francs escomptées par eux et des intérêts et frais divers y afférents.

En cas d'insuffisance la différence sera payée par le Gouvernement.

Art. 4. Pour le cas où les contractants de l'emprunt 4 pour cent 1910 décîneraient d'exercer leur droit d'option aux conditions stipulées aux contrats des 16 juillet, 1910 (N.S.), et 4 (17) juin, 1911, le Gouvernement consent dès maintenant une option aux contractants des présentes et abaisse à cet effet le prix d'option à 75 pour cent.

Toutefois, cette option ne pourra, sauf accord avec le Gouvernement, être exercée

à ce prix avant le 30 juin, 1913 (N.S.), ou avant le 31 décembre, 1913 (N.S.), si les traites susmentionnées sont renouvelées.

Art. 5. Dans le cas où le Gouvernement ne voudrait pas que lesdites obligations 4 pour cent fussent réalisées, il se réserve la faculté de notifier aux contractants de seconde part, avant les dates fixées pour la levée de l'option, qu'il désire procéder au remboursement de l'emprunt provisoire par la réalisation de 45,000,000 d'obligations 5 pour cent remboursables le 1er octobre, 1918 (N.S.), au plus tard.

A cet effet, il consent dès à présent, pour ce cas, aux contractants de seconde part, une option sur les susdites obligations au pair, sous déduction d'une commission de contractant de 1¼ pour cent et de 3¾ pour cent pour frais de négociation des titres timbrés comme il sera dit à l'article 6.

Il s'interdit, pendant toute leur durée, de mettre en circulation des obligations 4 pour cent dont la réalisation est ajournée.

Ces obligations 5 pour cent seront créées en coupures au porteur de 500 fr. = 19·17*l.* = 500 drachmes or chacune, et en titres représentant les multiples de ces coupures, dans les proportions qu'indiqueront les contractants de seconde part.

Elles seront productives d'un intérêt annuel de 5 pour cent payable par coupons semestriels à l'échéance des 1er avril et 1er octobre (N.S.), de chaque année attachés aux titres.

Les coupons représentant l'intérêt et les obligations appelées au remboursement seront payables au gré des prêteurs :

à Paris, en francs ;
à Londres, en livres sterling ;
à Athènes, en drachmes or,

aux guichets des contractants ou à ceux qu'ils désigneront. Le payement des intérêts et le remboursement du capital seront exempts de tous impôts, taxes ou retenues présents ou futurs en Grèce.

Le Gouvernement se réserve la faculté de rembourser à tout moment, après un préavis de trois mois, le montant de ces titres en totalité ou en partie avant l'échéance finale.

Dans ce cas, l'intérêt à 5 pour cent cessera de courir à partir de la date fixée pour le remboursement.

En cas de remboursement partiel, il sera procédé au tirage au sort d'une quantité d'obligations correspondant au montant à rembourser.

La forme de l'obligation générale sera arrêtée d'un commun accord entre le Gouvernement et les contractants de seconde part.

Sur la base de l'obligation générale, le Gouvernement délivrera, dans un délai d'un mois au plus, aux contractants de seconde part, les 90,000 obligations indiquées ci-dessus, aux places que ceux-ci désigneront.

Le service de ces obligations, comprenant les intérêts, l'amortissement et une commission de ½ pour cent sur le montant des payements de coupons, sera garanti par les sommes restant disponibles sur les revenus affectés ou à affecter à la garantie de l'emprunt hellénique 4 pour cent 1910.

En cas d'insuffisance de ces revenus, le service des obligations 5 pour cent sera complété sur les recettes ordinaires du budget de l'État.

Pour assurer l'affectation efficace de ces revenus au service des obligations 5 pour cent le Gouvernement hellénique cède définitivement et irrévocablement aux contractants de seconde part le montant nécessaire pour ce service et donne à la Banque nationale de Grèce, désignée à cet effet par les contractants de seconde part comme leur mandataire, l'ordre définitif et irrévocable de prélever sur les sommes qu'elle aura encaissées de ce chef le montant nécessaire pour le payement des intérêts et le remboursement du principal et de la commission de service des titres 5 pour cent créés en vertu de la présente convention.

Il est notamment et expressément stipulé que la Banque nationale de Grèce, en sa qualité de mandataire des prêteurs, retiendra, sur les excédents qui lui seront versés par la Commission financière internationale, conformément à l'article 30 de la Loi du Contrôle international, le montant nécessaire pour le service semestriel de l'échéance suivante desdites obligations 5 pour cent avant tout versement par elle de cet excédent à la caisse du Gouvernement hellénique. Elle complétera, en cas d'insuffisance, le montant nécessaire au service de l'emprunt par un prélèvement sur les autres revenus affectés à ce service.

La Banque nationale de Grèce accepte le mandat en question et s'engage à convertir en or le montant retenu par elle pour le service de ces obligations et à la

transférer au Comptoir national d'Escompte de Paris au plus tard un mois avant chaque échéance.

Le Comptoir national d'Escompte s'entendra avec les autres établissements chargés du service des titres pour les sommes qui seront mises à leur disposition pour le montant des coupons et obligations qui seront payés à leurs guichets.

Les différences de change pouvant résulter du transfert des sommes nécessaires au payement, au remboursement du capital et de la commission de service aux places où ces payements auront lieu resteront à la charge du Gouvernement.

Art. 6. La fraction de coupon courue au moment de la déclaration d'option sera bonifiée au Gouvernement hellénique et la contrevaleur des titres optés mise à sa disposition un mois après la date de levée de l'option, à Paris, en francs.

Les titres optés seront munis, aux frais du Gouvernement hellénique, du timbre du pays où leur réalisation devra avoir lieu.

Art. 7. Les contractants de seconde part auront la faculté de procéder au placement par voie de souscription ou tous autres moyens sur tous marchés, des titres 4 pour cent 1910 ou des obligations 5 pour cent créées comme il est dit à l'article 5.

Le Gouvernement hellénique s'engage à faire toutes démarches, signer tous documents nécessaires en vue de l'admission à la cote, dans les pays où ce placement aurait lieu. Les conditions du placement seront déterminées par les contractants de seconde part.

Art. 8. Le service des obligations 5 pour cent s'il en est créé, sera confié aux contractants de seconde part et à ceux qu'ils auront la faculté de désigner au Gouvernement hellénique.

Art. 9. Les opérations résultant de la présente convention seront centralisées au Comptoir national d'Escompte de Paris, tant pour la correspondance que pour la comptabilité, le mouvement des titres et de fonds, l'exercice des options, &c.

Le Gouvernement hellénique désigne son Ministre à Paris pour toutes les communications relatives à l'exécution des présentes.

Fait à la Légation de Grèce, à Paris, le 19 décembre, 1912.

Le Ministre de Grèce à Paris :
A. ROMANOS.

Banque nationale de Grèce :
Le Gouverneur,
J. VALAORITIS.

Bon pour une participation de 6,800,000 fr.

Comptoir national d'Escompte de Paris :
E. ULLMANN.

Bon pour une participation de 4,800,000 fr.

Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas :
H. CHABERT.
A. TURRETINI.

Bon pour une participation de 4,800,000 fr.

Société générale pour favoriser le Développement du Commerce et de l'Industrie en France :
Le Directeur,
L. MINVIELLE.

Bon pour une participation de 3,600,000 fr.

Banque de l'Union parisienne :
O. HOMBERG.
P. BARBÉ.

No. 147.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January 9.*)

(No. 5. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, January 3, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 219 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith a report by Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe-Owen, who returned yesterday from the head-quarters of the Greek army in Epirus.

Others of his colleagues have preceded or are about to follow him. I am told by one of my colleagues that Lieutenant-Colonel Tánczos, the Austro-Hungarian military attaché, whose proceedings have been the cause of so much inconvenience to the other foreign officers, was associated with Count Forgach in the discreditable affair of the forged documents three years ago.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 147.

Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe-Owen to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Athens, January 3, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I returned to Athens from Epirus on the 2nd instant, some of my colleagues among the military attachés having already returned and others following shortly. As related in my last despatch, little or no opportunity was afforded to the attachés of witnessing any of the operations in progress, but in any case no further military movement of importance immediately against the positions surrounding Yanina is likely to ensue for some days, viz., until the various reinforcing divisions now on the march are ready for concerted action. When this happens, it is possible that we may return to the Yanina theatre.

2. Subsequent to the failure of the recent Greek attacks on the fortified positions outside Yanina, the Greek troops have entrenched themselves on the terrain gained, and have on two occasions repulsed local Turkish counter-attacks.

The 4th division has (except the artillery, still at Prevesa and now disembarking) all passed through Philippiada on its way to the front; this division presented an extremely good appearance, but the battalions were weak, only numbering on the average 800 men.

Guns of 4-inch and 6-inch calibre are being sent forward from the Arta defences to augment the number already in front of Yanina to twelve. No news is yet to hand of the progress of the 3rd and 5th divisions, but they were still engaged with the enemy south of Koritsa on the 23rd December. It is stated that the 6th division will also move towards Yanina, so that it is evident every effort is being made for the reduction of that place irrespective of the progress or otherwise of the peace negotiations.

Should the war continue generally, it will be seen that, if it is desired to use Greek troops in the vicinity of the Dardanelles, only the 1st and 7th divisions would be available, and they would have to be replaced in their garrisons by territorial troops.

3. With respect to the treatment accorded to the attachés, I have been informed semi-officially more than once that this was due entirely to the presence of the Austro-Hungarian and Italian officers, who represent in the eyes of the Greeks an element adverse to the Hellenic aspirations in the Epiro-Albanian territory. Not only were we allowed to see practically nothing of the military operations, but a strict censorship, hitherto unknown, was placed on all letters or telegrams, and very considerable restrictions were laid upon our movements, even in the environs of the town.

How far this attitude of the Greek authorities may be justified I do not know, but certainly great resentment existed at the front regarding the alleged action of the Austrian consul in Yanina, who is reported to have openly encouraged the Turks to resist to the last. It is further stated that Austrian and Italian agents have been active in passing into Valona supplies for the use of the Turks, and that the Governments of these countries have put every obstacle in the way of blockade of the port by the Greek war-vessels.

In any case, the Greeks were persuaded that it was the intention of the Austrian and Italian attachés to present the situation as highly unfavourable to the Greeks, and even to convey military information as to the positions of the latter, including the gun emplacements (at present not located by the Turks). To convey this information, every effort was being made to get letters sent secretly to the Austrian and Italian consuls at Prevesa, to be thence forwarded by Austrian Lloyd packet.

4. Should the war be generally renewed and a Greek force be dispatched to the Dardanelles, it is my intention, with your Excellency's approval, to ask for permission to accompany this force, failing which to return to Epirus. In any case I should

propose, after the conclusion of the war, to visit Yanina and study the defences, as I think the War Office would probably desire a report under this head.

I have, &c.
F. CUNLIFFE-OWEN,
Military Attaché.

[1299] No. 148.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, January 9, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 1st January.

French Government learn that the German Minister at Belgrade has been instructed to protest against levy of duties at Ghevgheli. French and Russian Governments have agreed to instruct their representatives at Belgrade to concert a representation similar to that of their British and German colleagues.

Substance of telegram No. 5 of 6th January communicated to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[1281] No. 149.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 9, 1913.*

SIR R. PAGET'S telegram No. 4 of 5th January: Public Debt offices at Uskub.

Nothing is known of the affair at the German Foreign Office.

[1291] No. 150.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 9, 1913.*

I UNDERSTAND from my Austrian colleague that M. Danef has refused to treat any longer with M. Take Jonesco. Feeling is running very high here, especially in M. Take's party, and there is every reason to fear that, unless negotiations are resumed within two or three days, Roumania will take military action. Roumanian Government see that the fall of Adrianople would deprive them of leverage, and they are not inclined to brook delay.

The Austrian Minister has urged at Vienna that the Austrian Ambassador in London should be instructed to intervene with the delegates with a view to the resumption of negotiations.

The Austrian Minister thinks that the difficulty is partly due to personal animosities between M. Danef and M. Take, and hopes that the negotiations may be resumed between M. Danef and M. Misu.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[1297] No. 151.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 9, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 4 of to-day.

I learn confidentially from a reliable source that, after M. Danef had abandoned negotiations, proposals were presented to Minister for Foreign Affairs last night embodying Bulgaria's last word as regards concessions she is prepared to make.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has referred proposals to the King, and it is expected that Bulgarian Minister will receive reply to-morrow.

My informant tells me that, if reply is unfavourable, Bulgarian Minister will return to Sophia.

First five classes of reserves have been warned to be ready for mobilisation if required.

(Repeated to Sophia.)

[1295] No. 152.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, January 9, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 10.

In the absence of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I spoke unofficially to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs. He assured me that all the Servian irregulars had been disbanded since the battle of Kumanovo, and that there are no Servian bands in existence. He protested that no outrages had been or were being committed, and that the population welcomes the Servian rule, and said that the Servian Government had been so indignant at the reports that atrocities alleged have been committed by Servian troops that they at one time thought of asking for the appointment of an international committee to investigate the charges on the spot.

I have personally heard many reports of outrages, but cannot absolutely vouch for the reliability of any.

[1296] No. 153.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 9, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Uskub, No. 3, dated to-day:—

"Your telegram No. 1.

"To-day Servian Customs here demanded duty on goods imported from Salonica by a British firm which had already paid duty at Salonica before war. Customs also refused to pass eight cases of matches as being a Government monopoly. I am protesting energetically to local authorities.

"I hear that trosharina is being levied here; shall I protest against this?

"I have as yet had no reply to my formal enquiry as to tariffs."

(R.) I already, before receipt of this telegram, made representations regarding levying of prohibitive duties on certain article[s] under the excuse that these constitute Government monopolies. I was informed that orders are being given to discontinue practice.

I have authorised vice-consul at Uskub to protest against trosharina (excise tax), and will also speak about it myself.

[1303] No. 154.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 1. Commercial.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, January 9, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 1, Commercial, of 7th January.

Director-General of Customs states that instructions have been sent to customs authorities at Cavalla on 13th December not to levy dues on tobacco exported abroad (excepting to Egypt and certain other former possessions of Turkey), and that previous Régie regulations as to export were to be continued.

[1298] No. 155.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 9. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 9, 1913.*

I HEAR from a good source that negotiations were proceeding last week between General Ivanof and Chokri Pasha for the surrender of Adrianople. The former offered the latter a large personal bribe if he would surrender the town, but the Turkish general refused.

These are the negotiations vaguely alluded to in the "Times" of 3rd January.

Since the interview reported in my telegram No. 7 of 8th January, above has no great significance.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[1294] No. 156.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 9, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 4 of 6th January.

Reservists have been ordered to remain with the colours until the end of March.

[1293] No. 157.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 9.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Constantinople, January 9, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 11 and Sophia telegram No. 7.

The whole situation depends upon the fate of Adrianople, and if this actually fell the whole position would be profoundly altered. Rumours are now circulating that the town cannot hold out many days more, and it is even said that the commander is contemplating a sortie as the only alternative to surrender.

My Austrian colleague told me that he was convinced that Bulgaria would in the end get Salonica and that Adrianople would remain Turkish. This conviction on his part may, however, be connected with the solution of the North-East Albanian boundaries.

[1540] No. 158.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 9, 1913.*

GERMAN Ambassador has proposed that the four islands near the entrance of the Straits and Mitylene and Chios should be left to Turkey, and stated that this was the view of the Italian Government. Italian Ambassador has stated that his Government have not put forward this proposition, but I understand that Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs is made uneasy by campaign in French press about Syria, and considers that to take away from Turkey the islands at present occupied by Italians would deprive Italy of lever for ending Turkish operations in Tripoli. His Majesty's Government hold that Turkey cannot again be put in a position to suppress population of islands, which is entirely Greek, by force, and that we cannot be a party to creation of new Cretes and to use of force by European Powers to prevent annexation to Greece, which would certainly follow if islands were given autonomy under Turkish sovereignty. In other words, annexation of islands to Greece can only be prevented by use of force, either Turkish or European, and His Majesty's Government are opposed to either. His Majesty's Government would also oppose very strongly retention or acquisition of any of the islands by any Great Power.

On other hand, we would support extension to Mitylene and Chios of stringent conditions proposed by Russia for four islands near entrance of Straits to prevent

these from being a menace to Turkish territory, and any self-denying proposal to prevent Great Powers from securing islands for themselves.

I have spoken to Italian Ambassador in this sense, and you should explain matter to Minister for Foreign Affairs. It is not practicable to turn Greece out of the islands, nor to prevent their annexation to her, but I will consider anything that Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs may have to propose to guard against unfavourable consequences that he may fear from islands being ceded to Greece.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 14; Berlin, No. 12; Vienna, No. 13; St Petersburgh, No. 24; and Constantinople, No. 23.)

[1000] No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 9, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 1 of 6th January: Withdrawal of His Majesty's ship "Diana" from Suda Bay.

Withdrawal is necessary for administrative reasons, and, as no disturbances appear likely in near future, another ship will not be sent immediately. "Dartmouth," now at Smyrna, will, however, visit Suda Bay occasionally, and is available at short notice if required.

It appears that Russian ship is remaining indefinitely.

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[522] No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1913.*

COUNT TRAUTTMANSDORFF called at the Foreign Office on the 1st January, and handed to Lord Onslow a tracing of the Albanian frontier, as proposed by Austria.

Count Trauttmansdorff said that, in proposing this line, Austria had been animated by the following motives. They wished to include in Albanian territory as much country as was inhabited by Albanians as they possibly could, since they thought that were Albanians left on the other side of the border this would constitute a constant source of trouble. The frontier practically follows the Montenegrin line to the mountains by Gusinje; it then makes a curve south, and then north, along the crest of the Alps as far as Ipek; thence it runs to Prisrend, thence between Lakes Ochrida and Prespa; then south again to Lapsista, and then in a tortuous line as far as the sea close by Parga. Yanina was included in Albania as a matter of principle, as the Greeks did not succeed in taking it. Count Trauttmansdorff then said that the reason for their having included the south-eastern corner was because it seemed to Austria that the Koutzo-Vlachs should be included in Albanian territory, but he said that this rather depended on the views of the Roumanians, which we had not yet heard. Besides Scutari, the Austrians stood out for the inclusion of Dinkova, Dibra, and Koritza in Albania. As regards Ipek and Prisrend, they would, he seemed to think, be open to argument. They wished to include them, as, according to their information, these cities contained a majority of Albanians. The other three towns mentioned were purely Albanian, and should be put in Albania. As regards the frontier to the west of Lake Ochrida, he thought that probably it would be open to some slight modification. The last point which had governed the Austrians in their tracing of the frontier was that it followed crests of mountains rather than the valleys. The Russians had taken the valleys and rivers as the border, and the Austrians the watersheds. They had done this because, they said, that, if the frontier was on top of a hill, this would form a more effective barrier between the inhabitants on either side than if it ran along the valley.

As regards any modifications that were suggested, Count Trauttmansdorff made it clear that he only expressed personal views.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1586] No. 161.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1913.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day, the Austrian Ambassador stated that his instructions had now been received. The Austrian Government agreed to the *démarche collective* in Constantinople, and accepted in principle the idea of sending war-ships to Besika Bay, which they considered better than a direct demonstration at Constantinople.

The Italian Ambassador was further instructed that a naval demonstration was, his Government thought, unnecessary, and that the Italian Ambassador in Constantinople had been instructed to concert with his colleagues in drawing up a *démarche collective*.

The Russian and French Ambassadors continued to be strongly of opinion that a naval demonstration was required to make the *démarche* in Constantinople effective.

It was decided that the respective Ambassadors should ask their Governments what ships were being sent to Besika Bay, and when they were to go.

The French Ambassador said that, if the note to be presented in Constantinople was sent direct by the Governments to their Ambassadors, and a copy of it was given to the Turkish Ambassadors at the respective capitals, it would be far more effective than the presentation of a note which was known to have been drawn up by the Ambassadors in Constantinople.

The Italian Ambassador, who also had personal experience of Constantinople, agreed in this.

It was decided that, without altering the instructions to the Ambassadors in Constantinople, M. Cambon should make a *rédaction* of a note for us to consider to-morrow.

The German Ambassador then made the following statement:—

"Le Gouvernement Impérial est d'avis qu'il est indispensable que la démarche des Puissances à Sophia en faveur des réclamations roumaines ne suive pas la démarche collective auprès de la Sublime Porte, mais qu'elle soit simultanée. Une intervention amicale à Sophia dans cet ordre d'idées qui viserait, comme celle à Péra, à écarter le danger de la guerre, aura en ce moment un accueil d'autant plus favorable, que la Bulgarie sera en état de justifier vis-à-vis de son opinion publique les concessions faites à la Roumanie par les avantages sérieux que les Puissances sont en train de lui procurer auprès de la Sublime Porte."

No one objected to this in principle; but the Russian Ambassador said that it was not opportune in the present state of the negotiations between M. Take Jonesco and Dr. Danef, and in view of the menacing attitude of Roumania at the present moment.

I gave to the Ambassadors copies of the communication which the Servian chargé d'affaires had made to me yesterday, and we all agreed thereupon to the following resolution:—

"Les Puissances prennent acte de cette déclaration. Elles considèrent que la Serbie sera tenue d'évacuer le littoral et le territoire de l'Albanie après sa délimitation par les Puissances dès que lesdites Puissances lui auront notifié leur décision."

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[1211] No. 162.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1913.*

TEVFIK PASHA called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 6th January. His Highness brought a telegram from his Government asking for certain explanations in respect to the "Crawford proposal" in regard to Adrianople. They were desirous of knowing whether the forts were to be dismantled, &c., and also assuming that the town, railway to Dedeagatch, and the fort were to remain in Ottoman hands, whether they were to

* Also to Sir F. Bertie, No. 26; Sir E. Goschen, No. 13; Sir R. Rodd, No. 11; and Sir G. Buchanan, No. 15.

be neutralised. As Sir R. Crawford was in the office, he came to Sir A. Nicolson's room, but Sir A. Nicolson was not aware whether his explanations satisfactorily decided the question as to the possession of Adrianople. Sir R. Crawford seemed to think that the Maritza might be taken as a boundary, leaving the greater portion of the town to Turkey. Sir R. Crawford apparently regarded the question solely from the commercial point of view, as is natural, and had not, it seemed to Sir A. Nicolson, quite appreciated that the urgent question was as to whether Adrianople was to become Bulgarian or remain Turkish. He instanced that the City of London was distinct from the rest of London, and that there were divided municipalities in this capital. This analogy is not, of course, applicable to the question at issue. However, the main object being to avoid a rupture and endeavour to bring the question into the sphere of discussion, Sir A. Nicolson understood that Reshid Pasha would say at that day's sitting of the conference that Turkey was ready to discuss some solution of the question, and would endeavour before the next meeting to propound some basis for such discussion, taking Sir R. Crawford's proposal as a basis, that is if the other Turkish delegates agreed to this procedure. Tevfik Pasha saw no objection.

The Turkish delegates, however, stipulated at the Peace Conference of the 6th January that the line they were prepared to discuss must leave Adrianople in Ottoman territory.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[1210] No. 163.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1913.*

M. DANEF called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 5th January. He said that a rupture of the negotiations on the following day was more than probable, as the Turks would evidently not cede Adrianople, and the allies could not yield on that point. On the 7th January, therefore, the armistice would be denounced by the military authorities, four days' notice, according to the arrangements concluded, being given before hostilities were reopened on the 11th or 12th January. To avert this unfortunate contingency there was practically only one method. The Powers might first suggest, through the Balkan representatives accredited in London, that the delegates should not leave the country. The negotiations though, therefore, officially broken off would be in reality suspended. During the four days' grace which would elapse between the denunciation of the armistice on the 7th and the reopening of hostilities the Powers would have time to intervene. It was of no use and a waste of time giving advice or warnings to Kiamil Pasha or the Turkish Cabinet. They did not need convincing as to the necessity of making peace. What was required was some *act* on the part of all the Powers which would impress the Turkish *public*, and which would demonstrate the futility of continuing the conflict. A naval demonstration collectively made by all the Powers would certainly have the desired effect. M. Danef, therefore, was of opinion that the Powers should lose no time in taking this question into consideration, and he would not be surprised if Count Berchtold were to take the initiative in proposing a naval demonstration. He enquired if we should object if some other Power than ourselves were to take the initiative. Sir A. Nicolson said that we should not be jealous.

Sir A. Nicolson remarked to M. Danef that he was evidently convinced that the negotiations would be broken off on the next day, but did he not think it possible that some "transaction" or compromise might even at this moment be effected in regard to Adrianople which might be suitable and acceptable to both parties? M. Danef said that he would be ready to make special exceptions for some mosques and Imperial tombs, but further he could not go. He never imagined that the negotiations would succeed; a rupture sooner or later was inevitable, whether Adrianople fell or not. The fall of Adrianople would not affect the question. If hostilities were resumed the Bulgarians would bombard and assault Adrianople and then take the Chatalja lines, and the peace terms then would be far different from those now offered. The Powers must see that a resumption of hostilities would be a very grave danger to European peace, and they should use all their endeavours to avert that danger. There was still time to do so during the coming week, but acts and not words must be employed.

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M. Danef had already spoken in the above sense to the German and Austro-Hungarian Ambassadors here, and they had promised to communicate with their Governments and would probably have instructions by Monday the 6th. He again repeated that the initiative would probably come from Count Berchtold.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2057] No. 164.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1913.*

M. VENIZELOS came to see me to-day, and spoke strongly on the question of the Ægean islands. Mytilene and Chios were, he said, the most valuable; many of the others were mere rocks.

I told him confidentially the view of the British Government that Turkey could not be replaced in possession of the islands by force, nor were we willing to use force to prevent their annexation to Greece. I mentioned that the Italian Government were reluctant to see the islands taken away from Turkey.

M. Venizelos said that Greece was in possession of the islands, and he did not think that Italy could contemplate turning her out of them by force.

I told him that I thought it would be fair that the conditions for which Russia had stipulated with regard to the four islands at the mouth of the Straits should be applied to Mytilene and Chios if they were ceded to Greece.

M. Venizelos raised no objection to this.

I understood him to be prepared to accept these conditions for Mytilene and Chios.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1585] No. 165.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 9, 1913.*

I HAD some conversation with the Italian Ambassador to-day before the meeting of Ambassadors.

I explained to him the views of His Majesty's Government, as set forth in my telegram No. 13 to your Excellency, which I sent later in the evening, embodying the gist of the conversation.

The Ambassador asked me not to bring on the question of the Ægean islands at present, in order that his Government might consider what I had urged with regard to the question. He suggested that, to relieve the apprehensions of his Government, due to the agitation in the French press about Syria, some resolution might be come to giving a new guarantee to Turkey for her possessions in Asia Minor.

I told him what had passed between M. Cambon and myself about Syria, including my criticism of what the French press had said after M. Poincaré's statement. I feared that a guarantee to Turkey of her possessions in Asia Minor might be construed as directed against Russia, who might feel obliged to protect herself against Turkish moves on the Turco-Persian frontier, which had in recent years caused her anxiety. I also said that I did not wish to propose anything which might look as if we desired to forestall attempts by Germany to get a footing in Asia Minor.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1305] No. 166.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Paris, January 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, replying to a communication by which I acquainted his Excellency with the substance of your despatch No. 632 of the 28th ultimo in regard to the interests of the foreign holders of Turkish bonds, and enquired whether any further written communication on the subject was to be expected from the French Government, or whether M. Gout's memorandum, copy of which Mr. Carnegie transmitted to you in his despatch No. 529 of the 22nd December, was the communication alluded to by M. Poincaré in his conversation with Mr. Carnegie on the 18th December.

M. Poincaré informs me that the French programme of the 17th November (presumably the one enclosed in M. Cambon's note to you of the 21st November) correctly represents the present views of the French Government as to the best manner of safeguarding the interests of Turkey's foreign creditors. Having regard to the fact that the conclusions to which the Russian and German Governments have been led by an examination of the question have now been brought to the knowledge of the French Government, his Excellency attaches great importance to receiving an expression of the views of His Majesty's Government in regard to the French proposals at an early date in order that an exchange of views as to the settlement of financial questions raised by the present war may be proceeded with without delay.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 166.

M. Poincaré to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 7 janvier, 1913.*

PAR une note en date du 30 décembre dernier, votre Excellence a bien voulu me rappeler qu'au cours d'un entretien que j'avais eu avec Mr. Carnegie, le 18 décembre dernier, au sujet de la protection des intérêts des porteurs étrangers de fonds ottomans, je lui avais annoncé la remise d'un document précisant sur ce point les vues du Gouvernement français, et vous me demandez si le Gouvernement britannique doit attendre une autre communication que celle adressée à Mr. Carnegie, le 21 décembre, par M. Gout.

En réponse à votre demande, j'ai l'honneur de vous faire connaître que le point de vue consigné, à la date du 17 novembre dernier, dans les conclusions formées par la commission instituée auprès de mon département pour l'étude de cette question, et dont l'aide-mémoire du 21 décembre était destiné à fournir un commentaire, est encore aujourd'hui celui que le Gouvernement français estime le plus favorable à la sauvegarde des intérêts des créanciers étrangers de l'Empire ottoman.

Le Gouvernement russe et le Gouvernement allemand ont déjà fait procéder, de leur côté, à l'examen de ces propositions, et les conclusions auxquelles ils ont abouti viennent d'être portées à la connaissance de mon département. Aussi ai-je chargé M. Gout de rester officieusement en contact avec les différentes ambassades intéressées à ce règlement en vue de préparer, d'accord avec elles, les résolutions qui seraient soumises à l'approbation officielle des Puissances aussitôt que la question des cessions territoriales serait résolue. Il y aurait donc intérêt à ce que les échanges de vues engagés à Paris sur la solution des questions financières soulevées par la guerre actuelle se poursuivissent sans délai, et j'attacherais le plus grand prix à connaître aussitôt que possible les vues du Gouvernement britannique sur le programme formulé par le Gouvernement français à la date 17 novembre dernier.

Agréez, &c.
R. POINCARÉ.

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[1306] No. 167.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Paris, January 9, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 2 of to-day's date, copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, acquainting me with the instructions which have been sent, after consultation with the Russian Government, to the French Minister at Belgrade, in order that he and M. de Hartwig may agree upon a representation to the Servian Government similar to that made by their British and German colleagues, in respect of the improper levy of customs duties by the Servian authorities at Ghevgheli on goods from Salonica.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 167.

M. Poincaré to Sir Francis Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 7 janvier, 1913.*

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser réception de trois communications que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser sous la date des 2, 3 et 5 janvier au sujet de la perception illégale et vexatoire, par le Gouvernement serbe, de droits de douane à Ghevgheli, sur les marchandises venant de Salonique et ayant déjà acquitté dans ce port les droits du tarif ottoman.

Le Gouvernement de la république a été également avisé, à propos de cette question, que le Gouvernement allemand avait donné pour instruction à son représentant à Belgrade de protester contre l'établissement de droits de nature à préjudicier aux intérêts du commerce allemand.

L'Ambassadeur de la république à Saint-Pétersbourg a été chargé de demander au Gouvernement russe s'il serait, de son côté, disposé à faire en même temps que le Gouvernement français, au sujet de ces mesures douanières, des réserves appropriées.

M. Sazonof s'est déclaré prêt à inviter son représentant à Belgrade à s'entendre avec le Ministre de la république, dans cette ville, en vue d'effectuer, auprès du Gouvernement Royal, une démarche analogue à celle qui a été prescrite aux Ministres de la Grande-Bretagne et d'Allemagne.

En portant ces indications à la connaissance du Gouvernement britannique, j'ai l'honneur de faire savoir à votre Excellence que des instructions dans le même sens ont été adressées à M. Descos à la date de ce jour.

Agréez, &c.
POINCARÉ.

[1386] No. 168.

Colonial Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 10.)

Sir, *Downing Street, January 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to the letter from this department of the 24th December, forwarding a copy of a telegram from the Acting High Commissioner of Cyprus, on the subject of a petition received from the Archbishop and members of the Greek Orthodox Church, I am directed by Mr. Secretary Harcourt to transmit to you, to be laid before Secretary Sir E. Grey, the enclosed copy of a despatch from Captain Orr forwarding the petition in question.

I am, &c.
H. J. READ.

Enclosure 1 in No. 168.

Captain Orr to Mr. Harcourt.

Sir, *December 24, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you, with translation attached, a petition bearing the signatures of the Archbishop of Cyprus and a number of the most

influential members of the Greek Orthodox Church in Cyprus. The petition was handed to me personally by his Beatitude, and I attach also a translation of the letter which he tendered at the same time. I have already, in accordance with the request contained therein, communicated to you by telegram the gist of the petition, and I have caused his Beatitude the Archbishop to be informed of the action taken by me in the matter.

I have, &c.
C. W. ORR.
Administering the Government.

Enclosure 2 in No. 168.

Petition.

(Translation.)

Right Honourable Sir,

WE, the respectfully undersigned representatives of the Greek population of Cyprus, having assembled to-day in a general meeting at the Archiepiscopal Palace under the presidency of his Beatitude the Archbishop of Cyprus, and fulfilling, as we do, a general and unanimous mandate given to us by the people, whose representatives we are, have the honour to submit to the respected Government of His Majesty the following most fervent appeal of the people:—

The respected Government and the magnanimous nation of Great Britain are aware that Cyprus hailed the British flag thirty-four years ago with joy and gratitude because she was delivered by it from a cruel yoke, and more so because the people of Cyprus, relying on their own historical rights and on the liberal principles of the British nation, hoped from the earliest days that the British nation would not be long in completing its work of deliverance by effecting the national rehabilitation of the island. With those hopes the people of Cyprus have many times since the British occupation addressed, with due respect always, applications for the union of Cyprus with the Hellenic Kingdom, to which they are bound by the indissoluble ties of a common origin and religion, of common traditions and a common language.

Whereas now, owing to the issue of the Balkan war, the fate of the Christian peoples of the Near East is to be settled on the basis of the right of nationality, we confidently believe that the proper moment has come for us to place our own aspirations, too, in the hands of the British Government, expecting, as we do, from them a final settlement of the Cyprus question on the same basis of the right of nationality, by the union, that is, of Cyprus with her mother Greece, which we venture to believe has universally been acknowledged to be a strong factor in the progress and civilisation of the Near East, and a country which affords sufficient guarantees for an administration of the peoples under her sway by an equal treatment and in a progressive way.

We consequently, Right Honourable Sir, cherish the conviction that the British Government, which has been the first from among the civilised States to proclaim recently, through its Prime Minister, the dogma of the deliverance of the Near East as well as of the disinterestedness of the European States in the settlement of the eastern question, will extend its noble principles to us also, and will, by the national rehabilitation of the island, establish a new title to the gratitude of the much-tried, but with a historical past, people of Cyprus as well as to the gratitude of the whole Hellenism.

Whereupon we remain, &c.

KYRILLOS,
Archbishop of Cyprus.

Archiepiscopal Palace,
December 6 (19), 1912.

[And twenty-seven other signatures.]

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Enclosure 3 in No. 168.

Archbishop of Cyprus to the Officer Administering the Government of Cyprus.

(Translation.)

Your Excellency, *Archiepiscopal Palace, December* 6, 1912.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Excellency an appeal of the representatives of the Greek people of Cyprus, who have to-day held a general meeting in the Archiepiscopal Palace, praying, in behalf of the people they represent, that the liberal British Government may, in these proper circumstances, settle the Cyprus cause finally in accordance with their aspirations.

Please to forward the appeal to the Right Honourable the Secretary of State for the Colonies by telegraph, for which I shall be very thankful to you.

I remain, &c.

KYRILLOS.

[1868] No. 169.

Sublime Porte to Tewfik Pasha.—(Communicated by Tewfik Pasha, January 10.)

(Télégraphique.) *Constantinople, le 9 janvier*, 1913.

VOTRE Altesse voudra bien faire comprendre à Sir E. Grey que si solution satisfaisante n'est pas donnée sans retard à la double question d'Andrinople et des îles, la présence de notre délégation à Londres devient inutile et sujette à critique.

Son Excellence nous avait assurés il y a peu de temps du sort de nos îles. Nous sommes peinés maintenant d'apprendre qu'un revirement se dessine dans l'attitude du Gouvernement britannique à notre égard. Les détracteurs du Gouvernement Impérial ne manqueront pas de tirer profit de ce revirement, et le Cabinet actuel, connu par ses tendances et convictions anglophiles, ne pourra justifier la situation aux yeux de l'opinion publique tant ici que partout ailleurs. Son Excellence, avec la sagesse qui la caractérise, voudra bien considérer et peser les conséquences graves qui peuvent résulter de la retraite des hommes d'État dont la profession de foi n'est pas à établir.

[1416] No. 170.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 9, 1913.

FOLLOWING is the text referred to in my telegram No. 16 of 9th January:—

"Les Gouvernements, &c., ayant envisagé de concert les conditions dans lesquelles viennent d'être suspendus les pourparlers de paix engagés entre la Turquie, d'une part, et les quatre États coalisés, d'autre part, ont été unanimement d'avis que la Sublime Porte n'avait pas suffisamment tenu compte dans ses propositions aux alliés des résultats de la guerre, non plus que des conséquences que la reprise des hostilités pourraient avoir pour l'Empire ottoman, et sur lesquelles ils appellent sa plus sérieuse attention.

"Ils sont disposés à user de leur influence pour que les îles qui seraient cédées aux alliés et qui auraient une importance stratégique soient pourvues d'une administration soumise à des conditions de neutralisation telles qu'elles ne puissent constituer une menace pour la Turquie.

"En ce qui concerne la ville d'Andrinople, ils useront également de leur influence pour que les termes de la cession définitive de cette place aux alliés soient conçues de façon à préserver les intérêts musulmans relatifs aux mosquées et aux biens religieux ainsi qu'à en assurer la sauvegarde."

[1304] No. 171.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 16.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 9, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 22 of 7th January.

After long discussion to-day Ambassadors agreed on text for collective note.

Some difficulty was experienced in getting Ambassadors of Triple Alliance to accept even this text, they objecting to anything that might be construed as going beyond advice [group undecypherable] the nature of pressure.

None of the Ambassadors were disposed to be precise on points 3 and 4.

In point 6, instructions of the Triple Alliance Ambassadors gave "intérêts turcs," and not "musulmans," and they have referred for instructions on this point.

Following is text of note (here [group undecypherable: ? refer to] my separate telegram):—

"I understand that Porte intends to return unfavourable reply to contemplated *démarche* and asserts that even in the event of naval demonstration there would be no modification of their attitude. They seem convinced that they can divide the two groupings of Powers."

Though in circular sent to Ottoman Ambassadors to-day Porte states that it will not be influenced by fall of Adrianople, this would seem to contain an element of bluff, and its fall can hardly fail to influence the extreme committee section in the army, whose apparent object is to use the Adrianople question as a means of ousting the present Cabinet and returning to power.

[1414] No. 172.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January* 10, 1913.

I HAVE questioned Reuter's agent here as to the telegram sent by him on 8th January to the effect that you had proposed to the Powers that Adrianople should be left to Turkey on condition that the forts be razed, and that other restrictions should be imposed on Turkey. He says that he obtained the information from Turkish official sources. The idea seems to be entertained by my German colleague.

It is curious that Reuter's agent here should have sent the report without consulting me, as I am in daily indirect communication with him.

[1432] No. 173.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 8.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, January* 10, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of 9th January.

I have now received a complaint from the vice-consul at Uskub to the effect that the customs authorities have confiscated matches and cigarette paper (Government monopolies) imported by a British firm, and refuse either to deliver or to send them back to Salonica.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me this morning that the Minister of Finance perfectly understands that these proceedings constitute an infringement of treaty rights, and has sent the necessary instructions to the various local custom-house authorities, but that apparently they have not yet fully understood the situation.

He will move the Minister of Finance to send more stringent orders without delay. In the meantime, I stated that I must reserve our rights in the case of any loss to British subjects.

[1410] No. 174.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 10, 1913.*

I LEARN, on further enquiry, that the proposals mentioned in my immediately preceding telegram of 9th January were not made through the Bulgarian Minister, but Russian Minister. Information contained in penultimate paragraph of my immediately preceding telegram is therefore no doubt too alarmist.

Proposals were result, I understand, of a talk between the Russian Ambassador in London and M. Danef. Bulgaria is prepared to make only trifling territorial concessions, and refuses to cede Silistria, though she is willing to raze its fortifications.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[1430] No. 175.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 10, 1913.*

FILIPESCO, member of the Roumanian Cabinet, and formerly Minister of War, left on 7th January for Constantinople. This visit may not be without significance at the present juncture.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[1434] No. 176.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 10, 1913.*

BULGARIAN Minister tells me that the Bulgarian proposals are as follows:—

1. Cession of number of villages close to the present frontier.
2. Razing of Silistria fortifications and cession to Roumania of the Medjidieh Taba Fort, south of Silistria.
3. Proper treatment of the Kutzo-Vlachs.
4. A formal renunciation of Bulgarian aspirations with regard to Dobrudja.

Bulgarian Minister tells me that he notices a slight relaxation of the tension in Bucharest since the resumption of negotiations between Danef and Misu, but he clearly regards the situation as serious, and he thinks that the King is to some extent infected with the general excitement.

I gather that M. Take Jonesco has been eliminated from the negotiations, and has been told to keep quiet.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[1404] No. 177.

Consul-General Wratislaw to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Canea, Crete, January 10, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of 9th January.

I have no apprehension of disturbances in Crete, and the desire for presence of a British man-of-war arises from our undertaking to guard the flags of Turkey and the protecting Powers on Suda Bay Island.

Should the Russian ship leave, the flags will have to be hauled down. My Russian colleague is of the opinion that the position of sole guardian of the Turkish flag is too invidious for the Russian Government to accept.

[1427] No. 178.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 10. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 10, 1913.*

ROUMANIA.

Bucharest telegram No. 6 of 10th January.

Immediate policy of Bulgarian Government, if they are not able to come to an arrangement with Roumania or to postpone Roumanian action until the conclusion of the present war, is not to offer any resistance to the occupation of Bulgarian territory by Roumanian troops.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[1169] No. 179.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 10, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 6 of 8th January.

Austrian Ambassador has spoken to me. The important thing is to give something substantial to Montenegro. If she ceases to talk of Scutari no one else will mention it, unless, of course, Montenegro is compensated at expense of Servia, in which case one difficulty will only have been exchanged for another.

[1818] No. 180.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.**

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 10, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 25 of 10th January to Constantinople.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[1818] No. 181.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 10, 1913.*

M. DANEF has informed me that the allies will not discuss any proposal which includes the cession by Turkey of the town of Adrianople, but will be ready to discuss the conditions on which the town should be ceded. I find him immovable on this point.

Turkish Ambassador and Reschid Pasha have been informed of the above; they stated categorically that in these circumstances it was useless for the Ottoman delegates to remain any longer in London. They added that the impression that pressure by the Powers would make Turkey yield on this point was quite unfounded; they suggested that the Powers should speak at Sophia to induce Bulgaria to be more moderate in regard to Adrianople. They were informed that there was no hope that the Powers would be prepared to speak in this sense on that point at Sophia, but that I would inform the Ambassadors at the next meeting on Monday of what had passed. I have previously used to Turkish Ambassador and Reschid Pasha the arguments that are proposed for the collective *démarche*, but only on my own account. (End of R.)

My personal impression is that nothing but the actual fall of Adrianople will have any effect on the situation, but it is most desirable that Powers should present united advice to Porte and remove any impression of division between them, otherwise even fall of Adrianople may not ease the situation.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 13; Paris, No. 12; Rome, No. 14; St. Petersburgh, No. 26; Vienna, No. 16; and Sophia, No. 1.)

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* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 13), Sir R. Rodd (No. 15), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 27), and Sir F. Cartwright (No. 17).

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[1819] No. 182.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1913.

FOLLOWING text has been drafted by French Ambassador here. I prefer it to text drawn up by Ambassadors at Constantinople. Ambassadors here are favourable to it, and have telegraphed it to their Governments. You are authorised to join in presenting this in a *démarche collective*, but you can join in the text drawn up at Constantinople if instructions of your colleagues lead them to prefer it:—

"Les soussignés, Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie, d'Allemagne et d'Italie, ont été chargés par leurs Gouvernements de faire à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan la communication suivante:—

"'Désireuses de prévenir la reprise des hostilités, lesdites Puissances croient devoir appeler l'attention du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman sur la grave responsabilité qu'il assumerait si, par sa résistance à leurs conseils, il empêchait le rétablissement de la paix. Il n'aurait à s'en prendre qu'à lui-même si la prolongation de la guerre avait pour conséquence de mettre en question le sort de la capitale et peut-être d'étendre les hostilités aux provinces asiatiques de l'Empire. Dans ce cas, il ne pourrait pas compter sur le succès de leurs efforts pour le préserver contre des dangers auxquels elles l'ont déjà dissuadé et le détournent encore de s'exposer.

"En tout état de cause, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman aura besoin après la conclusion de la paix, de l'appui moral et matériel des Grandes Puissances européennes pour réparer les maux de la guerre, consolider sa situation à Constantinople et mettre en valeur les vastes territoires asiatiques dont la prospérité constituera sa force la plus effective. Pour entreprendre et mener à bien cette œuvre nécessaire, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan ne saurait encore compter sur l'efficacité du bienveillant appui des Puissances qu'autant qu'il aura déféré à leurs avis, qui s'inspirent des intérêts généraux de l'Europe et de ceux de la Turquie.

"Dans ces conditions, les Grandes Puissances européennes croient devoir renouveler collectivement au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman le conseil de consentir à la cession de la ville d'Andrinople aux alliés balkaniques et de s'en remettre à elles du soin de statuer sur le sort des îles de la Mer Égée.

"En retour de ces concessions, lesdites Puissances s'emploieraient à assurer la sauvegarde des intérêts musulmans à Andrinople et le respect des mosquées, édifices ou biens religieux existant dans cette ville. Elles feraient également en sorte que la solution donnée par elles à la question des îles de l'Archipel exclut toute menace pour la sécurité de la Turquie."

[1820] No. 183.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1913.

SERVIAN chargé d'affaires has given me a communication respecting future withdrawal of Servian troops from littoral of Adriatic. I communicated it to the Ambassadors here, and we came unanimously to the following resolution:—

"Les Puissances prennent acte de cette déclaration. Elles considèrent que la Serbie sera tenue d'évacuer le littoral et le territoire de l'Albanie après sa délimitation par les Puissances, dès que lesdites Puissances lui auront notifié leur décision."

This is for your information.

[1773] No. 184.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 28.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1913.

I SAW M. Cambon to-day, and told him what I had telegraphed yesterday to Sir Rennell Rodd about the Ægean islands.

I also told him that the Italian Ambassador, when pressed as to the reason of his Government for making difficulties about the islands, had informed me privately that the apprehensions of the Marquis di San Giuliano had been aroused by the campaign in the French press about Syria. I had heard, in addition, from the German Ambassador, when I pressed him on the subject, that Italy feared that the annexation of the islands to Greece was the first step for some plan of dividing Asia Minor amongst the European Powers. I gathered that Italy was afraid that, if Asia Minor were divided in this way, after the islands had all been annexed to Greece, there would be nothing for Italy; whereas if France were going to annex Syria, and other Powers were going to get other things in Asia Minor, Italy might get some of the islands if they still belonged to Turkey.

I suggested to M. Cambon that, if M. Poincaré could set the mind of the Marquis di San Giuliano at rest about Syria, it might help to smooth the difficulties about the islands.

M. Cambon said that he would tell M. Poincaré what I had said.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2060] No. 185.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1913.

I ASKED Dr. Danef to come to see me this morning. I told him that the Turkish Ambassador and Reschid Pasha had said that it was for me, as honorary president, to convoke the peace conference, which had been suspended; but that it was absolutely useless to convoke it unless the Bulgarians were prepared to discuss some proposition such as that which Sir Richard Crawford had, I understood, explained to Dr. Danef, and which would leave the town of Adrianople to Turkey, but provide a free zone with advantages for Bulgarian commerce.

Dr. Danef said that he was not prepared to discuss this. It would only give the Turks the impression that Bulgaria was willing to yield.

I said that then apparently the situation was this: the allies would not admit a proposal which excluded the cession of the town of Adrianople to them, but would discuss the conditions on which the town should be ceded. I asked whether this was the answer which I must give to the Turks.

Dr. Danef replied definitely that this was the situation.

I said that, if I gave this answer, the Turkish delegates would, according to what I heard that they had said in conversation with several persons, leave London.

In that case, said Dr. Danef, there would be a rupture of the peace negotiations and a resumption of hostilities: a contingency which did not seem to disturb him, and which he appeared to contemplate with equanimity. He said, however, that there would be four or five days after the rupture of the negotiations before the armistice came to an end; in this interval the Powers might do something; a naval demonstration would be effective.

I told him definitely that the Powers were in accord as regards the principle of a collective *démarche* in Constantinople. They were not in accord yet about a naval demonstration. A naval demonstration at Constantinople was a difficult matter. War-ships could not go through the straits without danger unless they did so with the consent of the Turks.

Dr. Danef replied that they had already been at Constantinople recently.

I pointed out that that had been with the consent of the Turks, to protect the embassies. The present question was one of sending ships to demonstrate against the Turks; and, supposing that they did get to Constantinople, what were they to do? Were they to bombard Constantinople?

Dr. Danef thought that a mere demonstration would be effective.

I said that some of the Powers doubted whether it would be effective; and, if it were not effective, the Powers would be a little ridiculous.

Sir Arthur Nicolson, who was present, urged upon Dr. Danef, in the course of the conversation, the advantages which Bulgaria might derive from a proposal such as Sir Richard Crawford had made.

But Dr. Danef was immovable on this point.

I asked him whether, if the war was resumed, he did not fear other complications, from the side of Roumania, for instance.

He replied in the negative, and apparently contemplated this contingency either as one which was not serious, or one for which Bulgaria was prepared.

I told him that we would give this afternoon to the Turks the answer about Adrianople which I had stated.

Dr. Danef acquiesced.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1772] No. 186.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.[*]

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1913.

AT the meeting of the Ambassadors to-day the French Ambassador presented the following draft, which we had asked him to draw up, for a note to the Turkish Government:—

"Les soussignés, Ambassadeurs d'Autriche-Hongrie, d'Angleterre, de France, de Russie, d'Allemagne et d'Italie, ont été chargés par leurs Gouvernements de faire à son Excellence le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan la communication suivante:

"'Désireuses de prévenir la reprise des hostilités, lesdites Puissances croient devoir appeler l'attention du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman sur la grave responsabilité qu'il assumerait si, par sa résistance à leurs conseils, il empêchait le rétablissement de la paix. Il n'aurait à s'en prendre qu'à lui-même si la prolongation de la guerre avait pour conséquence de mettre en question le sort de la capitale et peut-être d'étendre les hostilités aux provinces asiatiques de l'Empire. Dans ce cas, il ne pourrait pas compter sur leur bonne volonté pour le préserver contre des dangers auxquels elles l'ont déjà dissuadé et le détournent encore de s'exposer.

"'En tout état de cause, le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman aura besoin après la conclusion de la paix de l'appui moral et matériel des Grandes Puissances européennes pour réparer les maux de la guerre, consolider sa situation à Constantinople et mettre en valeur les vastes territoires asiatiques dont la prospérité constituera sa force la plus effective. Pour entreprendre et mener à bien cette œuvre nécessaire, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan ne saurait encore compter sur le bienveillant appui des Puissances qu'autant qu'il aura déféré à leurs avis, qui s'inspirent des intérêts généraux de l'Europe et de ceux de la Turquie.

"'Dans ces conditions, les Grandes Puissances européennes croient devoir renouveler collectivement au Gouvernement Impérial ottoman le conseil de consentir à la cession de la ville d'Andrinople aux alliés balkaniques et de s'en remettre à elles du soin de statuer sur le sort des îles de la Mer Égée.

"'En retour de ces concessions, lesdites Puissances s'emploieraient à assurer la sauvegarde des intérêts musulmans à Andrinople et le respect des mosquées, édifices ou biens religieux existant dans cette ville. Elles feraient également en sorte que la solution donnée par elles à la question des îles de l'archipel exclut toute menace pour la sécurité de la Turquie.'"

No one took exception to this draft; indeed, the German Ambassador thought that we might accept it unanimously.

The Ambassadors agreed to telegraph it to their Governments.

I stated that I preferred it to the text drawn up by the Ambassadors in Constantinople, and would instruct Sir Gerard Lowther to join in presenting it in a *démarche collective*.

I observed that, if the Powers wished to exercise any influence on the situation, they ought to send instructions soon to the Ambassadors in Constantinople as to which text they were to present.

I told the Ambassadors of my conversation with Dr. Danef this morning respecting Roumania.

The French Ambassador and the German Ambassador also gave an account of conversations with him.

[*] Also to Sir F. Bertie, No. 27; Sir E. Goschen, No. 14; Sir R. Rodd, No. 12; and Sir G. Buchanan, No. 46.

In all these, Dr. Danef seemed to have said much the same thing.

We separated after a short sitting, and agreed to meet again on Monday, the 13th instant, to consider the situation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1541] No. 187.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 10, 1913.

TEWFIK and Reshid Pashas called at the Foreign Office, at Sir A. Nicolson's invitation, on the afternoon of the 10th January. Sir A. Nicolson told them that last night Osman Nizami Pasha had explained to him that the Ottoman delegates would have to leave London unless the conference reassembled in the next day or two; that it was of no use for the delegates to meet unless the allies were prepared to enter into a discussion in regard to Adrianople, on the basis of what is termed the "Crawford proposal," by which full trade and other commercial and industrial facilities were accorded to Bulgaria, while the town itself remained under Ottoman sovereignty. If the allies continued the attitude hitherto assumed of declining all discussion of any terms proposed by Turkey, and simply insisted on the acceptance pure and simple of their own conditions, the Ottoman delegates would be obliged to carry out the instructions with which they were already furnished and leave London. They would, therefore, be ready to attend a meeting of the conference, if they received an assurance that the allies would discuss matters on the above-mentioned basis.

Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik and Reshid Pashas that he had communicated the the above to me, and that I had invited M. Danef to come and see me this morning. M. Danef was informed of the substance of what Osman Nizami Pasha had stated on the preceding evening, and I had said that I would be ready, as honorary president, to take the necessary steps for convening the conference if the allies would be disposed to discuss matters on the Turkish basis, which was the condition laid down by the Ottoman delegates for their participating in a renewed sitting. M. Danef, Sir A. Nicolson said, had replied that the allies were unable to discuss the question of Adrianople on any basis which excluded the cession of the town of Adrianople to the Bulgarians, but they would be ready to discuss the conditions on which the town should be ceded. In reply to an enquiry, M. Danef had stated very categorically that this was the last word of the allies.

Tewfik and Reshid Pashas entered into explanations as to the impossibility of Turkey ceding Adrianople, on the grounds sufficiently well known; and Reshid Pasha said that in the circumstances it was useless for the Ottoman delegates to remain any longer in London. Sir A. Nicolson pointed out that in the matter of conditions relative to the cession the allies would probably be very conciliatory, and would offer all guarantees as to the mosques and Imperial tombs. Reshid Pasha observed that the Turks were not Chinese and did not attach an exaggerated importance to the Imperial tombs. Adrianople in the hands of Bulgaria would be a constant danger to Constantinople. Its cession was a new demand but recently put forward by Bulgaria, and it was well known that the Powers were contemplating putting pressure on Turkey to give way, and that rendered M. Danef so obstinate. If the Powers would distribute their pressure more impartially, and speak at Sophia in the sense of inducing the Bulgarian Government to be more moderate, some effect would be produced. Sir A. Nicolson replied that painful as it was for him to say so, he was afraid that the Powers would not be disposed to speak in that same sense at Sophia. Reshid and Tewfik Pashas both declared with emphasis that the course which the Powers were taking and the attitude adopted by the allies would lead to a resumption of hostilities, the overthrow of the present Turkish Government, and very possibly to an outbreak in Constantinople. Would I again speak to M. Danef? Sir A. Nicolson said that the situation had been very fully explained to M. Danef that morning, with the results which had been described. Sir A. Nicolson saw little use in resuming a conversation with him, as there was nothing new to say. In that case, said Reshid Pasha, "nous n'avons qu'à faire nos paquets et nous en aller." Sir A. Nicolson said perhaps Reshid Pasha would like first to communicate with his Government. Reshid Pasha said he would inform them of what had passed, but only "à titre de renseignement." He had his instructions, and required no fresh ones. Sir A. Nicolson said in any case he would

repeat to me all that he and Tewfik Pasha had mentioned, and that probably I would like to inform the Ambassadors, as I would inform them as to what had passed with M. Danef in the morning. Reshid Pasha said he would wait for a further communication from Sir A. Nicolson.

Both Tewfik Pasha and Reshid Pasha observed that it was thought the Turkish Government were only waiting for pressure to be put on them in order to yield. This, they said, was a complete misconception of the situation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1241] No. 188.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 10, 1913.*

M. TAKE JONESCO called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 4th January, and conversed for nearly an hour, ranging over a variety of topics.

He mentioned that he had found M. Danef here in a very different disposition from that in which he was when he recently visited Bucharest. On the latter occasion M. Danef was conciliatory, and anxious to settle matters amicably; now he was "stiff," taciturn, and disinclined to make any concessions—averring that he had no full powers, and did not think it advisable to ask for any, though ready to transmit to Sophia Roumanian proposals. M. Take Jonesco was uneasy, as unless some satisfactory settlement was reached matters might arrive at a breaking-point. When asked by M. Danef why Roumania did not put forward her claims earlier, he had replied that in June last Bulgaria had assured his Government that if war by any chance did break out it would only be waged for the purpose of securing reforms; and as late as September last King Ferdinand and M. Gueshof had given the most solemn assurance that war would not take place.

M. Jonesco also said that Russia, through the Grand Duke Nicolas Michailovitch and M. Schibiko, the Russian Minister, had endeavoured to induce Roumania to side with Russia in case of a war with Austria-Hungary, but King Charles and his Government had intimated that they did not wish to entangle themselves.

He also stated that in Austria-Hungary there was a strong war party, chiefly on account of Austria having yielded so much—which in the opinion of many at Vienna constituted a distinct reverse to Austria-Hungary and a corresponding gain to Russia on the diplomatic field. Austria-Hungary was said to have reversed her policy of the last fifty years and surrendered the sanjak, while Russia had been the promoter of the all-successful Balkan league. In the interests of Greece M. Take Jonesco considered that it would be wise not to press Austria-Hungary unduly to make any further concessions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1000] No. 189.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

(Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 10, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, relative to the withdrawal of His Majesty's ship "Diana" from Suda Bay.

I am to inform you in reply that Sir E. Grey acquiesces in the arrangements now contemplated, and considers it unnecessary that further immediate steps should be taken to dispatch another of His Majesty's ships to Crete, but I am to add that, on similar occasions in the future, when the movements of vessels have a bearing on the political situation or should be determined by it, he trusts that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will cause him to be consulted before carrying into effect any measures of the kind.

I am to transmit to you herewith in this connection copies of telegraphic correspondence recently exchanged with His Majesty's consul-general at Canea on this subject.*

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[1483] No. 190.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 6.)
Sir, *Athens, January 4, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 218 of the 28th ultimo, I have the honour to transmit herewith the continuation of the diary of the war, taken from the official bulletins, from the 28th December to the 3rd January.

I hear on very good authority that it was decided to recall General Sapountzakis, whose direction of the operations before Yannina is not giving satisfaction, but the decision appears to have been rescinded. The General is elderly and unwieldy, and seldom leaves his base. He has had many casualties, without any energetic action to justify them.

The surrender of the Turkish garrison of Chios consummates the conquest of the Turkish islands.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 190.

Diary of the War from December 28, 1912, to January 3, 1913.

December 28.—The situation remains the same, both sides are retaining their positions. Our artillery bombarded Bizani, which replied feebly. During the night the slight attack of the Turks was repulsed. After mid-day the enemy attacked the 2nd division but were repulsed.

Dated from Philippiada.

SAPOUNTZAKIS.

December 31.—From 3 to 6 A.M. the battery of siege guns bombarded the enemy's encampment to the south of the Yannina road and the hollows of the Bizani hill. The enemy's artillery made no reply. At 3·30 the enemy attacked our centre and left, but were repulsed. During the day an artillery duel took place.

Dated from Philippiada.

SAPOUNTZAKIS.

January 2.—To-day our artillery bombarded the enemy's positions at Dessana from the Foud defile. The enemy did not reply.

Dated from Philippiada.

SAPOUNTZAKIS.

January 3.—The advance of our troops from Aipos continued vigorously, in the direction of the interior, during the whole day (yesterday), the Turks offering resistance but continually retiring. Also, a battalion from Hagios Georgios advanced and occupied the Monastery of the Holy Fathers. The Turks, being attacked at Kardamyla and Volisso, withdrew and concentrated at definite points, the destruction or surrender of which is certain. Our losses at Aipos were two killed and twelve wounded.

Later.—After the fight of yesterday the enemy were surrounded, and at the same time broken by the troops advancing by the Aipos hill, and would certainly have been cut to pieces to-day. But early in the morning their commander, Zihni Pasha, came down to Karyai and surrendered to me at that place with his staff and the civil governor. The surrender of the whole force, amounting to 1,800 men, then followed in sections. Although the surrender was unconditional the usual terms were granted by a protocol, viz. (1) the surrender of arms; (2) the prisoners to be at the disposal of the Greek Government; (3) the officers to keep their swords and to remain at liberty

* No. 109 and 159.

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in Greece like the other Turkish officers. The matériel, according to them, consists of two guns, three heliographic instruments, eight telephone apparatus belonging to the town service, as well as provisions and ammunition scattered at various points in the mountains, the amount of which will be ascertained when it is taken over. The severely wounded and those incapacitated for military service will be conveyed to Chesmé. The families of prisoners and officials are free to leave. The town and surrounding villages are enthusiastically celebrating the final liberation of the island.

Dated from Chios.

THEODORAKIS, *Governor.*

[1463] No. 191.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Cairo, January 5, 1913.*

I HAVE received from Sir Gerard Lowther a copy of his despatch No. 1104 of the 24th December last, reporting the foundation by Mohammed Sherei Pasha, head of the Egyptian Red Crescent Mission at Constantinople, of an association said to be of a political nature.

I can entirely confirm the description of the character and aims of Sherei Pasha, as given in this despatch, though my French colleague, who is always suspicious of Panislamic intrigue, is inclined to consider him a more dangerous person.

Whatever the object of his activities may be, Sherei, at any rate, has had no success for the moment, Prince Mohammed Ali, the president of the Egyptian Red Crescent, having telegraphed to him that the movement which he is prosecuting is incompatible with the direction of a purely charitable association, and that he must therefore resign his position as head of the mission.

Copy of this despatch has been sent to Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(For Viscount Kitchener),
M. CHEETHAM.

[1459] No. 192.

Sir N. Helme, M.P., to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

Dear Sir Edward, *House of Commons, January 9, 1913.*

HEREWITH I beg to submit copy of a letter received from our representative in Salonica, from which place business has been done with the district hitherto in Turkey, under an *ad valorem* duty of 11 per cent. Now, before the country has been ceded formally, very heavy customs duties of some 40 or 50 per cent. are to be charged forthwith.

If you can obtain any relief, I shall be greatly obliged.

Yours truly,
NORVAL W. HELME.

Enclosure in No. 192.

Letter received from Sir N. Helme's Representative at Salonica.

Messieurs, *Salonique, le 2 janvier*, 1913.

LE commerce de Salonique était complètement paralysé déjà par l'invasion des troupes, massacres, pillages, &c., qui ont eu lieu dès l'arrivée "triomphale" des armées balkaniques; l'arrêt complet des communications par chemin de fer rendait, en outre, la situation des commerçants très critique. Maintenant que quelques-unes des lignes de chemin de fer ont été ouvertes au trafic, on espérait que le commerce reprendrait lentement son cours normal.

Mais, malheureusement, une nouvelle, qui s'est confirmée hier officiellement, a jeté la consternation parmi les cercles commerciaux de notre ville: les Serbes et les Bulgares se font payer des droits d'entrée dans les territoires occupés par eux sur toute marchandise provenant de Salonique. Cette mesure des autorités serbo-bulgares

risque de ruiner la plupart des négociants de notre place si elle ne vient pas immédiatement abrogée; l'application d'une telle mesure est, du reste, pour le moment, contraire au droit des gens, car la Turquie d'Europe est occupée par les armées balkaniques, mais elle ne fait pas encore partie intégrante de leurs territoires; il est, par conséquent, arbitraire d'établir des droits de douane entre deux portions quelconques de la Turquie d'Europe.

La mesure prédite, si elle est maintenue, serait désastreuse pour le commerce local; on sait que ce commerce est alimenté par sa vaste zone d'action, qui comprend la Macédoine, l'Albanie du nord et une partie de la Thrace; les acheteurs de ces localités sont presque constamment débiteurs envers les commerçants de Salonique des sommes qui, dans leur ensemble, s'élèvent à un grand nombre de millions de francs. Les barrières douanières qui viennent d'être subitement mises par les Serbes et les Bulgares ne permettent plus aux commerçants de Salonique de desservir les régions précitées. Il est évident que les débiteurs desdites contrées, qui ne se verraient plus dans l'obligation de recourir au marché de Salonique, se montreront réalcitrants pour le payement des dettes contractées jusqu'à présent.

Les grossistes de Salonique se trouveront aussi dans l'impossibilité de vendre les stocks de marchandises qu'ils possèdent, car par les mesures douanières prises par les Serbes et les Bulgares le rayon d'activité de la place vient complètement restreint. Ce commerce si prospéré et qui marchait vers un avenir brillant est voué de la sorte à la ruine. On ne saurait aussi cacher les grands préjudices que ces mesures causeraient à l'exportation européenne dans notre pays.

Les consuls des Puissances représentées sur place ont été saisis de l'affaire et ont promis de faire intervenir leurs Ministères des Affaires Étrangères pour l'abrogation de toute mesure douanière dans les pays occupés de la Turquie d'Europe.

Je vous prie par la présente de vouloir entretenir de cette question votre Chambre de Commerce, afin qu'elle intervienne aussi et énergiquement auprès de votre Ministère des Affaires Étrangères pour que les taxes douanières prélevées par les Serbes et Bulgares soient rapportées.

Je recommande ce qui précède à votre attention spéciale et vous prie de me tenir au courant de vos démarches et des résultats qui seront portés à votre connaissance.

Veuillez, &c.
ISAC J. JAHIEL.

[1554] No. 193.

Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

Sir, *Manchester, January 10, 1913.*

I AM instructed by the president of this chamber to ask your particular attention to the circumstances recited in the following paragraphs, which gravely affect the position and prospects of a large body of Manchester merchants, members of this chamber, engaged in the shipping of goods to the port of Salonica, who will be subjected to heavy immediate and prospective losses unless a remedy can be found.

As a result of the recent campaign, the troops of the allies—Bulgaria and Servia—are in actual possession of territory until recently belonging, in common with Salonica, to Turkey. Traders obtaining their goods from British merchants at Salonica during the last few weeks have found that, when they reach the territory held by Servian and Bulgarian troops, instead of being allowed freely to transport their goods, fresh duties are demanded of them according to the Servian or Bulgarian tariffs. Now, as you are aware, a very large business is done between this country and Salonica, the major portion of the exports not being destined for Salonica, but for the hinterland of Macedonia, chiefly for Uskub and Monastir. The new duties levied by the allies in territories in which they are in military possession only, and which could only be considered as legalised after the results had been recognised by the Great Powers, seem to the president to show a very high-handed disregard of the interests of peaceful commerce. The results to Manchester will be most disastrous. Manchester merchants will not only lose the business, but in addition to that, as it is common in all oriental countries, when traders have running accounts, to pay for their old liabilities with the proceeds of new business, the debts now owing in Manchester on Salonica account may never be discharged at all.

There are large quantities of Manchester goods still in Salonica which have not yet been sent forward to the *soi-disant* new fiscal frontier. Losses will be entailed on

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all these shipments. They could not be returned to England except at great expense, as they have already paid duties at Salonica. Furthermore, they cannot be disposed of elsewhere, except at a considerable sacrifice, as they have been made specially for this market.

I am, therefore, earnestly to request that you will take such action as will make it clear to all concerned that His Majesty's Government does not recognise the right of the allies suddenly to impose new duties in territories—not yet definitely transferred, still nominally under Turkish rule—with which British subjects have been accustomed to deal, and will, if possible, obtain an undertaking that the levying of these duties shall be promptly abandoned. The president very much dislikes to have to trouble you with matters of this kind whilst more important subjects are in their present delicate position, but a very real British interest is involved, as was evidenced by an important deputation of merchants which to-day waited upon him, fully corroborating the facts.

The enclosed excerpt from the "Times" newspaper of the 1st instant shows that the matter is one of common knowledge.

The president is informed that Austrian and Italian interests are the same as British in this respect, and that joint action by the three Governments might yield the most successful result, but he entirely recognises that this is a matter for your judgment. The president would greatly value any assurances of assistance that you may find it possible to give him.

I have, &c.
WALTER SPEAKMAN, *Secretary.*

Enclosure in No. 193.

Extract from the "Times" of January 1, 1913.

THE SALONICA CUSTOMS.

AN official of the Greek Ministry of Finance has declared that under Greek rule Salonica, in the absence of a Balkan Customs Union, would become a free port and a great military and naval station.

In the meantime commercial relations between Salonica and the interior have been turned topsy-turvy. While merchandise arriving from Europe continues to be subjected to a duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, goods of Greek origin or reforwarded from Greece are exempt. Exports from Salonica into territory occupied by the Bulgarians pay 11 per cent., while imports from Bulgaria arrive duty free. Similarly, passengers arriving from Servia declare that the Servians have established a customs barrier at Ghevgheli, on the Uskub railway, 46 miles north from Salonica, where goods from the south are subjected to the Servian tariff.

Fifteen hundred refugees were to-day shipped for Smyrna. The British Red Cross Mission is proceeding to Yanina viâ Prevesa.

Queen Olga and the Greek Princesses left for Athens to-day on board the Royal yacht "Amphitrite."

Salonica, December 30, 1912.

[1583] No. 194.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January* 10, 1913.

MY telegram No. 41 of last year.

The British vice-consul at Constanza reports further shipment of munitions of war by a Turkish steamer.

[1504] No. 195.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 4.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, January* 10, 1913.

ÆGEAN islands.

I have submitted the views expressed in your telegram No. 13 of 9th January to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who asked for time to consider and refer them to the President of the Council, who has hitherto been favourable to leaving the coastal islands to Turkey. On one point identical views seem to exist. He said that Italy would be ready to sign an agreement that none of the Great Powers should acquire or retain any island, and categorically assured me that Italy had never contemplated doing so.

He agreed as to future complications which any proposal of autonomy would involve and as to the difficulty of sanctioning force to recover the islands from Greece, but said that Germany and Austria were in agreement about leaving Chios and Mitylene to Turkey. I asked whether he had reason to believe that Germany's objections to their becoming Greek were insuperable. He did not believe that German opposition would be pushed to extreme limit, but gathered that her aim was to confirm Turkish power in Asia Minor.

As to the southern group of islands occupied by Italy, the latter was bound by her treaty to restore them to Turkey, and it would not be acting loyally were she, before they were restored, to encourage their cession to Greece. I asked how much longer conditions in Cyrenaica would entail continuance of occupation. He said that there were some 300 or 400 Turkish troops there, still assisting the organisation of the Arab resistance, and, though the Turks were doing their best to fulfil treaty conditions, they had not yet succeeded in enforcing their recall. Probably they were not in a hurry to do so, but it was Italy's interest to retain lever which the treaty afforded her.

(Secret.)

Though he could not make such a proposal and might even be compelled by circumstances to oppose it, if made, he thought personally that the possible compromise which the others might suggest would be that, if Greece were enabled to retain Chios and Mitylene, Turkey might be allowed to retain Rhodes as an island that the Greeks had not taken in the war.

[1505] No. 196.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January* 10, 1913.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs, of whom I enquired whether any progress had been made with Scutari question, said he gathered that Austria would not be intractable as regards Ipek, Prisrend, and other places in hinterland. As regards concessions to Montenegro in plain near Scutari, he had reason to believe good result might be obtained if you could enlist German interest and through Germany work upon Austria to deal in a liberal spirit.

[1506] No. 197.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January* 10, 1913.

BELGRADE telegram No. 4 of 7th January.

Italian Government has received no information confirming report of His Majesty's consul at Uskub.

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[1507] No. 198.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 10, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Uskub to-day, No. 5:—

"Servian municipality has forced all shops, including Catholic, Jew, and Moslem, to close for the Servian Christmas holiday. Ottoman law contains no provisions for forced closing. I hear the same thing will be done on 1st January, old style. Non-Orthodox population regard this as rank oppression.

"Am I authorised to protest against any application of Servian law, except such as is absolutely necessary to preserve order, where British interests are concerned?"

I should be glad to know what instructions I should send to vice-consul.

[1617] No. 199.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 11, 1913.*

ACTING Minister for Foreign Affairs agrees that collective step at Constantinople should be made as soon as possible. He prefers note drawn up in London to that drafted at Constantinople, but considers paragraphs 2 and 3 in former are somewhat too hard. He is therefore telegraphing to German Ambassador in London to recommend following alterations:—

In paragraph 2, instead of "Compter sur leur bonne volonté," to say "Compter sur le succès de leurs efforts"; and in paragraph 3 to use following phraseology: "Compter sur l'efficacité du bienveillant appui des Puissances."

[1626] No. 200.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 11, 1913.*

I HAVE communicated to Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs substance of your telegram No. 25 of 10th January to Constantinople. He said that he had given instructions to Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople to accept wording of note to be addressed to Porte as it might be agreed upon by his colleagues.

His Excellency said that essential thing was to accelerate presentation of note, and not delay it by raising difficulties as to the wording. He entirely approved of your view that Powers should show united front towards Turkey at this moment, and he also approved of the sending of ships to Besika Bay by the Powers to be ready for any emergency. He was, however, of opinion that a naval demonstration at Constantinople offered more disadvantages than advantages, and was open to much weighty criticism.

[1602] No. 201.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 10. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 11, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 6 of 10th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs visited Russian Minister, and told him that, in view of the resumption of negotiations in London between M. Danef and M. Misu, Roumanian Government had abandoned any idea of an immediate occupation of Bulgarian territory.

The Russian Minister, under instructions from St. Petersburgh, urged the Minister for Foreign Affairs strongly to accept Bulgarian proposal, and made it clear that if she

did not do so she would forfeit Russian support and sympathy. The French Minister has been instructed to support Russian Minister's action, and will do so to-day.

I understand, in view of the resumption of negotiations in London, that the Roumanian Government will not reply here to the proposals presented by the Russian Legation on behalf of Bulgaria, and that these proposals have been known to Misu for over a fortnight.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[1599] No. 202.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 11, 1913.*

FOLLOWING received from the Dardanelles yesterday, No. 3:—

"Seven torpedo-boat destroyers, 'Medjidiyeh,' 'Assar-i-Tewfik,' 'Hamidieh,' went out 2:30."

[1604] No. 203.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 11.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 11, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 23 [repeating telegram to Rome No. 13 of 9th January].

I have fully laid before Minister for Foreign Affairs your views as regards cession of islands. He says that they hope to reoccupy islands now occupied by Greeks. He maintains that all the islands are not on the same footing. Crete, Samos, and Cyprus have turbulent populations, but others have no desire to be annexed to Greece. Moreover, he maintains that, were islands to be handed over to Greece, they would follow the example of Samos, and become hotbeds for smuggling, which would give rise to interminable questions with Greece, and would necessitate upkeep of a large fleet fo revenue cutters.

His Excellency desired me to say that he deeply regretted that you had changed your attitude on this subject, and that the declaration which it was reported to him from London about six weeks ago you had made to the effect that islands would be maintained to Turkey had created a good impression, and he had been instructed by the Cabinet to thank you for it. As regards Cyprus, it would appear that its fate depends more on article 61 of Treaty of Berlin than article 23 now under discussion.

His Excellency said that it had been decided to call together either to-morrow or next day a council of elder statesmen to consider situation.

(Repeated to Athens and Sophia.)

[2038] No. 204.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 29.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 11, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Ambassador said to me yesterday that Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs felt that discussion of Albanian frontiers at meeting of Ambassadors could not be postponed too long. I do not wish to bring it on till I know whether a compromise is possible and till Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is ready, but he ought to know what Austrian Ambassador has said.

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[1286] No. 205.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 7 of 9th January: Servian customs duties.

You should instruct vice-consul at Uskub to keep you telegraphically informed as to result of his protest.

[1299] No. 206.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 9th January: Servian customs duties.

In view of Sir R. Paget's telegram No. 5, I have decided, after consultation with French Embassy, that representations to Servian Government can be deferred for the present.

[1404] No. 207.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Wratislaw.

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 10th January.

There is little chance of the Powers sending ships to Crete, and we should not send any unless the others did so. If the Russian vessels leave, the best plan would be for the Turkish flag to be taken down and entrusted for safe keeping to the consular body.

[1002] No. 208.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 4 of 7th January.

I have consulted Red Cross Society.

They have recalled their unit, as it reported that there was no work to do, and they also feared that some of their men might get into trouble. They will leave a sufficiency of material in Cettinjé if Montenegrins wish to use it.

I do not think it desirable to interfere with discretion of Red Cross in the matter.

[2056] No. 209.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1913.

I ASKED M. Take Jonesco and M. Misu to come to see me to-day, and I said to them that there were so many reports as to the situation between Roumania and Bulgaria that I should like to know what had passed.

M. Take Jonesco gave a long account of their attempts to negotiate with Dr. Danef, from which it appeared that their overtures had been received not only with coolness but even with want of courtesy. Dr. Danef had made no offers, and had even said that he could no longer be a negotiator. He had since informed them that he was still a negotiator, but he had, or was, going to Oxford, and would not return till Monday, the 13th instant.

M. Take Jonesco was very emphatic as to his own peaceful disposition. What he would accept, he said, would really be little more than a mere bagatelle for Bulgaria to give. He would ask for the fortifications of Silistria and a straight line from there to

the Black Sea, including Kavarna, a town of only 3,000 inhabitants. The whole territory asked for would not be more than 1,000 square kilom. In view of the fact that for years past King Ferdinand had told the Roumanians that, when Bulgaria was enlarged, Roumania would get the territory which she desired on her frontier with Bulgaria, and that this had been allowed by the Bulgarians to pass as an axiom. What was asked for was very little.

M. Take Jonesco had begun by offering Dr. Danef the alliance of Roumania; and he had been prepared, if this was accepted, to offer to send two army corps to Chatalja to help the Bulgarians.

Dr. Danef had said that he did not wish to have the alliance, and M. Take Jonesco said it was no good offering help to people who said that they did not wish to have any help.

M. Take Jonesco was against Roumanian mobilisation. Rather than go to war, he would advise an appeal by Roumania to the Great Powers. He himself was prepared to settle with Bulgaria on such easy terms that he would have to resign after the settlement was made. But the breaking up of a Government, even though it had existed for only two months, and the sacrifice of one's personal position were small considerations if one could secure peace. He was prepared to accept much less than he asked, but though one might be prepared to leave an armchair in order to sit on a stool, one must first see that the stool was there; otherwise one would find oneself upon the floor. If Dr. Danef would offer nothing, he could not negotiate.

Sir Arthur Nicolson and I informed him of the offers made in Bucharest by the Bulgarian Minister, and reported in your telegram No. 8 of the 10th instant.

M. Take Jonesco had not heard of this, but he mentioned that the offer as to the Kutzo-Vlachs had always been promised.

I said that I was puzzled by the attitude of Dr. Danef. The account which M. Take Jonesco and M. Misu had given would be amusing if there were not such serious complications involved in it. War between Roumania and Bulgaria would be a very serious thing. I hoped that everything would be done to avoid it, as M. Take Jonesco had said.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2055] No. 210.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 11, 1913.

WITH Sir Arthur Nicolson I saw the Turkish Ambassador and Reschid Pasha to-day.

I told them that I would tell the Ambassadors at our next meeting here on Monday, the 13th instant, what they had said to Sir Arthur Nicolson yesterday, but I could not hold out any expectation that the Powers—who had already, in the course of the last week or two, separately given advice in Constantinople that peace should be made by the ceding of Adrianople—would intervene now to help the Turks to save Adrianople. I thought that all the Powers would simply give the same advice as I had given. If the war was resumed, how could Turkey save Adrianople? And by continuing the war she might lose much which she had not yet lost.

The Turkish Ambassador and Reschid Pasha used the same arguments as before, as to the impossibility of giving up Adrianople, and were quite firm on the point that it was of no use to convoke the peace conference again to discuss a proposal which involved the cession of Adrianople. They urged that the Powers ought to intervene, because a recommencement of the war might raise questions embarrassing to them.

I repeated that I was sure the Powers would not intervene to keep Adrianople for Turkey. It was true that, if the war was resumed, questions might arise that would involve embarrassment for the Powers, but, though embarrassing to the Powers, they would involve sure loss for Turkey.

Finally, I observed that we had told Dr. Danef what the Turkish Ambassador and Reschid Pasha had said, and we had told them what Dr. Danef had said. Sir Arthur Nicolson had pointed out to Dr. Danef the advantages which the Turkish proposal, suggested by Sir Richard Crawford, might have for Bulgaria, but Dr. Danef was quite immovable, and we could do no more.

Reschid Pasha said that, in that case, the Turkish delegates to the peace conference must leave. He asked whether they were to wait for the answer of the Ambassadors here on Monday.

I said that I could not hold out any expectation that the Ambassadors would say anything which would change the situation. The Turkish representatives could, of course, see each of the Ambassadors separately at the embassies if they liked. As a matter of fact, I had telegraphed to our Ambassadors in the five capitals to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day what the situation was, and the Turkish Government could, through their own Ambassadors in those capitals, ascertain the views of the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2054] No. 211.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 11, 1913.*

THE Bulgarian Minister called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 11th January to inform him that the Bulgarian Government had instructed their delegates to break off further negotiations. The Bulgarian delegation, however, were considering whether it would not be preferable to wait till the Powers had made their collective representations, and then effect the rupture. As between the rupture and the resumption of hostilities four days had to elapse, the Ottoman Government would have time to consider their position. The Bulgarian delegation were of opinion that a rupture coinciding with the presentation of the collective note would have a great effect on the Porte. M. Danef contemplated telegraphing to his Government in the above sense.

Sir A. Nicolson told M. Madjanof of the steps taken with the Ottoman delegation, and of what Tewfik and Reschid Pashas had said that afternoon, and the arguments which the latter had employed in favour of keeping Adrianople to Turkey. Sir A. Nicolson also said that I had explained to the two pashas very clearly the views and attitude of the Powers, which, indeed, were already well known at Constantinople.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1611] No. 212.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 12, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 14 of 11th January.

Following from consular officer at Uskub to-day, No. 6:—

"Your telegram No. 5.

"Local authorities inform me that no duties are to be levied on goods coming to Salonica, and that no trosharina is to be collected. Nevertheless, on 9th January duty was collected and trosharina demanded (see my telegrams Nos. 3 and 4 of yesterday).

"Customs here refuse to deliver confiscated matches or give statement in writing that they have confiscated them. Customs have abandoned pretension to apply Servian tariff."

(R.) Prime Minister has just returned from Uskub, and I will endeavour to see him to-morrow and request him to send such orders as can no longer be misunderstood by Customs authorities.

[1605] No. 213.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 12, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 11th January.

I much regret that through an oversight I took your telegram No. 23 (repeating telegram No. 13 of 9th January to Rome) to be an instruction to me, and used some of the arguments to Minister for Foreign Affairs, with the result that he appears to have sent to Ottoman diplomatists in London an inaccurate version of my conversation with him. I have explained to him that what I wished to convey was your opinion that special régime for islands, of which population is almost entirely Greek, could only lead to risings and declarations of annexation and to multiply Cretan questions obviously undesirable.

[1610] No. 214.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 12, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 4 of 9th January.

I learn to-day from Minister for Foreign Affairs that, when Roumanian Government heard that M. Danef refused to continue negotiations, King Charles himself sanctioned intention of occupying Bulgarian territory. My telegram No. 10 of 11th January will have shown that this intention has been abandoned now for the present.

Roumanian Government saw in M. Danef's action merely pretext to gain time, and, as Minister for Foreign Affairs explained to me, Roumania's position does not admit of delay, for she is now in the favourable position of being able to help Bulgaria, by pressing Turkey, to make peace. His Excellency added significantly that Torgut Shefket Pasha was staying in Bucharest, obviously implying that Roumania might join hands with Turkey.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs tells me that frontier desired by Roumania is, as indicated in my telegram No. 21 of 25th November, a line from Turtukai to Baltchik. But I understand from my Austrian colleague that she would at a pinch content herself with a line either from Kavarna or Baltchik to a point on the Danube 3 miles west of Silistria.

[1627] No. 215.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 12, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informed me last night that the growing strain in the relations between Bulgaria and Roumania was causing him considerable anxiety. He told me that information in his possession went to show that all the leading men in Roumania, as well as public opinion, were determined to obtain Silistria. He hoped that Bulgaria would give in on this point and so avoid further complications in the Near East. He said that Bulgaria was not in a position to offer resistance to Roumania in a military sense, and he thought it was not impossible, if Bulgaria continued to procrastinate on the subject of Silistria, that Roumania might by a *coup de main* seize that town. Such a *fait accompli* might have to be accepted by Bulgaria temporarily, but it would remain a permanent source of friction between the two countries, which was most undesirable.

His Excellency told me that he had just instructed Austrian Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to sound Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs with a view to possible co-operation of the two Powers in settlement of Bulgarian-Roumanian dispute.

[1609] No. 216.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 12.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, January 12, 1913.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 19 of 11th January.

The only argument of Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs against annexation of islands by Greece which is *primâ facie* plausible is that relating to smuggling. Answer to it is that if the Greek tariff is imposed all the smuggling will be into, not out of, the islands.

I believe that Greece would carry on the war single-handed rather than surrender any of the islands.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[1776] No. 217.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 2. Treaty).
Sir, *Salonica, January 6, 1913.*

I HAVE had the honour to receive your telegram of the 3rd instant, communicating to me the explanation given by the Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard to the attempt of the Servian authorities to levy at the station of Ghevgheli prohibitive duties on goods forwarded by rail from Salonica to Uskub or other places on that line at present in the occupation of their troops.

In reply, I had the honour of telegraphing to you on the 4th instant to the effect that, in my opinion, this explanation was either based on imperfect information or else intentionally misleading. The attempt to throw the blame back upon the Greeks, though characteristic of the attitude adopted towards the latter by their two Slav allies, does not appear to me to be based on any solid foundation whatever. All transit trade for Servia was necessarily suspended on the outbreak of hostilities and cannot possibly be resumed until the re-establishment of through traffic on the railway. It is theoretically conceivable that one or two parcels of goods manifested to Uskub may have arrived here and been subjected to import duty in the ordinary course by the Greek authorities on landing, but it is improbable in the existing circumstances and I have been unable to obtain the slightest information as to any such question having arisen between the Servian and Greek authorities. Nor does it appear to me that even the occurrence of such a conflict would have afforded the Servians the slightest justification for immediately imposing prohibitive duties on goods purchased in Salonica.

Postal communication with Uskub has not yet been established and telegraphing (viâ Trieste and Belgrade) is expensive, whilst there has scarcely been time yet for the merchants who went up from here with goods to return themselves to Salonica. It is therefore difficult to know from day to day exactly what the Servian authorities in Ghevgheli have been demanding. I am, however, inclined to think that the statement of the Minister for Foreign Affairs that the instructions issued were to levy merely the previously existing Turkish duties was at least disingenuous. One of the local commercial houses sent an employé to Ghevgheli on purpose to obtain more definite information than was here procurable. This person returned on the 3rd instant and reported that he had been informed that the Servian tariff was being applied only to tobacco, salt, petroleum, and sugar, whilst everything else was subjected to the ordinary Turkish duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem*. The Customs official, however, had added that, in the absence of definite instructions to the contrary, he was levying in addition a surtax or "droit de consommation" similar in amount to that levied at the Servian frontier. It seems probable therefore that the instructions to levy 11 per cent. (subject to certain important restrictions) may have been given at the date of Sir R. Paget's conversation with the Minister, but these can hardly have been the instructions originally issued. A Servian official, who was in Salonica at the date of my first telegram, had himself told one of my informants that his instructions were to enforce the Servian maximum tariff, and I have before me a receipt for duties paid at Ghevgheli on the 28th December, from which it appears that woollen shirts were taxed under article 323 (10) of the tariff at 8 fr. per kilometre, and coloured silks at 28 fr. per kilometre under article 335 (1).

It is worth remarking that the Servian authorities at Monastir, which is equally in the occupation of their troops, have not attempted to levy duty on goods forwarded from here. It is difficult to avoid drawing the conclusion that the principal object in view has been to enable Belgrade merchants who are in possession of accumulated stocks to dispose of them at high prices in those of the occupied territories which are within their reach. The difficulty of transport between Belgrade and Monastir renders the latter place practically inaccessible at present, and it may therefore have been thought useless to go to the expense of establishing a custom-house there in the uncertainty which exists as regards the permanence of their occupation.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[1637] No. 218.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1108 of the 24th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Dedeagatch reporting on the general state of that town.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 218.

Vice-Consul Badetti to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 29.)
Sir, *Dédéagatch, le 21 décembre, 1912.*

DANS ma dépêche No. 28 du 17 courant, j'avais l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance, Sir, que notre commandant militaire avait voulu imposer la censure aux postes françaises et autrichiennes.

Le différend a été vidé—le Major Servilief a été destitué et remplacé par le Colonel Ghirgief—et les postes ont été autorisées à fonctionner de nouveau comme par le passé, sans aucun contrôle.

Je vous signalais aussi l'arrivée du cargo bulgare "Varna" avec charbon; depuis nous eûmes la touchée du vapeur "Korniloff," de la Compagnie russe, avec 12,000 sacs de farine embarqués à Odessa; le "Boris," Compagnie bulgare, avec un plein chargement de farine; le "Mars" et "Imbriko" avec houille: le tout pour les besoins de l'intendance bulgare.

Le matériel roulant du chemin de fer étant plus que restreint, on réquisitionna des dépôts vides pour effectuer l'emmagasinage des denrées au débarquement.

La population musulmane continue à traverser une misère noire, elle a faim, sans perdre de vue aussi qu'elle a tout perdu lors de l'occupation de la ville par les comitadjis. Les autorités bulgares ne soucient guère de cette situation. La consigne demeure toujours des plus sévères: personne ne peut quitter le pays. Que va-t-il résulter? Rien de bon, surtout si le mauvais temps se met de la partie.

Maintenant que la population environnante est revenue plus ou moins de ses tristes émotions, les villageois commencent à paraître ici. Je ne manque pas d'aller aux informations. D'après ce que j'apprends journellement, Yaver Pacha a laissé un bien triste souvenir de sa fuite tout à fait sanguinaire: incendie, massacre, vols, viols —voilà le bilan à son actif. Églises, écoles ont payé aussi leur tribut au feu. Les fuyards ont égorgé même des nourrissons.

Je tâcherai de former une liste des pertes subies par l'incendie et la quantité des victimes qu'a eu à souffrir chaque village.

J'ai, &c.
G. BADETTI.

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[1740] No. 210.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Belgrade, January 7, 1913.*

ALTHOUGH during the course of the war the majority of the Servian press appears to have fallen entirely under the influence of the Radical party, and is consequently at the command of the Government, two newspapers, the "Srpska Zastava" and the "Vetchernie Novosti," have maintained sufficient independence to lately produce articles violently attacking the Government upon the weakness of their policy in regard to Bulgaria.

The trend of these articles is to the effect that, although the Government have never had the courage to publish the conditions of their arrangements with Bulgaria, there is an uncomfortable feeling abroad that Servia is eventually to be called upon to cede Monastir and other places which have been won at great cost and at the sacrifice of the flower of the Servian army. The Government are warned not to endeavour to persist in any such intention, which would not for a moment be tolerated by the Servian people, no matter what previous arrangements may have been made since these arrangements were come to without their knowledge and consent. Comparisons are drawn between the achievements of the Bulgarian and Servian armies, and it is pointed out that, whereas Bulgaria has fallen short of her promises in regard to the number of men she would put in the field, Servia has exceeded hers, and has moreover helped Bulgaria with men and money, whilst owing to the perfection of her army and equipment she can count more victories and has been far more successful generally than Bulgaria. And notwithstanding this "the Bulgarians now ask for themselves the whole of Macedonia, while they send Servia in the direction of Albania, generously offering to let her keep all she gets there. And if she gets nothing all the worse for her." Warnings are at the same time addressed to Bulgaria not to be uncompromising so as to deprive Servia of her rights, otherwise the present alliance cannot be maintained, as "Servia will not keep company" with those who attempt to rob her of such cherished possessions.

The Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs having recently remarked to me in conversation that it would be very difficult to make the army and the public grasp the necessity of ceding Monastir to Bulgaria, and he hoped the Bulgarians would be inclined to make some concessions, I yesterday enquired of my Bulgarian colleague whether he had noticed the articles above summarised. He replied that he had, but attributed small importance to them. He had proof that the "Vetchernie Novosti" was subsidised by Austria, whose aim it was to make trouble between the allies, whilst the "Srpska Zastava" was owned by M. Ribaratz, the leader of the Liberal party, who out of jealousy was attempting to create difficulties for M. Pasitch. The Servian Government had not approached the Bulgarian Government in any way as yet for a revision of the original territorial arrangements, and he felt confident they would keep their word. Any apprehension of trouble between Servia and Bulgaria on this score might be dismissed. M. Toshef should undoubtedly be a complete authority on this point, but a tendency has lately been noticeable in political circles towards competition in estimating the respective losses of the Bulgarian and Servian armies and the value of the services respectively rendered to one another, as though the ground was being prepared for a discussion of the respective claims.

Meanwhile the rest of the press, headed by the semi-official organ "Samouprava," occupies itself almost exclusively with the question of Albania, its delimitation, and the part that is being played by Austria. The bitterness towards Austria is profound, and I cannot better convey the feeling in Servia than by quoting a statement made two days ago by M. Pasitch to the correspondent of the "Novoe Vremiya," and which has been printed throughout the press in large type: "You can tell the Russians that we Servians are very much embittered at Austria having taken away from us the trophies which we won at the price of blood and by overcoming overwhelming difficulties. We are deprived of territories which we conquered by force of arms from the Albanians, who fought against us on the side of the Turks. Have we not the right to that which we have conquered by the bravery of our army? We bow to the wish of the Great Powers, but this does not mean that we do not feel the full force of the insult which has been offered us."

It is scarcely ever safe to prognosticate in the Balkans, but if one reads the press and comes in contact with the official world in Servia at the present moment, one cannot escape the impression that, in her recent treatment of Servia, Austria has done a bad day's work for herself, and that the bitterness which it has engendered in the Servian mind will some day soon find expression in deeds. For the moment Servia is restrained by the fact that her own army and her money are more or less exhausted, that Russia is not altogether ready, and has counselled moderation. These, however, are mere passing conditions, and as soon as peace with Turkey has been assured it is likely to become the chief aim of the Servian Government and people to bring their army up to such a standard that it could, even though alone, offer a stout resistance to Austria. But the Servians are well aware that they will never have to fight alone, and that, despite official asseverations to the contrary, Russia will be drawn in even though Servia be the aggressor. That Austria may realise this intention and consider the chances would be more in her favour now, probably constitutes one of the chief dangers to peace at the present moment, and there is no doubt that if she wishes to provoke Servia into a quarrel this can easily be done by insisting on the inclusion in the new Albania of certain places now in Servian occupation.

Perhaps only one degree less bitter are the feelings in Servia towards Italy. The press recalls that it was Italy who, when herself in difficulties, incited the Balkan States in their action against Turkey, and then availed herself of the effect of this action to press satisfactory peace conditions, and to declare peace herself with Turkey on the eve of the outbreak of the Balkan war. And it was Italy who associated herself with the Austrian protest against possession by Servia of an Adriatic port and of Albania. Regret is now expressed that Italy was not left to struggle for another year with Turkey, by which time she would have been thoroughly exhausted and incapable of harm. Side by side with this regret is discernible the latent hope that Austria and Italy will surely become embroiled in Albania, and that the chaotic condition of the new State, though a disadvantage to Servia in some respects, may on the other hand enable her, when the proper moment arrives, to find a pretext for aggression and an opportunity of paying off old scores.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[1741] No. 220.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Belgrade, January 7, 1913.*

BOTH M. Stephanovitch, the Secretary-General to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, and my Bulgarian colleague, in speaking of the delimitation of Bulgaria yesterday, expressed the opinion that unless Scutari were secured to Montenegro the dynasty would fall. M. Stephanovitch informed me that Servia had offered Montenegro military assistance to reduce the fortress, but this had been refused.

I suggested that the fall of the dynasty would cause no great sorrow in Servia, and endeavoured to draw from M. Stephanovitch what he expected the result would be, and whether the Montenegrins would incline towards incorporation into Servia, but M. Stephanovitch avoided the subject.

M. Toshef, on the other hand, to whom I made the same remark, said that Austria would never permit Montenegro to become incorporated into Servia, and if the present Montenegrin dynasty fell there was no knowing what new surprise Austria might not have in store for Europe.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[1777] No. 221.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 3. Treaty.)
Sir, *Salonica, January 7, 1913.*

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch in this series of yesterday's date, concerning the levying of import duties on goods forwarded from here into the interior of the country, I have the honour to transmit herewith an extract from

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yesterday evening's issue of the local newspaper "Indépendant," the information contained in which is in general agreement with that which I have obtained from other sources—at least, in so far as regards the Servian sphere.

As regards the Bulgarian zone, the "Indépendant's" statement that the Bulgarians have hitherto abstained from levying import duties on goods sent from here into the districts occupied by their troops is not in agreement with my own information, which is that, on the contrary, the Bulgarian authorities likewise have commenced to levy 11 per cent., plus a "droit de consommation." I have, however, no positive information on the subject, as there has so far been very little traffic on the Constantinople Junction Railway, and no direct complaints have as yet reached me.

The Bulgarians, moreover, have raised another question of considerable importance in connection with the foreign post offices, and, by refusing to allow the French and Austrian offices at Cavalla and Dedeaghatch to land their mails, have rendered communications with these places extremely precarious.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 221.

Extract from the "Indépendant" of January 6, 1913.

TARIFS DOUANIERS SUR LES PROVENANCES DE SALONIQUE.

LE bruit ayant couru en ville que le Gouvernement serbe avait décidé de ne percevoir sur les provenances de Salonique que 11 pour cent de douane *ad valorem*, à l'exclusion de tout autre droit, un négociant de Salonique est parti pour Ghevgheli afin de s'informer exactement sur cette question auprès du fonctionnaire des douanes serbes de cette ville.

Le préposé aux douanes serbes de Ghevgheli a répondu en ces termes au négociant de notre ville :—

"J'ai reçu de Belgrade l'ordre de considérer Ghevgheli comme frontière serbe et de percevoir 11 pour cent *ad valorem* sur les provenances de Salonique, à l'exclusion des articles monopolisés, tels que : le sel, le sucre, le pétrole, l'alcool, des allumettes, les cartes à jouer, le tabac, &c. Au point de vue des droits d'octroi, les ordres de Belgrade sont muets; cependant, comme les régions au delà de Ghevgheli sont considérées comme des territoires serbes, je me vois constraint de percevoir outre les droits de douane de 11 pour cent *ad valorem* des droits d'octroi sur base des tarifs d'octroi serbe sur toutes les provenances de Salonique."

Selon nos informations, les droits d'octroi perçus en Serbie sont exorbitants pour les articles de quincaillerie, de pharmacie, de manufactures, &c. Sur les principaux articles de consommation, les droits d'octroi, quoique élevés, le sont cependant moins que les autres. En voici quelques exemples : 1 kilog. de café paie 1 fr.; il est perçu 26 fr. sur 100 kilog. de riz, 20 fr. sur 100 kilog. de fruits secs, 20 fr. sur 100 kilog. d'huile, &c.

Les droits de douane ainsi que les droits d'octroi sur les provenances de Salonique ont commencé à être perçus à Ghevgheli par les autorités douanières serbes depuis le 26 du mois écoulé.

Les provenances de Salonique à destination des régions occupées par l'armée serbe et desservies par la ligne d'Uscub, en dehors des droits de douane et d'octroi dont elles sont frappées à Ghevgheli, ont encore une autre difficulté sérieuse à surmonter. Elles doivent subir une transbordement à Gumendgé des trains de C.O. sur des wagons serbes, et naturellement cette opération extrêmement onéreuse, dans un pays où il y a manque de bras, ne peut qu'augmenter considérablement le prix de revient des marchandises; de plus, le transbordement a pour conséquence de faire subir aux marchandises des avaries; tout cela rend nécessairement toute transaction impossible entre Salonique et la région au delà de Ghevgheli. Aussi est-il exagéré d'affirmer que le commerce d'importation de Salonique a d'un coup été amputé des 50 pour cent de ses débouchés à l'intérieur ?

A Serrès, qui est pour ainsi dire la frontière des régions occupées per l'armée bulgare de Thrace, les autorités bulgares n'ont encore imposé aucun droit de douane sur les provenances de Salonique. Cependant, toutes les marchandises provenant de Salonique sont soumises à un double droit, qui comporte la perception sur tous les

articles, quelle que soit leur qualité, de 2 fr. par kilog.—1 fr. pour droit d'accise et 1 fr. pour droit d'octroi. Chaque kilog. de marchandises est donc frappé de 2 fr. à son entrée dans les régions occupées par les armées bulgares. Ces deux droits sont absolument indépendants des droits de douane qui peuvent être institués d'un moment à l'autre.

Déjà la Bulgarie pense prendre une mesure préliminaire de nature à favoriser l'exportation de la Bulgarie vers les régions occupées au détriment de celles de Salonique. Le "Pravo" annonçait en effet dans un de ses précédents numéros qu'il est question en Bulgarie de frapper de droits de douane les marchandises des régions occupées lors de leur entrée en Bulgarie et d'exempter, par contre, de tous droits les provenances des régions occupées à leur entrée en Bulgarie. De là à frapper de droits de douane les provenances de Salonique, à Serrès, par exemple, il n'y a qu'un pas et ce pas serait sans aucun doute franchi, surtout si les Gouvernements européens s'inclinent devant la mesure très grave prise par les Serbes à Ghevgheli. Si par leur silence les chambres de commerce et les Gouvernements européens sanctionnent la décision du Gouvernement serbe, la Bulgarie aurait vraiment tort de ne pas limiter.

[1742] No. 222

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 5.)

Sir, *Belgrade, January 8, 1913.*

IN its issue of the 4th January the "Samouprava," the semi-official organ of the Servian Government, has an article under the title "That it should be known," the substance of which is to the following effect: "On all sides there appears to be a tendency to pare away the conquests of the Servians, gained at the price of so much blood, and to deprive the victors of what is undoubtedly Servian territory in order to hand it over to the vanquished Albanians. The Servian nation has hitherto borne cruel injustices out of consideration for others, but it has now reached the limit of its patience. The nation that has so often looked death in the face, which has spared neither the blood nor the lives of its sons who died for freedom, this nation, which has given undoubted proof of its national virtues, demands to be heard to-day. It is not permissible, it is unjust and dangerous, to sport with the sorrow of a nation. In the present situation it is dangerous, and it is unworthy to kill the faith of such a nation in the justice of the civilised Powers. It is not megalomania which dictates our demands, but the bitter sufferings of our race. Even our antagonists would despise us if after Kumanovo, Prilep, Veles, Monastir, and other proofs of the heroic courage of our army we were to permit thousands of our brothers to be subjected to blood-thirsty Albanian hordes."

This sort of high-flown style is much favoured by the Servian press, and appeals strongly to the Slav temperament, and will therefore probably find an echo in Russia. The Servians undoubtedly think they are suffering extreme injustice, and have entirely lost sight of the fact that before the war they themselves declared that the war was being undertaken not for territorial aggrandisement but merely for the rectification of wrongs. They forget that the Great Powers formally declared that whatever the results of the war there would be no alteration of the territorial *status quo*, and that had the Balkan States not tacitly acquiesced in this declaration Servia might have been very much hampered in her movements in the Sanjak, Old Servia, and on the Adriatic coast by the attitude of Austria, or possibly even by military measures taken by the Monarchy.

Whenever in conversations with M. Pasitch, M. Yovanovitch, or the present Secretary-General I have represented this view it has been brushed aside with impatience, and with the enquiry "What right has Austria to dictate in those regions at all?" Although M. Pasitch is far too perspicacious to need an answer to this question, I am inclined to think the limit of Servian long-suffering will be reached if Austria attempts to press the limits of Albania too far.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

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[1640] No. 223.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at Cavalla, reporting on the state of affairs in that district.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 223.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Cavalla, December 28, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, as news begins to come into Cavalla, the extent to which massacres of Moslems by Christians have taken place is greater than one had imagined. It may be said without exaggeration that there is hardly a Turkish village in the districts of Cavalla and Drama which has not suffered at the hands of the Bulgarian comitajis and of the local Christian population. In many, scores of males have been massacred, in others, rape and pillage have taken place.

In the Cavalla region, apart from the murder of Cavalla Turks by comitajis, already reported, the massacre of some 200 Turks is announced from Pravishta, and of an equal number at Sarishaban. In the Drama district, Chatalja, Doxat and Kirlikova have been the scenes of murders of Turks. Most of these murders took place shortly after the Bulgarian occupation but some have been of more recent occurrence.

In the matter of murders both Bulgarians and Greeks have been equally guilty, the former being mostly comitajis and the latter local inhabitants. In other words, these massacres have been perpetrated by Macedonians on Macedonians, and it would be hardly fair to blame civilisation and Christianity in connection with such events, for the Macedonian Christian is as much devoid of civilisation and Christianity as his Moslem neighbour.

Bulgarian regular troops do not seem to have participated in any of the murders, but the Bulgarian Government and the military authorities cannot be excused for their failure to prevent such happenings or to punish any of the wrong-doers. Furthermore, such successes are looked upon with indulgence by Bulgarians and when condemnation takes place it is rather based on saving Bulgaria's reputation in the eyes of Europe than on real indignation. Less excesses seem to have taken place in parts occupied by Greek troops than in those in the occupation of the Bulgarians.

The worst now seems to be over. Messrs. Buxton, Masterman and Orloff, working for the relief of all in need in the Drama and Cavalla districts, are meeting with every support on the part of the Bulgarian officials, and Bulgarian prefects or sub-prefects are making tours of inspection in their districts with a view to alleviating distress, but the damage done by the destruction or dispersal of the peaceful Moslem population is hardly reparable.

During the last two weeks large numbers of Bulgarian troops have been moving in the direction of Chatalja through Drama and Xanthi. Daily military trains carrying from 1,000 to 1,200 men have been running from Serres to Dedeagatch, and several regiments have performed the same journey on foot. A railway bridge near Drama which had been blown up by Bulgarians at the beginning of the war is being repaired. In the meantime a temporary loop line has been constructed near the damaged bridge.

Ill-feeling between Greeks and Bulgarians still continues. Local Greeks would, so they now say, welcome Turkish rule back rather than be Bulgarian. A deputation of local Greek notables, headed by the metropolitan, waited on King George at Salonica to express the grievances of the Greek population, and have come back apparently much elated by their visit. They seem to think that there is a hope of Cavalla becoming Greek. In any case, in the event of a conflict between Greece and Bulgaria, they are confident of their ability to beat Bulgaria. The Bulgarians on their side are equally confident. Both sides look to England for support. On what grounds one is unable to discover.

Bulgarians are planning a great future for Cavalla, both commercially and socially. Two lines of railways from Bulgaria are to be run to Cavalla, one through Demir Hissar and Serres, and the other by a more direct route from Philippopolis through Drama, and a good harbour is to be constructed. Contemplated increase in taxation on tobacco, and the absence of the Turkish cultivator and of the Greek merchant may prevent the realisation of these hopes for a brilliant commercial future for Cavalla.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[1641] No. 224.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copy of an extract from the *procès-verbal* of a meeting of the Administrative Council of the Ottoman Public Debt on the subject of the Tripoli revenues.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 224.

Extract from Procès-verbal of Meeting held on December 6 (19), 1912.

Revenus de Tripolitaine.

AVANCE de £T.300,000 demandée par le Malié sur la part lui revenant de l'indemnité italienne.

De la part du Malié, le Commissariat Impérial transmet au conseil une ampliation certifiée conforme de la copie légalisée du traité de paix conclu dernièrement entre le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman et le Gouvernement italien.

Aux termes de l'article 10 du traité, fait remarquer le département, l'Italie s'engage à verser chaque année à la caisse de l'administration, pour compte du Gouvernement ottoman, un montant égal à la moyenne des sommes affectées à la dette publique sur les revenus de Tripolitaine dans le courant des trois années qui ont précédé la déclaration de guerre; le chiffre de ladite annuité doit être fixé par les soins de deux commissaires à désigner de part et d'autre, sauf, au cas de désaccord, à faire trancher le différend par voie d'arbitrage; enfin, il a été admis de capitaliser l'annuité en question au taux de 4 pour cent.

Sur la proposition des délégués ottomans, l'annuité susvisée a été fixée à 2,000,000 de livres, au minimum, et une partie de cette somme doit revenir au Trésor Impérial. En conséquence, le Ministère demande au conseil de vouloir bien consentir à lui avancer une somme de £T. 300,000, remboursable, avec les intérêts à 7 pour cent l'an, soit sur la susdite part, soit sur le produit en espèces du premier emprunt qui sera conclu par le Gouvernement Impérial, ou bien enfin sur la part du Malié dans le produit de la surtaxe douanière de 3 pour cent, à partir du mois de mars prochain, 1329.

M. le président expose que, saisi verbalement de cette demande par son Excellence le commissaire Impérial, il a, après un échange de vues avec ses collègues, décidé d'y faire droit, et que des ordres ont été donnés en conséquence. Il ajoute que, dans l'impossibilité où il était d'apprécier, d'une façon exacte, la part qui, dans l'indemnité italienne, doit revenir au Gouvernement Impérial, il a cru nécessaire de réclamer les sûretés de remboursement dont parle la dépêche de son Excellence Said Bey; néanmoins, il pense que cette part sera probablement suffisante.

A ce propos, il invite le Directeur des Services du Conseil, qui a traité hier cette question avec le Directeur de la Comptabilité, au Malié, Barbérian Effendi, à fournir au conseil des renseignements sur les prétentions dudit département.

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M. Abouncau rappelle que la perte annuelle subie par la Dette publique du chef de l'abandon des Revenus concédés en Tripolitaine s'élevait à £T. 31,637 (moyenne des cinq dernières années). C'est le chiffre que l'administration avait officieusement communiqué au Gouvernement Impérial à l'époque où se poursuivaient les négociations en vue de la paix entre les plénipotentiaires italiens et ottomans.

Or, le traité qui est intervenu postérieurement précise que la moyenne devra être calculée sur trois années seulement. Le revenu de la Dette publique est ainsi ramené à £T. 30,089.

Pour la même raison, le chiffre de l'indemnité annuelle réclamée par la Régie des Tabacs et arrêtée à £T. 38,968, se trouve réduit à £T. 37,092.

Mais le Malié entend déduire de ce dernier chiffre outre un montant indéterminé de frais, considéré comme fraction proportionnelle des dépenses de l'Administration centrale pour le contrôle, la part de 30 pour cent des bénéfices qui doit revenir au Gouvernement Impérial, à la clôture annuelle des comptes de la Société cointéressée.

Il en résulterait, si ce point de vue pouvait être admis, que la réclamation de la Régie devrait être déjà réduite à £T. 25,964, et que la part du Trésor Impérial dans l'indemnité de 2,000,000 de lires (soit environ £T. 88,000) ne serait pas inférieure à £T. 31,917.

Le Directeur des Services du Conseil a fait observer à l'envoyé du Ministère des Finances qu'avant de pouvoir établir le chiffre de ses excédents de revenu, la Régie avait l'obligation d'encaisser les recettes et que, partant, elle devait, en tout état de cause, recevoir sur l'indemnité la part de £T. 37,092 qui lui revenait ; c'est seulement après cette perception qu'elle serait en mesure d'établir si et dans quelle mesure le Gouvernement Impérial pouvait participer aux bénéfices—qu'au surplus la baisse des recettes rendait problématiques.

M. de La Boulinière, en attirant l'attention du conseil sur l'exagération des revendications du Malié, pense que le moment est venu pour le conseil de se prononcer sur la question de l'annuité ou du capital, entre lesquels le traité turco-italien lui laisse le choix.

MM. les délégués anglais, allemand et austro-hongrois expriment leur préférence pour le règlement en capital.

L'essentiel, déclare Sir Adam Block, est que l'Italie verse au plus tôt le montant annuel minimum de £T. 88,000 que prévoit le Traité de Lausanne. Ce montant serait placé sans retard et le Gouvernement, aussi bien que la Dette publique, profiterait de l'intérêt.

Ce payement ne saurait d'ailleurs préjuger le chiffre sur lequel les commissaires italien et ottoman seront amenés à tomber d'accord. Le partage s'effectuera après examen des comptes, et le Trésor Impérial, recevant la part qui lui revient, pourra, de cette façon, se libérer de sa dette vis-à-vis de l'administration, ainsi que de l'intérêt de 7 pour cent qu'il paie de ce chef. Le Gouvernement profitera en outre des 75 pour cent des excédents des revenus auxquels contribuera le produit de l'indemnité.

M. le délégué allemand, vu les circonstances exceptionnelles du moment, n'a pas d'objection contre l'avance faite au Trésor sur la part de l'indemnité capitalisée revenant au Gouvernement après règlement des différentes créances de la Dette publique. Toutefois, il craint que ladite part ne soit à peine suffisante pour couvrir la somme de £T. 300,000, et que, par conséquent, la différence ne doive être recouvrée sur la part du Malié dans le produit de la surtaxe douanière de 3 pour cent. Il estime que le conseil ne doit pas oublier sa réclamation relative à l'emprunt "Pêcheries," et qu'il conviendrait de préférer, au règlement spécial qu'en veut faire le Malié, un simple règlement sur le montant de l'indemnité.

En votant pour la capitulisation de cette dernière, M. Pritsch est d'avis que les sommes à réserver sur ce capital pour les divers services de la dette ne pourront pas être touchées sans le consentement des intéressés et du conseil, les intérêts de ces sommes devant seuls être portés, en remplacement des revenus de Tripolitaine, aux comptes des différents exercices.

M. de Jauko appuie cette opinion.

M. le délégué italien, annonçant au conseil qu'il se propose de se rendre prochainement et pour quelque temps en Italie, offre à ses collègues de s'intéresser à Rome au règlement de la question du payement de l'indemnité. Il demande seulement que, conformément aux termes du traité italo-turc, M. le président veuille bien faire connaître au Gouvernement italien les intentions du conseil par l'entremise du Gouvernement ottoman.

Le conseil décide de réclamer le capital de l'indemnité qui lui est dûe. Il remercie de son offre M. Nogara, et lui confie le soin de hâter par les démarches officieuses le payement du montant capitalisé sur la base de l'annuité minima de 2,000,000 de lires italiennes fixée par le traité, en laissant au Gouvernement Impérial toute liberté pour conduire, dans les conditions prévues, ses négociations.

Pour permettre à l'action tout officieuse de M. le délégué italien de s'exercer utilement en secondant les négociations officielles, le conseil prie M. le président de solliciter une prompte intervention à Rome du Gouvernement Impérial.

[1642] No. 225.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 22.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of an extract from the *procès-verbal* of the sitting of the 19th December of the Ottoman Public Debt, relative to the measures taken by the Direction générale to safeguard the interests of the Debt in the Rumelian provinces occupied by the allies.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 225.

Extract from Procès-Verbal *of Meeting held December* 19, 1912.

Services de la Dette en Roumélie.

LA Direction générale expose au conseil que les autorités serbes ont procédé à la saisie des fonds d'Etat se trouvant dans les caisses de la Banque Impériale ottomane à Monastir.

Parmi ces fonds se trouvait une somme de P. T. 24,543, provenant des versements effectués à ladite banque par la Dette publique avant la reddition de Monastir.

L'inspecteur de l'administration en cette ville, craignant que ladite somme ne fût confisquée avec les fonds du Gouvernement Impérial, a fait observer aux autorités serbes que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane étant une institution internationale, les fonds expédiés à son adresse ne pouvaient être compris parmi les valeurs appartenant à l'État. Les autorités serbes reconnurent le bien-fondé de cette remarque et promirent de restituer à la Dette publique la somme en cause, après toutefois qu'elles auraient saisi de la question le quartier général d'Uscub.

Les consuls de France et d'Angleterre ont, d'autre part, conseillé aux agents de la Dette publique à Monastir de patienter jusqu'au règlement définitif de la question relative au fonctionnement de l'administration dans les localités occupées par l'armée serbe.

La Direction générale ne doute pas que ce différend ne soit résolu à l'avantage de la Dette publique ottomane. Cependant, et pour faciliter sur les lieux les tâches des agents de l'administration, elle déclare qu'elle vient d'y envoyer l'Inspecteur principal Grenier, ainsi qu'elle l'a fait pour les bache-mudirets de Salonique et de Durazzo, où la même mission a été confiée à MM. Violet et A. Logothétidès.

De même que ceux-ci, M. Grenier devra prendre, d'accord avec le chef de l'Exécutif et celui de l'Inspection, toutes les mesures que nécessite, dans les circonstances actuelles, la sauvegarde des intérêts de l'administration.

Le conseil prend note de ces renseignements.

[1643] No. 226.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 23.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of an extract from the *procès-verbal* of the sitting of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt held on the 19th ultimo,

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at which the question of the treatment of the Debt's revenues at Salonica and Mitylene by the Hellenic military authorities was discussed.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 226.

Extract from Procès-Verbal of Meeting of Council of Ottoman Public Debt held December 19, 1912.

Services de l'Administration à Salonique.

PAR lettre du 3 (16) décembre, 1912, la Banque Impériale ottomane transmet au conseil copie d'une lettre que Son Altesse le Diadoque Constantin, en sa qualité de commandant en chef de l'armée d'occupation à Salonique, a adressée le 20 novembre (3 décembre) à l'agence de cet établissement en la susdite ville.

Dans cette lettre le Prince Constantin déclare que, par application des lois de guerre qui lui donnent le droit d'administrer les services publics des pays occupés, il a prescrit aux autorités placées sous ses ordres de percevoir les revenus, taxes et impôts antérieurement perçus par les autorités ottomanes. Toutefois, soucieux de respecter les droits des créanciers étrangers de la Turquie, il est résolu "à ne pas toucher durant la guerre au fonctionnement des institutions établies pour leur sauvegarde. En conséquence, il a été décidé que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, qui, en vertu des règlements en vigueur à son égard, a été substituée à l'autorité ottomane dans la perception des revenus affectés à la dette, continuera à assurer le service dont elle a eu jusqu'ici la charge." Mais, afin de garantir tous les droits que l'Etat hellénique tire de l'occupation de guerre et d'empêcher que l'ennemi ne puisse profiter de l'excédent des revenus affectés au service de la dette, la Banque Impériale ottomane ne pourra, sans autorisation des autorités helléniques compétentes, faire aucun emploi des fonds déposés dans ses caisses par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane. Au rétablissement de la paix, il sera procédé à un règlement de comptes, afin de déterminer, dans les sommes perçues, durant l'occupation, par l'Administration de la Dette publique la part revenant à cette dernière pour le service de la dette et la part revenant au Trésor hellénique à titre de butin de guerre.

La Banque Impériale ottomane transmet, d'autre part, au conseil copie de la réponse adressée au Diadoque par son agence à Salonique, laquelle a déclaré à ce dernier que, tout en se conformant à sa demande, elle était tenue d'en référer au siège central de la banque. Celle-ci ajoute qu'en attendant des instructions, son agence à Salonique refuse tout prélèvement et tout transfert sur les sommes qui sont ou seront déposées chez elle par la Dette publique, ces sommes étant portées au crédit d'un compte "transitoire."

En terminant, la Banque Impériale ottomane demande au conseil de vouloir bien lui indiquer, au cas où il jugerait que l'agence du susdit établissement peut refuser d'accéder à la demande du Prince Constantin les arguments à invoquer en l'occurrence.

M. le directeur général demande la parole pour déclarer que le même esprit que celui dont s'inspire la décision prise par le Diadoque à Salonique semble se généraliser. D'après des renseignements envoyés à l'Administration centrale par l'inspecteur de la Dette publique à Mytilène, les autorités helléniques qui occupent cette île entendent prélever sur les encaissements afférents aux revenus concédés une part considérée par elles comme représentant des excédents.

A ce propos Sir Adam Block annonce au conseil que, dès qu'il a eu connaissance de la mesure adoptée par les autorités helléniques de Salonique, il a écrit à son syndicat de demander au Gouvernement anglais de vouloir bien expliquer aux autorités helléniques et serbes que les fonds déposés par la Dette publique ne représentent pas des excédents, ainsi que l'établit le paragraphe 9 du Procès-Verbal No. 29.

Le conseil prend acte du passage de la lettre du Diadoque spécifiant que la Dette publique continuera à assurer son service. Considérant, d'autre part, qu'il ne s'agit en définitive que d'un malentendu, puisqu'il ne saurait être question ici d'excédents, et confiant enfin dans l'intervention des Puissances et dans l'action des inspecteurs principaux envoyés par la Direction générale sur les lieux, le conseil exprime l'espoir que l'incident provoqué par la saisie des fonds de la Dette publique à Salonique sera promptement réglé au mieux des intérêts de l'administration.

[1644] No. 227.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 24.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 8 of the 4th January, I have the honour to forward herewith copy of a note from the representative of the British bondholders on the council of the administration of the Ottoman Public Debt on the question of Government's share in the Debt's surplus revenues and the action of Greek authorities in regard thereto.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 227.

Note by Sir A. Block.

THE Greek authorities have laid a sequester on all the moneys collected by the Ottoman Debt officials in Macedonia and either deposited in the Ottoman Bank or retained in the offices of the Debt administration on the plea that the Ottoman Government participate in the surplus of these revenues.

The Greek authorities by such action effectually prevent the Debt council from receiving any of the revenue at the central administration.

The action of the Greek authorities is, in the opinion of the Debt council, unjustified.

In accordance with the decree of Muharrem of the 8th (20th) December, 1881, article 7, confirmed by the decree annex of the 1st (14th) September, 1903, articles 3 and 12, the foreign bondholders of Turkey are considered proprietors or possessors of the ceded revenues absolutely and until the total extinction of the Debt. The product of these revenues is assigned to the payment of interest and sinking fund of the Debt.

By article 7 of the decree annex the Turkish Government, it is true, participate in the net receipts of the Debt administration, but this participation cannot be made, according to the terms of the decree, until the interest and the sinking fund are duly provided for. It is only then that a surplus can be said to exist in the net receipts, in which case the Ottoman Government have a right to 75 per cent. of that surplus, 25 per cent. being retained by the Debt council for extraordinary sinking fund.

Thus the Ottoman Government have no share in any part of one or other of the revenues, nor in the receipts of any one district.

The right of participation can only be exercised at the end of the financial year and when the accounts are closed for all the districts taken together. The right can only be exercised when the service of the Debt is assured. It is a participation in the surplus arising from the product of the total revenues collected throughout the whole Empire, and not from the product on any one category of revenues or from the revenues in any one district at any moment in the financial year.

Further, the share of the Ottoman Government is no longer free. By the terms of the contract for the loan of 1904, 4 per cent., the Government's share in any surplus of the ceded revenues is earmarked for the service of that loan to the amount of the annuity required, namely, £ T. 124,350, and the Debt council is called upon to make this payment to the Imperial Ottoman Bank out of the Government's share in the surplus, if any, and before any payment to the Ottoman Government of the said share.

Further, again, by the terms of the Bagdad Railway loan contract, second and third series, the Debt council is called upon to pay to the Bagdad Railway Company two annuities, one of £ T. 200,000 and another of £ T. 220,000, before any payment can be made to the Ottoman Government on account of its share in the surplus revenues; and, lastly, the working expenses of the Bagdad Railway, first series, are also secured on the Government's share of the surplus.

The service of the Unified Debt requires an annuity of £ T. 2,157,375, and before the Government can receive a share in the surplus revenues this sum as well as the annuities above mentioned, to the amount of £ T. 544,350, plus the sum required annually for the working expenses of the first series of the Bagdad Railway, has to be provided for.

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It is quite impossible to foresee the amount of the share in the surplus which reverts to the Ottoman Government before the accounts of the year are closed. The year ends the 13th March, and the final accounts are not made up as a rule until the end of June. It is therefore also impossible to determine or to precise what part, if any, of the revenues of the Salonica district or of any other district in Macedonia will eventually revert to the Ottoman Government, and the action of the Greek authorities in laying an embargo on the revenues, whilst depriving the Debt council from the usufruct of its revenues already encashed prevents the council from carrying out its engagements to the bondholders and to third parties interested in the surplus of these revenues.

Similar arrangements have been made with regard to revenues other than those of the decree of Muharrem encashed by the Debt council in virtue of contracts for third parties to be applied either for the service of loans outside the decree of Muharrem or for the payment of various railway kilometric guarantees. Until the end of the year and until the final accounts are made up it is impossible to state what, if any, surplus reverts to Government, and at the present moment the surplus, if any, is earmarked for the interest and reimbursement of Treasury bonds taken up by the Imperial Ottoman Government to the amount of £ T. 250,000 in the current year and of £ T. 500,000 in succeeding years. This year at any rate it is nearly certain that there will be no surplus reverting to Government from these revenues (see my annual report of November 1912, pp. 52–54, "The New Revenues and Tithes").

January 7, 1913.

[1645] No. 228.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 25.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 9, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's vice-consul at Adana, reporting on the pardon of some Armenian deserters at Hajin, and other Armenian matters.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 228.

Vice-Consul Matthews to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Adana, January 2, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 45 of the 19th November last and to previous despatches, I have the honour to report to your Excellency that it is reported that the Armenian deserters in the neighbourhood of Hajin have been pardoned. Yesterday, in conversation with me, the vali confirmed this report, but stated that the decision had not then been communicated officially to the vilayet. I am informed on good authority that the two battalions of Aintab redifs, detachments of which have been drafted to Hajin, Dourtyol, and other points (my despatch No. 48 of the 9th ultimo), will shortly be disbanded. A detachment of regular troops will be maintained at Hajin. Considerable interest has been roused by the reported formation of a commission of reforms for certain Armenian provinces, and local Armenians are discussing the possibility of having this vilayet and the Aleppo vilayet included within the scope of the commission.

With regard to the pardon of the Armenian deserters at Hajin, offers of pardon on condition of surrender were made by the local authorities on several occasions during the past six months, but without result. An Armenian notable stated yesterday in the presence of the Armenian bishop, who apparently agreed with him, that the Hajin deserters were unlikely to trust the word of the Government and surrender. The Armenians generally express satisfaction with the decision of the Government, and take it as an earnest of good intentions. I have not heard the question of the redifs discussed, but I submit that the Government has been well advised in deciding

to withdraw them from this vilayet. If troops are required to assist in maintaining order, nizam troops are preferable to redifs.

I have, &c.
W. D. W. MATTHEWS.

[1707] No. 229.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 6. Very Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, January 10, 1913.*

DURING a short conversation with the Imperial Chancellor on the 7th instant I took the opportunity of communicating to his Excellency the substance of your telegram No. 6 of the 4th instant, in which, after alluding to the step contemplated by the Ambassadors, and stating that you had given certain advice to the Turkish delegates, you declared your readiness to co-operate in any fresh suggestions which might be put forward by the Imperial Government in furtherance of the views expressed to me by the Emperor in conversation on New Year's Day. After saying how much he appreciated the cordiality of your message, the Chancellor asked me whether I could tell him exactly what the Emperor had said to me. I replied that His Majesty had informed me that, with his (the Chancellor's) concurrence, he had instructed Prince Lichnowsky to suggest to you that, in view of the attitude of the Turkish delegates, Great Britain and Germany should exercise gentle, but firm, pressure at Constantinople with the object of bringing the Ottoman Government to a more reasonable frame of mind.

After a moment's thought his Excellency said that perhaps the Emperor, in his enthusiasm for peace and his desire that England and Germany should continue to work together, had given too definite a form to Prince Lichnowsky's instructions, which had been simply to consult with you as to the best means of causing the Turks to realise their position and make peace. "In any case," the Chancellor continued, "the Powers must see to it that this war is brought to a conclusion, and that all the questions which are now agitating Europe are settled once for all. We have been on tenter-hooks for too long, with war always looming in the background. This state of things is getting on the nerves of all Europe, and is interfering with every sort of social, financial, and political development." He declared that no one knew how near we had been to war lately, adding: "I do not wish to give away political secrets, but I can assure you that if it had not been for England and Germany, Europe would be in a state of war at this moment." Nothing had given him greater pleasure than that the two Governments should have been able to work so well together, and he hoped that this hearty co-operation, which had had such important and beneficial results, would be still further extended to the advantage both of the two Powers themselves and the world in general.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[1708] No. 230.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Berlin, January 9, 1913.*

THE "Tageblatt" published yesterday morning an article by an engineer formerly employed on the Bagdad Railway dealing with the effect of the war on the construction of the line. He stated that orders had been given by the Deutsche Bank for a considerable reduction in the works at present in hand in view of the danger that the loss of the greater part of European Turkey would jeopardise the payment of the kilometric guarantees. He pointed out that the earnings of the railway could only provide 25 or 30 per cent. of the funds required for working expenses and the payment of interest and sinking fund on the capital invested, and that the remaining 70 or 75 per cent. had to be furnished by the Turkish Government in the form of kilometric guarantees and advances. The undertaking therefore depended upon the financial position of the Turkish Government, and it behoved German diplomacy to take steps to safeguard the interests of the company.

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In its evening's issue of the same date, the "Tageblatt" stated that it had been informed on the best authority that it was a fact that the construction of the railway was being retarded, but that this was merely a result of the shortage of labour due to mobilisation and other causes connected with the war, and had nothing to do with any doubt as to the security of the Turkish guarantees. It was expressly provided in the treaties with the Turkish Government that in case of *force majeure*, which term included the outbreak of war, the periods prescribed for the construction of the railway were to be correspondingly extended. The kilometric guarantees themselves were secured: (1) on revenues from purely Asiatic provinces, which would not be affected by the cession of European provinces, and (2) on the revenues conceded to the Ottoman Public Debt. As regards the latter security an agreement in principle existed between the Powers interested to the effect that compensation must be provided by the States taking over former Turkish territory for any loss of revenue that might ensue from the cession of a portion of European Turkey.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[1767] No. 231.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Rome, January 9, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1 of the 5th instant, relative to the customs duties imposed by the Servian authorities on goods imported via Salonica, I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a communication which I have to-day received from the Secretary-General of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs informing me of the substance of the explanation received by the Italian Legation at Belgrade from the Servian Government as the result of their representations on the subject.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

Enclosure in No. 231.

Signor de Martino to Sir R. Rodd.

Mon cher Ambassadeur, *Rome, le 8 janvier,* 1913.

EN réponse à votre lettre du 2 de ce mois, je m'empresse de vous informer que des réclamations nous étant parvenues de Salonique à l'égard des droits imposés par les autorités serbes des pays occupés par elles, des démarches ont été faites à Belgrade dans l'intérêt des commerçants italiens.

Il nous revient que des démarches dans le même sens ont été faites auprès du Gouvernement de Serbie par d'autres Puissances, et notamment par l'Allemagne.

La Légation Royale de Belgrade vient de nous informer, pour sa part, que le Gouvernement serbe a donné des instructions à son représentant à Athènes afin que les marchandises importées à Salonique ne soient pas grevées par la douane grecque du droit du 11 pour cent, ou, en cas contraire, qu'elles soient accompagnées d'un certificat constatant le payement et donnant lieu au remboursement, lorsqu'elles sont introduites dans les pays occupés par les Serbes.

La Légation Royale ajoute que ces marchandises ne sont pas, d'ailleurs, assujetties au tarif général serbe, mais bien seulement au droit du 11 pour cent.

Ce qui précède se réfère au commerce en transit par Salonique. Quant aux droits que les Serbes imposent dans la zone occupée par eux et dont il est mention dans la lettre de votre Excellence en date du 5, nous n'avons pas d'indications précises jusqu'ici. Nous venons de télégraphier à Belgrade pour nous en procurer ; je ne manquerai pas de vous faire part de ce qui va nous résulter à cet égard.

Veuillez, &c.
G. DE MARTINO.

[1709] No. 232

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Berlin, January 10, 1913.*

ON calling on Herr Zimmermann yesterday, I found him rather perturbed at the unsatisfactory state of affairs between Roumania and Bulgaria. He said that he was afraid that in Roumania public opinion was getting rather excited, and that even the King had lost some of his usual calm. He regretted this all the more, because the differences of opinion between the two countries might encourage the Ottoman Government to hold out against the advice of the Powers and continue the war. He considered, therefore, that Roumania had chosen a bad moment for urging her claims. She had certainly a right to demand something from Bulgaria, as the latter would hardly have been able to act with such immediate success against Turkey if she had had to detach a large force at the beginning of the war to watch Roumania. But Roumania ought to have made her terms beforehand or else have waited until the war was over. He did not anticipate a rupture between the two countries, but their inability to come to terms certainly added to the general difficulties of the international situation.

Before seeing me Herr Zimmermann had just received a visit from the Servian chargé d'affaires, who had informed him that it had been arranged that the Servian troops should evacuate Durazzo. Herr Zimmermann had expressed pleasure at this piece of news, as he thought that it was a fresh departure which would enable the Austrian Government to relax their military preparations and thus relieve the general tension and uneasiness. On being told however that the evacuation was to take place only after peace was signed, he had, he informed me, spoken rather sharply to the Servian chargé d'affaires, and had told him that it was scarcely worth while coming to the Imperial Foreign Office to tell him of a step which would have to be taken in any case as soon as hostilities ceased.

Herr Zimmermann is not particularly well disposed towards the Servian Government for the moment, both because they do not seem to make even an attempt to control their military authorities either on the coast or in the interior, and because he considers that their territorial claims in the delimitation of the eastern frontier of Albania show an utterly unreasonable attitude on their part and a complete absence of all sense of proportion. The line drawn by the Servian Government showing the amount of territory which in their view should fall to the allies, and which the Servian chargé d'affaires had told him was the minimum of their claims, was in his opinion ridiculous and left no territory worth speaking of to the Albanians.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[1853] No. 233.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received January 13.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, January 10, 1913.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3rd January, and its enclosures, relative to the customs régime applied to goods imported at Salonica and destined for Servian territory, and with reference thereto I am to forward to you herewith copy of a letter which they have received from the London Chamber of Commerce, together with copy of the reply which they have caused to be addressed to the chamber.

I am to ask you to be good enough to move Sir E. Grey, should he see no objection, to cause telegraphic instructions to be sent to His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica to report, also by telegraph, whether similar difficulties are in fact arising as regards goods sent to Bulgarian territory from Salonica, as appears to be implied in the telegram, copy of which is forwarded by the London chamber.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

Enclosure 1 in No. 233.

London Chamber of Commerce (Incorporated) to Board of Trade.

Oxford Court, Cannon Street, London, January 2, 1913.

Sir,

I AM instructed by the General Purposes Committee of this chamber to append copy of a telegram from the Chamber of Commerce at Salonica, which has apparently been sent to this and other chambers in foreign countries interested in Turkish trade, for such action as can properly be taken by His Majesty's Government under all the circumstances.

The chamber has no other information on the matter beyond what is contained in this telegram or has appeared in the press.

Yours, &c.
CHARLES E. MUSGRAVE, *Secretary.*

Telegram above referred to.

Chambre Commerce, London; *Salonique, le 1er janvier*, 1913.

Avons honneur vous communiquer que Gouvernements serbe bulgare imposent arbitrairement droits douane aux marchandises de douanes, Saloniques allant dans régions occupées par leurs troupes. Cette mesure ruine commerce Salonique. Prions demander votre Gouvernement faire démarches pour faire cesser cette situation nuisible aux négociants, votre pays ayant rapports considérables ici.—CHAMBRE COMMERCE, SALONIQUE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 233.

Board of Trade to London Chamber of Commerce (Incorporated).

Board of Trade, January 10, 1913.

Sir,

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to advert to your letter of the 2nd January, forwarding copy of a telegram from the Chamber of Commerce at Salonica respecting the duties levied on goods imported at that port and destined for territory occupied by the Servian and Bulgarian troops.

In reply, I am to state that the Board are in receipt, through the Foreign Office, of a telegram from His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade reporting that he has been informed by the Servian Government that goods destined for Servia or territory occupied by Servian forces should not be subjected by the Greek authorities to customs duty at Salonica. Goods destined for territory in Servian occupation should pay duty at Gheygheli at the former Turkish rate (*i.e.*, 11 per cent. *ad valorem*), and those destined for Servia proper should pay duty either in Belgrade or at the former Servian frontier.

His Majesty's Minister adds that he is suggesting to the Servian Government that they should come to an understanding with the Greek Government in order to obviate the irregular levy of duty on imports at Salonica.

The Board have no official information as to any corresponding difficulties in the case of goods passing through Salonica into Bulgarian territory, but they are in further communication with the Foreign Office on this subject.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

[1841] No. 234.

Treasury to Foreign Office.—(Received January 13.)

Treasury Chambers, January 11, 1913.

Sir,

I HAVE laid before the Lords Commissioners of His Majesty's Treasury Sir L. Mallet's letter of the 4th ultimo, enclosing copies of two despatches from His Majesty's Minister at Athens, with special reference to the means at the disposal of the

Greek Government, and, in reply, I am to request you to convey to the Secretary of State their concurrence in the terms of the reply which he proposes to send to Sir F. Elliot.

I am, &c.
ROBERT CHALMERS.

[1608] No. 235.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, January 12, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 29 of the 11th January.

I have informed Minister for Foreign Affairs in a private letter as he cannot see me till to-morrow.

[1651] No. 236.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 12, 1913.*

THE Emperor told me to-day that Germany would on no account take part in a naval demonstration. I informed the Chancellor of what His Majesty had said, and he told me that Emperor's remarks to me coincided with what the German Ambassador has already communicated to you on this subject.

In subsequent conversation, the Chancellor begged me to express to you his satisfaction that he had been able to support all your suggestions at the Ambassadors' meetings, and to tell you that he hoped to continue doing so. He had found draft note rather sharp, but had approved it with some slight modifications. Only as regards naval demonstration, a proposal which had not come from you, the Imperial Government did not see their way to join in it. He added that he had every confidence in your conduct of Ambassadors' conversations, and that he neither wished nor intended to make any proposals or suggestions, but that I was to tell you that if you thought it advisable that a word should be said at Sophia as well as at Constantinople, and cared to make a proposal to that effect, you might be quite sure of German support.

On one point he seemed to have strong views, namely, that the Powers should not allow their policy to be dictated, or their interests affected, by Bulgaria and Turkey. His idea was that if they made peace, well and good, and the Powers would still continue to occupy themselves with questions in which they were interested. If, on the other hand, they refused to make peace, they should be told that they must fight it out among themselves, as the question of the ultimate possession of Adrianople did not interest the Powers. He added that the efforts of the latter had from the first been directed towards localising the war, and, as far as he could judge, nothing had happened since to make them change this attitude. His feeling was that a declaration to the above effect on the part of all the Powers would be more likely than anything else to bring the war to a conclusion.

[1900] No. 237.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 13, 1913.*

KING of the Bulgarians and Ministers leave for Mustapha Pasha to-morrow. Latter in the morning and former in the evening. Leading Bulgarian generals have been instructed to proceed there also, and a general council will be held on Wednesday to discuss both military and political situation.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

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[1901] No. 238.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 12. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 13, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 5 of 7th January: Roumania.

Prime Minister tells me that Bulgarian Minister of Finance and Bulgarian Minister at St. Petersburgh have had several confidential conversations with Minister for Foreign Affairs and with Roumanian Minister at St. Petersburgh regarding Roumanian demands. He said that Roumanian Government have now given way on the question of cession of Silistria, but they want small rectification of frontier to the east of that town and a considerable stretch of territory extending from frontier southwards in the direction of Kavarna. Bulgarian Cabinet will discuss matter in the course of a few days.

Prime Minister assured me confidentially that he himself was in favour of granting their demands, but that several of his colleagues were extremely indignant at conduct of Roumanian Government in the present crisis.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[1801] No. 239.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 14. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Vienna, January 13, 1913.*

I AM told by a trustworthy informant that the Austro-Hungarian Foreign Office take a very pessimistic view of the existing state of affairs. The opinion seems to be gaining ground that Russia will move against Turkey either in Constantinople or in Armenia, if fighting recommences. Should this prove to be the case, it is considered by influential persons at the Ballplatz that Austria should in the future regard the Near Eastern question as a purely Balkan one, in which she has her own particular interests to look after, instead of treating it as a European question as she has hitherto done. I gather that Count Berchtold's policy is being subjected to increasing criticism, and that he is blamed for not having exacted written guarantees from Servia when the latter's troops marched into the sanjak, which would have safeguarded the interests of the Dual Monarchy and averted the grave crisis from which it is now suffering. It appears that the military party assert that, if Russia takes action against Turkey, Austria must at once settle the Servian question, if necessary, by coercion.

[1821] No. 240.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 13, 1913.*

FOLLOWING received from Dardanelles to-day:—

"Ships returned last night, and the whole fleet went out again this morning."

[1899] No. 241.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 13, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 12th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs regrets the irregularities which are occurring through action of Customs authorities, and will have the confiscated goods released. The excuse he makes is that there has not been sufficient time to come to a definite arrangement with the Greeks. The proposal made to them is:—

1. That on goods in transit for Servian territory no duties shall be collected at Salonica.

2. That in the case of goods imported into Servian territory from Salonica which

have already paid duty in Salonica, duty shall be refunded by Greek authorities to the original importer at the time of exportation from Salonica.

3. If the goods arrived at Salonica previous to Greek occupation, they can upon production of a certificate to that effect, be imported into Servian territory free of duty. This has been suggested to meet an objection raised by Italian Government. As soon as definite understanding has been arrived at with Greek Government, the arrangement will be communicated to the Powers through the Servian representatives.

(Sent to Salonica and Uskub.)

[1893] No. 242.

Sir C. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 13.)

(No. 12. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 13, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 12th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs has declared to several of my colleagues that the minimum with which Roumania will be satisfied is frontier from a point on the Danube a little above Silistria, to a point on the Black Sea some little way south of Kavarna, and that, if she does not obtain this, she will occupy territory claimed.

The Russian Minister tells me that he sees no chance of Roumanian Government accepting the Bulgarian proposals, and that he is to-day urging his Government to use strong pressure at Sophia to induce the Bulgarian Government to increase their offer.

In the event of further hitch in the negotiations in London, there will be little hope of Roumania's holding her hand any longer. I understand it was only strong pressure from the Russian and Austrian Ministers which stopped her from invading Bulgarian territory last week.

The communiqué appeared yesterday in a Government organ stating that Roumania is resolved to settle her differences with Bulgaria before the conclusion of the peace.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[1602] No. 243.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir C. Barclay.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 13, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 10 of 11th January.

You should support your French and Russian colleagues by expressing the hope that Roumania may be able to come to an agreement by negotiation with Bulgaria.

(Repeated to Sophia, No. 4.)

[1818] No. 244.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 13, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 25 of 10th January to Constantinople repeated to you for your information only.

[1602] No. 245.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 13, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 1 of 13th January to Sir G. Barclay.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs, but say that I gather that Dr. Danef has been very discouraging to the attempts of M. Take Jonesco and of M. Misu to negotiate with him here, and that this attitude must impair the effect of conciliatory advice at Bucharest.

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[2058] No. 246.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 12.) *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1913.

Sir,

DR. DANEF asked to see me this morning, and saw me with Sir Arthur Nicolson.

He had no news, but was waiting for instructions. His idea was that Bulgaria might have to denounce the armistice, and had better make her denunciation coincide with, or follow immediately upon, the presentation of the collective note by the Powers in Constantinople.

I told him that we had found Tewfik Pasha and Reschid Pasha quite immovable on the subject of Adrianople. I had told them what Dr. Danef had said, that the allies could not admit any proposition which excluded the cession of the town of Adrianople, but would discuss the conditions on which the town should be ceded. I had said that I was ready to convoke the conference, but Tewfik Pasha and Reschid Pasha had said that it was quite useless to convoke the conference to discuss the cession of the town. This was the situation.

Dr. Danef said that his Government must wait to see whether the denunciation of the armistice, coinciding with the collective *démarche* of the Powers, would induce the Turks to give way; if not, the war must be resumed. In the meantime, he would remain here.

As to Roumania, Dr. Danef said that he was negotiating and had seen M. Misu this morning. Bulgaria could not give up the town of Silistria, but she was willing to raze the fortifications, and was prepared to make some small concessions on the frontier, perhaps even on the Black Sea. The Roumanians did not realise that this was a very difficult matter for Bulgaria, and that public opinion in Bulgaria needed to be humoured.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2208] No. 247.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.[a]

(No. 11.) *Foreign Office, January* 13, 1913.

Sir,

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day, the Austrian Ambassador stated that his Government accepted the formula which the Ambassadors had drawn up after considering the Servian communication as to withdrawal from the Adriatic, that was communicated to them on the 10th instant.

It was understood that all the six Powers accepted this; but the Russian Ambassador asked that the communication of the formula to the Servian chargé d'affaires here should be deferred until the Ambassador had consulted his Government.

With regard to the *démarche collective* in Constantinople, the German Ambassador said that his Government preferred the text drawn up by the French Ambassador at the meeting of the 10th instant, with the following modifications:—

"Substituer aux mots: 'compte sur leur bonne volonté,' les mots: 'compte sur le succès de leurs efforts' au second alinéa; et aux mots du troisième alinéa: 'compter sur le bienveillant appui des Puissances,' les mots: 'compter sur l'efficacité du bienveillant appui des Puissances.'"

The Austrian and Italian Ambassadors said that their Governments also agreed to this text.

As it was assumed that the Ambassadors in Constantinople had instructions which would enable them to present a text to-day or to-morrow, I stated that Sir Gerard Lowther had instructions which would enable him to agree to either text.

The German Ambassador stated that his Government saw difficulties in the way of a naval demonstration, would prefer that there should be no question of one, and were opposed to the suggestion especially on the ground of the practical difficulties.

[a] Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 34), Sir E. Goschen (No. 17), Sir R. Rodd (No. 14), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 19).

Finally, after I had pointed out that the resolution come to on the 7th instant contemplated sending ships of war to Besika Bay, not necessarily for a naval demonstration, but to be ready for every emergency, which might include the protection of the embassies in the event of a revolution or trouble in Constantinople, the following formula was agreed to:—

"Sur les observations de l'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne, visant surtout certaines difficultés techniques, la possibilité d'une démonstration navale collective paraît devoir être écartée. La réunion prie les Gouvernements de faire connaître leurs vues sur l'avis qui leur a été soumis le 7 janvier dernier, au sujet de l'envoi à la Baie de Bésika de bâtiments de guerre en vue d'une possibilité de reprise d'hostilités et de trouble, qui paraît menacer la vie et les biens de leurs nationaux, et compromettre les intérêts européens à Constantinople."

I told the Ambassadors what had passed in my conversation with Dr. Danef this morning.

Some of them had had conversations with him, and they all regarded the negotiations between Bulgaria and Roumania as having advanced somewhat favourably since our last meeting.

The Russian Ambassador made the following statement:—

"Répondant aux désirs exprimés à Sophia ainsi qu'à Bucharest, nous nous sommes entremis entre la Bulgarie et la Roumanie."

I said that, after my conversation with M. Take Jonesco and M. Misu last Saturday, the 11th instant, I had sent instructions to the British Minister in Bucharest to express the hope that Roumania and Bulgaria would come to terms with each other, and I had instructed the British Minister in Sophia to tell this to the Bulgarian Government, and to add that the way in which Dr. Danef had discouraged negotiations with the Roumanian delegates here must impair the effect of conciliatory advise in Bucharest.

On the question of the Ottoman debt, the German Ambassador suggested that, while leaving the details to the commission in Paris, the meeting of Ambassadors might agree to the following resolution of principle, and that the Balkan States might adopt this principle in the treaty of peace:—

"1. Les droits appartenant aux porteurs de la dette publique de l'Empire ottoman sur les revenus, qui ont été affectés comme gages spéciaux au service des différents emprunts d'État, tant à courte qu'à longue échéance, soit que ces services soient administrés et gérés ou non par le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, seront pleinement sauvegardés dans les territoires acquis par les États balkaniques.

"2. Les États balkaniques cessionnaires de territoire ottoman auront donc à supporter une partie de la susdite dette publique de l'État ottoman, soit moyennant payement de parts contributives annuelles aux services des différents emprunts, soit moyennant remboursement en capital de la part leur incombant de la dette de l'Empire ottoman.

"3. La part de la dette publique de l'Empire ottoman à supporter par les États balkaniques sera arrêtée sur base de la proportion constatée pour l'année fiscale 1327 (1er (14) mars, 1911, au 29 février (13 mars), 1912) entre les recettes d'État provenant des territoires cédés et la totalité des recettes d'État de l'Empire ottoman."

The French Ambassador and others said that they would transmit this resolution to their Governments.

In conclusion, I said that we must some time discuss the question of Albania, but it might be some days before all the Ambassadors were ready to discuss it, and in that case our next meeting had better be fixed without reference to it, as there might be sudden developments in the situation between Turkey and Bulgaria that it would be desirable to discuss.

The Russian Ambassador said that though he had some instructions on the question of Albania, they were incomplete. He expected to be ready in a few days.

We fixed the next meeting for Wednesday, the 15th instant, without reference to this particular question, in order that we might review the situation as it presented itself then.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[2209] No. 248.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 15.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 13, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador urged me to-day to find some way of getting out of the difficulty about the Ægean Islands. He suggested that Mitylene, Chios, and Samos, to which the Greek Government attached most importance, might go to Greece, if other islands might go to Turkey.

I said that I did not wish to be more Greek than the Greeks. I raised no objection of principle, but I did object to leaving the islands to Turkey unless they had autonomy. If they had autonomy, I objected to the use of force to prevent their being annexed to Greece, and therefore I objected to the Powers giving a guarantee to Turkey respecting them. I also said that, in order to allay suspicions, there might be some self-denying ordinance on the part of the Great Powers respecting the islands.

The Italian Ambassador said that the Marquis di San Giuliano had disclaimed the intention of retaining Rhodes; but he urged that, if there was a self-denying ordinance about the islands, it ought to extend to Asia Minor, otherwise France might get Syria and the harbour of Beyrout, and Italy would have no corresponding naval position. This would place her, as a Mediterranean Power, at a great disadvantage.

I said that we ourselves had no designs in Asia Minor. All that we desired was the maintenance of a satisfactory *status quo* which would secure the Persian Gulf and its littoral against disturbance. But Russia had special interests in Asia Minor, owing to her strategic frontier; Germany had vested interests in the Anatolian and Bagdad railways; and France had the Syrian railways. I thought that all, or any one of them, might raise objections to a self-denying ordinance as to Asia Minor. I suggested that the Italian Ambassador might sound their Ambassadors in London on these points. Meanwhile, I would consider what he had said as to finding some settlement about the Ægean Islands, if it could be done without giving guarantees to Turkey.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1898] No. 249.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 13, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from vice-consul at Dardanelles, No. 5, 13th January:—

"Turkish fleet returned.

"Only 'Hamidieh' and 'Assar-i-Tewfik' fired on intrepid Greek torpedo-boat destroyers without results."

[2070] No. 250.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 14.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 14, 1913.*

VIENNA telegram No. 10 of 12th January.

I gather from what Minister for Foreign Affairs told me yesterday that his Excellency is using all his influence at Bucharest to induce Roumania to moderate her demands, while he has urged Bulgarian Minister of Finance, who is here, to get his Government to consent to cession of small strip of coast land adjoining Roumanian frontier. His Excellency seemed to hope that Bulgarian Government would make this concession.

[1605] No. 251.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 14, 1913.*

YOU should be very careful to distinguish between telegrams repeated for information and instructions. I particularly wished to avoid discussing islands with Turks at this stage.

[1651] No. 252.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 14, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 7 of 12th January.

I have consistently pointed out here the practical difficulties in the way of a naval demonstration at Constantinople, but I think it would be desirable to leave ships at Besika Bay. A renewal of the war may bring about a collapse in Constantinople that may make it necessary to protect embassies from mobs. In that case ships could go up from Besika as they did before.

Modifications desired by German Government and proposed by German Ambassador were accepted readily at our meeting yesterday.

I have already instructed British Minister at Sophia to point out that very discouraging attitude of Dr. Danef in negotiations with Roumanian delegates here must impair effect of any conciliatory advice given at Bucharest, but there was some feeling amongst Ambassadors here that moderating counsels at Sophia desired by German Ambassador should not be linked with collective *démarche* at Constantinople.

I have told Turks that Powers will not intervene to save Adrianople for them, and have told Dr. Danef that he must not expect Powers to resort to a naval demonstration to make Turks give way. This points to leaving them to fight out question of Adrianople if they can settle it in no other way. I have kept German Ambassador informed generally of all I have said.

[2264] No. 253.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 14, 1913.*

COUNT MENSDORFF told me confidentially to-day that, when the Austrian Ambassador in Constantinople had urged in conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs that if Turkey did not give up Adrianople she must face a continuance of the war, the Minister for Foreign Affairs had said that there were three courses open to Turkey: to go on resisting the allies, or to refer the matter to some independent authority, or to give way about Adrianople if she could get from the Powers a free hand to deal with her tariff and taxation and some assurance about the Ægean Islands. Count Berchtold had instructed Count Mensdorff to mention this to me.

I thanked him, but said that it did not at first sight seem to me very helpful. To consent to the raising of the customs dues was a thing which we had been prepared to do on conditions, but to give the Turks a free hand in raising the dues, and in taxation would mean that the Powers would be paying the price for giving Adrianople to Bulgaria, and I did not see how I could defend this in Parliament. As to the islands, I did not wish to raise any question of principle. The difficulty was a practical one. The population of the islands was Greek, not Turkish. If the population had been Turkish, we could easily have said to Greece that she must keep her hands off certain islands, which were to be left to Turkey. But, as the population was Greek, if we were to guarantee the islands to Turkey, we must be prepared to repress the population by force, and to this we were opposed. It was a real practical difficulty, through which I could not see our way. Experience in Crete had shown quite clearly

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what the course of events would be. I did not mind the islands being left to Turkey with an autonomy, provided that we did not give any guarantee to Turkey, and that Turkish troops did not use force in the islands.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2265] No. 254.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.[a]

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 14, 1913.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF and M. Cambon came to see me together to-day.

Count Benckendorff spoke with much emphasis about the Albanian question. He suggested that the discussion at the meeting of Ambassadors should follow the lines on which the question had been discussed between the Governments of St. Petersburgh and Vienna. These Governments were agreed on certain points of detail about the international railway to the Adriatic, and we might come to a settlement on those points. The only point not yet settled was the question of Servia's right to import munitions of war in time of war. Then we should discuss the question of Scutari, on which there would be a difference of opinion. Russia might possibly give way at the end about Scutari, but, in that case, would have to adopt practically the Servian line for the eastern frontier of Albania, and say that her offer was there to take or to leave.

I said that Austria would probably say, when the question of Scutari was discussed, that she was prepared to make sacrifices as regards the eastern frontier of Albania, but by this she would mean giving up Ipek and Prisrend, and possibly Dibra, and I feared that this would not go far enough to meet the Russian view.

Count Benckendorff said that it certainly would not.

I observed that the British sources of information at my disposal all said that it was unreasonable that Montenegro should have the town of Scutari, which was purely Albanian.

Count Benckendorff agreed to this on its merits, but said that, if Russia gave way about Scutari, she must have complete satisfaction for Servia about the eastern frontier of Albania.

I pointed out that some places, such as Djakova, claimed by the Servians were really Albanian.

Count Benckendorff said that there were, in fact, four races in the district of Albania: there were true Servians and true Albanians, and false Servians and false Albanians. Numbers of people who were called Albanians were not really Albanians, and at places like Djakova the language used was Servian.

As he spoke very seriously of the feeling of public opinion in Russia about the Servian question, I said that it was really most unreasonable that there should be a great war on the question of whether Servia was to get at the present moment so many square kilometres, more or less. It was now absolutely certain that, at the close of the present war, there would be a great Bulgaria and a Servia larger than before. In a few years, especially after the death of the Emperor of Austria, the Slav position would be enormously stronger, and the future developments of the present change would not be affected in the least by whether Servia got a little more or a little less at this moment. Count Benckendorff had said that, if there was not a good settlement now, there would be constant fighting and trouble, and war would come a year or two hence. I urged that, if it was to be so, let the war be later rather than sooner. From the Russian point of view it seemed to me that the whole of the time in the next few years was on the side of the Slavs in that part of Europe.

Count Benckendorff did not contest all this, but said that feeling was so strong in Russia that she could not give way about Scutari without complete satisfaction for Servia in the eastern hinterland of Albania.

M. Cambon said that Germany and Italy would have to be used to overcome the difference in Vienna as to the eastern boundary of Servia. Germany and the Emperor, he was sure, were bent upon avoiding war.

I said that no doubt all this must be tried; but even should it all fail, and should there be a complete deadlock between Austria and Russia, could not the matter be referred to some international commission, which would enquire into the ethnographical and geographical conditions on the spot and make a report?

[a] Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 38).

Count Benckendorff did not exclude this possibility.

I also urged upon Count Benckendorff that, if I were a Russian journalist, I should find it much easier, instead of writing articles to show that Russian policy had been defeated, to write articles pointing out how, by Austria's giving up of the sanjak to Servia and Montenegro, and by her allowing them to join hands and cut her off for ever from territorial access to Salonica, the Austrian policy as it was understood in Count Aehrenthal's time, four years ago, had been defeated and humiliated.

Count Benckendorff said rather significantly that there were still ways in which Austria might get territorial access to Salonica. I said I did not see how this could happen unless the Austrian Slavs united with Bulgaria in Servia, in which case it would be as if Austria, or part of it, were annexed by Bulgaria and Servia.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2104] No. 255.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 5. Treaty.)

Sir, *Salonica, January 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, copy of a despatch, with its enclosure, which I have this day addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Belgrade, on the subject of the refusal of the Servian authorities at Ghevgheli to admit into the territory occupied by their troops cigarette paper manufactured by a registered British company in Salonica, on the ground that the article in question is a State monopoly in Servia.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 255.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir R. Paget.

Sir, *Salonica, January 8, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram of this afternoon, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter addressed to me by the Mair de Botton Cigarette Paper Company (Limited) (which is duly registered at this consulate as a British company under the Order in Council of 1910), complaining that the Servian authorities at Ghevgheli have refused admission into the territory occupied by their troops to four cases of cigarette paper, manufactured by them here and forwarded by rail to their branch office at Uskub, on the ground that cigarette paper is a State monopoly in Servia.

It seems to me clear that the Servian Government is not justified in introducing its State monopolies into the occupied territory without due notice and before the incorporation of such territory with the kingdom of Servia has even been proclaimed; but, as there is no Servian authority here with whom I can even lodge a complaint, I am compelled to refer the matter to you for such action as you may consider it desirable to take.

Copy of this despatch and its enclosure has been forwarded direct to the Foreign Office.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 255.

Mair de Botton Cigarette Paper Company to Consul-General Lamb.

M. le Consul, *Salonique, le 8 janvier, 1913.*

NOUS avons l'honneur de vous informer que nous avons expédié, le 6 courant, à destination d'Uscub: Nos. 1043–4 et 1046–7 caisses papier à cigarettes confectionné contenant 176 boîtes Maffra et 176 boîtes Bahia.

Les susdites caisses ont été retenues à Ghevgheli par les autorités serbes, sous

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prétexte que c'est un article monopolisé par la Serbie, et elles ne permettent pas de l'introduire à Useub.

Vous concevez donc, M. le consul, que cette objection de la part des autorités serbes nous cause un préjudice énorme, étant donné qu'une grande partie de notre fabrication est destinée pour notre succursale d'Useub. Cette entrave de la part des autorités serbes nous met dans le plus grand embarras, s'agissant d'un intérêt capital pour nos affaires, qui devront être sensiblement diminuées par ce fait.

Nous vous prions donc, M. le consul, de faire un moment plus tôt les démarches nécessaires et protester auprès de qui de droit, afin qu'autorisation nous soit donnée pour continuer à expédier, comme par le passé, nos marchandises à notre succursale d'Useub.

(Pour The Mair de Botton Cigarette Paper Company (Limited)),
Le Directeur,
MOISE J. ALEVI.

Un Administrateur,
ISAC J. JAHIEL.

[2095] No. 256.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 27.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 11, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica reporting the inauguration of Greek courts of justice in that city.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 256.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 183.)
Sir, *Salonica, December 31, 1912.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Greek courts of law were formally inaugurated in this place yesterday in the presence of the préfet, the Minister of Justice (M. Ractivan), and the Greek Archbishop, who delivered a benediction. They comprise both courts of first instance and a court of appeal. The latter is presided over by M. Pashalingos, who was, I believe, judge of the Greek consular court at Constantinople, the other members, MM. Vlahos, Romanos, and Manuelides, being all of them importations from Greece. The office of procureur is filled by M. Achil Lambros, likewise imported.

In anticipation of this event an endeavour had been made by the Salonica bar to secure the continued application of Ottoman law and procedure and the admission of the Turkish language in the pleadings. It has, however, been decided to maintain only the Ottoman civil and commercial law, applying the Greek Penal Code and also the Greek codes of civil and criminal procedure.

Three criminal cases of trifling importance were heard to-day, and resulted in all three defendants being acquitted, but there seems to be an evident inclination to allow all more important cases to stand over until the general situation becomes less uncertain.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[2201] No. 257.

Prince Lichnowsky to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(Translation.)
Sir, *German Embassy, London, January 14, 1913.*

IN the accompanying letter from the president of the Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane complaint is made that certain sums of money deposited at

the Imperial Ottoman Bank and belonging to the Public Debt have been irregularly distrained by the Greek military authorities.

In view of the circumstances explained in this communication, the German Government have been obliged to instruct their Minister at Athens to point out to the Greek Government that territories occupied by Greece do not yield any surplus revenue which could accrue to the Porte, and to request that the distraint of these goods should be removed.

I therefore have the honour to inform your Excellency of the above, under instructions from my Government, and to express the hope that the British representative at Athens may be furnished with similar instructions.

I have, &c.
LICHNOWSKY.

Enclosure in No. 257.

Letter received from the Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane.

M. le Président, *Constantinople, le 18 (31) décembre, 1912.*

A LA suite de l'occupation de la province de Salonique par l'armée du diadoque Constantin de Grèce, ce dernier avait adressé, à la date du 3 décembre, 1912, à l'agence de la Banque Impériale ottomane à Salonique, une lettre par laquelle il déclarait qu'en vertu des lois de la guerre, qui lui donnent le droit d'administrer les services publics des pays occupées, il avait prescrit aux autorités placées sous ses ordres de percevoir les revenus, taxes et impôts antérieurement perçus par les autorités ottomanes.

Le diadoque ajoutait toutefois que, soucieux de respecter les droits des créanciers étrangers de la Turquie, il était résolu à ne pas toucher, durant la guerre, au fonctionnement des institutions établies pour leur sauvegarde.

En conséquence, l'Administration de la Dette publique, qui a été substituée à l'autorité ottomane pour les revenus concédés à sa gestion, devait continuer à en assurer le recouvrement. Cependant, afin de garantir tous les droits que l'État hellénique tire de l'occupation actuelle et d'empêcher que l'adversaire puisse profiter de l'excédent des revenus affectés au service de la dette, le Prince Constantin décidait que la Banque Impériale ottomane ne pourrait, sans l'autorisation des autorités helléniques compétentes, faire aucun emploi des fonds déposés dans ses caisses par l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane. Au rétablissement de la paix, il serait procédé à un règlement de compte en vue de distinguer de la part de la Dette publique celle qui revient au Gouvernement hellénique à titre de butin de guerre.

Le Conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, saisi de la question dans sa séance du 12 décembre, 1912, a fait remarquer que les autorités helléniques, en prenant de pareilles dispositions, commettaient une erreur. En effet, les sommes déposées par l'agence de l'Administration à la Banque Impériale ottomane représentent simplement des recettes ordinaires et ne sauraient être considérées comme constituant des excédents. D'ailleurs, même dans l'hypothèse contraire, ces excédents n'appartiendraient pas non plus au Gouvernement ottoman, puisqu'ils ont été assignés à divers services (emprunt 4 pour cent 1904 et emprunts du Chemin de Fer de Bagdad); quant aux excédents des dimes, ils sont affectés à un plus grand nombre de services encore intéressant également des tiers.

Revenant sur la même question dans sa séance du 19 décembre dernier, le conseil a pris acte du passage de la lettre du diadoque qui spécifiait que la Dette publique continuerait à assurer son service, et considérant qu'il ne s'agissait en définitive que d'un malentendu, a exprimé l'espoir que l'incident provoqué par la saisie des fonds de la Dette publique à Salonique et dans d'autres localités occupées par l'armée hellénique serait promptement aplani, grâce à l'intervention des Puissances, au mieux des intérêts de l'administration.

Enfin, dans sa dernière séance du 28 décembre courant, le conseil, désireux de voir activer le règlement de cette question, m'a chargé de vous en faire l'exposé, ainsi qu'aux autres syndicats, pour que vous puissiez, si vous le jugez à propos, demander au Gouvernement allemand de vouloir bien intervenir en vue de faire lever le plus tôt possible la saisie-arrêt indûment pratiquée par les autorités helléniques sur les fonds de la Dette publique.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Président du Conseil.

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[2108] No. 258.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, January 14, 1913.*

ISLANDS.

Your telegram No. 13 of 9th January, and my telegram No. 4 of 10th January.

I asked the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon if he had any answer to the points I had submitted, and, as he at once referred to views of Germany and Austria, enquired whether Italy had not individual view and could only adopt attitude prescribed by the Triple Alliance. He replied that it was difficult in the Balkan question to depart from general principle of understanding with [?] Austria, and, in this case, proposal to cede islands to Greece was made by the other three-Power group collectively. Italy could not, so long as she had to retain Sporades as a lever to secure pacification of Cyrenaica, well advocate their cession to Greece, while her allies held that coastal islands and those commanding the Straits must remain under Turkish sovereignty. As there were these two proposals advocated by either group, neither of which was acceptable to the other, he thought that some third proposal might be put forward for consideration as a compromise. I pointed out that if Italy could not discuss the question of the Sporades, and supported the contentions of her allies, there was practically nothing left but Thasos on which to compromise. It is evident that official Italy cannot, or dare not, be detached on any point from the leading strings of the Triple Alliance.

[2207] No. 259.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 15, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 5 of 13th January: Roumania.

In view of Prime Minister having left with King of Bulgaria and Cabinet for Mustapha Pasha, as reported in my telegram No. 11 of 13th January, it will be extremely difficult for me to communicate with him. I would propose, therefore, not endeavouring to carry out your instructions until his return, and then only if necessary. Have I your approval?

Roumanian question will be discussed at Mustapha Pasha.

[2210] No. 260.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 15, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 11 of 13th January.

Departure of the King and all the Ministers for Mustapha Pasha may be considered as a demonstration arranged in the hope that it will exercise some influence both on the Powers and on the Porte.

It is not believed here generally that it will be efficacious.

Ministers will return in about three days, meanwhile work is at a standstill.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[2215] No. 261.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 15, 1913.*

WHEN I saw Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, he told me that Turkish Ambassador had just informed him that Turkey would give a negative reply to note of the Powers. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs had no hope that renewal of hostilities could now be avoided. Most favourable course events might take now seemed to him that neither side should take military action, but should wait patiently for the fall of Adrianople, and then renew pourparlers for peace.

With regard to Roumanian-Bulgarian conflict, Minister for Foreign Affairs said that language used by Bulgarian Government now was less conciliatory than that held by M. Danef to him at Budapest. His Excellency intimated that possible solution might be sudden seizure of Silistria by Roumania, to which Bulgaria might possibly resign herself while protesting. In that case war between the two countries might be avoided.

Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that as regards Salonica he had information tending to show that the Bulgarian military authorities might resign themselves to letting that city go to Greece. In that case Bulgaria would claim Monastir, and Minister for Foreign Affairs observed that in a few years Bulgaria would take Uskub. With regard to Scutari, his Excellency repeated to me that Austria could not allow it to go to Montenegro, as it was the gate to northern Albania. He had just seen Italian Ambassador, and, on my enquiring whether Italy still insisted that Scutari should go to Montenegro, he replied that this question could be satisfactorily settled.

[2211] No. 262.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, January 15, 1913.*

CONSUL, Syra, reports Turkish cruiser attacked Greek auxiliary cruiser "Macedonia" coaling in harbour, set her on fire, and left in direction of Smyrna.

[2207] No. 263.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 15, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 13 of 15th January.

I have informed Ambassadors here of the instructions sent to you. Communication should therefore be made as soon as Prime Minister returns, but in doing so you may point out that it is now out of date if negotiations are progressing favourably.

(Confidential.)

It is impossible to discover the truth here at this moment, the statements of Dr. Danef and of Roumanians respectively are so contradictory, but former has sometimes been cool almost to point of discourtesy.

[1507] No. 264.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 15, 1913.*

SIR R. PAGET'S telegram No. 9 of 10th January and my telegram No. 15 to Sir R. Paget of 15th January: Action of Servian authorities at Uskub.

You should inform Government to which you are accredited, with a view to identic action.

(Repeated to Belgrade, No. 16.)

[1507] No. 265.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 15, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 9 of 10th January: Action of Servian authorities at Uskub.

You should reserve in the fullest manner the rights of any British subjects who

* Also to Sir G. Lowther (No. 34), Sir F. Bertie (No. 18), Sir R. Rodd (No. 16), Sir G. Buchanan (No. 35), and Sir F. Cartwright (No. 21).

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many be adversely affected either in person or property by the application of this Servian municipal law in a place which is not Servian territory.

No Servian annexation of territory has yet been recognised by the Powers. Consequently nationals of Powers continue for the present to benefit by capitulatory régime. No actual protest can be made till a particular case occurs of violation of these rights, and consequent detriment to British interests.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 34; Berlin, No. 17; Paris, No. 17; Rome, No. 17; Constantinople, No. 33; and Vienna, No. 20.)

[1899] No. 266.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 15, 1913.

SIR R. PAGET'S telegram No. 11 of 13th January.

By agreement under the Capitulations the maximum duty payable by foreign imports into the territory now in military occupation is fixed at 11 per cent. *ad valorem*. It therefore appears to His Majesty's Government indefensible that imports should be subjected to any duties above that maximum.

Please inform Government to which you are accredited and enquire if they would be prepared to join in a communication to this effect to the allies.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 36; Athens, No. 4; Belgrade, No. 17; Sophia, No. 8; Cettinjé, No. 3; Salonica, and Uskub.)

[1617] No. 267.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January* 15, 1913.

SIR E. GOSCHEN'S telegram No. 6 of 11th January: Collective step at Constantinople.

Representatives of the Powers here accepted modifications in question.

[2521] No. 268.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.†

(No. 13. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 15, 1913.

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day, different Ambassadors gave accounts of what had passed between them and various Balkan delegates who had come to see them separately.

It appeared that yesterday morning the four first delegates of the Balkan States had, at the instigation of Dr. Danef, come to a decision to declare that the Peace Conference had failed. They had sworn themselves to secrecy, and immediately after their meeting the decision had been communicated to the press. The actual terms were to be drawn up at their meeting yesterday afternoon.

The French Ambassador stated that he had subsequently expressed very strongly to Dr. Danef, and, I think, others, the opinion that it was a very unwise step to come to such a decision. There seemed to be opposition to the decision on the part of the non-Bulgarian delegates, and the decision had been suspended.

There appeared to be a direct conflict of statement between what Dr. Danef had said to one Ambassador and what M. Take Jonesco had said to another as to whether Dr. Danef had, or had not, made proposals for a settlement to M. Take Jonesco.

The amount of intrigue and confusion amongst the delegates seemed to me to be such that I suggested that the meeting of Ambassadors could not do anything except to let the collective *démarche* proceed.

* Also to Sir E. Goschen (No. 20), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 23), Sir R. Rodd (No. 20), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 27).

† Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 41), Sir E. Goschen (No. 20), Sir R. Rodd (No. 21), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 25).

The Russian Ambassador then made the following statement about Mount Athos:—

"Le mont Athos: Autonomie indépendante, neutre, sous la protection et la garantie de toutes les Puissances orthodoxes.

"Le mont Athos conservera son régime autonome. Un conseil supérieur composé de représentants de vingt couvents, propriétaires des terres du mont Athos, sera chargé de l'administration et réglera toutes les questions litigieuses entre les moines et les établissements religieux. Ce conseil disposera d'une force de police pour le maintien de l'ordre et de la sécurité publique. Un règlement à cet effet sera élaboré par les Puissances orthodoxes protectrices. Le Patriarche de Constantinople restera comme par le passé chef spirituel et canonique du mont Athos et décidera en dernière instance de toutes les questions religieuses et ecclésiastiques, qui devront lui être soumises par le Conseil supérieur de la montagne.

"Le mont Athos est habité par 8,000 moins à peu prêt, dont 5,000 de nationalité russe, 2,100 Grècs, 300 Bulgaro-Macédoniens, 150 Serbo- et Monténégrino-Macédoniens et 150 Moldavo-Roumains.

"Ces moines sont répartis dans 20 couvents (1 russe, 1 bulgare, 1 serbe, 17 grecs) et plus de 120 autres établissements religieux orthodoxes (dits scythes, cellules, &c.). Un scythe appartient aux Moldavo-Roumains."

The Russian Ambassador also read the following explanatory statement:—

"Le mont Athos est le plus oriental des trois promontoires de la presqu'île Chalcidique.

"Dès le quatrième siècle de notre ère des hermites chrétiens s'y sont établis et y ont fondé des couvents orthodoxes sous la haute protection des Empereurs de Byzance. Ceux-ci les ont dotés de nombreux et spécieux privilèges et les ont défrayés au moyen d'offrandes constantes. C'est à cette époque que remonte l'organisation quasi-autonome des couvents du mont Athos.

"La conquête turque n'apporta aucun changement à la situation du mont Athos, le lien entre la sainte montagne et l'Empire ottoman n'étant établi que par le payement d'un tribut annuel peu élevé et par la présence de quelques fonctionnaires turcs y jouant un rôle effacé.

"Actuellement toutes les terres du mont Athos sont partagées entre 20 couvents orthodoxes, dont 17 sont grecs, 1 russe, 1 bulgare, 1 serbe. Le mont Athos est gouverné par un conseil (protate), composé de 20 moines, représentant chacun des couvents précités. Ces couvents sont autonomes et possèdent des terres en toute propriété. Le conseil (protate) règle les affaires religieuses et ecclésiastiques et tous litiges surgissant entre les moines; mais sur son propre territoire chaque couvent est absolument autonome et s'administre par un supérieur (hégoumène) élu à vie par les moines du couvent. Il y a pourtant quelques couvents dont l'administration est aux mains, non du supérieur, mais des Conseils des Anciens.

"L'autorité turque est représentée par un employé civil assisté de fonctionnaires de la douane et quelques gendarmes, tous résidant dans un village (Karelos) au centre de la montagne. Les fonctionnaires de droit ne s'immiscent pas dans les affaires du couvent, sauf au cas de crimes de droit commun. Le Gouvernement turc reconnaît aux couvents la franchise de droit pour les vivres et les ustensiles de ménage.

"Les couvents du mont Athos se trouvent officiellement sous la haute juridiction spirituelle (canonique) du Patriarche de Constantinople, mais *de facto* sont tout à fait indépendants de lui.

"Le nombre des moines du mont Athos se monte actuellement à environ 8,000, dont 5,000 environ sont de nationalité russe. Près de 2,000 d'entre eux habitent le couvent autonome russe, et les autres sont établis en qualité de colons sur des terres appartenant aux couvents grecs et affermées contre une rente annuelle, moyennant des contrats spéciaux conclus à vie avec droit de substitution. Ces moines russes fermiers ont fondé plus de 150 établissements (cellules, scythes), lesquels quoique organisés en couvents, n'ont pas de représentants au conseil (protate) du mont Athos, et sous beaucoup de rapports dépendent du couvent sur la terre duquel ils se sont établis. Ce système donne parfois lieu à des différends entre les couvents et leur dépendances.

"Quelques modifications qu'auront à subir les Balkans par suite de la guerre, l'organisation autonome séculaire du mont Athos devrait être respectée.

"Tous les couvents précités garderaient, selon l'usage séculaire, leur autonomie ecclésiastique, ayant à leur tête le conseil (protate), sous l'autorité canonique

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supérieure du Patriarche de Constantinople. La protection de la sainte montagne échoirait aux Puissances orthodoxes en qualité de Puissances protectrices, qui garantiront sa neutralité."

The French Ambassador read to us article 62 of the Treaty of Berlin affecting Mount Athos.

The Austrian Ambassador "demande:

"1. Qu'il soit entendu que les communautés religieuses orthodoxes de l'Autriche-Hongrie auront le droit de s'établir dans la presqu'île et d'affermer des terres pour leurs établissements religieux."

On this, "l'Ambassadeur de la Russie fait observer que ces communautés devront se pourvoir de l'assentiment préalable du Patriarche œcuménique.

"2. Que l'Etat autonome et neutre ne pourra entretenir des bâtiments de guerre, et qu'il sera interdit à ceux des autres Puissances de stationner dans les eaux de la presqu'île."

On this, the French Ambassador suggested that after the word "stationner" should be added "d'une façon permanente," because a ship of war might possibly have to take refuge in these waters from a storm, or might have to go there for supplies.

I observed that we could not postpone much longer the discussion of the Albanian question. It was clear that we should make no progress till we had begun the discussion, and if we did not begin to discuss the question people would be inclined to fear that we had found agreement on it impossible.

The Russian Ambassador said that he expected to receive at the end of this week the full information and instructions which would enable him to discuss the question.

The Austrian Ambassador was ready at any time.

As the French and Russian Ambassadors were to go to Windsor on Monday the 20th instant, it was suggested that we should undertake the discussion of Albania on Wednesday next, the 22nd.

As to the Ægean islands, I suggested that we had, in effect, advised Turkey to cede Adrianople and to refer the question of the islands to the Powers. If Turkey accepted our advice, we must enter upon a discussion of the islands; but it was hardly worth while to begin a discussion until we knew whether Turkey would accept our advice.

In the meantime, we agreed to meet again on Friday the 17th, in case that further developments of the negotiations between Turkey and the allies required discussion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2522] No. 269.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 21.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 15, 1913.

THE German Ambassador asked to see me to-day before the meeting of Ambassadors, and read to me the following:—

"The Imperial Government, holding it to be incompatible with its position as a neutral Power, and, for military reasons, impracticable to take part in a naval demonstration against Turkey, would equally decline to participate in a pressure on the Porte exceeding the arrangement of a simultaneous step.

"It cannot be the duty of the Powers to substitute themselves for the Balkan States in their dispute with Turkey.

"Should, therefore, the proposed common step in Constantinople, and similar steps to be possibly taken in Sophia—which would seem advisable in themselves—be unsuccessful, the Imperial Government is of opinion that it should for the present be left again to the States immediately concerned to settle their divergencies between themselves, whether peacefully or by force of arms.

"The desire of all the Great Powers to preserve peace guarantees, that Europe, even in the case of renewal of hostilities between the Balkan Powers, will not be implicated into a war."

I said that, as he knew, I had been the first, or one of the first, to point out the practical difficulties in the way of a naval demonstration against Turkey at Constantinople. My own view was the same as that contained in the statement which he had just made to me, to the effect that it should for the present be left again to the States immediately concerned to settle their divergencies amongst themselves, whether peacefully or by force of arms, if our collective *démarche* had no effect, and that the desire of all the Great Powers to preserve peace should guarantee that Europe, even if hostilities were renewed between the Balkan Powers, should not be implicated in the war. If Bulgaria and Turkey resumed hostilities, they must do so at their own risk, and each must be responsible for the consequences which might happen to it.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1867] No. 270.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.**

(No. 14.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 15, 1913.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith a memorandum respecting the reports which have reached His Majesty's Government of outrages perpetrated on the Moslem inhabitants of territory in Bulgarian occupation. You should hand a copy of this memorandum unofficially to the Bulgarian Minister for Foreign Affairs. An identical memorandum has also been sent to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade with similar instructions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 270.

Memorandum communicated to Bulgarian and Servian Ministers for Foreign Affairs.

REPORTS have reached His Majesty's Government through the British consular representatives in various parts of the Balkan Peninsula of serious and most regrettable outrages perpetrated upon the Moslem inhabitants of territory in Bulgarian [Servian] occupation. Into the details of these reports His Majesty's Government do not propose to enter in this memorandum; suffice it to say that they include incidents which can only be described as deplorable. While making all due deduction for the possibility of exaggeration, His Majesty's Government cannot but consider that these reports are not without foundation.

His Majesty's Government are fully aware that the exigencies of war necessarily entail degrees of rigour and suffering of which the war itself is the explanation. They are also aware that some of the excesses now brought to their notice are stated to be the work of irregular bands over whom the regular authorities have failed to exercise control, or of those who might seek to justify these doings on the plea of reprisals.

While making full allowance for the above-mentioned considerations, His Majesty's Government feel impelled to point out to the Bulgarian [Servian] Government, in a friendly and unofficial manner, how detrimental to the best interests of Bulgaria [Servia] the currency of such reports must be. The Bulgarian [Servian] Government will have observed that the reports in question have already begun to attract attention in various quarters. The suspicion, to say nothing of the confirmation of their accuracy, cannot fail to alienate sympathy from all those who might be held morally responsible for such occurrences. His Majesty's Government therefore hope that the Bulgarian [Servian] Government will interpret this communication in the spirit which has prompted it.

E. G.

Foreign Office, January 13, 1913.

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* Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 9), *mutatis mutandis*.

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[2255] No. 271.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Athens, January 10, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 212 of the 18th December, I have the honour to report that some uneasiness is being manifested here lest the position with regard to the Ægean Islands should be misunderstood in Europe, and lest compensation for the cession of Adrianople should be sought by the Powers in the return of some of the islands to Turkey.

The Government no less than the public are undoubtedly determined to abate nothing of their demand for the cession of the whole of the islands, though they are ready to give any undertaking that may be required not to fortify those in the immediate neighbourhood of the Dardanelles. The possibility of a continuation of the war by Greece alone for the possession of the islands, after her allies have been satisfied and have concluded peace, must not be left out of account. The inconvenience of it would fall chiefly upon the neutral trade of the Black Sea.

I understand that Germany is pressing for the retention of Lemnos, Imbros, Tenedos, and Samothrace by Turkey, and Italy for the establishment of an autonomous régime, under the suzerainty of Turkey, for Rhodes and Kos. Anything short of the absolute cession of all the islands, except perhaps Tenedos and Castellorizo, would, in my opinion, be certain to lead to trouble in the future.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[2256] No. 272.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Athens, January 10, 1913.*

I ASKED M. Coromilas yesterday what were the difficulties which were said to have arisen with regard to Mount Athos. He said that until recent times the monastic community of the holy mountain had governed itself, in virtue of immemorial privileges, under the supervision of the Patriarch of Constantinople, but that some years ago the Turks had established a kaimakam and gendarmerie in the peninsula. These having been swept away, it became necessary to set up something in their place, and it had been proposed that the civilian administrative officials should be appointed by agreement among the Orthodox Powers. Difficulties had, however, arisen, on the one hand, because a voice in the matter had been claimed by Austria, in virtue of her possession of the Patriarchate of Carlowitz, and on the other hand because the Œcumenical Patriarch, although precluded by the canon law from taking an actual part in civil administration, nevertheless thought that he had a right to be consulted, and even to enact regulations for the government of the community.

I gathered that M. Coromilas thought that the Austrian claim could be set aside, and that the question could be settled between the Orthodox States. My Russian colleague is in frequent consultation with him about it.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[2258] No. 273.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 3. Treaty. Confidential.)

Sir, *Athens, January 10, 1913.*

IT appears that telegraphic communication between Valona and Italy has been interrupted, whether from an accident to the cable or from the Greeks having succeed in cutting it is not known. The Italian consul represented to his Government that he was thus deprived of communication with the outer world, and suggested that a ship should be sent to set up a wireless station. The Italian Minister was instructed to ask if this could be done, and M. Coromilas said he regretted it could not be allowed: the restoration of telegraphic communication had been refused to the

English in the case of Tenedos and could not be granted to the Italians in the case of Valona.

My Italian colleague came to me yesterday to enquire about the Tenedos precedent. After looking up my despatches of this series, No. 23 of the 31st October and No. 29 of the 4th November, I showed him that it was not strictly analogous, inasmuch as His Majesty's Government had not intervened in the matter at all, but had tacitly acquiesced in the right of the Greeks to cut cables or to prevent them from being repaired. The Marquis Carlotti said that in his personal opinion the right was incontestable, and the interruption of communication with Valona was of importance to the Greeks because, since it was reported that the land line had been cut between Janina and Argyrocastro, the Turks had no means of telegraphic communication with Janina.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[2340] No. 274.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Berlin, January 10, 1913.*

DURING a recent conversation with Herr Zimmermann I asked him whether the Imperial Government had any special views with regard to the effect which the transformation of Salonica into a free port would have upon international trade or respecting the limitations of the tariffs in the conquered territories, and I informed him at the same time that you were anxious that the barriers to trade which might be raised by the transfer of territory from low tariff Turkey to potentially high tariff States should be as far as possible minimised.

Herr Zimmermann replied that the question was one of considerable importance, but that as far as he knew, it had not yet been considered by the Imperial Government.

I have now received, and transmit herewith in translation, a memorandum from Herr Zimmermann, giving the views of the Imperial Government upon this question.

As you will perceive they entirely share your desire that in the territorial changes about to take place in the Balkans, the customs arrangements should be settled in such a manner as to throw as few burdens as possible on international trade. Their opinion seems to be that a watchful eye must be kept on this question, but that nothing much can be done until a definite decision has been come to with regard to the constitutional future of Salonica.

In the same conversation I mentioned your views with regard to the scope of the Ambassadors' meetings, and the suggestion of Russia that the choice of the Albanian port and the *tracé* of the international railway leading thereto should be left to Servia.

The views of the Imperial Government on these questions, which are in complete accordance with those entertained by you, are also recorded in Herr Zimmermann's memorandum.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 274.

Memorandum communicated to Sir E. Goschen.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Government entirely share the desire of the British Government that in the territorial changes in the Balkans, the customs arrangements should be settled in such a manner as to be as little burdensome as possible to international commerce. They are especially anxious that the requirements of commerce should receive all possible consideration in the decisions taken in regard to the fate of Salonica. Whether this object can best be attained by the creation of a free port or free port zone, can, in the opinion of the Imperial Government, only be accurately determined after the Balkan States have agreed as to the constitutional future of the city.

The Imperial Government share the view of the British Government as to the utility of the Ambassadors' conversations in London, and concur in the desire expressed by Sir E. Grey that these conversations may be continued in the informal manner hitherto adopted. They also are of opinion that the Ambassadors' *réunion*

ought not to be entrusted with the preparation of a new instrument (*statut*) to replace the Treaty of Berlin. For such a formal act will possibly prove quite unnecessary when once the results of the peace negotiations have been recognised by the Powers, and the supplementary decisions of the Great Powers have been accepted by the Balkan States. On the other hand the Imperial Government consider it urgently desirable that the question of the Ottoman Public Debt should be settled at least in principle by the Ambassadors' meeting, and that this solution should be announced to the peace delegates as the will of the Powers, whilst the details could be settled later, perhaps in Paris, in consultation with financiers and technical experts.

As regards the suggestion of Russia that the choice of the Albanian port accorded to Servia and the *tracé* of the international railway connection to the Adriatic should be left to the Servian Government, the Imperial Government entertain the hope, in concurrence with Sir E. Grey, that an agreement on this detail of comparatively minor importance will be easy of attainment when once the status, organisation, and territorial extent of Albania under the guarantee of the Powers have been settled.

Berlin, January 9, 1913.

[2251] No. 275.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 9.)

Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January* 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that the changed attitude of the Russian press of all shades of political opinion towards Roumania, as the result of that country's claims against Bulgaria, is daily becoming more marked. Much irritation is shown that the Roumanians should fail to see that they are being made the tool of Austria, who is held to be solely responsible for the friction between Bulgaria and Roumania.

The "Novoe Vremya" in discussing the present attitude of the Roumanian Government observes that it is due to a consciousness of the fact that a voluntary agreement respecting Roumanian claims from Bulgaria will never be reached. It was quite clear who was inspiring Roumania in the attitude which she was now adopting, and which was likely to prove so regrettable in its results for her hopes. The world had just seen what great results could be achieved by a nationally directed national spirit. European Turkey had fallen before its onslaught, and a similar fate lay in store for Austria-Hungary. It was therefore not surprising that she should endeavour by all possible means to put off that evil day. The "Novoe Vremya," in conclusion, calls on the Roumanian Government and people to reflect well before pursuing their present course too far.

The Liberal "Bourse Gazette" remarks that the Roumanian claims constitute a menace to the peace of Europe if the Great Powers do not act with firmness. If they do not so act it will once more be shown that the European "concert" is a myth, and that the Triple *Entente* is incapable, even in this scandalous instance of injustice, of insisting on the most elementary equity.

The "Sviet" (Moderate Right) considers that the haste with which Roumania wishes to deal with Bulgaria in the matter of her claims is due to a recognition by the former of the injustice of those claims and a desire to take advantage of the difficult position in which Bulgaria stands at present. Should Bulgaria conclude peace the situation would at once be materially changed to the disadvantage of Roumania.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[2392] No. 276.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 15.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, January* 16, 1913.

MY telegram No. 11 of 13th January.

The King and the Ministers have now returned here. It is evident that their visit to Mustapha Pasha was merely of a demonstrative nature.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[2417] No. 277.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 23. Confidential.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 16, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 31 of 15th January.

German modifications and consequent delay in presenting the collective note have produced a distinctly uncertain situation here. Committee and anti-peace factions, who seem to indentify themselves with the Triple Alliance, have accentuated their no-surrender attitude, favour rejection of the note of the Powers, summoning of a grand assembly in which they reckon they would have a majority, and demand the resumption of hostilities rather than the cession of Adrianople and the islands.

I learn, confidentially, that the Grand Vizier and the majority of his colleagues are secretly inclined not to reject the note, and to make peace without consulting a grand council, on the plea that, like Italian treaty, a treaty with the Balkan States will be submitted to Parliament when it meets. This course is not devoid of danger, and the risks of a *coup d'Etat* by the military extremists, or even the assassination of the Grand Vizier and some of his colleagues. Anonymous threatening letters have been received at the palace and the Porte, and a bomb has been reported to have been found at the latter place. The Grand Vizier is reserving his final decision until he receives the collective note.

As soon as the note is presented, I am inclined with my Triple *Entente* colleagues, in view of the importance of the issues, to strongly support the Grand Vizier and the moderates, even at the risk of a struggle between the two native parties taking colouring of apparently sharp division between the two groupings of Powers.

Much will depend on the real state of things in Adrianople, where the vali reported two days ago to the Minister of the Interior that the last limit would be reached about 21st January. The Minister of War has appealed to the military commandant there to make a desperate effort to prolong resistance, and I hope to learn result to-day.

A stiff attitude on the part of the Balkan allies may help towards a definite solution here.

(Repeated to Sophia, Athens, Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, and Vienna.)

[2421] No. 278.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 16, 1913.

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

Austrian Ambassador, who is doyen, informs me that German Ambassador has not yet received authority to sign collective note, and is at a loss to explain reason for the delay.

Grand Vizier, being anxious to come to a decision, has been asking privately what is cause of non-presentation of note.

(Sent to Berlin.)

[2426] No. 279.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 1.)

(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, January* 16, 1913.

THE Roumanian Government are buying horses in South Russia suitable for military purposes. They do so every year, but not at this time, and also numbers are said to be large.

But Odessa is a bad place for getting details.

(Repeated to Constantinople and St. Petersburgh.)

[2419] No. 280.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 16.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 16, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 15 of 15th January.
Following sent to consul at Uskub to-day:—

"Your telegram No. 5.

"Under instructions from the Foreign Office, I have reserved all rights of any British subjects who may be adversely affected in property or in person by the application of this Servian municipal law in a place which is not yet recognised as Servian territory.

"Servian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to whom I made representations, told me that these irregularities often occurred through ignorance of Servian authorities concerning rights of foreign subjects under the Capitulations.

"It would therefore seem advisable that when any breach of our rights is threatened you should, in the first instance, in an unofficial friendly manner, present our point of view to the Servian authorities, so that they may not subsequently plead ignorance.

"Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs tells me that he will instruct M. Voutchkovitch to call upon you and to discuss these questions with you unofficially."

[2409] No. 281.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 37.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 16, 1913.*

WHAT is reason of delay in presentation of a collective note to the Porte? Changes suggested by Germany were accepted by all of us on Monday, and Austrian Ambassador here stated yesterday that Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople had expected to present the note as doyen on Tuesday last.

[2545] No. 282.

Sir H. Babington Smith to Mr. Parker.—(Received January 17.)

My dear Alwyn, 50, *Cornhill, London, January 13, 1913.*

I ENCLOSE a copy of the German Banks' memorandum which I mentioned to you. It was sent to me confidentially—so please treat it as confidential.

Yours, &c.
H. BABINGTON SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 282.

Memorandum by German Banks.

(Translation.)

WE are in agreement with the French commission on the generally recognised principle of present day international law that, in the event of the total or partial dismemberment of a State, financial charges attaching to territory which changes sovereignty, and in particular a share of the public debt of the dismembered State, must be borne by the State which annexes such territory.

2. On the other hand, we are unable to accept as it stands, the view of the French commission in regard to the manner in which, in the particular case under consideration, the charges arising out of the Turkish public debt should be distributed among the Turkish territories to be ceded to the Balkan States under the impending treaty of peace.

The French commission declare that it is neither opportune nor practical to base such distribution on the revenues pledged as special security for the various elements of the Turkish public debt; the commission propose that the Balkan States should in future each assume a share of the total Turkish public debt—such share to be in the same ratio to the whole as the revenues accruing to the State from the annexed territories are to the total revenues of the Turkish State.

In our view it is desirable, having regard to the great importance of special securities for the whole system of the Turkish public debt, to supplement this principle at least by the proviso that the payments to be made by the Balkan States towards the service of the Turkish debt must not be smaller than the yield of the revenues (of the ceded territories) which have been pledged as special security for different parts of the Turkish public debt.

It appears to us that only by means of such a supplementary proviso is it possible to prevent the reduction in the amount of special securities resulting from the modification of the territorial *status quo* proving to be greater than the proportions of the charges of the Turkish debt to be assumed, in accordance with the principle laid down by the French commission, by the Balkan States.

This addition is likewise in accordance with the principle (which it is essential to preserve intact) that the holders of Turkish public debt, whose interests are secured through the pledging of certain State revenues have, apart from any general claim on the State, a special right to the pledged revenues—a right independent of any change in the territorial *status quo*. The French proposal takes account of this point in No. 3, paragraphs 2 and 3, but we think in a not entirely adequate manner.

3. The question of the manner in which the total amount of the contributions to be paid by the Balkan States towards the service of the Turkish public debt is to be secured also requires further consideration. It is commonly known that the tribute, which the Treaty of Berlin laid down in principle, should be paid by Servia, Bulgaria, and Greece, has in actual fact never been forthcoming. The question of whether and, if so, in what manner, a working guarantee can be evolved which would adequately secure for the future the payment of the proposed contributions of the Balkan States, is one which must also be examined. The only reference to this point in the conclusions of the French commission is that contained in No. 3, paragraph 4, which suggests that the securities to be assigned in place of the special securities which will lapse should be sought in the intervention of the controlling bodies already in existence. Such bodies are in existence in Greece (the Greek administration of the public debt) and in Servia (the monopoly administration), but not in Bulgaria and Montenegro.

4. There is yet another question of very special importance, namely, the proportion in which the total contribution of the Balkan States to the Turkish public debt is to be assigned to each of the various special loans. The latter will be affected in a varying degree by the transfer of the European vilayets of Turkey to the Balkan States, thus, for instance, if the vilayet of Constantinople remains Turkish, the customs loan floated in Germany in 1911, for which the customs receipts of the vilayet of Constantinople were assigned as security, would not be in any way affected. On the other hand, various loans floated in France, which are secured partly on the customs receipts of Adrianople and Salonica, will require an additional security from the contributions of the Balkan States. It appears to us necessary that some understanding should now be arrived at in regard to the principle on which the contributions of the Balkan States are to be divided among the various special loans.

5. We have no objection to make to the principle that the annual payments to be made by the Balkan States to the service of the Turkish debt should be capitalised according to the precedent contained in article 10 of the Turco-Italian Treaty of Peace of the 11th October, 1912. Nevertheless it seems desirable to decide in advance, in the present, as in the preceding case, the proportion in which the capitalised sum is to be affected to the different categories of Turkish loans.

6. The principle that, in the event of the Balkan States demanding an indemnity from Turkey, no relation ("kompensation") can be allowed to exist between such indemnity and the amounts to be paid for the service of the Turkish public debt has our full concurrence.

7. It would be exceedingly satisfactory if, in connection with the impending treaty of peace, an undertaking could be obtained from the Balkan States to carry out the obligations which they assumed under the Treaty of Berlin of 1878 in regard to the annual payments to be made to the administration of the Dette publique.

8. We have no objection to the proposal that the Balkan States should participate in the extinction of the floating debt of the Turkish Empire constituted before the outbreak of hostilities.

9. The proposal is made that the Balkan States should be required to recognise the concessions granted by the Turkish Government and the contracts concluded by them, but not yet executed, in so far as these refer to the ceded territories, and that the Balkan States should thus be subrogated to the rights and obligations of the Turkish State arising out of these concessions and contracts; although such a proposal

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is not directly connected with the questions relating to the Turkish public debt, yet it requires, as urgently as do those questions, to be settled by the impending treaties of peace. In particular the railway concessions mentioned in No. 10 of the conclusions of the French commission are, of course, included among such concessions.

10. We entirely agree with the principle of the compensation of the Régie coïntéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman in the event of this institution not being maintained up to the expiration of its concession in the territories to be ceded to the Balkan States. This principle is not only important in the interests of the European capital invested in the Turkish tobacco monopoly, but also in the interests of the creditors of the Turkish State, seeing that the administration of the Turkish public debt are in receipt of a considerable portion of the yield of the tobacco monopoly.

11. We agree with the views of the French commission (No. 12) that in all circumstances the Turkish State must remain, first and foremost, responsible for the Turkish State loans, and that Turkey is not freed from this obligation by the payments which it is proposed should be made by the Balkan States.

Berlin, November 28, 1912.

[2433] No. 283.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 17.)

Sir, *Paris, January* 15, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my despatch No. 8 of the 8th instant, copy of a memorandum from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, enclosing the following documents in regard to the distribution among the Balkan States of the charges with which the territories which may be ceded to them on the conclusion of peace are burdened for the benefit of foreign creditors:—

1. Conclusions of the commission appointed to study the position of the foreign bondholders.

(Identical, except for a slight variation in No. 11, with the conclusions transmitted to you by M. Cambon in his note of the 21st November.)

2. A commentary on the conclusions of the commission.

3. A draft of articles which it is proposed to insert in the general treaty of peace.

M. Poincaré expresses the hope that His Majesty's Government, after taking note of these documents, may instruct their representatives in the belligerent States in the sense proposed at the end of the memorandum of the 10th January (Enclosure 3).

I have, &c.

FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 283.

M. Poincaré to Sir F. Bertie.

LE Président du Conseil, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, a l'honneur de faire parvenir à son Excellence M. l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique à Paris, la note et les propositions ci-jointes, au sujet de la répartition entre les États balkaniques des charges grevant au profit des créanciers étrangers de l'Empire ottoman les territoires qui pourront leur être cédés à la conclusion de la paix.

M. Poincaré serait heureux d'apprendre, qu'après avoir pris connaissance des documents ci-joints le Gouvernement Royal a bien voulu donner à ses représentants auprès des Puissances belligérantes des instructions conformes aux suggestions proposées à la fin de la note du 10 janvier, 1913, ci-jointe.

Paris, le 14 *janvier*, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 283.

Conclusions of Commission.

LA commission, estimant que la discussion a dégagé les principes qui pourraient être invoqués pour la sauvegarde des intérêts des créanciers de l'Empire ottoman, a arrêté les conclusions suivantes:—

1. La commission partant du principe de droit public aujourd'hui généralement reconnu, qu'en cas de démembrement d'un État, l'État annexant ne saurait prendre possession du territoire annexé qu'avec les charges qui le grèvent, et qu'il doit équitablement supporter une part de la dette publique contractée par l'État démembré, envisageant, d'autre part, le mode suivant lequel ces charges doivent être réparties, estime, dans le cas particulier de l'Empire ottoman, qu'il n'est ni opportun ni pratique de baser cette répartition sur la spécialisation des gages affectés aux divers éléments de la dette publique ottomane.

2. En conséquence, les États alliés devront supporter une part de la dette publique ottomane proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés conformément au principe déjà inscrit, pour les cessions territoriales antérieures dont ils ont bénéficié dans le Traité de Berlin de 1878, et dans la convention signée à Constantinople, le 24 mai, 1881.

3. La participation des territoires cédés au service de l'ensemble de la dette extérieure de l'Empire ottoman sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire ottoman, calculé d'après la moyenne des trois dernières années, suivant le système déjà proposé à la Sublime Porte par une note de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre en date du 6 novembre, 1883.

Cette méthode de calcul de la participation des États alliés à l'ensemble de la dette publique ottomane ne saurait annuler, au détriment des porteurs étrangers, le principe même de la garantie spéciale affectée aux différents emprunts.

Il appartiendrait, au contraire, aux États alliés de fournir pour la quote-part laissée à la charge des provinces cédées des sûretés équivalentes à celles dont le maintien serait reconnu impossible ou impraticable.

Ces sûretés pourraient être recherchées dans l'intervention des organismes de contrôle déjà existants.

4. L'annuité des États alliés sera versée, pour le compte du Gouvernement ottoman, à l'Administration de la Dette publique, qui sera chargée d'en faire la répartition entre les différents emprunts qu'ils soient gérés ou non par cette administration.

5. L'annuité de territoires cédés, destinée au service des emprunts ottomans, pourra faire l'objet d'une conversion en capital suivant le précédent inscrit à l'article 10 du traité de paix italo-turc du 18 octobre, 1912.

Dans ce cas les sommes ainsi capitalisées seront versées, pour le compte du Gouvernement ottoman, à l'Administration de la Dette publique, chargée d'assurer la destination qui leur revient.

6. Aucune compensation ne pourra être admise en cas de stipulation par les alliés d'une indemnité de guerre, entre cette indemnité et la part de la dette ottomane qui demeure à la charge des territoires cédés.

Cette compensation ne saurait davantage s'établir entre les arrérages respectifs de l'une et de l'autre au détriment des porteurs étrangers de fonds ottomans.

7. Au cas où une indemnité de guerre serait exigée de l'Empire ottoman, les Puissances se réservent de faire un rappel de la part contributive non encore liquidée des États alliés à la dette ottomane existant en 1878 pour les territoires cédés en vertu du Traité de Berlin.

8. Il y aura lieu de demander aux États alliés de participer à l'extinction de la dette flottante ottomane constituée avant la date de l'ouverture des hostilités.

La contribution des États alliés serait calculée en capital d'après la proportion existant entre le revenu global de l'Empire ottoman et les revenus des territoires cédés.

Les versements à intervenir seraient faits par les alliés pour le compte du Gouvernement Impérial dans un établissement préalablement désigné à cet effet et chargé de s'assurer de l'exact emploi de ces sommes.

9. Les Gouvernements alliés devront reconnaître et confirmer les concessions quelles qu'elles soient accordées par le Gouvernement ottoman ou par les différentes autorités administratives sur les territoires cédés.

Il en sera de même des contrats en cours d'exécution conclus par l'État, les villes ou autorités ottomanes.

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Les Gouvernements alliés demeureront subrogés à tous les droits et à toutes les charges qui résultaient de ces concessions et de ces contrats par le Gouvernement ottoman.

10. Les Gouvernements alliés demeureront subrogés en tout aux droits et obligations du Gouvernement ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions de chemins de fer.

Les provinces cédées conserveront notamment à leur charge les garanties kilométriques afférentes aux lignes existant sur leur territoire.

11. Dans le cas où le monopole de la Régie cointéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman ne serait pas maintenu jusqu'au terme normal de son contrat (qui arrive d'ailleurs prochainement à expiration) il y aurait lieu à indemnité envers cette société de la part des États alliés.

12. Les mesures envisagées pour la protection des porteurs vis-à-vis des États alliés n'excluent pas la nécessité, pour le Gouvernement ottoman, en sa qualité de principal débiteur, de fournir de son côté des garanties additionnelles aux porteurs étrangers.

Paris, le 17 novembre, 1912.

Enclosure 3 in No. 283.

Commentary on Conclusions of Commission.

LES conclusions auxquelles a abouti la commission française en ce qui concerne la répartition éventuelle de la dette publique ottomane et les garanties qu'il convient de stipuler pour la protection des intérêts étrangers constitués sur les territoires cédés, appellent quelques commentaires :—

Articles 1er, 2 *et* 3.—Le principe même de la participation des États alliés à la dette extérieure ottomane, inscrit à l'article 1er, est conforme à de nombreux précédents et ne paraît devoir soulever aucune difficulté. Au contraire, on pouvait hésiter sur le mode à adopter en vue de déterminer d'une façon précise le montant de la participation de chaque État.

Suivant le précédent italo-turc, le dernier en date, la participation des territoires cédés pouvait être fixée, comme pour la Tripolitaine, à une somme représentant la contribution moyenne de ces provinces au service de la dette ottomane. Le conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane recevrait, d'après ce système, l'équivalent de ce qu'il percevait autrefois dans les territoires cédés sur les revenus donnés en gage aux porteurs étrangers.

D'après un second système, voisin de celui-ci, les territoires cédés auraient conservé la charge de tous les emprunts gagés spécialement sur les revenus particuliers de ces territoires, à l'exclusion complète des emprunts garantis sur des ressources étrangères à ces territoires, ainsi qu'à l'exclusion des emprunts jouissant simplement de la garantie générale de l'Etat ottoman.

La participation des États alliés aurait encore pu être calculée d'après la proportion existant entre les dépenses des territoires cédés et l'ensemble des dépenses budgétaires de l'Empire ottoman, chaque province devant normalement participer dans la mesure de ses ressources, et pour sa part virile aux dépenses générales de l'Empire, et, en particulier, au service de la dette.

Enfin, cette participation pouvait être calculée d'après le rapport existant entre les recettes générales de l'Empire et les recettes effectuées dans les territoires cédés.

C'est ce dernier système qui, après mûr examen, a retenu l'attention de la commission comme le plus conforme à l'intérêt général des porteurs de fonds ottomans, et, en même temps, comme le plus équitable vis-à-vis des alliés. C'est le mode de calcul déjà fixé par l'article 10 de la convention du 24 mai, 1881, relatif à la participation de la Grèce à la dette publique ottomane, à la suite des avantages territoriaux recueillis par elle au Congrès de Berlin. C'est également sur cette base que les Puissances ont poursuivi à Constantinople, depuis 1883, le règlement des parts contributives de la dette ottomane déjà mises, par le Traité de Berlin, à la charge des États ou principautés balkaniques. (Voir la note de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre à la Sublime Porte du 6 novembre, 1883.)

En dehors de l'autorité qui s'attache à ces précédents, la commission a été guidée par les raisons suivantes : la répartition de la dette basée sur la spécialisation des gages

aurait eu le grave inconvénient de nécessiter une ventilation difficile des divers éléments de la dette publique ottomane, certains emprunts étant gagés partiellement seulement sur les revenus des territoires cédés, d'autres ayant pour gage des excédents de revenus calculés sur l'ensemble des perceptions opérées par la dette publique sur tous les territoires et non point sur un territoire déterminé. Certains gages sont administrés entièrement par le conseil d'Administration de la Dette publique, et offrent aux porteurs une garantie complète, tandis que d'autres sources de revenus quoique données en gage, sont restées sous le contrôle immédiat du Trésor ottoman, et on pourrait faire valoir, en ce qui concerne des derniers, qu'une telle sûreté n'est pas opposable aux tiers, aucun dessaisissement effectif n'étant intervenu au bénéfice d'une administration autonome.

D'autre part, la productivité de certains gages, tels les revenus des douanes de Constantinople, pourrait se trouver diminuée d'une façon considérable comme conséquence des cessions territoriales envisagées et des détournements de trafic qui en résulteront au préjudice de cette ville, sans que les alliés soient à aucun degré tenus à compensation dans ce système vis-à-vis des porteurs d'un emprunt gagé nominément sur les douanes de Constantinople.

Invoquer le précédent italo-turc, serait, d'autre part, inviter les États alliés à opérer une stricte révision qui les amènerait à ne tenir compte, dans la détermination de leur part, que du montant des recettes réellement affectées au service des arrérages des emprunts, c'est-à-dire déduction faite des excédents que donnent annuellement les revenus gagés et qui sont en partie reversés au Trésor.

C'est pour éviter de telles incertitudes que la commission française a préféré adopter un mode de calcul plus large qui tient compte de l'ensemble de la dette extérieure ottomane, et détermine, en toute équité, la participation des territoires cédés en raison de leur capacité financière manifestée par leur contribution effective au budget général.

Articles 3, 4 *et* 5.—Ces articles organisent un ensemble de garanties destinées à assurer l'exécution fidèle des obligations mises à la charge des États alliés. Il paraît d'autant plus légitime de stipuler de telles garanties que, d'une part, à l'exception de la Bulgarie, les États balkaniques ne se sont pas encore libérés des obligations financières analogues mises à leur charge par le Traité de Berlin, et que, d'autre part, la situation financière de la plupart des États alliés les a déjà placés, vis-à-vis des porteurs de leurs fonds d'État, dans l'obligation de fournir des sûretés spéciales.

Il n'y a aucune contradiction à demander à ce que la part des États alliés soit déterminée sur l'ensemble de la dette ottomane, abstraction faite de la spécialisation des gages et à stipuler ensuite, comme le fait la commission à l'article 3, qu'une garantie particulière doit être affectée à la sûreté de cette part. La garantie générale des États balkaniques saurait d'autant moins suffire à la sûreté d'obligations actuellement gagées sur des revenus spéciaux que la Grèce, la Serbie, la Bulgarie elle-même ont été amenées à donner des garanties spéciales aux porteurs de fonds grecs, serbes et bulgares. Il est donc normal que les mêmes organismes de contrôle international qui existent déjà dans ces pays, succèdent en quelque sorte à l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane et prennent en main la défense des intérêts des porteurs étrangers.

Une autre garantie résulte de la désignation faite aux articles 4 et 5 de l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane pour recevoir et répartir la contribution des États alliés au service de la dette ottomane. Ce n'est pas dans les caisses du Trésor ottoman que ces versements seront opérés, mais dans celles d'une administration autonome qui en assurera l'exact emploi. La créance ainsi liquidée ne l'est pas au bénéfice de l'Empire ottoman, mais au seul bénéfice des porteurs étrangers, et c'est pourquoi, conformément à l'article 6, aucune compensation ne saurait s'établir entre les arrérages de cette dette et ceux d'une indemnité de guerre si elle est stipulée.

Mais la commission française estime que la garantie essentielle résiderait dans la conversion en capital de l'annuité mise à la charge des États alliés, et c'est pourquoi, conformément au précédent italo-turc, elle l'a prévue à l'article 5. La liquidation des obligations des alliés par l'émission d'un emprunt spécial opérerait novation et ce serait aux nouveaux prêteurs d'exiger les sûretés nécessaires en harmonie avec le nouvel état de choses. Les alliés verront d'ailleurs dans une telle combinaison l'avantage de réduire le montant de l'annuité nécessaire au service de leur part, grâce à une réduction sensible du taux d'amortissement qui est très largement calculé dans le cas des emprunts ottomans.

Articles 6 *et* 7.—Le maintien intégral des sûretés générales dont jouissent actuellement les créanciers de l'Empire ottoman devrait faire écarter l'idée d'une indemnité de guerre. Si toutefois une stipulation de ce genre intervenait dans le traité, il importe que cette créance des États balkaniques n'affecte à aucun degré, par voie de compen-

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sation par exemple, l'obligation qui, résulte pour eux de la participation à la dette extérieure ottomane. Il est à peine besoin de signaler que la nouvelle dette de la Turquie au titre de l'indemnité de guerre devrait prendre rang à la suite de la dette extérieure et non pas concurremment avec elle.

La réserve inscrite à l'article 7, qui prévoit le rappel de la part contributive des États alliés à la dette ottomane mise à leur charge par le Traité de Berlin et non encore liquidée n'envisage que la possibilité de faire entrer en ligne cet élément d'appréciation au cas où les exigences des alliés paraîtraient excessives aux Puissances.

Il y a lieu d'ailleurs de noter que ce rappel ne saurait être fait qu'à l'encontre de la Grèce, de la Serbie et du Monténégro, un règlement étant intervenu en 1909 en ce qui concerne la Bulgarie.

Article 8.—La dette flottante constitue une part trop importante de l'ensemble de la dette publique ottomane pour qu'il soit possible de l'écarter, *à priori*, du règlement à intervenir; de là, les dispositions de l'article 8.

Articles 9, 10 *et* 11.—Ces articles sont conformes à la pratique constante en matière de cessions de territoires; les droits acquis doivent être respectés. En ce qui concerne le respect des concessions du chemin de fer, il y aura lieu de stipuler expressément que les compagnies intéressées seront remises en possession immédiate des lignes dont l'exploitation leur a été concédée, nonobstant tout règlement qui pourrait être envisagé pour l'avenir d'accord entre les intéressés.

La dépossession d'un privilège conféré en vertu d'un contrat régulier crée un droit à indemnité, et c'est ainsi qu'au cas où les États alliés décideraient de mettre fin au monopole de la Régie contéressée des Tabacs, sans attendre l'expiration, d'ailleurs prochaine (en 1914), de son contrat, celle-ci devrait être indemnisée du préjudice ainsi causé aux actionnaires de cette société.

Article 12. Il est inutile d'insister sur les considérations inscrites dans cet article. Dans la mesure où les États alliés ne substituent pas leur responsabilité à celle de l'Empire ottoman, celui-ci reste entièrement tenu vis-à-vis des créanciers étrangers.

Ce n'est pas dans un esprit de défiance vis-à-vis des États alliés ou pour leur faire payer le fruit de leur victoire que la commission française a élaboré les règles qui précèdent. C'est dans un esprit d'équité et en application du principe général qu'un État annexant ne saurait légitimement prendre possession du territoire annexé qu'avec les charges qui le grèvent et en respectant tous les droits constitués au bénéfice des tiers sur ces territoires.

Le Gouvernement de la république espère qu'après avoir pris connaissance des motifs qui l'ont amené à proposer à l'attention des Cabinets des Hautes Puissances les conclusions ci-jointes, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique voudra bien les recommander d'une façon toute spéciale aux Gouvernements des États belligérants, afin que ceux-ci s'inspirent des principes qui y sont posés dans la rédaction du traité de paix et des protocoles qui y seront annexés.

En vue de la réduction, peut-être prochaine, du traité de paix générale, il y aurait sans doute avantage à proposer aux États belligérants d'insérer, dans cet Acte international, les principes généraux résumés dans le projet d'articles également ci-joint et de les convier, pour la réduction des protocoles, destinés à donner une forme pratique à ces dispositions, à la confier à une commission internationale dans laquelle figureraient, outre des plénipotentiaires spéciaux des États belligérants, des représentants des Grandes Puissances.

Paris, le 10 *janvier*, 1913.

Enclosure 4 in No. 283.

Draft of Articles.

CHACUN des États signataires du présent traité, qui reçoit cession d'une portion des territoires ayant appartenu jusqu'à présent à l'Empire ottoman, supportera une part de l'ensemble de la dette l'Empire ottoman proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés. Cette participation sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existent entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire, calculés d'après la moyenne des trois derniers exercices financiers.

La quote-part incombant aux États cessionnaires dans les engagements de l'Empire ottoman sera incessible, insaisissable et ne pourra faire l'objet de compensation; des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés actuelles dont le maintien sera reconnu impraticable, seront données par les États cessionnaires pour la garantie des créanciers.

La contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires ci-dessus déterminée sera convertibles en capital sur le pied de 4 pour cent.

2. Les États cessionnaires sont subrogés dans tous les droits et charges du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions ayant leur exploitation sur les territoires cédés par le présent traité; ils s'engagent également dans ces territoires à respecter et à exécuter les contrats valablement consentis par le Gouvernement Impérial ou les autorités compétentes.

3. Les détails d'application et d'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus seront consignés dans des protocoles, annexés au présent traité et élaborés par une commission internationale, où seront représentées les six Grandes Puissances, et qui se réunira à , le .

Le 10 *janvier*, 1913.

[2549] No. 284.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 24 A.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 17, 1913.

I LEARN confidentially from a reliable source that the Cabinet has recently discussed and rejected an offer made by Jewish financiers in America through the Turkish Ambassador at Washington to make Turkey a loan of 100,000,000 dollars at nominal rates, and to be raised in London on condition that she would allow unrestricted immigration of foreign Jews into Palestine. This would appear to be connected with Zionist projects as set forth by Max Nordau in the "Times" of 30th December last.

[2550] No. 285.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 17, 1913.

MY telegram No. 7 of 6th January.

I am informed that Porte has made a few days ago a conditional contract for purchase of two Dreadnoughts said to be building in England for Brazil.

[2570] No. 286.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 17, 1913.

TELEGRAPH agencies here report from Bucharest and London that the acute stage in the relations between Bulgaria and Roumania has passed, and that an agreement in principle as to compensation has been reached. I should be glad of information on the matter as reports of "imminent" conflict between the two Powers is being exploited here by committee and warlike circles against the Cabinet and moderates on the theory that a diversion of the kind would be the moment for Turkey to resume hostilities. A recent statement of my German colleague, made openly at an embassy here to the effect that Roumania was on point of attacking Bulgaria, was made much capital out of by the local war party as showing that Austria and Germany would back Roumania in such action.

With reference to my telegram No. 23 of 16th January, reliable information on the point would be of great assistance in deciding how far we can go in actively and positively supporting the moderates.

I learn confidentially that Commandant of Adrianople has informed Minister of War that by making a supreme effort the fortress may hold out till about 5th February.

(Sent to Sophia, Bucharest, and Berlin.)

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[2573] No. 287.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 17, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 23 of 16th January.

Collective *démarche* was made to-day, note being presented to the Minister for Foreign Affairs by the Austrian Ambassador in the presence of the other Ambassadors.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs did not read it, but said that it would have immediate attention, and reply would be sent as soon as possible.

[2579] No. 288.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 17, 1913.*

FOLLOWING from consular officer at Uskub dated to-day, No. 8.:—

"I hear that Servian authorities have forbidden public ceremonies of the Bulgarian church here on Epiphany. Feeling between the two churches is very bitter largely owing to Servian Chauvinism, and it is said that there will be serious disorders on 19th January."

[2580] No. 289.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 16. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 17, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 12 of 13th January: Roumania.

I have carried out instructions conveyed in your telegram No. 5 of 13th January.

The Prime Minister states that Roumanian demands were thoroughly discussed at Mustapha Pasha by the Cabinet and leading generals at council held by the King of the Bulgarians.

The Bulgarian Government has decided to cede a strip of territory to Roumania on the Black Sea littoral between the frontier and Kavarna, but not to include that town. This strip may extend to 5 or 6 kilom., but not more, and it will include the hinterland.

They will also agree to slight rectification of the frontier to the east of the town of Silistria, in order to round it off; to raze fortress, but not to cede the town; to meet Roumanian view respecting Koutzo-Vlachs; and to grant a few other minor concessions.

Instructions have been sent to M. Danef to negotiate in this sense with M. Misu in London. The Prime Minister tells me that this is the extreme limit of Bulgarian concessions. He added that M. Take Jonesco was due in Bucharest on Sunday, and that until he arrives there, he scarcely expected that much progress would be made with the negotiations.

The Prime Minister is of opinion that MM. Danef and Misu are more likely to be able to come to an agreement in the absence of M. Take Jonesco. I hear from another but sure source that the two Governments have agreed to accept Russian offer of arbitration to settle their difficulties if necessary.

(Sent to Bucharest.)

[2581] No. 290.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 17. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 17, 1913.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 23 of 16th January, last paragraph.

At council just held at Mustapha Pasha decision was arrived at to continue war if the Ottoman Government refuse to agree to conditions to be presented in the collective note.

It appears to me that the attitude of the allies could scarcely be stiffer than hitherto.

Allies have decided not to recall their delegates in London out of respect to you as honorary president of peace conference.

Prime Minister tells me that the tone of the troops is excellent, and that they are quite willing to resume hostilities at any moment.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[2554] No. 291.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 15th January: Customs duties in occupied territory.

Acting Secretary of State says that Imperial Government has already made a communication to the allies in sense of your suggestion.

[2558] No. 292.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 17, 1913.*

SERVIAN Municipal Law in occupied territory.

Acting Secretary of State says that as they have no consul at Uskub they have heard nothing of this matter, but in general interests will send instructions to Belgrade similar to yours.

[2574] No. 293.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 17, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 12 of 8th January.

Acting Secretary of State said that the view of the Imperial Government, which had been communicated to German bankers, was that there was no objection to loans to Turkey as long as proceeds were devoted to administration and not to military purposes. He now understood that the National Bank was rather reluctant to join a loan. He thought this a pity as small loans for administrative purposes were much required in view of the fact that the day before yesterday the Ottoman Government for the first time had not been able to pay civil and military officials. This was rather a dangerous symptom. Representatives of the banks on the spot could easily control the expenditure, and see that funds were only devoted to running administration.

[2570] No. 294.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 26 of 17th January.

Discussions between Bulgaria and Roumania are, I understand, continuing, and I have no information as to an imminent conflict between the two Powers. I believe M. Take Jonesco has left for Bucharest with certain proposals made by Dr. Danef, which are considered very meagre, but this does not point to an imminent rupture.

[3639] No. 295.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 17, 1913.*

MEETING of Ambassadors here will begin discussion of Scutari and Albanian frontier on Wednesday. I shall endeavour to arrange that statement of divergency of views is made on each side in such a way that it does not appear to be irreconcilable, and to prevent any risk of a deadlock at the outset. But Russian and Austrian views are both so stiff that it will be a most difficult and anxious task to secure a compromise. I hope German Chancellor is aware how serious the difficulty is, and that he will use all his influence at Vienna to promote a settlement. I fear Austria thinks that concession of Prisrend and Ipek will settle the matter. I am sure this will not be nearly sufficient if Austria gets her way about Scutari. On other hand, if Scutari is given to Montenegro, settlement should be easy, but this is the point of supreme difficulty with Austria.

You should speak to German Chancellor as soon as you can get a convenient opportunity before Wednesday.

[2735] No. 296.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 17, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador communicated to me yesterday a suggestion from Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to the effect that Russia, France, and this country should mark their solidarity by taking combined action at Constantinople with a view of exercising further pressure on the Porte. I replied that I doubted whether pressure by one group of Powers might not do more to encourage than to discourage Turkey by affording to her evidence of division amongst the Powers. In reply to Sir G. Lowther's telegram No. 23 of 16th January, repeated to you, I have told him that in speaking to the Grand Vizier or to Minister for Foreign Affairs he can use the same argument as I have employed here, viz., that none of the Powers will intervene to save Adrianople; that the Turks cannot save it by continuing the war and may lose other things that are not lost already.

[2417] No. 297.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 17, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 23 of 16th January: Balkans.

I certainly wish to encourage Porte to make peace, but it is very undesirable to take action that would give the impression at Constantinople that there is division between the Powers. You can however use in speaking to Grand Vizier or Minister for Foreign Affairs the same argument as I have used here that none of the Powers will intervene to save Adrianople, that Turks cannot save it by continuing the war, and may lose other things that are not lost already.

[3037] No. 298.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 17, 1913.*

THE German Ambassador read to me to-day the following communication:—

The Imperial Government welcomes with satisfaction the abandonment of the idea of a naval demonstration. Germany would have had to abstain from such a measure if it were only for the reason that her participation would have been considered by the public opinion as a flagrant breach of neutrality, and would certainly not have been understood.

As regards the proposed concentration of men-of-war in Besika Bay, the German war-ships now before Constantinople would be the only ones which for Germany come into question. These, however, cannot be removed, as the German interests there more urgently require protection than anywhere else. Therefore German ships will not be dispatched to Besika Bay.

The Imperial Government recommends that the *démarche* in Constantinople be made now without further delay, and the answer of the Porte be thereupon awaited. This applies also to the Balkan States.

Should the answer of the Porte, contrary to expectation, be in the negative, and should the Balkan Federation decline to alter its stand-point, the Powers could for the moment leave the belligerents to themselves and return to the strictest neutrality.

Moreover, by the fall of Adrianople, the surrender of which could doubtless be expected soon in consequence of the renewal of hostilities, the main obstacle for Turkey to yield would be removed. The war would, therefore, probably be of short continuance. To observe the strictest neutrality would be the surest way of preventing not only a European conflict, but also the spreading over to Asia of the warlike complications.

The Imperial Government is convinced that a strict neutrality of *all* the Powers concerned would also particularly preclude any danger of unrest in Armenia. Owing to the extensive German interests in Asia Minor, it is of the highest importance to Germany that the unrolling of the Asiatic question should be prevented. The Imperial Government also believes to be one not only with England, but also with all the Powers, in the desire that the Turkish Empire in Asia should be kept intact. The principal necessity still remains that the Powers continue to work in harmony and abandon every separate action in the interest of the peace of Europe.

I said that I would make the sending of war-ships to Besika Bay depend upon whether Sir Gerard Lowther thought that they should be within reach in case of emergencies in Constantinople. This was putting the matter on the same footing as before. I thought that we must remain neutral if the war was resumed, and my hope was that, were it resumed, Adrianople would fall; even the military party in Turkey would then see that it could not be recaptured, and the Bulgarians would say that they had all they required, and that it was for Turkey either to attack them in their strong lines or to make peace. In this case, I hoped that the Turkish Government would make peace before the war had continued very long. We did not desire that the Asiatic question should be opened.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3038] No. 299.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 17, 1913.*

I ASKED the German Ambassador to-day whether he had had any conversation with Count Benckendorff about the Albanian question.

He told me that he had had some conversation, and had found him very firm about Scutari. But, on the other hand, Austria was prepared to fight rather than let Scutari go to Montenegro. Prince Lichnowsky's impression was that the question might be settled by concessions on the eastern frontier of Albania. He thought that this could be arranged. Austria was prepared to give up Ipek and Prirend.

I said that no doubt the eastern frontier of Albania could be settled easily if Scutari went to Montenegro. But if Scutari was retained by Albania, I feared that the settlement of the eastern frontier of Albania would be very difficult. The concession of Ipek and Prisrend to Servia would not be enough. I feared that we had a very difficult task ahead of us, that would require very hard work on our part.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3039] No. 300.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1913.

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day I stated that the note from the Six Powers had not yet been presented in Constantinople, and that I heard that this was because the German Ambassador had not received instructions.

The German Ambassador stated that the German Ambassador in Constantinople had now received instructions to join his colleagues in presenting the note, and that the German Government desired it to be presented without delay.

The French Ambassador stated that he had heard that the Turkish Government might send a conditional reply to the note, asking for promises from the Powers about the increase of customs duties and internal taxation on foreigners, a guarantee that there should be no war indemnity, and other matters.

I said that I did not see how Turkey could pay both in territory and in money. She was called upon to sacrifice practically the whole of her territory that had been occupied by the allies during the war, and to have to pay an indemnity as well would be very hard. I supposed that, in the interests of our commerce and of political quiet, we all wished to see Turkey recover as soon as possible after the war, and an indemnity would delay this; but, so far as I was aware, the allies had not yet asked for an indemnity at the peace discussions. I could not, without consulting my colleagues in the Cabinet, promise definite commercial concessions on the Turkish tariff, or express more than a general desire to facilitate the recovery of Turkey. I thought that these points might wait till we had the Turkish reply. The delay in presenting the note was very inopportune and regrettable, and I hoped that it was now over.

Respecting the reply to the Servian communication about the withdrawal of troops from the Adriatic, the Russian Ambassador was now authorised to agree to its being communicated to the Servian chargé d'affaires in London.

The Italian Ambassador said that his Government approved of it.

The Austrian Ambassador asked me to wait till he was quite certain that his Government, who had approved of it, also agreed to its being communicated to the chargé d'affaires.

I therefore said that I would wait, and communicate it when I heard that the Austrian Government agreed.

It was settled that we should meet again on Wednesday next, the 22nd, for certain, to begin to discuss the question of Albania, and that, if the Turkish reply was received before Monday, I should summon a meeting at 3 o'clock that afternoon.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[2344] No. 301.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 17, 1913.

M. SKOULOUDIS, the second Greek delegate, called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 14th January to say that at 10 A.M. that day MM. Venizelos, Danef, Novakovitch, and Miouchekovitch, respectively the first delegates of Greece, Bulgaria, Servia, and Montenegro, met together and decided to inform the Ottoman delegates that as the Turkish Government apparently did not realise the results of the war, and as eight days had elapsed since the last meeting of the conference without fresh proposal from the Porte, the allies considered that the conference had failed ("la conférence avait échoué"). Sir A. Nicolson asked if this note carried with it the denunciation of the armistice. M. Skouloudis observed that Greece had never subscribed to the armistice, but he could tell him that the Governments of the other three allies would telegraph to the respective military commandants to denounce the armistice. The four principal delegates of the allies were meeting again at 4 P.M. that afternoon to draw up the

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 42), Sir E. Goschen (No. 24), Sir R. Rodd (No. 22), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 28).

terms of the note, which would give a summary of what had passed during the conference in London.

M. Skouloudis had been much surprised at being informed at 11·30 A.M. by Reuter's correspondent of all the details of what had passed at that morning's meeting, at which only the four principal delegates had been present. Reuter's agent had told him that he had derived his information from two sources, so apparently two of the delegates had been a little indiscreet.

I am, &c.

E. GREY.

[2637] No. 302.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 20.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 13, 1913.

RUMOURS have during the last few days been rife here regarding strained relations between Roumania and Bulgaria, and it has been reported, apparently with some authority, that the former was about to present an ultimatum demanding the surrender of Silistria and certain other districts.

Public opinion here at first appeared to view this condition of affairs with some pleasure, and built hopes on the possibility of seeing a portion of the Bulgarian forces engaged with those of Roumania.

This view, however, rapidly gave way to a wiser appreciation of the reality, and a conviction now exists that if Bulgaria has to make more sacrifices than those for which she is prepared, it will probably be at the expense of Turkey.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs stated to me on the 11th instant that he was convinced that the question which had arisen between Roumania and Bulgaria would be peacefully settled. In any case, Turkey placed no hope on Roumanian assistance.

I have sent a copy of this despatch to Bucharest.

I have, &c.

GERARD LOWTHER.

[2716] No. 303.

Sir R. Crawford to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(Confidential.) *51, Holland Park Avenue, London, January* 13, 1913.

Dear Sir Edward Grey,

IN view of the continued uncertainty as to "peace," my projected detailed memorandum on the finances of Turkey must be deferred; but in the meantime you may like to have some indication as to the existing state of affairs.

As a result of the wars with Italy and the Balkan States the current liabilities of the Turkish Government in respect of (1) diverted revenues and deferred payments on account of supplementary war credits; (2) outstanding advances on short term Treasury bills; and (3) the ordinary deficit on the budget amount approximately to £ T. 24,000,000.

The financial situation is not immediately so serious as it appears at first sight, because in the case of some of the advances on short-term bills arrangements already exist for their conversion into "long-term" loans after the war, and similar operations are contemplated for the remainder of the outstanding advances. In this way the annual charge on the Treasury would be reduced while the funded debt would be correspondingly increased.

The actual position, however, is that in the event of peace being concluded now, arrangements will have to be made by funding operations and otherwise to meet outstanding liabilities, incurred during the wars, and budget deficits, amounting in all to about £ T. 24,000,000.

Should the uncertainty as to peace continue the financial difficulty will, of course, be aggravated, and in the event of a renewal of hostilities a financial and commercial crisis can hardly be avoided. The falling-off in revenues has already reached a stage which has made it impossible for the Government to meet the current requirements of the administrations (irrespective of extraordinary war expenditure) without borrowing, and had not arrangements been made, with the assent of the Foreign Office, for a short

advance to "carry over" the present month, it is probable that steps would have been taken for the appropriation of revenues assigned to the Ottoman public debt.

In this connection I may say that throughout the war period I have constantly advised the Ministry of Finance to refrain from taking any steps which might diminish Turkish credit. Persistent demands for the declaration of an official moratorium have been successfully resisted with the co-operation of the principal banks, and in meeting engagements care has been taken to avoid any action of default which could be publicly interpreted as a suspension of payment on the part of the State.

This precarious state of things cannot be indefinitely maintained. It is now practically a condition of postponed suspension of payment which by a renewal of hostilities, or by the entire withdrawal of financial support from the Turkish Government, would be quickly converted into a financial and commercial crash.

In these circumstances financial and commercial circles have naturally pressed, and are pressing, the Ottoman Government to offer reasonable terms of peace, and it was an intelligent appreciation of this position and its contingencies which induced the Minister of Finance to take steps which were instrumental in bringing about the "armistice." (It is commonly known that he and the Grand Vizier are strongly opposed to a renewal of hostilities.)

Whatever may be the outcome of the present situation there seems to be a consensus of opinion in financial quarters that the finances of Turkey should be subjected to some form of international control. This view is defended on the ground that the amount of foreign capital invested in the fixed and floating debt, and in public and industrial enterprises, is so large that the financial readjustments after the war should include measures to restrict military expenditure, and to insure that the revenues available be devoted more liberally to internal development and to extinction of debt.

No suggestions have been formulated as to the manner in which this control could be effectively exercised, and the question does not yet seem to have reached the stage of joint consultation though it has been mentioned to me by the official representatives of French and German interests.

If joint financial control, either direct or indirect, is seriously contemplated it ought to be a primary condition that it should be exercised by an independent authority with no patronage and composed of delegates who are not personally interested in any of the institutions or enterprises having financial relations with the Ottoman Government.

If this principle is accepted, the Council of the Ottoman Debt would hardly be a suitable body to charge with the general control of the finances of the country, because the debt is itself one of the administrations to be controlled, the council has much patronage, and the members of the council, or most of them, are more or less interested personally in other institutions and enterprises having financial relations with the Government.

Direct control might be exercised by a board of special delegates nominated by the Powers interested; but the objection to this plan is that the important functions exercised by these delegates would eventually invest them with distinction and attributions which might diminish the prestige of the diplomatic representatives of the Governments represented on the board of control.

Is it desirable, however, that financial control should be in the form of supervision and intervention imposed directly on the Ottoman Government by the Powers concerned? Would not the supervising authority in this case be forced to incur responsibilities involving active interference in internal executive administration and entailing expressed or implied guarantees for the maintenance of the integrity of the Turkish Empire?

As an alternative to direct control, sufficiently satisfactory results could be obtained I think, by the indirect influence which might be exercised by the existing "Conseil des Réforms financières" attached to the Ministry of Finance. This council has six regular members including an English, a French, and an Italian official with three Turkish colleagues, and the French Inspector of Finance and the English Financial Adviser are members "*ex officio*." Hitherto the work of this body has been confined to the drafting of laws and regulations; but I have recently succeeded in enlarging its functions in more practical directions, and by a further slight reorganisation the council could be so constituted as to act as an advisory committee, on questions of revenue and expenditure, to the Minister of Finance.

There would, I think, be no serious difficulty in obtaining the consent of the Ottoman Government to a reorganisation of the council on these lines; but it would be desirable that a clear understanding should be arrived at as to the future financial policy, and that this understanding should guide the council in its advisory functions. (As an example of what I mean by this understanding I may mention that the Minister of

Finance assured me on my leaving for England that in framing future budgets he was prepared to insist on a reduction of the army to 100,000 men.)

I will not enter here into any details as to the manner in which the foreign members of the council could fulfil these suggested advisory duties, but with the continuance of the same spirit of loyal co-operation which has characterised their work in other directions, I feel convinced that they would succeed indirectly in exercising sufficient controlling influence over financial policy to render unnecessary more direct supervision and intervention. It would be desirable, however, that their functions in this respect should be strictly confined to joint advice on the allocation of revenues and expenditure in the annual budgets—they should take no part in negotiations for loans, advances, or concessions—and that, in case of need, they should receive proper support from their respective Governments in pressing modifications of financial policy.

Indirect control exercised through this body would not involve the Powers concerned in wider responsibilities than they might care publicly to assume, and would not be so likely to injure the *amour-propre* of the Ottoman Government.

In conclusion I may add that the financial reorganisation after the war ought to be accompanied by an increase of the customs duties and by the application of the "temettu" tax to foreigners in order to obtain an equilibrium of revenues and expenditure. Under existing conditions the annual payments on account of loans leaves insufficient revenue to meet the current demands of administration, and whatever economies may be effected hereafter these will not be sufficient materially to reduce the deficit on the annual budget if a moderate policy of internal development is to be encouraged.

Yours faithfully,
RICHARD F. CRAWFORD.

[2638] No. 304.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 14, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1072 of the 15th ultimo, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Beirout, reporting on the subsidence of the Anglo-Egyptian agitation in Syria.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 304.

Consul-General Cumberbatch to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 87.)
Sir, *Beirout, December* 31, 1912.

WITH reference to my despatches No. 75 of the 14th November, and No. 79 of the 4th December, I have the honour to report that the agitation in favour of an Anglo-Egyptian occupation of this district is subsiding so far as Beirout is concerned, mainly owing to the little encouragement received from this consulate-general.

Steps are now being taken by leading men of the various communities, including the Moslems, to formulate demands to be presented to the Porte for the introduction of a more decentralising form of local government.

I have, &c.
H. A. CUMBERBATCH.

[2653] No. 305.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 18.)

(No. 28. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January* 17, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 39 of 17th January.

Since the repulse of the Bulgarians at Chatalja in November the line of cleavage in local politics here between the Triple Alliance, Roumania, and the committee on the one hand and the Triple *Entente* on the other hand has been very distinct and marked,

the former being positive and in favour of resistance, whilst the Triple *Entente* has been negative and counselled moderation. In the Cabinet, Minister for Foreign Affairs has hitherto been credited with being on the side of the committee and the Triple Alliance, while Grand Vizier is supposed to be in favour of the policy of the Triple *Entente*.

Question now is should the Triple *Entente* become positive and overtly counsel acceptance of advice of six Powers in the matter of surrender of Adrianople and the islands? If they remain passive, the chances would be in favour of further resistance, and, perhaps, a resumption of hostilities.

Placards have been to-day posted up in the mosques couched in most violent language, and threatening an outbreak and death, &c., against the "Cabinet of traitors" if they surrender Adrianople, &c.

I learnt privately from the Grand Vizier that his Highness intends, before answering the collective note, having a telegram sent to Turkish Ambassador in London instructing him to set forth to you the difficulties of the Cabinet and the danger that its surrender of Adrianople may lead to civil war and worse calamities than the present, and to beg you to endeavour to induce the Balkan States to agree to town of Adrianople and its environs being neutralised and placed under a Moslem governor of any nationality chosen by the Powers.

When told that this would probably be unacceptable, but that to meet Turkish national prejudice against actual capitulation to the Bulgarians it might be perhaps arranged that town should be like islands so to speak surrendered to the Powers, and that garrison should be allowed to march back with honours of war to Ottoman territory, his Highness replied that, if his first solution, based on neutralisation idea referred to in my telegram No. 10, proved impracticable, the second suggestion might be considered.

The army does not seem to be really under the control of the Minister of War, and it is doubtful whether the Cabinet reposes on any real authority or whether it can assert itself against the committee forces should they come out into the open and become active on Carbonari lines.

I hear that orders have been given to the fleet to go out and try definite conclusions with Greeks.

(Sent to Athens and Sophia.)

[2793] No. 306.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 18, 1913.*

SOPHIA telegrams Nos. 12 of 13th January and 16 of 17th January.

(Confidential.)

During past few days indications of a *détente* have been perceptible here. I have heard nothing here to [?] signify that Roumania has given way about Silistria, but French Minister informs me that the last time he saw the Minister for Foreign Affairs his Excellency spoke of arbitration as a possible solution, should present negotiations fail. Minister for Foreign Affairs mentioned Italy as possible arbitrator.

(Sent to Sophia and Constantinople.)

[2794] No. 307.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 18, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 13 of to-day.

Russian Minister, who saw Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, found him hopeful as to prospect of agreement with Bulgaria. His Excellency no longer spoke of the cession of Silistria as a *sine quâ non*, but said that last Bulgarian proposals formed

a basis for negotiation. His Excellency again mentioned arbitration as a solution if negotiations should fail.

(Confidential.)

I hear also that the King expressed himself at a recent audience as personally satisfied with the Bulgarian proposals.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[2721] No. 308.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, January 18, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 120 of 23rd December.

Austrian flag has now been saluted at Prisrend and Mitrovitza, as arranged.

[2796] No. 309.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, January 18, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 11 of 13th January.

I should be glad to know whether you consider that, in the case of goods imported into Servian territory from Salonica and which have already paid duty at Salonica, it is incumbent on the Servian Government or on importer to claim a refund from Greeks.

Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs maintains that it is importer's business to claim refund. I contend that Servian Government should claim it, as under the Turkish régime after the goods had passed Salonica they would have been free. His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica has telegraphed to me with reference to my telegram above mentioned merely that, in his opinion, "proposal 2 would be impracticable and 3 futile." These criticisms would be of greater value to me if accompanied by some explanation and suggestions for improved methods of dealing with matter, and I have telegraphed to him to this effect.

[2795] No. 310.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 18. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 18, 1913.*

I HEAR that secret negotiations have been proceeding at St. Petersburgh between Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs and Italian chargé d'affaires respecting northern and southern frontiers of Albania and Montenegro respectively.

Two Governments have agreed that Elbassan shall, if possible, be chosen as capital of Albania. This is directly opposed to wishes of Austria, who appears to be willing to make Scutari capital, and who is now creating difficulties regarding its cession to Montenegro, first, because it has always been centre of Austrian propaganda in Albania; secondly, because she hopes, by supporting its inclusion in Albania, to be able eventually to give it to Montenegro in exchange for Lovtchen, which is of the highest strategical importance, as it dominates both Cattaro and Cettinjé (see my despatch No. 6 due on the 21st January).

Austria will, I believe, be prepared to allow Montenegro to have Scutari, San Giovanni di Medua, and Alessio in return for Cattaro heights. She will in all probability for the same reason make difficulties as to Montenegro acquiring Ipek.

Russia has categorically informed the King of Montenegro that she will never permit this place to be ceded to Austria.

I gather that the Italian Government fully realise that the cession of Lovtchen to Austria would be extremely detrimental to their interests in the Adriatic.

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[2799] No. 311.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, January 18, 1913.*

I HAVE been confidentially informed that Khedive, having been requested by Sultan to assist in raising money for Turkey, has sent his advocate, De Martino [group undecypherable] to Rome to sound Italian Government as to prospects of loan or advance. Italian Government refused to entertain question.

(Sent to Cairo.)

[2802] No. 312.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 18, 1913.*

ALBANIAN frontier.

Your telegram No. 22 of 17th January acted on.

Chancellor promised to consider matter and to let me know as soon as possible what he can do to meet your views.

[2799] No. 313.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Athens, January 18, 1913.*

GOVERNOR of Tenedos reports that four large Turkish ships came out of the Dardanelles. Greek fleet engaged them near Tenedos for two hours. Fight continuing towards Dardanelles.

[2780] No. 314.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Athens, January 18, 1913.*

TURKISH ships, of which there were five, re-entered Straits apparently damaged, two having a list and appearing to be on fire. No damage to fighting capacity of Greek ships. One man wounded.

[2465] No. 315.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 18, 1913.*

M. CAMBON communicated to Sir A. Nicolson on the 14th January the substance of telegrams received from M. Jules Cambon, who during the Ordensfest at Berlin had two conversations with the German Emperor—one after the religious ceremony and one after the banquet in the evening.

The substance was that the Emperor was strongly opposed to a naval demonstration, but was most anxious that the Turks should conclude peace and cede Adrianople. His Majesty was much perturbed at the risk of hostilities being resumed, as he said he remembered the warning Russia had given the Porte as to the difficulty she would have in maintaining her neutrality were hostilities to recommence and troubles occur in Asia. This would mean that Russia might advance into Armenia, and this would give rise to all manner of complications, possibly affecting all European interests. The Emperor said he had written (he did not say to whom, but probably to the Emperor of Russia) urging that Russia should not take any active measures. His Majesty repeated that if

war were to break out again he trusted that the parties should fight it out between themselves, and that other Powers would not be dragged in. He was most anxious personally to see peace among the Great Powers remain undisturbed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2791] No. 316.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 19, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 40 of 17th January: recall of "Imogene."

No objection.

[2792] No. 317.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, January 19, 1913.*

CROWN Prince left Salonica yesterday for Prevesa.

[2803] No. 318.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 19, 1913.*

SIR R. RODD'S telegram No. 8 of 18th January.

Martino Bey, sent by Khedive to Rome, is supposed to be negotiating on behalf of Khedive for sale of Mariout railway line to syndicate there. As this line is built on Government property Khedive cannot sell, but it would be as well that any attempt to do so should be prevented.

Sir R. Rodd has been informed.

[2798] No. 319.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 7.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, January 19, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 10 of 7th January: Ottoman Public Debt offices at Uskub.

French Government have no information, but are instructing French consul at Uskub, should he receive a similar complaint, to concert with his British colleague so that they may report to their Ministers at Belgrade.

Ministry for Foreign Affairs considers that the representations which the two legations were authorised to make under the instructions sent to them on 23rd November in regard to administration should result in a stop being put to abuses reported by His Majesty's consul.

[2800] No. 320.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January 19, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 18 of 15th January: Servian municipal law.

Similar instructions have been sent to Italian Minister at Belgrade.

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[2653] No. 321.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 19, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 28 of 17th January.

I should have thought that the instructions contained in my telegram No. 39 of 17th January and the terms of the collective note would have brought home sufficiently clearly to the Turkish Government that the Powers are at one in advising cession of Adrianople. This advice has on more than one occasion also been very forcibly given from me to the Turkish Ambassador and principal Turkish delegate here. The Turkish Ambassador has some little time since explained very fully to me the difficulties of the Cabinet and the dangers which might attend the cession of Adrianople, and it was explained to him that greater dangers would threaten the Ottoman Empire if the allies' conditions were refused and if hostilities were resumed. The suggestion privately made to the Grand Vizier as to possible conditions attending capitulation of Adrianople should not have been made. The condition would probably be quite unacceptable to the allies and possibly to some of the Powers. It is essential that no advice be given or suggestions made to the Grand Vizier without previous consultation with me.

[2857] No. 322.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Bucharest, January 4, 1913.*

I SEE from Sir H. Bax-Ironside's telegram No. 1 of the 1st instant, that M. Misu is empowered in his negotiations with M. Danef to offer that Roumania should join the allies against Turkey on certain conditions, one of which is of course the desired rectification of the Dobrudja frontier. This intelligence has somewhat surprised me. It is true that the last time I saw M. Take Jonesco, before his departure for London, he remarked to me that Roumania was in a position to do a great service to the allies by stopping the transit viâ Constanza of munitions of war for Turkey, but I had never heard that the Roumanian Government had had any idea of actually joining the allies.

It would of course be highly desirable in the interest of Roumania's future relations with Bulgaria that the former should give a substantial *quid pro quo* for the desired rectification of the Dobrudja frontier, and in the present uncertain state of the peace negotiations the offer of Roumania's help against Turkey might well serve as such a *quid pro quo*; at the same time it would seem unlikely that King Charles with his strong Austrophil sentiments should have sanctioned negotiations on these lines without the ete from Austria. That Power may be specially desirous just now of conciliating Bulgaria; at any rate it is believed here that Austria is not pressing at Sophia on Roumania's behalf with the same energy as Russia.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[2925] No. 323.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 4. Confidential.)
Sir, *Sophia, January 6, 1913.*

BY your telegram No. 196 of the 10th ultimo, you instructed me to authorise Mr. Wilkie Young, His Majesty's vice-consul at Philippopoli, to undertake a tour in Macedonia for the purpose of enquiring, on behalf of the Balkan Relief Committee, into the best means of distributing relief in the territories at present in the occupation of the Bulgarian military authorities.

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of an interesting and well-written report received from Mr. Young with regard to the condition of the country he has already visited.

I cannot but fear, from the tone in which his despatch is written as well as from information received from other sources, that it presents a fair and unprejudiced picture of the deplorable state of affairs produced by the excesses of the irregular Macedonian bands, which acted as allies of the Bulgarian regular forces.

I shall be glad to receive your instructions regarding the question of the expenditure incurred, which Mr. Young raises in section 27 of his report. It will be within your recollection that I reported in my telegram No. 9, Consular, of the 9th December, 1912, that it was Mr. Noel Buxton's intention to discuss the matter with you personally on his return to London.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

Enclosure in No. 323.

Mr. Young to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 1. Confidential.)
Sir, *Philippopoli, January 2, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report my return from a preliminary tour through parts of the Turkish provinces recently occupied by the Bulgarian forces. Though the purpose of this journey was to investigate—with a view to the distribution of relief—the condition of certain districts which have suffered severely from the war, the following notes of a more general character may be of interest:—

1. The journey in question occupied the fortnight 14th to 28th December, and the itinerary was as follows: Philippopoli–Kara'agatch (by rail), Kara'agatch–Seminli (country cart), Seminli–Dimotika (motor-car), Dimotika–Dedeagatch (rail), Dedeagatch–Drama (rail), Drama–Cavalla (carriage), Cavalla–Xanthi (carriage), Xanthi–Gumuljina (rail), Gumuljina–Nolbandler–Kirdjali–Haskovo (horseback, three days), Haskovo–Philippopoli (rail).

2. Trains were running regularly as far as Mustapha Pasha (Svilen), but with no certainty beyond that point; those permitted to pass Adrianople were restricted to the transport of provisions and the civilian personnel of the railway. On the train I met an Englishman (a Mr. Crossfield, I believe) who appears to have a large consignment of grain at Lulemitz destined for Adrianople. The night was passed on the train in a siding, and the journey was continued the following day in a goods truck as far as Kara'agatch.

3. From Kara'agatch to Seminli, on the Arda, by road was uneventful, a large number of motor-lorries (German) were seen, which, notwithstanding the roughness of the track, occasional steep inclines, and heavy mud, appeared to be working satisfactorily. Over several miles of the road a temporary track had been improvised with faggots laid close together and covered with earth. A steel pontoon bridge, equal to bearing the heaviest lorries, had been thrown across the Arda at Seminli.

4. The second night was passed at Seminli, where there was a field hospital of 258 beds, comprising a few wounded, but mostly sick. The doctors spoke of contagious cases, and seemed to suspect cholera. In the village were 337 unfortunate Turkish women and children ignorant of the fate of their menfolk, who may or may not return from the war. At the moment it seemed that there were no men at all in the place, and the women were utterly without resources. The Queen of the Bulgarians had been here to visit the hospital the day before.

5. From Seminli, viâ Ortakeui, to Dimotika there is a first-rate *chaussée*. Dimotika appears to have offered slight resistance; its population is almost exclusively Turkish and Greek. The military authorities were distributing bread to the destitute.

6. From Dimotika to Dedeagatch by rail (five hours). Trains are not yet running with regularity on the Dimotika–Salonica line, and chance travellers, fortunate enough to obtain a pass, share accommodation with troops in goods wagons or third-class carriages.

7. As no trains were running in the direction of Gumuljina, two days were passed at Dedeagatch, which is an attractive little modern port of 5,000 inhabitants (3,000 Greek, 1,500 Turks, and 547 Bulgar). Its streets, which were laid out during the Russian occupation, are wide, regular, and planted with trees. It is the centre of an important grain-producing country, and its principal flour-mill (owned by a Greek) is said to be the largest in the Ottoman Empire.

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8. The province of Dedeagatch (Mutessariflik) extended northwards to (and including) Sulli, east to (but not including) Keshan, and west to Makri. The population is estimated at 96,000, of whom 47,000 are Turks, 32,000 Greeks, and 17,000 Bulgars.

9. The Dedeagatch district appears to have suffered fearfully from the passage of the armies. First came Yaver Pasha with 15,000 men, followed and hampered at every turn by a panic-stricken mob of Mussulman fugitives, estimated at anything up to 10,000. Then came General Kovatchef with his army of 25,000, and, finally, 13,500 Bulgarian troops, who were disembarked under convoy of the Greek fleet, and who, after remaining in the town eighteen hours, left for Chatalja.

10. The wealthy village of Keshan is said to have been devastated by the Turks.

11. It seems that 140 Macedonian volunteers entered Dedeagatch on the 12th November, and had the place at their mercy during the ensuing week. The numbers of the killed are variously estimated, but there was undoubtedly much pillaging in the Moslem quarter, where a mosque and many houses were destroyed; 15,000 fr. (all of it in Turkish gold) was paid into the foreign post offices by the looters for transmission to their homes. It would seem that the ruffianly advance guard of the Bulgarian army was allowed a free hand from the 12th to the 19th November, on which day General Kovatchef arrived and order was to a certain extent restored. At one time a general massacre was feared, and the situation is said to have been saved only by the courage and self-possession of the Greek Metropolitan of Enos.

12. A sober estimate suggests ten years as the period which must in all probability elapse before this, till now, prosperous district recovers from the horrors to which it has been subjected.

13. It is early to criticise Bulgarian methods in the occupied provinces, but it seems desirable not to pass over a remark made to me by a Bulgarian officer, whose views I had asked with regard to the distribution of relief, particularly with a view to the restoration of Moslem villages and other measures calculated to encourage the Turkish population to settle down. Colonel ———— replied: "Certainly they (the Moslems) will be treated fairly, but, frankly, they are useless subjects; we should get on better without them; 'et nous serions contents de pouvoir nous en débarrasser.'" It remains to be seen whether this observation of an officer, at present holding a high administrative post, represents the view of the Bulgarian Government. It must be added that there is very bitter discontent among the Greek population, which the present attitude of somewhat scornful condescension and patronage displayed by the Bulgars towards their new "subjects" is hardly calculated to dispel.

14. From Dedeagatch to Drama was twelve hours by rail. The newly-appointed prefect of Drama is M. Dobref, whom I last knew at Monastir in 1905. He was then Bulgarian representative in that district with the title of "commercial agent," the Ottoman Government refusing to recognise him as a member of the consular corps. He, as well as M. Batchvarof (sub-prefect of Drama), have since been employed in the Bulgarian Legations in London and Paris. Staying in a Bulgarian house and surrounded by Bulgarian officials, I had little opportunity of hearing the true state of affairs at Drama, but a visit to the Moslem quarter gave some idea of recent occurrences. It seems that on the approach of the Bulgarian forces the Mahommedan population had fled *en masse*, some to Doxat, some to the coast. They were subsequently induced to return to their homes, but it was to find them in many cases in ruins, in every case stripped of all they had contained. Agents of the Balkan War Relief Fund are working to relieve the suffering, which is great.

15. From Drama the journey was continued by road to Cavalla (four hours). As I am not sure that my private letter of the 21st December last will have reached you, it is perhaps desirable briefly to recapitulate certain facts which one would like to suppose are not fully realised by the Central Government at Sophia.

16. It seems that a mere handful of komitajis, under the notorious Tchevnopeief (the capturer of Miss Stone?) and a certain Tchakof, arrived at Cavalla on Saturday, the 9th November. Bluffing the Greek bishop and whatever vestiges of panic-stricken authority remained in the town with a story that 5,000 Macedonian volunteers were in the immediate neighbourhood, these men obtained the surrender of the place, and, notwithstanding the arrival thirty-six hours later of some regular troops under Major Zetchef, they enjoyed absolute license for some ten days. There was a supply of rifles which had been abandoned by the flying garrison and gendarmerie, and these, in spite of the protests of the bishop, were distributed among the riff-raff of the Greek population. A reign of terror followed, a large number of Moslems were imprisoned,

and on one day fifty-one of them were led outside the town and butchered in cold blood with indescribable cruelty. On the following day thirty-nine were similarly tortured to death, and subsequently twelve, and so on until a total of "approximately 200" had been reached. Many of these poor wretches seem to have been denounced by Greeks who had a personal grudge against them, but the general motive of the murders appears to have been neither vengeance nor fanaticism, but a calculated plan to terrorise well-to-do Moslem and Israelite citizens into buying their safety at the highest price which could be extracted from them. A number of leading Jews were driven out to the village of Sarashaban and there terrified with threats of torture and death into ransoming themselves with a round sum of 10,000*l*. Ibrahim Pasha is said to have got off for £T. 20,000, and I am informed on respectable financial authority that these Bulgarian brigands must have carried off from Cavalla not less than 70,000*l*. The banks were depleted, and had nothing in hand but the reserve funds, which their rules forbid them to part with. Three thousand five hundred fugitives were shipped on board the Khedive's yacht "Mahrousse." I understand that the mutilated corpses were left exposed on the sea-shore for weeks after the event, and certainly on the 21st December there was at least one still visible at 8 A.M. An hour later three individuals were observed covering up any traces that remained. All the Moslem cemeteries in the town have been desecrated and wrecked. These things happened in a peaceful little trading port whose terrified inhabitants had meekly surrendered without a thought of resistance on the first approach of the invader.

17. The foregoing details were furnished me by different persons, most of them Europeans, whose word I have no reason to doubt, and whose testimony has proved essentially consistent. In no case is my information derived from a Moslem source. After some years passed in Armenia and Macedonia in times when religious and racial feelings were running high, I am obliged to admit that I know of no instance of Turkish or Kurdish cruelty to compare for diabolical, cold-blooded ferocity and greed with the acts perpetrated calmly each day at sunset on some eight successive days by these forerunners of Bulgarian authority at Cavalla. At the village of Sarashaban (referred to above) I am told that out of 220 families, 181 Turks were killed. The women were divided among the captors. The place is now a desert. A Bulgarian mayor has been installed.

18. Whatever may be said in exculpation of the Bulgarian regular troops as distinguished from the Macedonian volunteers, it must be remembered that in the minds of the unfortunate Moslem population no such distinction can be expected to exist. Ere this no doubt reports of the doings of the "Christians" have been carried by the 3,000 fugitives and by other channels to Egypt and beyond. It is to be hoped that the Bulgarian Government will take what measures it can to dissociate itself from this disgrace and to vindicate the claim to be treated as a civilised State.

19. From Cavalla the journey was continued by road across the fertile plain of the Karasu to Sketche (Xanthi), the centre of the finest tobacco-growing country in the world. The town of Xanthi had, like most others in this region, surrendered without resistance. It has suffered comparatively little, though painful stories are told of the depredations committed in the surrounding villages. Here, as at Cavalla, there is an alarming shortage of flour, salt, &c., and as foreign vessels are not unnaturally unwilling to discharge their cargoes to be requisitioned by the military, there seems to be reason for fearing a recurrence of famine. The practice of requisitioning is being abused just now to a ludicrous extent; Bulgarian officers "pay" for everything, even for refreshments in cafés, with requisition notes of very doubtful value. No one dares refuse, and it is creditably stated among others presenting such documents for payment lately was the proprietress of a "maison de passe."

20. From Sketche to Gumuljina was two hours by rail. As this is the administrative centre of the district in which I have been asked to distribute relief, I remained two days, and had several interviews with the prefect (Moskof), the mayor, the "commandant de la place" (Angelof), and with General "Pepin" Petrof, all of whom were extremely civil and obliging. The night of my arrival 5,000 troops were billeted in the town, mostly in private houses, but these have since left for Chatalja. There is considerable uneasiness amongst the well-to-do Greeks and Jews, who have lost heavily through the ruin of the Moslem landowners and in the general devastation of the country-side; but it is early to hazard an opinion as to their prospects under Bulgarian administration. There is, however, one circumstance which may be signalised, and with great regret. A number of disreputable komitajis are still at large and very much in evidence, apparently under the patronage of the general. When

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I asked his Excellency whether he considered that money might be safely distributed among the poor while these people were about, he replied that there were none, or at least only a "very few whom he required 'pour sa garde personnelle.'" Collecting bands from among the rabble, these ruffians raid the adjacent villages and commit great cruelties. The notables of Gumuljina have been semi-officially advised to petition the Tsar to allow them to rename their town "Boris-Tirnowskigrad."

21. At Gumuljina horses were procured for us, and with a small escort we rode across the Rhodopes (three days) viâ Mastanl and Kirdjali to Haskovo, where we rejoined the railway and returned to Philippopoli. These last three days of the tour were particularly interesting, as we were following in reverse direction the line of march taken by the left of the three main Bulgarian columns which, crossing the old Bulgarian frontier at Tumrush, Chipilari, and Haskovo respectively, descended to the Ægean.

22. About four hours from Gumuljina we passed a bend in the road where Yaver Pasha is said to have made his last stand. I understand that the attacking force comprised some 5,000 volunteers. They had 284 casualties and thirty-four of them lie buried on the spot. No doubt there were other actions, but the resistance offered by the Turks appears to have been on the whole feeble, and a Bulgarian who took part informs me that the advance of this left column was on the whole a uniformly successful promenade. It is with no intention of criticising military measures, of which I know nothing, and which were perhaps imperatively called for by the situation, that I have to add that the track of the invading army is marked by 80 miles of ruined villages. In some cases walls are standing, but the houses are roofless, and the inhabitants, having lost their possessions, have fled to villages removed from the line of march.

23. At Khotana seventeen women and children and one old man are left. At Edlerlan walls were standing, but there was no sign of life. At Chorbajilor there were eight women, eight children, and one old man. At Haji Osman Ullah there were five women, six small children, and one old man. Such cases as these are, of course, helpless, and money would be a doubtful benefit, as they have no means of transport and no one to send elsewhere to fetch provisions. Relief for them, to be of any use, must be brought to them in kind.

24. On the road an old man was overtaken with a couple of women and three small children. At the first alarm of war the poor creatures had fled with all they possessed from their village in the hills down to Gumuljina, some 80 miles; their oxen had died from exhaustion, or been taken from them; and the family is now returning on foot to the village, carrying what little they have saved of household possessions, bedding, &c., on their backs. They will be fortunate if, at the end of a week's tramp, they find the walls of their home standing.

25. At Azabler, out of eleven houses, only three are now inhabited.

26. Such cases as the foregoing are typical, and are perhaps no more than the inevitable aftermath of war. Many of the men now missing from these Turkish villages are probably still serving with their regiments in Adrianople or at Chatalja, others are possibly prisoners in Bulgaria, and will eventually return. In any case it will be fairer to judge Bulgaria by the methods she adopts to restore prosperity than by the miserable tale of desolation with which she has, perhaps unavoidably, signalised her first appearance in these fertile provinces.

27. As your Excellency is aware, the motive of the tour described above was to inquire—on behalf of an English fund—into the best means of distributing relief. I have, however, thought it better to retain my freedom of action and not to allow travelling or other expenditure incurred by myself to be a charge upon the fund in question. So far as has been possible, too, I have avoided using requisitioned animals or being otherwise a burden upon individuals. It seems desirable to mention this circumstance. The position is in some respects a delicate one, but need not, I imagine, preclude me from submitting to you confidentially my *impressions de voyage* should you care to have them. If you approve, the question of the expenses of the journey might perhaps be referred to the Foreign Office.

28. In conclusion, I venture to hope that any observations occurring in the foregoing notes with regard to the conduct of Bulgarian forces (regular or irregular) may not be attributed to prejudice. Though I do not happen to have come across them, I can well believe that on the Turkish side, too, there may have been great excesses, and when I started on this tour any prejudice I may have had would have been rather in favour of the Bulgarians, whom till then I had only been able to judge

from pleasant acquaintance with them in their own country—a fact which, however, puts in higher relief the deplorable character of some of the incidents referred to.

I have, &c.
H. E. W. YOUNG.

[2926] No. 324.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)
Sophia, January 6, 1913.

Sir,

THE present would seem to be a favourable time to put on record a full account of the history and inception of the Balkan league, which led to the present war.

Bulgaria has been dissatisfied ever since she failed to obtain the territory which was to have been accorded to her by the Treaty of San Stefano, but her claims to which were not agreed to by the signatories to the Treaty of Berlin. The wretched state of Macedonia, and the steady degeneration of the Ottoman administration of the vilayets, fostered the hope, through a series of years, of a successful fulfilment of Bulgarian territorial aspirations. Occasions have not been wanting when Bulgaria has been on the point of declaring war upon Turkey single-handed, but, at the last moment, she has hesitated to risk her well-being, and perhaps even her independence, on the hazard of war. She has, however, only been awaiting her opportunity, and she did not fail to seize it, when approached by Servia to conclude with her a treaty of alliance, at a time when Turkey was engaged in war with a great European Power. Servia has long been dissatisfied with her position. Hemmed in on all sides, with no egress to the sea, and living under the constant domination of a Power she does not love too well, she has been desperately anxious to improve her political status, and to enlarge the boundaries of her kingdom. The precarious position in which she found herself, owing to the uncertainty of Austro-Hungarian aims in the sanjak, and the constant diminution of the Servian inhabitants in the vilayet of Kossovo (especially in the cazas of Prishtina, Ipek, Prisrend, and Dibra), owing to the excesses committed by the Albanians, forced her to fix upon a policy which would promise her, at any rate, a certain measure of support. The Radical party in Servia, of which M. Pasitch is the present leader, has held for some years the idea of an agreement with Bulgaria in order to efficaciously oppose the programme of Austria-Hungary, as well as to use it as a counterpoise against Turkish policy, which they considered in the main, as hostile to the Christian inhabitants of the Balkans. As soon as this party came into power, M. Pasitch, together with his chief advisers, amongst whom the late M. Milovanovitch must be especially mentioned, seized every opportunity which they considered to be propitious for realising their dream.

On the accession to office of the present Bulgarian coalition Cabinet of Messrs. Gueshof and Danef, early in 1911, circumstances showed themselves as unexpectedly favourable for the execution and the realisation of the plans of these Servian statesmen. All that was required to start the ball rolling was the occurrence of some important European event which would unfavourably affect either Turkish or Austrian policy, and the Italian ultimatum, launched against the Turkish Government in September 1911, was the signal for departure sought by these leading statesmen in the two countries to solidify their efforts to meet all eventualities in consequence of the new situation created by the Turco-Italian conflict. In this connection I may mention, as a very significant event, the confidential circular sent by M. Milovanovitch to St. Petersburgh, London, and Paris, calling the attention of the Triple *Entente* to the repercussion which the Turco-Italian war was likely to cause in the Balkans, and pointing out that the best means of safeguarding the interests of the Balkan States would possibly be the creation of an *entente* or alliance between them.

On the 23rd October, 1911, I found myself in a position to be able to inform His Majesty's Government that a meeting had taken place between the Bulgarian Prime Minister and the Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 11th of that month, during the return journey of the former from Vichy. They travelled together in a special carriage from Belgrade to Lapovo. M. Milovanovitch was accompanied by the Servian Minister for Public Works, and in order to keep the meeting with the Bulgarian Prime Minister quite secret, it was given out in the Servian capital that they had left together to open a bridge. Prior to this meeting M. Rizof, the Bulgarian Minister in Rome, who

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had formerly been Minister in Belgrade, and was a well-known partisan of this policy had been sounded generally as to the possibility of a rapprochement between the two countries. In the course of this conversation M. Gueshof was able to assure the Servian Foreign Minister, that he had brought much pressure to bear on King Ferdinand lately with a view to establishing a good understanding in the hope that it might eventually develop into an alliance between the two Governments. He added that he had been assisted in this task by M. Danef, and by M. Teodorof, the Minister of Finance. These two both hoped and believed that the King of Bulgaria was won over to their way of thinking, and that he now saw that a friendly policy between the Balkan States, favourable to Russia, and hence leading towards the Triple *Entente*, was preferable to the game of see-saw that His Majesty was still at that time playing. At this meeting views were exchanged on the general political situation, and it was decided that negotiations should be immediately entered into between the two countries with a view to joint action, either of a defensive nature against Austria-Hungary, or even of an offensive nature against Turkey if necessary. Shortly after this, the Servian Minister in Sophia received instructions to enter into direct negotiations with M. Gueshof to endeavour to bring about an alliance between the two countries. I did not gather that this important meeting was, in any way, inspired by a hostile feeling towards the Ottoman Government, as far as Servia was concerned as she had many reasons for remaining on good terms with Turkey. On the Bulgarian side this was doubtless an important, although an indirect cause, but on the Servian side the chief reason was the danger that Austria-Hungary might fish successfully in the troubled waters of the Turco-Italian war on the pretext of safeguarding her interests in the Balkans (especially in Albania and the sanjak). One of the objects in view was to delimitate the spheres which should belong to Bulgaria and Servia in Macedonia, in the event of a break up of European Turkey. The two Prime Ministers decided that all efforts should be used in maintaining the *status quo* at this juncture, unless Austria made an advance; this was especially on account of Russia having informed both Governments that she would not aid any forward movement on the Turkish frontier at that time. It should be noted that the Bulgarian Prime Minister adhered to this condition to the time of the outbreak of the war in the following October, in spite of the great pressure brought to bear on him, both by his political opponents and by the Bulgarian press of all shades. M. Milovanovitch gave M. Gueshof to understand that no arrangement of a permanent character could ever be arrived at between the two Governments unless Uskub fell under Servian influence; Servia would also desire that the Kuprulu-Monastir line (excluding the latter town), together with old Servia, should be assigned to her. The Bulgarian Government spontaneously recognised Servian claims to Uskub and to all lands to the north and west of that town as far as the Adriatic Sea, but they had hitherto considered that they had a claim to the caza of Valessa, together with the town of the same name, the caza of Perlepe, and that portion of the vilayet of Monastir which includes the capital of the same name. It was further arranged that Servia was to occupy Uskub when the time for partition came, and the question of the definite division of Macedonia between Bulgaria and Servia was reserved for future arbitration by the Russian Government, and that country agreed to undertake the task in order to hasten the realisation of the alliance. The Ministers decided that every effort must be made to exclude both Italy and Austria, from all territorial participation in a final settlement, and this was the special reason for the insertion of article 3 of the Treaty; but—and this was made a particular point of by M. Milovanovitch—no action whatsoever was to be taken at that time to weaken Turkey, preferably a weak Turkey to a strong Austria. M. Gueshof also spoke in favour of the creation of more friendly and closer ties between Greece and Servia. He stated that Bulgaria and Greece were originally on very bad terms, and no one could have supposed that their relations could so rapidly have improved. This meeting contained the seeds of the future Balkan Alliance, and the Prime Ministers separated temporarily satisfied with the accomplishment of their work. Four months of negotiations passed, however, before a practical arrangement was arrived at respecting the limitation of the frontiers between the two countries.

On the return of M. Gueshof to Sophia M. Danef, the President of the Sobranjé, and General Nikiphorof, the War Minister, were won over to the cause, and severe and constant pressure was brought to bear on King Ferdinand to give his consent to a secret alliance with Servia.

On the 18th January, 1912, I had the honour to report that the King had been given to understand that, in view of the disquieting state of affairs, Bulgaria must decide once and for all to cast in her lot either with Russia or with Austria.

M. Danef was made the spokesman in the negotiations which then followed with His Majesty. He pointed out to the King that, in any case, Russia would not throw over Servia in the event of a move on the part of Austria, and should Bulgaria show unwillingness to co-operate with Servia she must expect the opposition of Russia. King Ferdinand now found himself placed *au pied du mur*, and he was, for some weeks, in a far from happy state of mind. He could not throw over the existing coalition Government, for reasons unnecessary to relate here, and he was constitutionally disinclined to break with Austria. He paid several hasty visits to that country during the months of November and December 1911, and the Bulgarian Government came to the conclusion that His Majesty had been knowingly somewhat indiscreet during one of these visits. They were of the opinion that Count Aehrenthal, although he knew, they imagined, nothing definite, had some vague inkling of a Servo-Bulgarian rapprochement; they therefore redoubled their efforts to induce His Majesty to make up his mind; and the fateful occasion presented itself in connection with the coming-of-age celebrations of Prince Boris.

This event occurred on the 2nd February, 1912, and, amongst other Royalties, the Crown Princes of Greece, Servia, Roumania, and Montenegro were all present. Occasions were found for the several heirs to the thrones to meet together on intimate terms, and King Ferdinand made special and successful efforts to win over the Crown Prince of Greece and the Greek Government to join the league, to which the King of Bulgaria was now practically pledged. No one knew better than King Ferdinand how to utilise the presence in his capital of so many highly-placed personages, and, though no formal action was taken, from this date the alliance became a practical certainty. At the end of February last, at the time of the death of Count Aehrenthal, a good deal of excitement arose in the Austrian Legation, and there is no doubt that a hint had been received from the Ballplatz to endeavour to find out whether negotiations for an alliance were proceeding between the Bulgarian and Servian Governments. The Austrian military attaché closely questioned the Bulgarian chief of staff, and endeavoured to extract information from him. General Fitchef, who was kept in entire ignorance of these negotiations, denied their existence *in toto*. The Austrian Minister, Count Tarnowski, sounded most of his colleagues and two minor officials at the Ministry, who are said to be in Austrian pay, but without success. He eventually reported that he could gather no confirmation whatever of the rumours.

Meanwhile the negotiations had been proceeding very actively between the two Governments up to the 25th February, when a temporary deadlock occurred as regards the frontier that was to be fixed between the two countries in the case of the eventual break up of the Turkish Empire. A difficulty arose respecting the Struga Valley, together with the village of the same name. This place lies to the north-north-west of Lake Ochrida, and both countries attached much importance to its future possession. Eventually the Bulgarian Government gave way to the Servian claim, and the frontiers were practically arranged, the debatable land varying in extent from 20 kilom. in one place to entire juxtaposition in another. In order further to throw dust in the eyes of the Austrian Government, King Ferdinand approached them regarding his official visit to the Austrian Court, which took place later in the year. The inclusion of the Struga Valley in Servian territory with the consent of the Bulgarian Government removed the last remaining difficulty, and on the 14th March I had the honour to report to His Majesty's Government that a secret treaty of friendship and alliance had been signed on the previous day, by the Kings and Foreign Ministers of the two kingdoms. King Ferdinand signed it on the morning of that day, after considerable pressure, the King of Servia having already signed on the 11th. I have the honour to enclose herewith a French translation of this treaty from the Bulgarian and Servian originals. King Ferdinand was most loth to sign the third article during the lifetime of the Emperor Francis Joseph, as its provisions are directed against a forward movement on the part of the Austro-Hungarian Government in European Turkey. The Russian Emperor and Government were made aware of the contents of the treaty, and the former took a personal interest in its successful conclusion. The Russian Government made a condition that it should not be made known to any other Power without their consent. They eventually communicated the fact of its conclusion to the other Powers of the Triple *Entente*. As Russia had been cognisant of the pourparlers and had played a considerable rôle in the successful negotiation of the treaty, she was considered in the light both of a witness and a guarantee of its execution by the Bulgarian and Servian Governments. This is especially important from the Servian point of view, because of King Ferdinand's lack of stability.

The Russian Government exercised much influence both in Sophia and Belgrade to

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bring the secret negotiations to a successful conclusion, and the matter was firmly clinched by the Russian Emperor himself sending for the Bulgarian military attaché in St. Petersburgh and requesting him to inform the Bulgarian Minister of War, General Nikiphorof, that he would view with favour a successful termination of these negotiations; and this personal pressure, added to that brought by M. Gueshof and M. Danef, at last decided King Ferdinand to take this most important step. By giving his consent to a defensive alliance with Servia he showed the determination of the Bulgarian Government to oppose by force of arms any southerly Austrian advance. The foundation of a federation of the Balkan States, backed by Russia, to oppose a forward movement on the part of Austria, in the sanjak was now laid, and negotiations were at once entered into between Bulgaria and Greece, and between Servia and Greece, to include the latter country in the league. When this had been successfully accomplished, overtures were made to Montenegro, but not until action had been decided on against Turkey. This was to avoid indiscretion on the part of Montenegro, and also to prevent a premature movement which, however, nevertheless did take place.

On the 1st April of last year I had the honour to report that pourparlers were taking place between the Greek Minister and the Bulgarian Prime Minister for the purpose of more closely binding the relations between their respective Governments, with special reference to the Greek and Bulgarian spheres of influence in the vilayets. Even, however, when these conversations were actually proceeding, the Greek Minister in this capital was entirely unaware of the secret treaty which had been so recently concluded. In fact, on the 30th March he expressed to me at some length his regret that there was so little likelihood of a friendly convention ever being arranged between Bulgaria and Servia, and should these two countries not come to terms, he saw but little prospect of Greece and Bulgaria agreeing, as, in their case, the situation bristled with difficulties. However, as you, Sir, were duly informed, Greece joined the league on the 26th May, 1912, but unfortunately no delimitation of the respective frontiers was agreed upon. The Bulgarian Government feared that the question of delimiting the frontiers would be so difficult that no alliance would be concluded, M. Gueshof preferred therefore not to raise it. Hence the many serious territorial problems which are presenting themselves for solution at the present time.

Meanwhile no rumour whatever of the alliance had reached any of the foreign representatives in this capital, with the exception of the Russian Minister and myself. On the 20th February the French Minister left for Paris to take up his post as political director at the Quai d'Orsay. His parting words to me were to the effect that there was no probability whatever of an alliance ever being concluded between Bulgaria and Servia, and that anyone who believed in the possibility of an alliance between Bulgaria and Greece showed profound ignorance of Balkan politics. The representatives of the other Great Powers adopted and continued this line until just before mobilisation was ordered on the 30th September, 1912.

Early in April vague rumours reached the press of a Balkan *entente*, and on the 8th April a short paragraph appeared in the "Daily Telegraph," written by their Paris correspondent, to the effect that a secret defensive alliance had been entered into by the Balkan States—Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece—by which they agreed to guarantee the integrity of each other's dominions, and to take the field jointly should any one of the three be attacked. Information somewhat to the above effect appeared at the same time both in the "Temps" and in the "Echo de Paris," the sub-editor of the latter paper was, at that time, a personal friend of M. Paléologue. Meanwhile the latter had been informed of the alliance by his Government, on assuming his new duties early in April. The news contained in these two papers was reported also in the "Manchester Guardian," but it was eventually declared to be inaccurate, which was true at the time as far as Greece was concerned.

Negotiations were, in the meantime, proceeding for the conclusion of a military convention between Bulgaria and Servia; they continued as soon as Servia decided to accept a condition made by the Bulgarian Government to the effect that the high command in case of war was to be left in the hands of King Ferdinand when Servian troops were operating with a majority of Bulgarian troops in the field. By this convention Bulgaria agreed to send 100,000 men to the Vardar, *i.e.*, to the Servian seat of war, in the event of a Turkish invasion. Servia was not under any obligation to send troops to the Bulgarian seat of war, as Bulgaria was presumed to stand in need of no such aid. The contrary, however, proved to be the case. This convention was definitely signed on the 12th May, 1912.

During the course of these negotiations the Turco-Italian war was steadily proceeding, whilst deplorable accounts of the condition of Macedonia continued to reach

the Bulgarian Government. M. Gueshof urged continually on Naby Bey the great importance of the Ottoman Government introducing serious reforms in the administration of the vilayets, and of granting autonomy, or at least re-establishing the foreign gendarmerie. No practical amelioration, however, of the Macedonian situation took place. The Ishtib massacre of December 1911 was followed by other similar disturbances, and, at the end of April 1912, M. Gueshof informed the Turkish Minister that he considered the situation as somewhat serious.

Prior to my departure on leave of absence in May, I had a long conversation, early in that month, with the King of Bulgaria. His Majesty stated that his new policy of treaties and *ententes* between the Balkan Powers was, in his opinion, the only safe one to adopt in view of the existing general distrust of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand. King Ferdinand on this occasion alluded to the secret treaty, and said that he knew that I had been privy to it, I would therefore be able to appreciate from one of the articles of the treaty (His Majesty evidently referred to article 3) that both he and his Government were well-disposed towards Turkey. The treaty had as its object the curtailing of Austrian pretensions, and, supported as the Balkan States would be by Russia, he did not believe that Austria would now dare to occupy the sanjak. His Majesty had, he himself considered, by the conclusion of this secret treaty, saved Servia, the independence of which country was seriously menaced by Austria Hungary; for this he trusted the Servian nation would show gratitude. He would do his utmost to preserve the peace, but, should Italy be successful, *i.e.*, be able to inflict a serious defeat on Turkey anywhere in Europe, it would be difficult to restrain the Bulgarian army.

His Majesty added that he would never act in direct opposition to Russia, the more so as the Bulgarian Government were now absolutely convinced that Russia did not covet any Turkish territory. If a war took place, either against Austria or Turkey, Bulgaria and Servia would act as one nation. He hoped shortly to come to an arrangement with Greece; negotiations had commenced between the two Powers and were progressing favourably. His Majesty added that he had approved the Servian proposals as regards a military convention.

In reporting the above conversation I had the honour to write a memorandum to the effect that it appeared to me possible that Bulgaria, Servia, Greece, and Montenegro would attack Turkey in less than one year. They would prefer to go forward before the death of the Austrian Emperor rather than after that event, as His Imperial Majesty would be most unwilling to march into the sanjak, whereas the allies considered that the archduke, urged on by the military and clerical parties, would be sure to favour a forward policy.

I had the honour to add that until Greece joined the federation no overt action on the part of the allies was likely.

In the course of the month of June the Bulgarian and Servian Governments sent special missions to Russia to announce the conclusion of the Treaty of Alliance, and it was not till after the reception of these missions by the Emperor of Russia that Austrian suspicions were again aroused. The first reliable news was received at the Ballplatz on or about the 19th June. In the course of the month of May Count Benckendorff announced the conclusion of the treaty to His Majesty's Government, giving, however, an incorrect version of article 3.

In the course of the summer negotiations between Greece and Bulgaria and between Greece and Servia were being steadily continued, and His Majesty's Legation was able to announce the signature of a treaty between Bulgaria and Greece on the 26th May, and of a military convention between Servia and Greece on the 14th October.

The state of affairs in Macedonia and Albania became more and more unsatisfactory. On the 19th June His Majesty's chargé d'affaires reported that there was no prospect of any definite arrangement being come to on the Albanian question. Towards the end of the month a statement appeared in the "Times" to the effect that the Turkish Minister of the Interior had advocated the appointment of an English inspector for Macedonia. The Bulgarian Minister spoke to you on this matter on the 26th, stating that such an appointment would be very welcome to the Bulgarian Government, but nothing was done. Early in July the condition of affairs became serious. The Vali of Salonica actually sent a memorial to the Porte advising the grant of autonomy to Albania as the only means of avoiding complications.

In reply to enquiries as to the views held by the Bulgarian Government on the situation, M. Gueshof informed His Majesty's chargé d'affaires that they considered it serious, though not yet grave. His Excellency added that he need hardly reiterate the

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pacific intentions of the Bulgarian Government, but no one could possibly foresee what might happen if the revolutionary movement, which had originated at Monastir, grew in intensity and spread throughout Macedonia. At this time a supplementary credit of 21,000,000 fr. had been voted by the Skupshtina in Belgrade for armaments, and the Russian Minister in Sophia reported that he considered that a mobilisation of the Bulgarian army did not seem to him to be improbable. Early in August news reached Sophia that a bomb outrage, followed by a massacre of Bulgarians, had occurred at Kotchana, in which 112 Christians were killed and over 200 wounded. The Bulgarian Government employed all their efforts to smooth down this incident, for two reasons: firstly, because of the approaching celebrations to be held on the twenty-fifth anniversary of King Ferdinand's accession; and, secondly, because war had already been decided on in principle for the month of October. It was most important not to raise Turkish suspicions at this time, so as to prevent her from concluding a peace with Italy. This massacre rendered the position of the Bulgarian Cabinet very difficult, but M. Gueshof still hoped that, if the Ottoman Government would accord some political concession to Macedonia tending to autonomy, the situation would be saved.

On the 13th August the first mass meeting of protest against the unsatisfactory régime existing in European Turkey was held in Sophia, but the Bulgarian Government continued to give reiterated pacific assurances to the foreign representatives. The twenty-fifth anniversary of King Ferdinand's accession was successfully celebrated at Tirnovo, but in view of the unsatisfactory state of the political horizon no special missions were invited from foreign countries.

On the 30th August M. Gueshof stated frankly that the situation in Bulgaria had never before been so serious. With Turkey at war with a great Power, Bulgaria had a feeling that it was an unique opportunity for her to act. The local press was outspoken in its attacks on the king, and the leading journals, exclusive of the Government organs, made disparaging comparisons between him and Prince Alexander of Battenberg. The Prime Minister has since informed me that, at this time, he tendered his resignation to His Majesty, but King Ferdinand refused to accept it, urging him to continue in office. During the whole of this month fighting of a desultory nature continued on the Turco-Montenegrin frontier. Southern Bulgaria was in a state of seething excitement, and outspoken demands were made for a declaration of war against Turkey. The Austro-Hungarian Government now began to show much interest in the situation. Count Berchtold paid a visit to the Roumanian Court, and on the 15th August he proposed an exchange of views between the Powers on the Balkan question. Nothing very definite arose, however, from this suggestion, and on the 27th August the Grand Vizier made it known that Turkey would not tolerate any foreign interference with her internal affairs. The Ottoman Government continued to give the most categorical assurances that they intended to punish those guilty of the Kotchana massacres, but their action was confined to promises. The Governments of the Great Powers, with the exception of Italy, were now instructed to urge M. Gueshof to resist the pressure of the war party. But it was apparent that the Bulgarian Government was now on the horns of a dilemma, and had to choose between peace within or peace without. Meanwhile a fresh massacre at Berana on the Montenegrin frontier, and at Sienitz in the sanjak, on the Servian frontier, increased the excitement reigning in the Balkan States. On this occasion the Servian Government suggested immediate mobilisation, and it was apparent to those best able to judge of the situation that war was practically inevitable. The danger of the position really lay in the fact that neither Bulgaria nor Servia could believe that Russia would abandon her policy of centuries in the Balkans, and in case of the future war turning against the allies she would fail to give them her active support. They argued that the present moment was as favourable a one as was ever likely to occur. The Turco-Italian war was in progress, and the allies counted upon the Emperor of Austria's desire not to be drawn into hostilities at his advanced age, while they felt apprehension of his successor's intentions, and, moreover, of the fact that the strength of the Austrian army would be almost doubled in a few years.

On the 12th September, His Majesty's Legation had the honour to report that the Bulgarian Government had fixed the 14th October as the last day for the delivery of the provisions, forage, equipment, munitions, and medical stores ordered by them for the army. From this time forward it became apparent that all the allies were making extensive military preparations, and on the 30th September Bulgaria and Servia issued orders for general mobilisation. This definite step was taken in consequence of the concentration of Ottoman troops close to the Bulgarian frontier.

Events now moved with great rapidity. Greece decided to mobilise on the 1st October, and it became known about the same time that the Montenegrin forces

were being assembled. Both Russia and Austria-Hungary addressed special warnings to Turkey and to the Balkan States, but they passed almost unheeded, Russia even made efforts to separate the allies. The Powers took collective steps to stop the war, but without avail. Turkey at last seemed to realise her great peril, and she offered to put into force the "Law of the Vilayets" drawn up in 1886 by an international commission, but never carried into effect. Although the allies did not regard this proposal as entirely sincere, negotiations were still proceeding when King Nicholas of Montenegro precipitated matters by declaring war on the 8th October. It was generally considered at the time that the Montenegrin Government were acting in agreement with their allies in this matter, but M. Gueshof informed me that the Montenegrin declaration of war was unprompted, and had only been communicated to him ten days previously. It did not, however, imperil the understanding between Montenegro and the other Balkan States. On the 13th October, Bulgaria, Servia, and Greece, addressed joint demands to Turkey for radical reform in the vilayets. These reforms were to be based on article 23 of the Treaty of Berlin, and were to be carried out under the supervision of the representatives of the Great Powers and of the Balkan States at Constantinople. This latter condition made them practically inacceptable to the Ottoman Government, and the only response of the Sultan was a militant proclamation to his troops. On the 15th, Turkey decided to break off diplomatic relations with Bulgaria and Servia, and Kiamil Pasha employed every effort to detach Greece from the alliance. It was apparent that diplomacy had failed to avert a general war in the Balkans. On the evening of the same day, the Italian and Turkish delegates signed the preliminaries of peace at Ouchy. On the 17th October Turkey declared war on Bulgaria and Servia, and on the following day Greece declared war on Turkey. At the time of writing a successful campaign has been waged, Macedonia and large portions of Thrace are in the hands of the allies, and delegates are now at work in London endeavouring to arrange terms of peace.

I shall have the honour in a later despatch to discuss the inferences to be drawn from the history of Balkan alliance, which has created a new political situation in Europe.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador in Constantinople.

I have, &c.

H. G. BAX-IRONSIDE

Enclosure in No. 324.

Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance.

(Translation into French from Bulgarian and Servian original.)

Traité d'Amitié et d'Alliance entre les Royaumes de Bulgarie et de Serbie.

PRÉAMBULE.

2. Les deux États se garantissent réciproquement et d'une manière absolue l'indépendance et l'intégrité de leurs territoires.

3. Les deux États s'obligent d'employer toutes leurs forces contre toute Grande Puissance qui essaierait d'annexer ou d'occuper, ne fût-ce que provisoirement, n'importe quelle partie de territoire balkanique qui se trouve aujourd'hui sous l'autorité de la Turquie.

4. Les deux pays concluront une convention militaire après la signature du traité, dans laquelle on déterminera les obligations militaires des deux pays en temps de guerre, le nombre de troupes et les rapports entre les deux commandements.

5. Durée du traité sera jusqu'à la fin de 1920.

(Note.—Certain details then follow as to the drawing up of the treaty.)

6. Ce traité pourra être publié ou communiqué aux autres États seulement après entente préalable entre les deux hautes parties contractantes, assemblées après entente préalable entre les deux États.

(King of Bulgaria.)

M. GUÉCHOF.

(King of Servia.)

M. MILOVANOVITCH.

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

[2828] No. 325.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 7.)

Sir, *Vienna, January 8, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a despatch which I have received from the military attaché at His Majesty's Embassy, reporting the proceedings at a Common Council of Ministers with regard to the sums to be demanded of the delegations to meet the expenses incurred during the present crisis.

I have, &c.

FAIRFAX S. CARTWRIGHT.

Enclosure in No. 325.

Major Sir T. Cuninghame to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 17.)

Sir, *Vienna, January 7, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report for the information of your Excellency that a Common Council of Ministers took place here on Saturday the 4th January, for the object of determining what sums should be laid before the delegations for sanction, in connection with the expenses incurred by the army and navy departments on account of the existing crisis.

The conference, which was under the presidency of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was attended by the Common Ministers for War and for Marine, and by the Common and National Finance Ministers and Premiers. After preliminary conversations between individual participants the formal sitting began at 11 A.M. and lasted until 4 P.M.

The War Minister, General Ritter von Krobatin, gave details of the expenses incurred, indicating those which were non-recurrent, those which were anticipations of improvements and changes already sanctioned but not yet due, and those which once begun involved further outlay.

The total demanded by the army and navy departments together, amounted apparently to about 240,000,000 krones (10,000,000*l.*), of which, however, only 190,000,000 to 200,000,000 (8,000,000*l.*) were accepted for recommendation. Of this amount in the communiqué given to the press, 20,000,000 (800,000*l.*), were shown as required, for the navy and the rest for the army. The demand for these sums will be laid before the Delegations at an early date.

In the course of the conference Admiral Graf Montecuculli took the opportunity to press for the commencement of the Dreadnoughts projected in replacement of the present "Monarch" class of battle-ships, demanding that the special credits allowed this year for the completion of the "Viribus Unitis" class should be massed together and used for the preliminaries of the new ships. This demand, however, was not accepted by the conference.

In order to secure a sympathetic attitude towards the new demand by the people generally, a fresh note of alarm at supposed Servian chauvinism was assiduously spread, including the report that the Servian leaders declined to evacuate Durazzo. This procedure appears to be normal at times of national crisis.

While it was stated that in the event of an early settlement, it was not anticipated that the total of 8,000,000 would be exceeded, it was recognised that any prolonged duration of the present uncertainty in the political position would involve further outlay.

For many reasons it would be unwise to draw the conclusion that the total sums spent on measures taken to strengthen the army lately amount to no more than 170,000,000 krones. The fact that more was originally demanded, and was refused, is proof that the demand is in the nature of vote on account. Moreover, it was admitted that many of the measures taken amounted to no more than anticipations of improvements already decided on independently of any political crisis. That is to say, that they have been partially set to the account of the special credit allowed for the equipment of the army and for the provision of new artillery material in October last, the result being that the two accounts are probably by this time inseparable. In October, besides the usual ordinary and extraordinary credits for the maintenance of the army, the sum of 41,000,000 krones (1,750,000*l.*) was allowed for artillery reorganisation and provision (*vide* my despatch No. T. 5 of the 20th October, 1912), so

that with the new demands the War Department will have authority to spend in all 9,750,000*l.*, without being obliged to come to Parliament for fresh supplies.

It is, moreover, impossible to estimate what proportion of the expenses is represented by orders for war material given to firms in Austria and Hungary with a proviso in case of eventual non-requirement ("disappointed services.") From information generally derived, the total amount of such orders must be very large indeed, and, presumably, neither the amounts of the orders nor the proportionate solatium, as estimated in each case, is yet included.

As regards the actual provision of the money, the War Department will certainly share in the total loan of 11,500,000*l.* lately concluded by the Austrian and Hungarian Governments with American firms, so that the immediate provision of money will cause no difficulty. If it is decided that the cost of this additional outlay is to be a charge against the ordinary revenues of the two kingdoms, presumably the capital sum represented should be refunded to the loan account. It will be interesting in the future to see whether this procedure will be adopted, or whether having sums at disposal they will not expend them on further army requirements and demand sanction for *des faits accomplis*.

I have, &c.

T. M. CUNINGHAME.

[2912] No. 326.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 10.)

Sir, *Rome, January 12, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that I had a long visit this afternoon from M. Rizof, the Bulgarian Minister, whose observations on Balkan questions I have on former occasions reported. He is married to a Montenegrin lady, and not only knows that country well, but is in constant communication with Montenegrins. He assures me that contact with the Servian troops during the present war has had a far-reaching effect on the popular mind. There had long been a growing spirit of opposition to the patriarchal rule of the Sovereign and discontent with the miserable conditions of existence prevailing in the barren mountains of the little kingdom, but it had never before assumed a concrete form. Now that the Montenegrins have seen with their own eyes the Servian troops well armed, well clothed, well fed, and successful in the field, this discontent is assuming a more definite character, and the idea of union with Servia is taking a definite hold on their imaginations. The Servian reveals to them conditions of prosperity and development which they have never experienced, and the readiest way to acquire similar advantages appears to them to be to associate themselves with the fortunes of the neighbour State. That the present dynasty will not survive the life of the present King, M. Rizof is practically certain. The King's sons, one of whom was accompanied to camp by his mistress of French nationality, have forfeited the popular respect and earned little or no military prestige. But he goes further, and believes that unless Montenegrin ambitions can be satisfied by the acquisition of Scutari, even the reigning King, who has so long presided over the fortunes of the small State, will hardly be allowed to finish his reign. M. Rizof did not put forward these opinions as though the future of Montenegro was a matter of particular interest to Bulgaria, and did not lead me to suspect that he had any particular motive in expressing them. He came rather to ventilate the grievances of his own country against Roumania, and the question of the future of Montenegro only arose incidentally. If his forecast of events there should be verified, it is inevitable that a new occasion of conflict is destined to arise before long between Servia and Austria-Hungary, which will never allow the mountains commanding the Gulf of Cattaro to pass into other than Austrian hands, a contingency which this country is not likely to contemplate with equanimity.

I have, &c.

R. RODD.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[2859] No. 327.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 6.)

Sir, *Bucharest, January* 13, 1913.

I AM told that the cause of the interruption of the Roumano-Bulgarian negotiations in London early last week was the statement made by M. Take Jonesco to M. Poincaré in Paris that M. Danef while in Bucharest had committed his Government to the cession of Silistria. When this statement came to the ears of M. Danef, who had carefully refrained from committing himself during his stay in Bucharest, he was so indignant that he refused to continue the negotiations, and informed his Government that, if they wished them to go on, they must send out another negotiator. M. Misu being the only person officially empowered to treat with M. Danef, the latter's action in refusing to continue the negotiations on account of a misstatement of M. Take Jonesco to a third party, was interpreted by the Roumanian Government as nothing but an expedient to gain time. They feel that Adrianople may fall any day, and they see that this would greatly weaken their position for negotiating with Bulgaria. When, therefore, M. Majoresco learned what had happened at London he at once laid the matter before King Charles, who, M. Majoresco informs me, did not hesitate to sanction an occupation of Bulgarian territory. On the 8th instant M. Majoresco informed the Austrian and Russian Ministers of this decision, both of whom most strongly urged the folly of such precipitate action, with the result that a respite was obtained during which I understand that M. Majoresco, while making it clear to the Bulgarian Government that M. Danef had not committed himself to the cession of Silistria, urged them to instruct him to resume negotiations with M. Misu. On the 10th instant, M. Kalinkof, the Bulgarian Minister here, was able to inform M. Majoresco that the desired instructions had been sent. The intention to occupy Bulgarian territory has therefore been abandoned for the moment, though, from M. Majoresco's language to those of my colleagues whom he has seen during the last few days, it is to be feared that, unless Bulgaria can see her way to granting a frontier leaving Silistria and Kavarna to Roumania, military action may prove to have been only postponed.

When I saw M. Majoresco yesterday he laid stress on the assistance which Roumania could render Bulgaria by bringing pressure to bear on Turkey to make peace, though he did not give me the impression that the Roumanian Government had actually offered Bulgaria military assistance, as was implied by the Bulgarian Prime Minister in his conversation with Sir H. Bax-Ironside, reported in the latter's telegram No. 1.

As mentioned in my telegram No. 11 of the 12th instant, M. Majoresco followed up his remarks in regard to the assistance which Roumania could render Bulgaria by the statement that Turghut Shefket Pasha was staying in Bucharest, a fairly significant hint as to what may be expected if Bulgaria will not satisfy Roumania.

I have, &c.

G. BARCLAY.

[2835] No. 328.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 15. Confidential.)

Sir, *Berlin, January* 13, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that I had yesterday the honour to attend the annual "Krönung- und Ordens-Fest" which was held at the Royal Palace of Berlin. The State functions connected with this festival were divine service in the Imperial chapel, and afterwards a luncheon to which about a thousand people, consisting of those who are in possession of Prussian orders and those who had received such on the day itself, had the honour of being invited.

Between the service in the chapel and the luncheon there was a short *cercle* for the foreign representatives present, while after luncheon the Emperor again entered into conversation with several of the Ambassadors and Ministers. On the later occasion His Majesty spoke to me at some length upon the international situation, and particularly on the subject of the suggested naval demonstration in which he said he would on no account take part. He said that he very much disliked the idea of the Powers resolving themselves into a committee for the distribution by forcible

methods of the spoils of war, and he added that if the naval demonstration were carried out it would place the powers in a somewhat ridiculous position. They most of them had ships in the Bosphorus. If these ships remained there and the Powers demonstrated with other ships elsewhere, there would be a possible danger of the former being subjected to torpedo attacks, in which case the Powers would see themselves forced to take the aggressive, and if things came to the worst, bombard Constantinople. If, on the other hand, the Powers wanted to use the ships now on the Bosphorus for the purpose of demonstration, they would have to ask the Sultan for a firman to allow the ships to pass the Dardanelles for the purpose of bringing pressure to bear on the giver of the firman.

His Majesty seemed much put out by the action of Roumania, but attributed the the obstinacy of the Turks and their refusal to give up Adrianople not so much to hopes inspired by the tension between Roumania and Bulgaria as to the fear of the Sultan that as a military revolution had placed him on the throne, so a similar movement might overthrow him if he yielded to the Bulgarian demands.

I am told that subsequently His Majesty spoke with considerable severity to the Roumanian Minister, and told him amongst other things that there was a limit to the patience of Europe, and that it was quite intolerable that the prospects of peace should be endangered by Roumania's ill-timed action.

It must have been somewhat unpleasant for the Roumanian Minister to feel that the Bulgarian representative, who was standing next but one to him, was probably overhearing every word that the Emperor said.

Before I left the palace the Chancellor asked me to come and see him sometime during the afternoon. On my calling upon him, his Excellency asked me at once on what subject the Emperor had been speaking to me. I told him what His Majesty had said about the suggested naval demonstration, and he informed me that His Majesty's remarks to me coincided with the instructions which had been sent to Prince Lichnowsky. He added that His Majesty held strong opinions on this subject, with which he was in entire agreement. He had also agreed with the Emperor in considering that the note drafted in London was perhaps a little too sharply worded, and he had therefore instructed the German Ambassador in London to suggest one or two slight alterations in the draft, which, without altering the sense or weakening the effect of the note, seemed to him to modify to a certain extent its apparent harshness. He felt sure that you would not object to these slight alterations, while as regards the inability of the Imperial Government to subscribe to the suggestion of a naval demonstration—a suggestion which had not come from His Majesty's Government—he had reason to believe that you were yourself not greatly in sympathy with the proposal. In any case it had given him the greatest satisfaction to have been able to work with you, through the German Ambassador, so harmoniously at the Ambassadors' meetings, and he hoped that the same hearty co-operation between the two Governments would be continued. This co-operation, as he had told me before, had been most useful and advantageous, and as a starting point for future good relations between the two countries it was worth more than any naval agreement or political understanding.

As regards the present situation he showed traces, and his Excellency is not alone in this, of a certain revulsion of feeling in favour of the Turks. After a few pleasant words with regard to the manner in which you had presided over the meetings of the Ambassadors in London, and directed their labours, he said that it was not for him to make suggestions or proposals, and he would certainly abstain from doing so. But it had occurred to him that it would detract from any appearance of onesidedness if the Powers were to say a word at Sophia as well as at Constantinople. As you were directing the Ambassadors' conversations he himself would certainly not make a proposal to this effect, but I was to tell you that if you should think it advisable to do so, you might be quite assured of German support.

But the point on which the Chancellor laid the greatest emphasis was that the Powers should not allow their policy to be dictated from Constantinople or Sophia. By this statement, which his Excellency repeated several times, I presume that he meant that the Powers had set before themselves the task of facilitating the settlement of certain questions which affected their interests, namely, the question of Albania, the means of giving Servia access to the sea, the future of Scutari and the Ægean Islands, and also up to a certain point the question of the Ottoman Debt; and that it was undesirable that in consequence of hitches in the negotiations between the combatants and appeals from one side or the other, the deliberations of the Ambassadors should be extended to questions by which no vital interests of any Powers were affected.

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He said subsequently that the retention or the cession of Adrianople by the Turks was a question which concerned the combatants alone. The Powers, in their desire to see the war brought to a conclusion, had advised the Turks to give way, and he personally would have liked to have seen moderating advice given at the same time to the Bulgarian Government. His idea now was that if neither Turkey nor Bulgaria would give way on the question of Adrianople and hostilities were to be resumed in consequence, the Powers should let the combatants know that the question of the ultimate possession of Adrianople was one in which they were not interested, that they must fight it out amongst themselves, and that no Power would stir a finger to help either side. He felt certain that a declaration to that effect would be more likely to bring about the conclusion of the war than either advice or threats.

The main object of the Powers was, not so much to prevent the Turks and the Bulgars from fighting, though it would be highly desirable if this could be effected, but to avoid being dragged into quarrels with which they had really no concern. Their efforts had from the first been concentrated on the localisation of the war, and he knew of nothing which had occurred since the beginning of the war to cause them to change that attitude.

At the close of the conversation he reiterated his wish that nothing that he had said to me should be regarded as a proposal; that he had merely informed me of his feeling in these matters, and that while hoping that your views were not dissimilar, he was confident that in any case you would continue to direct the deliberations of the Ambassadors in the manner most advantageous for the common interests of Europe.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[2860] No. 329.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bucharest, January 14, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a report from Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon, military attaché to this legation, regarding the sanitary state of the Bulgarian army.

This report would come more properly from the legation at Sophia, but I am sending it in order to gain time. Colonel Lyon tells me he is forwarding a copy to His Majesty's Minister at Sophia.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

Enclosure in No. 329.

Lieutenant-Colonel Lyon to Sir G. Barclay.

(No. 4. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bucharest, January 13, 1913.*

AN American army doctor, Major Fauntleroy, who has just been in Thrace on a tour of inspection of the hospitals, and is passing through here on his way to Constantinople, informs me that he considers the sanitary state of the Bulgarian army to be very bad. It was hoped that with rest and colder weather disease would be stamped out. The winter has however been exceptionally mild, and Major Fauntleroy says that there is cholera everywhere in Thrace as well as dysentery and typhoid. The cholera appears to be of a mild type. He also states that sanitary precautions are still almost non-existent, and that soldiers continue to drink out of streams that are obviously polluted.

The doctor describes the *moral* of the soldiers that he saw as excellent, and he considers that the army is quite ready to continue the war. He was horrified at the the state of neglect in which he found the sick and wounded in the Bulgarian hospital at Kirk Kilissa, and spoke of the contrast afforded by the British and Russian Red Cross hospitals that he saw there.

I have, &c.
F. LYON, *Lieutenant-Colonel,*
Military Attaché.

[2861] No. 330.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 8. Confidential.)
Sir, *Bucharest, January 15, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram No. 1 of the 13th instant, I have the honour to report that I this morning informed the Minister for Foreign Affairs that I was instructed by you to express the hope that Roumania would succeed in coming to an agreement by negotiation with Bulgaria.

His Excellency evinced some surprise and annoyance at my communication, and said that he was embarrassed as to how to reply to it, though he could assure me that he shared the hope I had expressed.

He characterised what I had said as intervention, which, while it would have been natural at the moment when peace was in jeopardy owing to the rupture of the negotiations by M. Danef, surprised him coming at a moment when negotiations were proceeding in London without foreign intervention. I pointed out to him that my communication had contained no note of pressure whatever, and had merely expressed the natural hope, which I knew had already been frequently expressed to him by many of my colleagues, that the negotiations now proceeding would result in a peaceful settlement. I also reminded his Excellency that he had on one occasion complained to me (see my despatch No. 91 of the 3rd ultimo) that he had never learned from me what were my Government's views as regards the rectification of the frontier, and I was therefore naturally surprised at his taking amiss what I had said.

My French colleague tells me that the representations which he had made under instructions from his Government only a day or two ago, urging acceptance of the Bulgarian proposals, had been taken in good part by the Minister for Foreign Affairs: I am therefore somewhat at a loss to explain the annoyance shown by M. Majoresco at my much more anodyne communication. Possibly it was due to news which had reached the Minister for Foreign Affairs just before my visit, from the German Minister that Count Benckendorff had delared to his colleagues that Roumania and Bulgaria had asked for the intervention of Russia. His Excellency, in telling me of this, expressed extreme annoyance, and declared Count Benckendorff's statement to be, as regards Roumania at least, totally devoid of foundation. Possibly, also, the present attitude of the British press may have contributed to render M. Majoresco especially sensitive at this moment, for there is no doubt that the bitterness with which Roumania's attitude has been criticised in some papers—notably in the "Morning Post" and the "Daily Graphic"—is deeply resented here.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

P.S.—*January 17.* Since writing the above, I have received some information from my Russian colleague which seems to throw more light on the attitude of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. I understand that there has been a proposal from the German Government that all the Powers should make combined representations at Sophia with a view to persuading the Bulgarian Government to cede Silistria to Roumania, in view of the pressure which is being exercised on the Porte to cede Adrianople to Bulgaria. I also understand that the Russian Government objected to this proposal unless corresponding representations were to be made at Bucharest recommending moderation. If the Minister for Foreign Affairs had wind of Russia's attitude towards the German proposal his annoyance at my communication to him on the 15th instant would be more comprehensible, for he may well have thought it was part of a formal and combined representation, and that it would be followed by similar communications from all the other representatives of the Great Powers.

G. B.

[2871] No. 331.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 7.)
Sir, *Belgrade, January 15, 1913.*

I HAVE latterly heard it stated that a tendency is now showing itself in Servia to gravitate towards Austria; that since their recent experiences regarding Durazzo

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the Servians are coming to the conclusion that as soon as Austria shows her teeth support from Russia is not to be counted upon, and that consequently unless Servia be prepared to live in a perpetual state of tension, and possibly even to allow herself to be deprived of most of the territory she has so hardly won, it would be advisable to make advances to Austria-Hungary and endeavour to come to a friendly understanding with the monarchy.

I think perhaps the impression which has given rise to these statements finds its origin in a report current for some time past to the effect that M. Pasitch would shortly proceed to Vienna to confer personally with Count Berchtold. As a matter of fact, M. Pasitch did at one moment project such a visit, but that was some weeks ago when he still cherished the hope that in return for certain economic privileges Austria might concede to Servia the territorial possession of a port on the Adriatic. From the moment, however, that he learnt, through Professor Masaryk, that Count Berchtold stood altogether firm against any such concession, M. Pasitch tells me he entirely abandoned his intention of going to Vienna.

It is, of course, obvious that the Servians—not so much the Government as the people—have lately suffered a somewhat severe disillusionment with regard to Russia. At the outbreak and during the progress of the war they have been encouraged by a strong manifestation of Panslavist feeling to believe that at the crucial moment Servia would find the support she needed. Great hopes had likewise been built upon Great Britain and France, especially perhaps the former, and even though there may have been no sufficient grounds to warrant those hopes, the wish was father to the thought, and it has been a considerable disappointment to realise that neither Russia nor the other Powers of the *entente* have considered it worth while to run any risk of war for the purpose of backing up Servian claims.

Under the circumstances it is scarcely surprising if the expediency of relying upon the Triple *Entente* is now being called into question and weighed in the balance against the possible expediency of a good understanding with Austria. But this is a mere phase affecting a certain section of public opinion, and is possibly not at all discouraged by the Government in the hope that it may act as pressure, and stimulate the Russian Government to be more solicitous for Servian interests in the future, and less accommodating towards Austria concerning the delimitation of Albania than it showed itself concerning the port question. The fear that any close understanding with Austria must at the same time entail loss of some measure of independence is far too deeply rooted in Servia to make any serious contemplation of such a contingency at all probable now, no matter what political party may be in power here, but in any case it may be stated with assurance that so long as M. Pasitch remains in office, and so long as M. de Hartwig occupies the Russian legation at Belgrade, Russian influence here will be secure. And it is a test of the power of this influence that, notwithstanding the excitement and chauvinistic spirit aroused by the successes of the war, it should have been able to inflict a severe disappointment on the national ambitions and to exact obedience with no more serious consequences than a few expressions of discontent.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[2836]. No. 332.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 17.)

Berlin, January 15, 1913.

Sir,

IN reporting my conversation with the Chancellor on Sunday last, I mentioned that there seemed to be some change in the attitude of the Imperial Government towards Turkey, and a disposition on their part to think that it was hardly for the Great Powers to bring pressure, and especially violent pressure, upon only one of the combatants.

This change of attitude has possibly some connection with their dislike to the idea of a naval demonstration, a dislike arising perhaps from considerations of the practical difficulties of such a step, and perhaps from other reasons connected with their future relations with Turkey. The change may also be due to the death of Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, whose want of sympathy with the present Turkish régime was notoriously very pronounced. This new feeling towards Turkey, however, is not confined to official circles alone, for a campaign is now in progress in both the Liberal and

pan-German press protesting against a naval demonstration, and reproaching the Government for having been led by other Powers to join in bringing pressure to bear upon the Ottoman Government, and thus encouraging the Bulgarians to remain inflexible in a matter which so nearly concerns the safety of the Turkish capital.

This campaign was initiated by the "Tageblatt," which, like most of its contemporaries, was up till lately heaping abuse upon Turkey for threatening the peace of Europe by her obstinate refusal or inability to realise the position to which her military and political incompetence had brought her.

In its issue of yesterday morning the "Berliner Tageblatt" says that the action of the German Government in joining the other Great Powers in an effort to coerce Turkey, and force her to give up Adrianople, has met with the strongest disapproval in nearly the whole of the independent German press. Newspapers of the most varied shades of political opinion ask openly why the Chancellor and Herr von Jagow allow themselves thus to be taken in tow by other Powers, and why the German Government, contrary to all custom and justice, is demanding the cession of Adrianople.

After quoting a number of Berlin and provincial, especially Hamburg, papers, who have written in the above sense, and called attention to the tactless blundering and partisanship of the Great Powers both immediately before the war broke out and at the present moment, the "Tageblatt" continues as follows:—

"Even setting aside all questions of sentiment, and apart from the somewhat undignified character of such pressure, it must be admitted that such a one-sided procedure, at least, so far as the German Empire is concerned, cannot be regarded as specially skilful. We do not want an aggravation of the situation, but rather a proposal acceptable to both parties, and there can be no doubt that the situation has become distinctly more acute in consequence of the action of the Great Powers. As a London diplomat, quoted in this morning's issue, rightly says, the Balkan States, who would have been ready eventually to accept a compromise, have been rendered more obdurate, and a moderate and sensible solution affording guarantees for peace has been made much more difficult. As matters stand at present, we must be prepared either for a loss of prestige, or, if Turkey gives way, for the outbreak of disturbances from which some other Power may derive advantages, but certainly not Germany. Instead of merely following the lead of the other Great Powers, the German Government ought to have insisted that similar and simultaneous steps should be taken both at Constantinople and in the Balkan capitals. By proceeding in this way, and by adopting a compromise consisting perhaps in the neutralisation of Adrianople, or in some other solution, the dangers at present threatening might have been minimised, if not entirely averted.

"As matters stand at present, the result of the unfortunate début of the new Jagow era is that the Balkan States, knowing that all the Great Powers are behind them, intend to break off the peace negotiations. Why, indeed, should they exert themselves to find a sensible solution when the chestnuts are being taken out of the fire for them?"

While on the subject of the press, I would mention that, in reply to certain statements made by Reuter's agent in Constantinople in regard to the delay in presenting to the Porte the note drafted by the Powers, a Berlin telegram to the "Kölnische Zeitung" states that there was no foundation for the allegation that this delay was due to Germany alone, and that there was ground for the belief that several Powers besides Germany had proposed modifications tending to soften various points in the draft, and that these modifications were under the consideration of the Cabinets.

I may add that, in a further Berlin telegram in the same issue of the "Kölnische Zeitung," attention is called to a statement in the "Germania" to the effect that Russia had hinted at Bucharest that any attack on Bulgaria would be followed by the entry of Russian troops into Roumania and an attack by the Black Sea fleet, and it is stated that nothing at all was known of such a threat on the part of Russia, and that recent information went to show that no such step had in fact been taken.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[2913] No. 333.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 11. Confidential.)

Rome, January 15, 1913.

Sir,

WITH reference to your telegram No. 13 of the 9th instant, I have the honour to report that I have twice, without much success, endeavoured to elicit some definite opinion from the Minister for Foreign Affairs as to the future of the Ægean Islands hitherto under Turkish rule.

Before, however, recording my own experiences, it may be well that I should lay before you the substance of a conversation which the French chargé d'affaires had yesterday with the Marquis di San Giuliano. It appears that the Italian Ambassador in London had recently suggested to you, in what form or on what occasion I do not know, that Italy might consider it to her advantage to remain in occupation of Rhodes and the Sporades until it became quite clear that France was not going to put forward any claims or pretensions in Syria, which would disturb the equilibrium in the eastern Mediterranean. This observation was, it seems, transmitted to Paris, and the French chargé d'affaires was at once instructed to ask the Minister for Foreign Affairs whether any such idea had been entertained by the Italian Government, and, if so, how it could be after the recent very clear statement made by M. Poincaré in the Senate.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs, when approached by the French chargé d'affaires, said that the Ambassador in London was given to talking and writing too much—it was his temperament—and people who talked too much very often said ill-considered things. In any case, there was no justification for such an observation on his part. It had been, he understood, imagined in Paris and also in London that Italy, in spite of all her protestations, had designs to retain some of the islands now in occupation. He could assure him once more that there was no such intention. The indisposition of Italy to agree to the cession of all the Ægean Islands to Greece was based upon four reasons.

In the first place, she held that it was desirable to maintain the equilibrium in the Mediterranean, which object he considered would be best effected by preserving a strong and independent Turkey in Asia. Were all the coastal islands in the hands of the Greeks, they could, from their proximity, become centres of a new agitation for expansion which would spread to the Greeks of the mainland, and it was the desire of Italy to defer as long as possible any disruption of the Turkish Empire in Asia, in view of the incalculable consequences that might arise from a partition, which Italy, as an exclusively Mediterranean Power, must always regard with extreme anxiety.

Secondly, Italy had certain agreements with Austria, and as Austria was opposed to the cession of all the islands to Greece, and it was an object with Italy to retain Austrian goodwill and support in other directions, she was under an obligation not to oppose her in this.

Thirdly, he held that at the present moment the most serious question to be dealt with was the cession of Adrianople, and it would make it easier for Turkey to give way on this point, if she were not simultaneously pressed to make a wholesale surrender of all the Ægean islands.

Fourthly, and this was the consideration which carried most weight for Italy, the co-operation of Turkey was of vital importance to her for the pacification of Cyrenaica. Turkey was acting loyally by Italy, and doing her best to carry out the terms of the Treaty of Lausanne, and Italy could not decently bargain to hand over to Greece the islands she had promised to restore to Turkey, or deprive herself of the lever which enabled her to secure the assistance of Turkey in the pacification of her new African provinces.

The French chargé d'affaires asked if he might report that these were the only considerations on which the Italian attitude was based, and his Excellency replied in the affirmative. He added, of course, if there were ever to be a partition of the remainder of the Turkish Empire, and other countries were engaged in dividing the spoil, Italy might have to consider whether, in order to maintain the balance in the Mediterranean, she would not also have to claim some part in the division, but such a contingency was, he trusted, remote and not at present in the sphere of practical politics.

I have already in my telegrams Nos. 4 and 7 forwarded to you a summary of the conversations which I have had with the Marquis di San Giuliano on the 10th and 14th instant. On the second occasion I found it hopeless to make any headway

against the objections which he put forward to every possible mode of approaching a discussion of the island question. He began by referring to the objections of Germany and Austria to the cession to Greece of the coastal islands, and those in the neighbourhood of the Straits, and on my asking whether it was inevitable that each member of the Triple Alliance should necessarily hold the same views, said, half apologetically, that in principle he quite agreed there might be individuality of opinion, and that Italy had on several questions done her best to exercise a modifying influence at Vienna, and had done so not without success, but that, generally speaking, the alliance was bound to hold together, and Italy had to support her allies on certain points in order to retain their support on others. As regards the southern islands, he repeated the argument that Italy was pledged to restore them to Turkey, and, until that obligation was accomplished, which could not be while the pacification of Cyrenaica was still doubtful, she could not in common honesty well enter into a bargain for their transfer to Greece. I asked whether there were really any regular Turkish troops left in Cyrenaica, and if there was anything more that Turkey could do to fulfil her treaty obligations which had been left undone. He maintained there were still some 300 or 400 troops which were the backbone of the Arab resistance, and that Turkey was acting loyally by Italy. I then suggested that we should for the moment leave the islands occupied by Italy out of consideration, and go back to the other islands which Greece has actually taken possession of. To this he objected, that the problem of the islands must be dealt with as a whole, and that one could not separate one group from the other. I observed that in that case we found ourselves in a vicious circle; if the southern islands could not be discussed because Italy had not yet fulfilled her treaty obligations regarding them, and the northern islands could not be discussed separately from the southern group, no discussion was possible.

Moreover, as I had pointed out at our previous interview, Greece was in possession; Turkey was apparently not likely to be able to turn the Greeks out. It appeared that on land Greece was shortly to cease being limitrophe with Turkey, so that pressure could not be brought to bear on her land frontier. Was Italy prepared to join in undertaking the responsibility of using force to bring about the restitution of these islands to Turkey, and would public opinion in Italy uphold such a proposal?

His Excellency said this was no doubt a consideration to be put in the opposing scale, as was the fact that the population of the islands was overwhelmingly Hellenic, and that it might be a source of future trouble to create a number of future Cretes. Such considerations must be carefully weighed against the danger of Greek rule over islands in close proximity to the Turkish coast. At present there were two well-defined opposing views. Could not some compromise be suggested which might be accepted by both groups of Powers? There were a large number of islands in the Ægean. I pointed out, however, that if we eliminated the islands near the Straits, those in the immediate vicinity of the coasts and the "Sporades," which were occupied by Italy, there was little left on which to compromise except Thasos, which it seemed likely Bulgaria would claim, and Crete, which for all practical purposes had long been recognised as the reversion of Greece.

To this contention there seemed to be no answer, but he repeated that as there were so many islands, some proposal in the nature of a compromise ought to be available, and that he would be most ready to give such a proposal favourable consideration. Meanwhile, the questions of Adrianople and Scutari, and the difficulty which had arisen between Roumania and Bulgaria seemed to him to be much more urgent.

It appears to me evident that Italy, in so far at any rate as she is represented by the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is entirely under the control of the Triple Alliance, and although there is undoubtedly a certain feeling in the country of discontent at a policy which does not appeal to popular sympathies, it finds public expression for the moment only in the unsubventioned organs of the Radical party.

It is perhaps inevitable that this should be so after the premature and ostentatious renewal of the Triple Alliance at the end of last year, the reason for which still seems to be a puzzle to the majority of Italians, who, however, appear to be convinced that only their diplomatic support has thereby been engaged, and that in the case of a conflict they would remain outside it, knowing as they do that after the strain of the Tripoli campaign, with the depletion of their arsenals, and the wear of material, they are in no way prepared to do more.

I have, &c.

RENNELL RODD.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[2927] No. 334.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 6. Confidential.)

Sir, *Sophia, January 16, 1913.*

FROM the 1st January the Prime Minister continued to be much exercised at the attitude of the Roumanian Government. Prince Ghika, the Roumanian Minister here, told M. Gueshof that his Government would be prepared to join the Allies against Turkey on certain conditions, which conditions were known to M. Danef in London. The Prime Minister refused to go into details, being anxious not to take up the question at that juncture, and telegraphed to M. Danef to use as much diplomacy as possible with M. Misu. Shortly afterwards the Bulgarian Government decided to send M. Teodorof, Minister of Finance, to St. Petersburgh to solicit the support of the Russian Government on this question, the ostensible reason of his visit being that it was in order to discuss certain financial questions. On the 13th I learnt that M. Teodorof had had several conversations with M. Sazonof in St. Petersburgh. The Roumanian Government, the Prime Minister informed me, had given way regarding the cession of Silistria, but desired a small rectification of frontier to the east of that town and a considerable stretch of territory in a southerly direction towards Kavarna. I am, however, entirely unable to confirm the statement made to me by M. Gueshof as to the decision of the Roumanian Government not to demand the town of Silistria. M. Gueshof was personally in favour, he told me, of making some such concession to Roumania, but several members of the Cabinet were strongly opposed to any territorial concessions.

The immediate policy of the Bulgarian Government is to allow the Roumanian Government to occupy without opposition such Bulgarian territory as they may covet for the moment, and to reserve the question of retaking it until a later period.

It does not seem impossible that, if Bulgaria is able to tide over the matter until peace is declared with Turkey, she will then call upon Servia to aid her in resisting Roumanian demands, in which case Servia would obtain, as her reward, an extension of her new frontier in the direction of Perlepe, Kuprulu, and Monastir, while Bulgaria would, should she be successful, be led to claim the Dobrudja from Roumania.

In a conversation with the Prime Minister on the 6th instant, his Excellency stated that the continued mobilisation of the Austro-Hungarian army was causing considerable dissatisfaction. The Bulgarian Government had had to exercise the strictest possible censorship in order to prevent inflammatory articles appearing in the press. M. Gueshof was of the opinion that the threatening attitude of the Roumanian Government was largely due to the attitude of Austria. The Austrian Minister had told his Excellency that the Austrian army could not be demobilised until Servia had evacuated Durazzo, to which M. Gueshof replied that Servia could not possibly do this until after the official declaration of peace. Count Tarnowski answered that the Russian preparations on the Galician frontier rendered such a step practically impossible for Austria.

The Greek point of view regarding Austria's intentions, as disclosed to me by M. Panas, the Greek Minister here, is that, by continuing in her present attitude, she will be able to enforce certain demands for commercial preference at Salonica. As a natural corollary, this policy tends to strengthen her endeavours to enlarge the boundaries of Northern Albania so as to include Scutari and to make that town the capital of the new kingdom. Failing this, Austria would possibly be led to demand from Montenegro the village of Loytchen and the heights which command the port of Cattaro.

During the last fortnight the Bulgarian Government have been convinced of the inability of the garrison of Adrianople to hold out for more than a few weeks at the utmost. They remain absolutely determined to conclude no peace which will not include the cession of that city. The condition of Adrianople, as reported from various deserters, appears to be deplorable, and much discontent undoubtedly prevails there. Negotiations regarding the cession of the town were carried on on the 7th instant between Nazim Pasha and the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the one side, and General Savoff on the other. The Turks, who insisted on discussing the question of revictualment of the fortress, were firmly given to understand that not only was this out of the question, but that the town and fortress must be given up to Bulgaria.

The parting words of the Minister for Foreign Affairs (as reported in my telegram

No. 7 of the 8th instant) seemed to give some hope that the Turks would eventually yield on this point. I further heard from a good source that secret negotiations were proceeding between General Ivanof and Shukri Pasha, to the latter of whom a large personal bribe was offered if he would surrender the town.

The latest local development in connection with the peace negotiations has been the departure of the King and his Cabinet to Mustapha Pasha, where a general council is now being held.

I have, &c.
H. O. BAX-IRONSIDE.

[2872] No. 335.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 8.)

Sir, *Belgrade, January 17, 1913.*

ON receipt of your telegram No. 15 of the 15th instant, I called at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and saw the secretary general. I told him of the information received from His Majesty's vice-consul at Uskub concerning the enforced closing of shops by the municipal authorities on Servian holidays, and said that I was instructed to reserve in the fullest manner the rights of any British subjects who may be adversely affected either in person or property by the application of the Servian municipal law in a place which is not yet recognised as Servian territory by the Powers, and where their nationals consequently continue to benefit by the Capitulations.

I have the honour to enclose copy of a short *aide-mémoire* which I handed to M. Stefanovitch at the time.

In taking note of this communication M. Stefanovitch said that strict instructions had been sent to the military and local authorities in the occupied territories to respect all the rights of foreign subjects under the Capitulations, and that, if occasional violations of these rights occurred, it was probably due more to ignorance than intention. He thought he would himself have acted similarly to the Uskub municipal authorities in the present case. He therefore suggested that it would be of great assistance if, when an infringement of our rights is threatened, His Majesty's consular officers would apprise the Servian authorities in a friendly and unofficial manner of our point of view, so that the infringement may be avoided, rather than form the subject of a representation subsequently.

I cannot very well understand the ignorance of the Servian about the Capitulations, but, as M. Stefanovitch's proposal appeared practical, I have instructed Mr. Vice-Consul Peckham in that sense.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[2873] No. 336.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 9.)

Sir, *Belgrade, January 17, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch I have received from His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica, supplementing a telegram I received from him on the 12th instant, and calling attention to the wanton destruction of property by Servian troops and to the losses they are occasioning in the districts which they occupy.

As no specific instances of damage to the property of British subjects are mentioned either in the telegram or despatch, I have limited myself to mentioning the substance of Mr. Lamb's reports in conversation with M. Pashitch and to pointing out that from the Servian point of view it seemed very bad policy to destroy property and estrange the inhabitants in localities which Servia claims as her own territory.

I presume the octroi to which Mr. Lamb refers is Trosharina, the collection of which, as stated to me both by the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the secretary-general, has now been discontinued.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 336.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir R. Paget.

Sir, *Salonica, January 11, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram and despatch of the 8th instant, I have the honour to report that I yesterday had an opportunity of visiting the town of Ghevgheli, which is the first place within my consular district at present in the effective occupation of the Servian forces. Besides the Servian garrison of 3,000, there is a Greek force of approximately the same strength and also a smaller Bulgarian one, which has now been reduced to about 500 men. There has, however, been no attempt on the part of either State to establish a civil administration, and the welfare or otherwise of the population is entirely dependent on the character or caprices of the military officers who may happen to be in charge. The Greek commandant, Colonel Constantopolos, is a good soldier and a gentleman, endowed moreover with a kindly disposition, and consequently few complaints are heard about the soldiers under his command; but the opinion was generally expressed that a prolongation of the state of affairs arising out of the presence of the Servian and Bulgarian troops must lead to the complete ruin of the community.

Ghevgheli under the Ottoman rule, in spite of the difficulties arising from the strife of nationalities and the mistakes of a defective and uncomprehending administration, was a fairly flourishing and progressing little township. To-day its population is on the verge of despair, and unfortunately I have every reason to believe that its case is typical.

Ghevgheli has owned its prosperity principally to two sources, the culture of silk and tobacco, the trade in both of which has been almost completely arrested and is in danger of being at least very seriously compromised for many years to come.

As regards the latter, the principle sources of supply are certain upland villages in the districts of Maja-dagh, the inhabitants of which, being Mussulmans and reputed rich, have been plundered of everything they possessed, including naturally all their cattle and agricultural implements, and are therefore deprived of the possibility of preparing their fields for this year's crop. In the absence indeed of extensive Government assistance their power of production will be seriously restricted for several years.

The silk industry is even more seriously threatened, for not only is the Servian Government demanding the repayment of the tithes on last year's cocoons, which has already been once levied by the Ottoman Public Debt, but the Servian and Bulgarian troops are fast cutting down the mulberry trees for fuel, the former from sheer laziness and the latter probably out of the wanton spirit of destruction which has characterised their conduct throughout this region. A well-established mulberry tree of twenty year's growth produces annually from 40 to 50 piastres worth of leaves, and may therefore be taken to represent a capital value of at the very least 10*l.*, while its value as firewood is barely a few shillings. Apart, therefore, from the effect of the destruction of the trees upon the silk production of the next twenty years, this waste is sinful and inexcusable inasmuch as ample supplies of firewood are obtainable from the hill-sides a few miles behind the town. I was told that in this respect the behaviour of the Greek troops contrasted favourably with that of the others, the former sending fatigue parties two or three times a week to cut the necessary supplies on the hills.

In addition to the mulberry trees I was told that many houses in the Mussulman quarter of the town have been demolished in order to extract and use for fuel the "Khatile" or intermediate courses of timber which generally occur in buildings of native brick.

Not only are beasts of burden and of draught being subjected to wholesale confiscation but so also are the flocks of Mussulman, and frequently even of Christian, owners. In one day alone I was assured that 18,000 sheep and 378 horses were taken from Albanian drovers in the neighbourhood of Ghevgheli. During the next two days sheep were sold to the Bulgarian villagers at less than a shilling a head and slaughtered for conversion into "Pastirma" or smoked mutton. In the district of Langhaza at a much more recent date sheep and goats have been sold at one third of their normal value. As even pregnant ewes have been indiscriminately butchered the effect will be to reduce next years' flocks by fully one half. A competent informer assures me that in the district known as the Roumluk, just outside Salonica, which has habitually provided winter pasturage for 70,000 to 80,000 sheep brought down from the highlands, there are this winter barely 5,000 head.

While at Ghevgheli I took the opportunity of interviewing the official in charge of the custom-house which the Servians have established at the railway station. He informed me that he was no longer collecting the 11 per cent. import duty on foreign manufactures, but that he continued to levy the octroi on all articles of consumption, in accordance with the tariff applied in Servia, and that he was instructed to refuse admission to such articles as tobacco, alcohol, petroleum, salt, playing-cards, and cigarette-paper, which are the subject of State monopolies in Servia, in accordance with which instructions he admitted having detained the four cases of paper manufactured by the Mair de Botton Cigarette-paper Company as reported in my despatch of the 8th instant.

I requested him to inform his superiors at Uskub and Belgrade that I have lodged a protest against interference with neutral trade which I considered a violation of international law and usage. He replied that he had already written for further instructions on this subject and could do nothing more in the matter until he received an answer, which he thought might be in three or four days.

The effect of the Servian fiscal policy has been to bring all trade in Ghevgheli to a complete standstill excepting that in contraband tobacco, which is sold openly in the streets. The price of petroleum has reached 10*s.* a tin, though in adjoining villages, which draw their suplies freely from the Greek station of Ghumendja, it is only 3*s.* 6*d.* Sugar and coffee are both unattainable by the poorer classes, and only meat is for the present cheap. The latter, however, must almost inevitably rise to exorbitant prices as soon as the stolen cattle have been sold out and the drain on the live stock of the country in general has had time to make itself felt.

The offices of the Public Debt, I was told, have been occupied by troops, and the warehouses of the Régie transformed into a military hospital.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[3014] No. 337.

M. Miouchekovitch to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

Excellence, *Hyde Park Hotel, Londres, le 17 janvier*, 1913.

LA délégation monténégrine aux négociations pour la paix avec l'Empire ottoman, soucieuse des intérêts suprêmes du royaume qu'elle représente actuellement à Londres, a l'honneur de soumettre à votre Excellence un mémorandum concernant la délimitation des frontières entre le Monténégro et l'Albanie, question qui va former l'objet des délibérations ultérieures de leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances réunis à Londres.

Dans le ferme espoir que nos revendications nationales trouveront un accueil bienveillant auprès de votre Excellence et de son Gouvernement, j'ai, &c.

Le premier Délégué de Monténégro,
L. MIOUCHÉKOVITCH.

Enclosure in No. 337.

Memorandum.

LES soussignés, délégués plénipotentiaires du Monténégro aux négociations pour la paix avec l'Empire ottoman, pensent que les sentiments de déférence dont ils sont pénétrés envers les Grandes Puissances peuvent et doivent s'accorder avec la défense des intérêts sacrés dont ils ont la charge. Ce double souci, ainsi que le désir de leur auguste Souverain de contribuer tant soit peu à la paix de l'Europe, dictent aux soussignés le devoir d'exposer à leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances réunis à Londres les raisons qui, d'après l'opinion du Gouvernement qu'ils ont l'honneur de représenter, militent en faveur d'une délimitation des frontières entre le Monténégro et l'Albanie capables d'assurer la sécurité du royaume ainsi que son développement politique et économique.

C'est à partir du confluent du Drin blanc et du Drin noir que les frontières réclamées par le Monténégro deviennent matière de controverse, par le fait qu'un État albanais vient d'être créé par une décision des Grandes Puissances. La formation de cet État au nord et au nord-est rencontre des difficultés qui tiennent à ce fait primordial, à

savoir le conflit entre les besoins plus apparents que réels de cet État nouveau-né et les nécessités plus profondes, plus logiques, découlant des âges lointains, épanouies à la suite de la dernière guerre, des États constitués sur un sol labouré par des siècles d'histoire nationale et dont le développement normal exige l'annexion des territoires conquis et occupés par leurs armées, au prix de sacrifices sans nombre. Dans ce conflit d'intérêts les soussignés éprouvent le besoin de retracer par grandes lignes les titres que le Monténégro fait valoir pour l'annexion des territoires dont les chefs-lieux sont les villes de Scutari, d'Ipek et de Djakova.

La ville de Scutari, avec son territoire, peut être considérée comme ayant à plusieurs reprises appartenue de fait à l'État serbe et à titre permanent à la sphère d'influence serbe, représentée aujourd'hui dans ces parages par le Monténégro.

Le fait que Scutari au moyen âge comptait parmi les villes "albanaises" ne saurait pas être interprété dans le sens que nous attribuons aujourd'hui à ce mot au point de vue des théories nationalistes. Si, en effet, on devait prendre dans cette question très compliquée pour critérium immuable ces éléments purement ethniques, c'est-à-dire l'origine et les noms des habitants des vieilles villes, surtout de celles qui ont subi sur la presqu'île balkanique le flux et reflux des races méditerranéennes, ainsi que les influences des éléments greco-latins et autres antérieurs à la descente des Slaves—ce procédé nous conduirait bien loin et le bilan moderne de cette enquête se solderait par une confusion permanente.

La vérité, c'est que, malgré son caractère albanais, constaté déjà au quatorzième siècle sous la dynastie serbe des Nemagnas—caractère qu'elle a partagé avec Antivari et Dulcigno, villes maritimes du Monténégro—Scutari n'a jamais cessé d'appartenir à la zone serbe, que la ville fût soumise politiquement ou non à l'Empire serbe.

Depuis les temps les plus reculés—le haut moyen âge—le Drin a été toujours considéré comme la limite extrême de l'Albanie au nord. Dans un document de 1335 le Drin est appelé "flumen Selavoniæ" (fleuve serbe). En 1362 les Vénitiens appelaient les Balsa "barones maritimæ Selavoniæ" (barons de la Serbie maritime), c'est-à-dire de Scutari, de Medua, d'Alessio et de Durazzo. A partir du onzième siècle le royaume serbe de Zeta, dont le Monténégro actuel a recueilli l'héritage, s'étendait jusqu'au Drin. A l'époque du fondateur de la dynastie serbe des Nemagnas il n'y avait que Pulati, qui, sur la rive droite du Drin, comptait pour territoire albanais. Sous le fils conquérant Miloutine l'État serbe s'étendait même jusqu'au fleuve Mati. Quant au Drin, on n'a jamais avancé des doutes au sujet de son entière dépendance politique de l'ensemble des pays serbes. Scutari, tout particulièrement, fut le siège des toutes les dynasties serbes, et bien que la royauté en Serbie—à l'instar de la royauté française et anglaise de la première moitié du moyen âge—ne résidât pas d'une manière stable, et suivie dans les grandes villes, qui jouissaient de franchises municipales et jouaient plutôt le rôle de grands centres commerciaux, il est non moins vrai que Scutari, comme Skoplje et comme Prizren, fut souvent la résidence des Souverains serbes, de même que son origine fut chantée par les rapsodes serbes comme un événement national. Son histoire fut aussi plus tard, après la bataille de Kossovo (1389), intimement liée à l'histoire des dynasties serbes, et elle ne leur cessa d'appartenir que le jour où la puissante Venise se substitua aux familles serbes dans la défense de l'ouest balkanique et des places fortes adriatiques contre la marche de la conquête ottomane.

Les écrivains albanais eux-mêmes ont toujours considéré Scutari comme appartenant, au point de vue de la géographie politique, à la Serbie; ils ont toujours affirmé que la ville d'Alessio sur le Drin séparait l'ancienne Dalmatie de l'Albanie proprement dite.

Pour les écrivains du quinzième siècle—parmi lesquels il faut mentionner le célèbre biographe de Scanderbeg, Barletius, qui était originaire de Scutari—l'Albanie finissait à Alessio. "A l'occident," dit-il, "l'Albanie a la Dalmatie, où se trouvent les villes anciennement romaines de Risano, Cattaro, Budua, Dulcigno et le fleuve Drin, sur lequel est bâtie Scutari, ville romaine."

Au point de vue ethnographique, le chassé-croisé des races, les émigrations et les immigrations déterminées par les conditions instables de la presqu'île balkanique, surtout par la présence de beaucoup d'éléments étrangers qui se confondaient avec l'élément serbe et qui, cependant, d'après l'autorité indiscutée du Professeur Yirecek, dépendaient exclusivement de la civilisation supérieure serbe, cristalisée en un grand État, toute cette fluctuation qu'on retrouve dans plusieurs époques et qui rendent si instable l'ethnographie de ces contrées, ne pourra jamais obscurcir le fait primordial et

permanent de la large conquête slave embrassant tous les éléments hétérogènes tels que l'albanais et le koutzo-valache.

La persistance de ce phénomène se traduit par la dénomination tout à fait serbe des lieux, des montagnes et des rivières (Oblik, Priparana, Merkoevitchi, Zuptsi, Kosmatch, Loutchane, Detchane, Istinitchi, Prilepi, Siptchane, Treskovitsa, Selnobor, Kochontitsa, Bistritsa, Ribnitsa, &c.)—ainsi que par le fait que, malgré l'albanisation de beaucoup de districts jadis serbes, albanisation, il faut le souligner, toute de surface, comme le prouve l'existence de nombreux cryptoserbes parmi les tribus albanaises, il suffit d'un pouvoir fort et conscient de sa structure ethnique et politique pour reprendre à rebours le procès de dénationalisation et pour asseoir sur une base granitique la puissance de l'élément serbe contre le monde chaotique des nombreuses tribus albanaises.

Géographiquement, Scutari a été de tout temps le centre de la Zeta (Monténégro).

Presque tous les cours d'eau monténégrins du versant adriatique se déversent dans le lac de Scutari, qui à son tour s'écoule par le fleuve Boïana dans l'Adriatique, assurant ainsi les communications entre le centre de Monténégro et la mer. Le lac de Scutari constitue de la sorte la seule issue naturelle pour l'État monténégrin.

Économiquement, le lac de Scutari forme un tout indivisible.

Le Monténégro a toujours souffert dans son développement économique de cette séparation violente et artificielle d'avec le bassin de la Boïana et du Drin. Pour toute la région environnante, voire même pour le haut Monténégro, la plaine fertile de Scutari constitue, nous l'avons dit, la seule issue naturelle du commerce monténégrin à la mer. Antivari n'a pas la même importance. Cette ville a été, pendant toute la période de la domination ottomane, le débouché maritime de Scutari, une simple dépendance commerciale de celle-ci. Le chemin de fer Antivari–Vir Bazar, qui serpente péniblement sur les flancs d'une très haute montagne, à raison même de sa construction déterminée par l'orographie de la contrée (4 pour cent de pente) n'est et ne sera jamais un chemin de fer commercial. Scutari, avec son territoire, représente, par conséquence, les poumons de notre pays dont la respiration fut violemment interrompue par la conquête ottomane. En outre, les dégâts causés par les crues de la Boïana et du Drin sont immenses. Par la régularisation de ces fleuves et l'abaissement du niveau du lac de Scutari, le Monténegro s'épanouira et conquerra d'un seul coup son indépendance économique.

A tous ces arguments, puisés dans l'histoire et dans la géographie, s'ajoutent des graves considérations d'ordre politique.

Il est dans la nature des choses que les États déjà constitués sur une forte base nationale soient appelés en premier lieu à bénéficier des changements territoriaux, surtout lorsqu'ils ont puissamment contribué à une profonde modification de la géographie politique d'un continent, comme c'est le cas du Monténégro et de ses alliés. Les arguments tirés de l'histoire ont une valeur bien relative en présence de l'ensemble des intérêts et des circonstances d'ordre pratique qui—Lord Salisbury l'a dit dans un discours célèbre—déterminent en premier lieu l'unité d'une nation.

Le lac de Scutari partagé en deux, la ville importante de Scutari séparée de son centre naturel, le Monténégro et la rive droite du Drin étrangers l'un à l'autre, cela ne pouvait se concevoir et se défendre qu'à la condition que le *statu quo* demeurerait un "provisoire permanent" et que le Gouvernement turc continuerait à bénéficier d'une possession de fait de plusieurs siècles. Et qu'il nous soit permis de dire, en passant, que c'est à l'ombre de ce provisoire fatal que le Monténégro, privé de son complément naturel, a dû se développer en dedans sur la base étroite de son domaine patriarcal et qu'il n'a pu disposer des ressources, qui lui étaient nécessaires tant au point de vue économique qu'au point de vue politique et moral, pour asseoir sur une base logique et naturelle un système moderne d'administration.

Dès que le Monténégro décida de procéder conjointement à ses alliés à la liquidation de la Turquie d'Europe, les Albanais, qui—il faut bien le souligner—n'ont jamais eu de vie propre, n'ont jamais pu constituer un État, pas même dans l'âge d'or de leur histoire sous Scanderbeg et les dynastes de son temps, les Albanais, disons-nous, se rangèrent immédiatement sous les drapeaux monténégrins et ils prirent une part active à la guerre contre leur Souverain ottoman. Les nombreuses tribus des Malissores, qui devaient une large dette de reconnaissance au Gouvernement monténégrin lors de leur insurrection de 1911, demandèrent leur annexion au Monténégro. Dans une adresse

collective à Sa Majesté le Roi de Monténégro, les chefs des tribus Malissores de Ruisscha, de Traboin, de Gronda, de Castrati, de Rioli, de Schkreli, de Retch, de Glioi, &c., la population de Scutari, par la voix de l'archevêque catholique de la ville, demandèrent en des termes emphatiques l'aide et la protection de Monténégro. En faisant acte de soumission par les nombreuses députations de son clergé catholique, le peuple albanais, plus sage que ses agitateurs, rendait hommage à la nécessité politique et aux intérêts bien compris de sa race. Il reconnaissait implicitement l'inanité d'une interprétation excessivement large et partant fausse du principe : "Le Balkan aux peuples balkaniques," car il faudra toujours établir une distinction entre les peuples fortement groupés dans les États qui reprirent, il y a déjà un siècle, conscience de leur personnalité historique, et les peuplades ethnographiquement distinctes, mais destinées par les lois de l'histoire à subir le rayonnement de la poussée politique et civilisatrice des nations évoluées.

Ceux parmi les Albanais qui ne se rallièrent pas aux Monténégrins et aux Serbes du Royaume de Serbie pour conquérir leur autonomie dans le cadre des États libérateurs, loin de combattre pour leur indépendance dont ils ne se souciaient guère, se rangèrent sous les drapeaux ottomans. Ces derniers, ce sont les éléments que la politique fatale de l'ancien régime turc avait employé pour battre en brèche l'élément serbe. Si on prenait pour base de la délimitation des frontières de la future Albanie ces alluvions politiques destinées à tromper l'Europe et à retarder l'unification du monde slave balkanique, on verrait le chaos installé en permanence et la pacification de la péninsule si éprouvée retardée indéfiniment. La criante injustice de cette substitution d'une race par une autre a été reconnue à maintes reprises par l'Europe. Elle a été la semence des revanches nationales auxquelles nous assistons.

Les mêmes raisons militent, d'après l'opinion du Gouvernement Royal, pour l'annexion des nahiés de Petch (Ipek) et de Djakova.

Les soussignés se permettent de remarquer que la ville et le couvent de Petch sont inséparables de l'histoire nationale des Serbes. C'est à Petch que le premier successeur de Saint Sava, l'archevêque Arsenius I, fonda au treizième siècle un archevêché, qui plus tard, en 1346, fut érigé par l'Empereur Étienne Douchan en "patriarcat des Serbes et des Grecs." La résidence des patriarches qui, depuis lors, affirmèrent leur complète indépendance du Patriarche de Constantinople, fut, jusqu'à la fin du dix-septième siècle, le célèbre couvent de Petch ("Velikaia Crkov Patriarchija"). Le Roi Étienne Onroch III avait déjà construit, en 1330, le couvent de Detchani. Ce couvent illustre, situé à mi-chemin entre Petch et Djakova, que les troupes monténégrines restituèrent à la nation serbe après cinq siècles d'esclavage sous les Turcs, fut comblé par les Souverains serbes de terres et de donations de toute espèce. Les propriétés de Detchani, trait d'union entre les deux villes serbes de Petch et de Djakova, s'étendaient depuis le Drin blanc (Bieli Drin) jusqu'au lac de Scutari.

En résumant les arguments précédents, les soussignés se permettent de faire remarquer à leurs Excellences les Ambassadeurs des Grandes Puissances que tous les titres qu'on pourrait invoquer en droit public et en droit international pour l'annexion d'un territoire militent en faveur de l'annexion de Scutari, de Petch et de Djakova au Royaume du Monténégro.

L'occupation armée, à la suite d'une guerre nationale entreprise, au prix de sacrifices immenses en hommes et en argent, pour la délivrance des chrétiens et des mahométans, des territoires soumis pendant plusieurs siècles aux Turcs, territoires que le Monténégro et la Serbie n'ont fait que restituer à la nation à laquelle on les avait arrachés ; les consécrations historiques dont on n'a jamais perdu le souvenir, l'intérêt politique et économique du Monténégro qui, sans ces territoires, serait irrémédiablement condamné à une éternelle dépendance commerciale, forme déguisée de la dépendance politique ; le rôle que le Monténégro est appelé à jouer comme élément civilisateur et coordinateur des tribus albanaises dont les coutumes seraient respectées par un Gouvernement bien plus favorable, par sa nature et par ses traditions, au développement des Albanais, qu'un Gouvernement improvisé et privé de ressources, comme, d'ailleurs, les sujets albanais actuels du Monténégro en font foi ; la large tolérance religieuse, surtout le respect de l'élément catholique albanais qui trouverait, sous le régime concordataire monténégrin, un appui efficace pour ses besoins spirituels auprès du Saint-Siège ; enfin, la raison d'État, corroborée et consacré par la volonté clairement exprimée de la population des régions en question : toutes ces raisons dictent au Gouvernement monténégrin le devoir péremptoire de déclarer aux Grandes Puissances que l'annexion de Scutari, de Petch et de Djakova, inscrite, en premier lieu, sur le programme qui a présidé à l'ouverture des hostilités, forme un tout nécessaire et que le Monténégro, plutôt que renoncer à cet agrandissement logique et naturel de son territoire, préférerait disparaître comme facteur politique sur les Balkans.

L'expérience ne tardera pas à démontrer l'inanité des efforts qui tendent à faire sortir du chaos des clans albanais un État viable et civilisé, un nouvel élément d'ordre et de discipline sur les flancs des Balkans. Les deux Royaumes serbes qui, par la loi de l'atavisme historique, sont à même de comprendre mieux que personne l'état d'âme des populades albanaises, se sont inclinés devant la volonté unanime de l'Europe.

Le Monténégro croit, cependant, avoir mérité, par sa glorieuse histoire, qui n'est qu'un long combat pour le redressement de l'équilibre jadis rompu par la conquête ottomane et par ses instruments, un traitement plus libéral pour ses légitimes aspirations et de ne pas être sacrifié aux vagues essais de constitution d'un nouvel État, dont les éléments constitutifs n'ont représenté pendant de siècles que le désordre et la rébellion permanents contre toute idée de cristallisation politique et de civilisation.

L. MIOUCHEKOVITCH.
Comte L. VOÏNOVITCH.
J. POPOVITCH.

Londres, le 17 janvier, 1913.

[3057] No. 338.

Manchester Chamber of Commerce to Sir Edward Grey.—(*Received January* 20.)

Sir, *Manchester, January* 18, 1913.

ON the 10th January I had the honour of addressing a letter to you with reference to the position and prospects of the large body of Manchester merchants, members of this Chamber, engaged in trade with the port of Salonica.

I am now instructed by the president of this Chamber to amplify this letter and to bring to your notice the serious losses which may be entailed on these merchants if the judgment of the law courts of Salonica are no longer operative in the districts of Macedonia, Kossova, Epirus, Albania, Monastir, and Novi-Bazar. A large number of the clients of the Salonica merchants are traders in these districts, and if they are to be no longer amenable to the Salonica tribunal, the result may be repudiation of their debts. The Salonica merchants would then be put to great expense in having to bring actions, in many cases for small amounts, in the different districts, the cost of which individually might exceed the amount of the debt. They would thus have to face either the total loss of the money claimed or expenses amounting to more than their claims.

The effect on Manchester merchants is fully explained in my letter of the 10th January, where it is stated: "Manchester merchants will lose the business, and in addition to that—as it is common in all Oriental countries, when traders have running accounts, to pay for their old liabilities with the proceeds of new business—the debts now owing in Manchester on Salonica account will in all probability never be discharged at all."

The merchants of Salonica have already (viz., in December 1912) addressed a memorial, to the same effect as my letter, to the consuls of the Great Powers in Salonica, which memorial has doubtless reached you. Lest it should not have done so, I enclose a copy.

I have, &c.
WALTER SPEAKMAN, *Secretary*.

Enclosure in No. 338.

Memorial addressed to Consuls of Great Powers at Salonica by Merchants.

M. le Consul, *Salonique, décembre* 1912.

LES soussignés, négociants importateurs établis à Salonique, relevant les uns de la nationalité ottomane, les autres des diverses Puissances des Balkans et de l'Europe, ont l'honneur de vous exposer ce qui suit :—

Il est à votre haute connaissance que notre contrée manquant, pour ainsi dire, totalement d'industrie, presque toutes les marchandises manufacturées en général sont importées d'Europe.

Ces marchandises sont vendues par nous en gros dans les nombreuses petites localités qui constituent nos débouchés, et situées dans les régions de Macédoine, Cossovo, Épire, Albanie, vilayet de Monastir et Novi Bazar—bref, dans les nombreuses régions tributaires plus ou moins du port de Salonique.

Nos acheteurs de ces localités sont presque constamment débiteurs envers nous de sommes dont l'importance varie naturellement suivant la valeur morale et financière de chacun d'eux, mais dans la totalité ces débits envers les négociants importateurs de Salonique s'élèvent à un grand nombre de millions de francs.

Les soussignés appréhendent fortement les pertes les plus graves pour eux à la suite des événements qui ont jeté le trouble dans les régions précitées, pertes qui pourraient devenir du fait que les firmes débitrices seraient effectivement dans l'impossibilité de faire honneur à leurs engagements pour cause de ruine réelle de leur commerce, de la disparition des titulaires de ces firmes, ou de toutes autres considérations inhérentes à des circonstances aussi désastreuses.

Mais en dehors de ces pertes, contre lesquelles il serait impossible de se défendre et dont le commerce d'importation de Salonique ressentira déjà fort cruellement la répercussion, les soussignés désireraient se prémunir contre toutes autres pertes qui pourraient être la conséquence du partage des régions précitées entre les diverses Puissances balkaniques.

Dans une telle éventualité, en effet, et surtout dans le cas où des barrières douanières différentielles ne permettraient plus désormais au port de Salonique de desservir comme précédemment les régions qui nous occupent, il est évident que les débiteurs desdites contrées, qui ne seraient plus dans l'obligation de recourir au marché de Salonique, pourraient fort probablement se montrer quelque peu difficiles à acquitter les dettes contractées jusqu'à présent, d'autant plus qu'ils auraient conscience de la difficulté pour les négociants importateurs de Salonique de les poursuivre par-devant la justice de leurs villes ou villages, s'agissant en chaque cas spécial de sommes relativement petites, mais qui n'exigeraient pas moins de gros frais de déplacements et autres.

Effectivement il serait des plus onéreux, des plus désastreux si les négociants importateurs d'ici devraient entreprendre des frais des délégués dans chaque ville ou village pour poursuivre dans les juridictions respectives desdites localités la rentrée de ces créances.

Les effets représentatifs de ces créances portent que ces créanciers ou débiteurs élisent domicile à Salonique et déclarent le tribunal de commerce de Salonique comme seul compétent pour en connaître. Aussi jusqu'à présent toute poursuite s'effectuait par devers le tribunal de commerce de Salonique, et toute sentence de ce dernier avait force exécutoire dans les localités en question où les débiteurs avaient leurs résidences commerciales.

C'est la continuation de ce mode de procédure, du moins en ce qui concerne les dettes contractées jusqu'à présent par les localités en question envers la place de Salonique, que les soussignés désireraient voir établir sous le nouveau régime auquel cette ville sera soumise; et c'est à ces fins qu'ils viennent solliciter votre haute intervention. Ce ne serait d'ailleurs que justice, puisque ces effets de commerce stipulent déjà que les parties font élection de domicile à Salonique.

En pouvant user ainsi de la faculté dont ils jouissaient jusqu'à présent, les soussignés entendent donc pouvoir poursuivre à Salonique même leurs débiteurs récalcitrants des nombreuses localités précédemment desservies par Salonique, et avoir l'assurance que les Puissances entre lesquelles ces localités seront divisées consentiront à reconnaître la valabilité des sentences des tribunaux de Salonique et à les faire exécuter dans leurs États respectifs. Des tribunaux d'appel et de cassation devront, par voie de conséquence, être institués à Salonique pour connaître de ces affaires, si elles nécessitaient des procédures d'appel ou de cassation.

Les soussignés, dont les pertes déjà graves ne peuvent pas faire de doute, osent espérer, M. le consul, qu'il sera digne d'intérêt par vous de soumettre à qui de droit l'objet de la présente, afin que les négociants importateurs de Salonique dont les attaches avec les établissements industriels européens sont si étroites ne soient pas encore considérablement lésés dans leurs intérêts du chef de ne pouvoir pas, comme précédemment, poursuivre par-devant les tribunaux de commerce d'ici tous les débiteurs de mauvaise foi de l'intérieur qui tenteraient de se dérober à l'exécution de leurs engagements en mettant à profit les inconvénients que résulteraient pour leurs créanciers d'ici du fait de ne pouvoir obtenir justice à Salonique même.

Les soussignés vous prient d'agréer, &c.

[Suivent soixante-dix-sept signatures.]

P.S.—Copie originale de ce document avec les signatures est déposée à la chambre de commerce de notre ville.

[2808] No. 339.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 32. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 19, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 28 of 17th January.

I learn from a good source that in a naval engagement cruisers "Torgut Reis" and "Barbarossa," made in Germany, have been badly damaged, while 4 Turkish officers and 37 men were killed and 98 wounded. This result will tell considerably in favour of peace, especially in the matter of cession of islands, as it all but destroys any hope that, by regaining command of the Ægean Sea, military situation at Salonica and [on] the Macedonian littoral might be altered to Turkey's advantage. Cabinet will not take any definite decision pending reply to communication sent to Turkish Ambassador in London.

Grand Vizier has reverted to idea of a Grand Council to be held next Tuesday or Wednesday at the palace. His Highness's dilemma is that, if he makes peace (including cession pure and simple of Adrianople) to prevent further disasters, an internal revolution or civil war may result in the return to power of the Committee Jacobins, who would, he thinks, bring still greater disasters on country. He is feeling his way to see how far he can safely take repressive measures against the extremists, in case it has to be decided to make a peace involving the surrender of Adrianople.

(Sent to Sophia, Athens, Belgrade, and Bucharest.)

[2855] No. 340.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 19, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 22 of 17th January.

Chancellor has sent me the following communication :—

The Imperial Government fully realises the difficulties which may arise from divergence of views between Russia and Austria in Albania, and especially the Scutari question, and are quite ready to use their influence in Vienna to promote a friendly settlement. They entirely share Sir E. Grey's view that everything possible must be done to prevent divergence of views in Ambassadors' meetings from becoming acute, and they welcome with lively satisfaction the efforts which Sir E. Grey is making with that object. The Imperial Government think that a word of conciliatory advice from Sir E. Grey at St. Petersburgh would contribute very effectually to clearing up of the situation, and express the hope that close co-operation of England and Germany may result in a solution of the present problem satisfactory to both parties.

[3075] No. 341.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January 20, 1913.*

ISLANDS commanding entrance to Dardanelles.

I have learned confidentially from a person whose information is authoritative that Russia is ready that these islands should be ceded to Greece because she has come to a secret understanding with M. Venizelos in accordance with which the question of the opening of the Dardanelles shall be raised by the latter Government.

[3085] No. 342.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Rome, January 20, 1913.*

I UNDERSTAND from German Ambassador, who leaves for Berlin on the 22nd January, that Germany intends to propose that island question should now not be

further discussed at conference of Ambassadors, but that Balkan allies should be left to settle it directly with Turkey, and that if surrender to Greece is accepted, only then Great Powers should intervene and stipulate for similar conditions as regards ceded islands to those Russia has put forward regarding islands at entrance to Dardanelles.

[2885] No. 343.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 20, 1913.*

HIS Majesty's consul-general at Beirout telegraphs that "Hamidieh" called there on 18th January and landed officer and three men to set wireless telegraphy apparatus.

[3076] No. 344.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 34. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 20, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 43 of 19th January.

The idea as to the possible conditions attending the cession of Adrianople did not originate with me but with a relative of the Grand Vizier, and was endorsed by my Russian collegue. It seemed to fit in with the statement of M. Danef that "he would be ready to discuss conditions on which the town would be ceded," quoted in your telegram No. 25 of 10th January.

The Grand Vizier's idea is gradually to reconcile his Cabinet and supporters to the surrender of Adrianople, and to be able to justify it by showing that he has exhausted all appeals in friendly European quarters.

I have used language contained in your telegram No. 39 of 17th January, but the difficulty lies in the inability of the Turkish public to face inevitable facts.

[3082] No. 345.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, January 20, 1913.*

BULGARIAN outrages.

I have carried out instructions in your despatch No. 14 of 15th January.

Prime Minister states that communication was not altogether unexpected in view of statements in public press. He asserts that no outrages have been committed by Bulgarian regular troops, and actions of bands have been quite irregular and directly opposed to the orders issued by General Savof from head-quarters.

He is personally much grieved at reports, though not yet prepared to admit their authenticity.

[3083] No. 346.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 20. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 20, 1913.*

PRIME Minister, who has just called, discussed with me at some length prospects of peace. He states as soon as surrender of Adrianople is settled peace delegates will bring up question of war indemnity. This they will insist on. He seemed to think that if difficulties arose Bulgaria would probably remain in possession of portions of

Turkish territory, as, for instance, Rodosto, until arrangements were made for settling the indemnity. He quoted German action in 1871 as a precedent.

If the difficulties were very great he hinted at the possibility of a sequestration of revenues of the Ottoman Public Debt in the ceded territories. I refrained from offering any remarks beyond stating that financial questions of such a nature were generally discussed in Paris.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[2930] No. 347.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 20.)

(No. 2.)
(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, January 20, 1913.*

OFFICERS of the 8th cavalry division are ordered to provide second chargers.

Officer from the 8th cavalry reserve regiments is buying horses at Odessa for his regiments. The season is unusual.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh and Constantinople.)

[3164] No. 348.

Sir Edward Grey to Viscount Kitchener.

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 20, 1913.*

FRENCH Government have enquired whether anything is known in regard to a report that the Khedive has offered a loan of 3,000,000*l.* to the Sultan in return for a concession to him of the Hedjaz Railway. French Ambassador was told that we knew nothing of so improbable a story, but that we would enquire of you

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[3318] No. 349.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 20, 1913.*

THE Turkish Ambassador with Reschid Pasha and Nizamy Pasha, the two Turkish delegates to the Peace Conference, came to see Sir Arthur Nicolson and myself to-day.

They pointed out that the collective note of the Powers advised the Turkish Government to cede Adrianople, on the one hand, and, on the other, to leave the question of the Ægean islands to the Powers, while it held out expectations of financial and other benefits which Turkey would gain. Though the cession of Adrianople would be definite, the promises about the islands and the other things were quite vague. Supposing that Turkey did agree to cede Adrianople, how was she to know that the allies would not put forward further conditions, such, for instance, as an indemnity? And what would the Powers do respecting all these things?

I said that I could give only my personal opinion about an indemnity, which was that it would be inequitable to keep all the territory occupied in war and also to ask for an indemnity, though, when the occupied territory, or part of it, was given back, it was no doubt usual to ask for an indemnity. The Powers had not come to any decison about the islands. Though, from one point of view, it was natural that Turkey should ask the Powers to help her if she accepted the advice of the Powers, yet she could hardly expect the Powers to make sacrifices solely to enable Turkey to give up Adrianople. This would, in effect, be to ask the Powers to purchase Adrianople from Turkey in order to make a present of it to Bulgaria. As to the islands, if Turkey, by continuing the war, could recapture those which were already occupied by Greece, then the offer of the Powers was worth nothing; but if Turkey could not recapture them, the offer of the Powers, vague as it was, must at least be worth something, and Turkey had nothing to lose by agreeing to it. The question of the islands occupied by Italy was one for the Powers and Italy to discuss if the islands were to be ceded to Greece.

The Ambassador and the delegates pressed me very much to define what the Powers meant.

I said that I would mention this point at the next meeting of Ambassadors, but the Ambassadors were not likely to offer an opinion until they had before them the text of Turkey's reply to the collective note, given to the Powers by the same channel through which the note had been sent by them. If the Turkish Government wished to get answers from the Powers, they should state in their official reply the points on which they required explanations, and do so as quickly as possible.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3319] No. 350.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 23.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 20, 1913.*

I SAW Sir Henry Babington Smith to-day. I told him of what I had said to the German and French Ambassadors, and of what the German Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had said, as reported in Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 10 of the 17th instant.

Sir Henry Babington Smith explained that the Ottoman Bank and the Deutsche Bank had contemplated an option on a large loan to Turkey. The National Bank considered that a large loan could not be contemplated on a sound basis without foreign control to secure reduction in military expenditure. This would raise the question of a territorial guarantee of Turkey against aggression. We doubted whether this was necessarily so.

I said that I agreed with what the German Acting Secretary had said about advances to carry on the administration of Turkey, but I also felt that to put Turkey on a sound financial basis it would be necessary to have some sort of foreign control of Turkish finances, and this question would have to occupy the attention of the Powers, particularly France, Germany, and ourselves. But the Powers would not attend to the financial question of the future till the peace terms were settled and the political difficulties affecting European Turkey were adjusted. I thought that the Deutsche Bank and the Ottoman Bank should bring the question before their Governments, and I hoped that the National Bank would keep in close touch with these two banks.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3108] No. 351.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 12.)
Sir, *Belgrade, January 18, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that Colonel Boyovitch, who has been War Minister during the campaign, has resigned, and has been succeeded by General Bozanovitch, the commander of the Danube division.

Colonel Boyovitch's resignation is due to differences of opinion between himself and General Putnik, commander of the forces, regarding the promotion of certain officers.

General Bozanovitch took a prominent part in the conspiracy of 1903, but is not one of the officers whose removal His Majesty's Government required before the renewal of relations.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[3109] No. 352.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Belgrade, January 18, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that, in compliance with the instructions contained in your despatch No. 3 of the 15th instant, I to-day handed unofficially to the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs copy of the memorandum respecting the reports which have reached His Majesty's Government of outrages perpetrated on the Moslem inhabitants of territory in Servian occupation.

M. Stefanovitch said he would communicate it to M. Pashitch, but maintained that the reports were fabrications.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[3101] No. 353.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 24.)
Sir, *Paris, January 19, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, with reference to my telegram No. 7 of to-day's date, copy of a note from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, stating that the French Government have not received any information in regard to the refusal of the Servian authorities to hand back the offices of the Ottoman Debt Administration at Uskub, together with the cash in hand and revenue stamps which they had appropriated, and acquainting me with the instructions which are being addressed to the French consul at Uskub on the subject.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 353.

M. Poincaré to Sir F. Bertie.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, le 18 janvier, 1913.*

PAR une note du 7 de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu porter à ma connaissance que, d'après le rapport du consul de Sa Majesté britannique à Uscub, l'autorité militaire serbe aurait refusé d'évacuer les bureaux de la Dette publique ottomane qu'elle a indûment occupés et de rendre les espèces et timbres qu'elle a saisis, et a exprimé le désir de savoir si le consul de France à Uscub avait adressé une semblable rapport à ce sujet.

Je m'empresse de faire connaître à votre Excellence que je n'ai reçu aucun rapport dans ce sens, et que j'ai écrit au représentant de la république à Uscub, afin de l'engager, s'il est saisi d'une plainte de ce genre, de concerter avec son collègue d'Angleterre et d'en référer aux Ministres à Belgrade.

Ceux-ci ont en effet eu pour instructions dès le 23 novembre dernier de signaler au Gouvernement serbe que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane, agissant pour le compte des créanciers étrangers de la Turquie, était seule dûment qualifiée pour assurer elle-même, dans les provinces occupées, la gestion des intérêts dont elle a la garde.

Je ne doute pas que la démarche des représentants diplomatiques à Belgrade, s'appuyant sur les réserves faites antérieurement, n'ait pour effet de mettre un terme aux abus signalés par le consul de Sa Majesté britannique à Uscub.

Agréez, &c.
(Pour le Président du Conseil, &c.),
PALÉOLOGUE.

[3093] No. 354.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 20, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 40 [? 44] of 17th January.

Referring, in the course of conversation to-day, to his suggestion for combined action at Constantinople on the part of England, France, and Russia, Minister for Foreign Affairs remarked that as you were opposed to it there was nothing more to be said. Were Bulgaria, however, on the renewal of the war to meet with reverses Russia would have to intervene by herself. He did not think that this was likely, and gave me clearly to understand that Russia would take no action except in case of Bulgarian defeat. Austria, he thought, would hardly venture, should hostilities be renewed, to attempt to impose on Servia a definite settlement of their future relations.

His Excellency had heard that Roumania had suggested referring her difference with Bulgaria to arbitration, and thought that Bulgaria was not likely to accept such a solution; the fact that it was put forward showed that Roumania would hardly go to war. Were she, nevertheless, to occupy by force territory in dispute Bulgaria would not, he believed, offer armed resistance, so that Russia would not be called on to intervene. Bulgaria, however, would bide her time, and eventually seize the whole of the Dobradja.

[3247] No. 355.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 21, 1913.*

THE Grand Vizier has not yet finally decided as to the convocation of the Grand Assembly which had been announced for to-morrow, as to its composition, and as to whether it will have only consultative powers, or whether the final decision respecting the reply to the collective note is to be left to the Cabinet on its own responsibility. The Grand Divans convoked in 1827 and 1877 decided in favour of war.

During the last three days the Cabinet's position has been somewhat strengthened, and tendencies have grown correspondingly more pacific.

[3251] No. 356.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 21, 1913.*

INVITATIONS have now been issued for meeting of Grand Assembly for to-morrow at noon at Imperial Palace. It will be composed of high civil and military functionaries, senators, and councillors of State, but not ex-Ministers, as the majority of these are committee extremists. Assembly will be purely consultative, and ultimate decision will rest with Cabinet.

[3242] No. 357.

Consul-General Smith to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, January 21, 1913.*

MY telegram of 12th November.

Time-expired men are ordered to stay with the colours till next June.

(Sent to embassy and Constantinople.)

[3097] No. 357*.

Viscount Kitchener to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, January 21, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 5 of 20th January.

I have heard nothing as to this and cannot believe that there is anything in it. I will telegraph if I hear any confirmation.

[3318] No. 358.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1913.

TURKISH Ambassador and the two principal Turkish delegates called on me yesterday for the purpose of elucidating certain points in the collective note. They enquired whether, assuming that an arrangement satisfactory to all parties was made in respect to Adrianople, the Powers would be in a position to assure the Turkish Government that the allies would formulate no further demands for territorial concession, and would accord a satisfactory frontier line in the Adrianople vilayet. They also enquired what the Powers proposed to do with the islands supposing the Turkish Government were to leave the settlement of their future status to the Powers and, further, what was the precise nature of the financial assistance foreshadowed in the collective note. They also expressed the hope that they could be assured that no war indemnity would be demanded. I told them that I could give no answer without consulting the other Powers, and that the latter could not examine these questions until they had before them the text of the Turkish reply to the collective note. The Turkish Government might propound these questions in their reply, which should be given with as little delay as possible.

[2803] No. 359.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1913.

LORD KITCHENER'S telegram No. 3 of 19th January: Mariut Railway.

Inform Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs privately.

(Repeated to Cairo, No. 6.)

[2716] No. 360.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 10 of 17th January.

I have seen Sir H. Babington Smith and have informed him that I agree with Acting Secretary of State that there is no objection to a small loan to Turkey for immediate administrative requirements; but I do not think it well at this stage for banks to secure options for and hold out prospects of larger loans to be advanced later.

I understand that 1st (14th) March will be a critical date for Turkey, as considerable financial obligations mature on that date. The question of larger advances will then have to be decided upon, and it seems neither desirable nor reasonable to expect that banks should make such advances unless some form of financial control, precluding excessive expenditure for naval and military purposes, has been instituted.

I doubt whether such control could be exercised by the banks, and I think the Great Powers will have to consider in what form control can be established, or an effective advisory commission set up.

As British, French, and German financial interests are most heavily involved in Turkey, I should wish to know the views of the French and German Governments before other Powers are consulted.

The question of the customs increase will also shortly be forced upon us. We are ready to agree to this on conditions which have been fully stated to the Ottoman Government, and subject to the assent of all the Powers interested.

I have advised Sir H. Babington Smith to keep in close touch with the Ottoman and Deutsche Banks respecting the question of advances.

Please make a communication in the above sense to M. Zimmermann.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 28, and Constantinople, No. 46.)

(To Paris only.)

My telegram No. 25 of to-day to Sir E. Goschen.

Please make a communication in this sense to Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

[2855] No. 361.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 12 of 19th January: Balkans settlement.

You may inform Chancellor that I have not failed, and shall not fail, to encourage or to suggest possible forms of compromise; but the fact of Russia having agreed to Austrian solution of Adriatic port makes it difficult to press her to make concessions that would abandon both Servian and Montenegrin claims on remaining points, and impossible for Russian Government to give way too much.

[2796] No. 362.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 15 of 18th January.

I am not clear what is precisely intended by Servian territory. Does this refer to Servia alone, or does it include the territory now in occupation by Servian troops?

If it refers to territory in military occupation, I do not consider Servian Government have any right to levy duties, over and above those authorised under the Capitulations, upon foreign imports, and if they have levied such duties they should forthwith refund them.

The only satisfactory arrangement pending the recognition of the annexation by the Powers is for customs duties to be levied as heretofore on all imports at Salonica; these duties are largely pledged as security for various financial obligations incurred by Turkey.

If the imports are those destined for Servia proper, then they can pass through Salonica in transit.

(Repeated to Salonica; Paris, No. 29; Rome, No. 28; St. Petersburgh, No. 51; Berlin, No. 28; Vienna, No. 29; Sophia, No. 12; Constantinople, No. 49; Uskub; Athens, No. 7; and Cettinjé, No. 6.)

[3083] No. 363.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.**

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1913.

I UNDERSTAND that allies are likely to claim a war indemnity from Turkey. This does not seem equitable in addition to the very large territorial concessions demanded. But, apart from this, I do not see how Turkey will be able to pay an indemnity, and to impose this burden upon her will make her financial reorganisation on a sound basis impossible, and will cripple the civil administration and future commercial development of the territory left to her, for she will have very little to spare anyhow for naval and military expenditure, even if no indemnity is imposed.

Financial collapse of Turkey will be to the disadvantage of all the Powers, and I should like to discourage the idea of an indemnity.

Please ascertain views of Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[2699] No. 364.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 8.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1913.

M. SKOULOUDIS informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 15th January that, on the pressing advise of the French Ambassador, the allies had decided to postpone their notification to the Ottoman delegates to the effect that the conference had failed.

* Also to Sir R. Goschen (No. 29), Sir F. Cartwright (No. 30), Sir R. Rodd (No. 29), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 30).

M. Skouloudis said that the allies would wait to see what reply the Porte would give to the collective note of the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3521] No. 365.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Rose-Ironside.

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1913.

THE Bulgarian Minister brought to-day the Bulgarian Minister of Finance to see me.

The Finance Minister pressed me to give counsels of moderation in Bucharest. It was the prospect of a difficulty between Roumania and Bulgaria that was giving encouragement to Turkey and making the negotiations drag.

I said that we all wished to see peace concluded; but, if one Power began to give advice in Bucharest, other Powers would give advice in Sophia. This would all appear in the newspapers, the Turks would read it there and would know that there was a division amongst the Powers. This would be a greater encouragement to Turkey than anything else. At present the Great Powers were not divided. They had presented a collective note in Constantinople. I thought that the quieter they kept as regards other matters while they were waiting for the answer to their note, the better.

The Bulgarian Minister seemed to agree in what I said.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3522] No. 366.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 5.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 21, 1913.

THE Servian delegate to the peace conference gave me to-day the accompanying paper, which was being communicated to the Ambassadors also this afternoon.

I said that he must not think me unsympathetic if I did not make promises. The matter was one to be discussed between all the Powers, and it would be undesirable to push to the point of war the question of whether Albania was to be a little bigger or a little smaller. Servia was sure, in present circumstances, of a large accession of territory, and whether she got rather more or rather less at the present moment seemed less important than the risk of losing, as the result of a European war, what was at present assured to her. If war took place between the Great Powers the frontiers of Albania would be settled, not by ethnographical, historical, or geographical considerations, but simply by the result of the war.

M. Vesnitch argued the importance of arranging something now that would be a final settlement.

I said that it was a mistake to speak as if the settlement of the present war was to be final, like the end of a book. The disappearance of Turkey from Europe was not the end of the book, it was the beginning of a new volume of history of which the settlement which we were now trying to arrange would be only the first chapter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 366.

Paper communicated by Servian Delegate to Peace Conference.

FROM the time of the Ottoman invasion into the Balkan countries the Servian nation never ceased to struggle for an independent national existence.

In the beginning of the nineteenth century the Servians of Shumadiya were the first Balkan nation which, under its leader, Kara-George, rose up to fight for its national liberation, giving thereby the first impulse for the liberation of other Balkan nations too.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

In the year 1876 the Servians of Servia and Montenegro rose up again to liberate their co-nationals in Turkey, and their action led ultimately to the liberation of Bulgaria.

And three months ago the Servians, in alliance with the Bulgarians and Greeks—united between themselves by the identical national ideals, and by the same sentiments of duty towards their own co-nationals in Turkey—undertook to secure the victory to the principles of nationality and liberty.

Having such a past and such principles, the Servians can not, in principle, have anything against the organisation of Albania as an autonomous country. On the contrary, they can be only proud that, by their own and their allies' victorious campaign against Turkey, they gave occasion and possibility that the organisation of an Albanian State could be thought of.

And the moment it was understood that the Great Powers have decided that such an Albanian State should be created, the Servian Government hastened to declare that, on the conclusion of peace, the Servian army shall be withdrawn from Albania.

Although the victories of the Servian army, and the actual occupation of the Albanian territories by the same, could give us a legitimate justification for the definite retention of such conquered territories, we have not hesitated to make new sacrifices, only to prove how much the Servian nation wishes to respect the rights of every other nation, and how much we wish to comply with the desires and interests of the Great Powers.

Having given such a proof we believe we have the right to expect that the rights and interests of the Servian nation shall be respected. We are happy to know that the rights and interests of the Servian nation do not conflict with the legitimate interests of whatever Great Power. Still happier we are in knowing that no legitimate reason exists why any of the Great Powers should call in question the clear rights and legitimate interests of the Servian nation.

But we are deeply convinced that the delimitation of Albania could not be successfully carried out without a full knowledge of real facts and circumstances connected with such a delimitation. We thought it our duty to contribute, as much as we can to the fuller knowledge of those real facts and circumstances, and therefore we have prepared this *pro-memoriâ* explaining the views of the Servian Government concerning the delimitation of the autonomous Albania. In that explanation we might legitimately give the first place to the right of conquest, as the Turks had once exclusively by that right occupied all our territories. But we prefer to give the first place to our historical, ethnographical, cultural, and, therefore, to our moral rights.

I.

It was quite natural and intelligible, that the first Servian kingdom was created by those Servians, who lived in the Servian countries on the Adriatic, and, who, therefore, came early enough into the commercial and political contact with western Europe. That kingdom was known as Servia and as Zetta, and was composed of the Upper Zetta (to-day Montenegro) and Lower Zetta, which not only stretched up to the River Drin, but possessed more or less extensive territories on the left side of that river. The capital of that kingdom was Skudar (Scutari). The Servian Queen Helena, a French princess by birth, enjoyed all that country as appanage at the end of the thirteenth and in the beginning of the fourteenth century. And during the last-named century the heirs to the throne had always Zetta as appanage and resided in Skudar.

That historical right of the Servian nation imposes on us the duty to demand, that the northern frontier of an eventual autonomous Albania should be drawn in such a manner, as we have drawn it on the here annexed map.*

But in addition to the historical right, as the first reason, there are other reasons for such action, more especially this ethnographic reason: that in the country on both sides of the River Drin live many Servians, and that for the greater number of its Albanian inhabitants could be proved that once they were Servians. To day's Albanian, and by faith Mahommedan, clan Mekoyevichi, living in the neighbourhood of Dulcigno, already by its own name shows its Servian origin. Several similar cases might be cited as proof that many Albanians in that country were once Servians.

With the exception of Skudar, all that country is now in indisputable possession of the Servian and Montenegrin armies, supported by the voluntary consent of all the inhabitants and by their armed resistance.

* Not reproduced.

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II.

We wish to draw a special attention to that part of Servian territories which is situated between the White Drin and Scutari, and between the United Drin and the Montenegrin frontier. The principal towns of that territory are Ipek and Gyakovo. It seems that the Albanians form there the majority of the population. But since the fourteenth century when the Servian Patriarchate was established, till the end of the seventeenth century, that country was eminently Servian, and in such a degree a country of high culture, that the Servians placed the seat of their Patriarch at Ipek. That is such a well-known fact that we have no need to adduce special proofs. In the neighbourhood of Ipek has been built the Servian monastery Dechani, the most important monument of the Servian architecture and the Servian piety of the fourteenth century. It cannot be assumed even for a moment, that the seat of the Servian Patriarchate would be placed at Ipek, and that the magnificent Dechani would be built in a country in which the Servians were not in a majority, at the time when Servia was at the height of its political and national power. The country in which Ipek, Dechani and Gyakovo lie has always been and is now something like a "holy land" to all the Servians. There does not exist a Montenegrin or Servian Government which would or could dare cede to the Albanians, or to whomsoever else, that "holy land" of the Servian nation. Especially that is absolutely impossible now after the Servian and Montenegrin armies have recovered that territory from the Mahommedan Albanians and the Turks. On that point the Servian nation will not and cannot make any concessions, transactions or compromises, and no Servian Government would dare do it.

It is true that the Albanians form there at present the majority of the population. But in that country, as well as in all territories from Ochrida in a northern direction on both sides of the Black Drin, White Drin and the United Drin, the Albanians form a comparatively recent colony, or more properly speaking an invasion. When in the second half of the seventeenth century the Austrian Empire made war on Turkey, the Servians rose up as one man to assist the Imperial army to liberate the Servian countries from the Turkish yoke. But when the Imperial forces were obliged to retreat from the conquered territories, and when the Servian people were in danger of Turkish cruel revenge for their help to the Austrian army, then, at the invitation of the Austrian Government, great numbers of the Servians left their homes and emigrated to Hungary. Just especially from the territories, which we have here in view, the Servian Patriarch of that time, Arsen Charnoyevich, took in 1690 many thousands of Servian families with him to Hungary. Thereupon the Turkish Government ordered the Albanians to descend from their mountains into the partially abandoned Servian villages and hamlets and to settle there.

The Albanians themselves give the best proof of what we stated. They call themselves, in their own language, Skipetars, or dwellers of mountains. That means that in the beginning they did not dwell in the plains. In order to spoliate the Servians of their territories and to exterminate the race, or to compel them to emigrate, they have organised a whole system, rigorously applied during centuries.

Just because the Servian people always and in all circumstances worked to regain their suppressed liberty, the constant policy of the Turkish Government during the last 200 years—and more especially since the rising of the Servians under Kara-George—was, systematically to exterminate that nation. The more cruel instrument of such a cruel policy could not be found than the Albanians had been. It was no use to the Servians to complain to the Turkish authorities against the violence, robberies, and atrocities committed by the Albanians against them. The Turkish Government only encouraged the Albanian lawlessness and cruelties. Abandoned by the Government, the Servians in the territories of which we speak, had no other choice but either to die in a guerilla warfare against the Albanian invaders, or to emigrate to some other country where they could find justice, order, and protection, or to abandon their nationality, declare themselves Albanians, and even change their faith. And that is what really happened: many Servians perished in the guerilla warfare, many others emigrated to other countries, some of them remained, allowing themselves to be "Albanised," speaking to-day Albanian language, yet keeping up old Servian customs. Many a village, inhabited to-day by the Albanians, bears still the old Servian name.

The boundary from the north to south of the new Albania and Servia is marked on our map by the watershed between the Adriatic on one side and the lakes of Prezha, Ochrida, as well as the White Drin, on the other. That is the natural and the most rational boundary both for Albania and Servia. To justify that line we could appeal also to the considerations of ethical nature. Even the toponomy of all these countries is almost exclusively Slavonic.

It was not by a legitimate war, but simply by cruelties, atrocities, and violence that the Servians have been in their own country displaced, or reduced to a minority. Such violences are repugnant to the conscience of every honest man, to whatever race or creed he may belong, to the conscience of Europe, and of all the civilised world. Could Europe to-day, after the victories of the Christian arms in a legitimate and loyally carried war, give her sanction to such cruelties, by asking us to leave to Albania territories which the Albanians took from us by violence and usurpation in comparatively recent past, but which now have been taken from the Turks and Albanians by our victorious army! If Europe could do such a deed, the Servian nation cannot and will not give sanction to such violence and usurpation.

Therefore all the territories which stand outside the boundaries of the autonomous Albania, as we have drawn them on the annexed map, have to belong to the Servian nation without the regard, if the Albanians formed the minority, or majority of the population.

III.

We mentioned our historical rights on certain territories, as well as the impossibility, by abandonment of such rights, to sanction the usurpation and violence by which they were taken from us by the Albanians. Historical rights are moral rights and they are, therefore, more inalienable. But for our point of view we have also an argument of the more convincing character.

We will admit that in certain territories occupied by the Servian army, live Servians with a more or less strong admixture of the Albanians, or Albanians with a more or less strong admixture of the Servians. Whosoever knows well the Servians and Albanians could not say that the Servians are not by character gentler, and by culture and education a more progressed nation than the Albanians. As a more cultured nation we have a stronger and clearer claim to take under our rule—with all the securities which an enlightened Government could give to their citizens—our Albanian co-citizens, than the uncultured, and on the political and civil liberties, unaccustomed, Albanians could have to take the cultured Servians under their rule. The right of a more cultured nation to exercise a cultural mission towards less cultured peoples by taking them under their rule is not new, and there are, in the history of the world, many instances of it. When we are, therefore, asking to retain territories on which we have historical rights, which have been conquered by, and are now in possession of, our army, and into which the Albanian element has been introduced only by usurpation and violence, we practically expect that we should be recognised as a cultured nation, capable to undertake a cultural mission to less cultured Albanians. We are sure that we shall be able to prove our fitness for such a mission by our liberal and humane administration and by the cultured results which will speedily follow.

We did not enter into the details, nor into quotations of different authorities, historical and ethnographical, to prove our thesis, nor have we brought here statistical information, always uncertain in a country like Turkey.

We have stated that the Servian nation cannot sacrifice the "holy land" of its territories, in which are the old capital of the earliest Servian kingdom, Skadar; the seat of the Servian Patriarchate, Ipek; the monastery Dechani and Gyakovo. We have not mentioned expressly the capital of the Servian State during the fourteenth century, Prizren, nor the patrimony of the Servian national hero, Kralyevich Marko, because we cannot suppose for a moment that there exists anyone who would contest our rights to those places.

We wish to add here yet one argument for our case. Whole history of the Servian nation proves that our national interests have been always in harmony with the European interests. The delimitation of Albania such as we have proposed it, would satisfy the historical rights and legitimate interests of the Servian nation, and thereby give it possibilities to be one of the principal guarantors for peace, order, cultural, and economical progress in the Balkans. That to be is one of the fundamental and most cherished aspirations of our people. To be that is our own interest, but it is in the interest of Europe too.

And just in this our own national and in the general European interest we must insist, that our historical, as well as our cultured and moral rights should be respected.

We owe that to our victorious army.
We owe that to our past.
We owe it to our future.

[3574] No. 367.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 21, 1913.*

COUNT MENSDORFF told me to-day that his Government agreed to the communication to the Servian chargé d'affaires of the resolution which the Ambassadors had drawn up in taking note of the Servian communication about withdrawal from Durazzo, provided that the whole of the resolution was communicated to the chargé d'affaires.

I said that I would do this on Thursday, the 23rd instant, after the next meeting of Ambassadors, which would take up all to-morrow afternoon.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3281] No. 368.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 16.)
Sir, *St. Petersburgh, January 17, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to inform you that M. Todoroff, the Bulgarian Minister of Finance, has been in St. Petersburgh for about a week. It is announced in the press that M. Todoroff's object in coming here is to consult with Russian statesmen respecting the foundation of a Russo-Bulgarian bank, and the issue of a loan to Bulgaria by Russia on the conclusion of peace. M. Todoroff has been received in audience by the Emperor, and has also had interviews with M. Kokovtsof and M. Suzonof. On the conclusion of his stay he will, according to the "Novoe Vremya," proceed to Paris to see M. Poincaré as an official representative of the Bulgarian Government. The same journal states that his Excellency has always been an enthusiatic Russophil, and that the change in the political relations between Bulgaria and Russia dates from 1905, when he visited St. Petersburgh in an official capacity.

The "Novoe Vremya" of to-day's date publishes the account of an interview with M. Todoroff, who is alleged to have said that Bulgaria would never dream of surrendering any town to Roumania, although she might agree to a rectification of frontier.

M. Suzonof informed me to-day that, in the conversations which he had had with him, he found M. Todoroff very reasonable with regard to the question of the Ottoman debt, and that if he represented their views correctly the Bulgarian Government seemed disposed to take over their fair share of that debt. M. Todoroff, his Excellency added, had naturally pressed him to support Bulgaria on the Adrianople and Roumanian questions.

I have, &c.
GEORGE W. BUCHANAN.

[3271] No. 369.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 41.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 18, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1087 of 21st December, I have the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reporting that the Greek authorities have invited the Public Debt officials at Scio to resume their duties there.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 369.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Smyrna, January 14, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 145 of the 16th ultimo, in which I reported that I had requested the acting vice-consul at Scio to point out to the Greek authorities

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that the Ottoman Public Debt Administration was under the protection of the Powers, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that M. Antovitch now states that in consequence of his action the Greek authorities issued a proclamation inviting the officials of the Public Debt to resume the discharge of their duties within a delay of forty-eight hours and promising them full protection.

In the meantime, however, they had all been expelled and are now in Smyrna. I have shown the copy of the proclamation to the Director of the Public Debt, who proposes, with the assistance of the German consul, to send them all back to Chios.

M. Antovitch at the same time reported that the relatives of the employés are well and in the receipt of relief from the Greek authorities.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

[3272] No. 370.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 18, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from His Majesty's consul-general at Smyrna reporting the surrender of the island of Chios to the Greeks.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure 1 in No. 370.

Consul-General Barnham to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 4.)
Sir, *Smyrna, January* 14, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at Chios reporting the surrender of the island to the Greeks and the circumstances under which it took place.

I have, &c.
HENRY D. BARNHAM.

Enclosure 2 in No. 370.

Acting Vice-Consul Antovitch to Consul-General Barnham.

M. le Consul-général, *Chio, le* 3 *janvier*, 1913.

J'AI l'honneur de vous communiquer que les négociations officieuses qui ont eu lieu au commencement de cette semaine entre Zihni Bey, commandant de la garnison turque, et le commandant de l'armée grecque, par l'entremise d'un comité composé de primats ottomans, et du vice-consul d'Allemagne en cette ville, pour que le premier se rendit à l'armée grecque, n'ayant abouti à aucun résultat, hier l'armée grecque, laquelle depuis une semaine avait été renforcée de 2,500 soldats de l'armée de Mytilène, et de deux canons Schneider-Dangli, attaqua simultanément d'assaut de divers points la garnison turque de manière que vers le soir du même jour Zihni Bey a été obligé de se rendre avec toute la garnison, composée de 1,400 soldats environ, qui ont été emprisonnés.

Les pertes des deux côtés ont été insignifiantes pendant le dernier combat.

Veuillez, &c.
P. ANTOVITCH.

[3274] No. 371.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 18, 1913.

NEARLY two years ago M. Storpin, a Belgian, who for some time had been employed by the Turkish Government to reorganise the postal service, resigned his

appointment, finding that the obstructions with which he met were quite impossible to overcome.

Recently the present Government offered him the same appointment, but the conditions proposed were unacceptable, and M. Storpin declined. Modified conditions were then offered, but before they were received M. Storpin died; and I understand that no decision has yet been taken as to whether to make the offer in another direction.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[3275] No. 372.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 45.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 18, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith an extract from the thirty-first protocol of the sittings of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt dealing with a divergence of views which has arisen between the Debt and the Ministry of Finance over the question of the Tripoli revenues.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 372.

Extract from Thirty-first Protocol of Sittings of the Council of Ottoman Public Debt.

LE Commissariat Impérial expose que le Malié, auquel il avait communiqué la délibération (Procès-Verbal No. 25, § 1) concernant l'indemnité à payer par le Gouvernement italien en remplacement des revenus de la Dette publique en Tripolitaine, lui a fait observer, en réponse, que le traité de paix conclu avec le Gouvernement précité a été communiqué au conseil il y a vingt jours, et que son département a, comme le conseil, le plus grand souci d'assurer la sauvegarde des intérêts des porteurs.

Le Malié relève ensuite avec satisfaction le concours prêté récemment au Gouvernement Impérial par le conseil, en accordant au Trésor (Procès-Verbal No. 30, § 3) une avance de £ T. 300,000 gagée par l'annuité de 2,000,000 de lires que le Gouvernement italien s'est engagé à payer.

Le Ministère voit dans l'aide ainsi accordée par le Conseil de la Dette publique au Trésor "la marque de la juste appréciation de la fermeté et de l'énergie déployées par ce dernier qui, dans les circonstances exceptionnelles présentes et nonobstant les nombreuses difficultés financières auxquelles il se heurte, a, jusqu'à cette heure, entièrement tenu et exécuté les engagements pris vis-à-vis de ses créanciers. Le Malié considère donc cet acte comme la première preuve des sentiments nobles et bienveillants qu'il s'attendait à voir manifester par le conseil et s'en félicite."

M. le délégué anglais fait remarquer que son Excellence le commissaire Impérial, dans sa dépêche mentionnée plus haut, dit que l'avance de £ T. 300,000 consentie par la Dette publique a pour gage l'"annuité" de 2,000,000 de lires dont le Gouvernement italien, par le Traité de Lausanne, s'est imposé le payement. Or, c'est sur la part revenant au Gouvernement Impérial dans le "capital" de cette somme que doit être remboursée ladite avance, le conseil ayant donné la préférence au système de la capitalisation sur le régime de l'annuité.

A cette occasion, M. le délégué allemand désirerait que son Excellence le commissaire Impérial voulût bien faire parvenir au conseil copie conforme du texte français authentique, signé par les plénipotentiaires italiens, du Traité de Lausanne, la traduction turque, communiquée au conseil par le Malié, ayant donné lieu à des malentendus sérieux.

En ce qui concerne l'avance de £ T. 300,000, M. Pritsch rappelle que le conseil l'a accordée, dans les limites de ses pouvoirs, non à longue échéance sur l'excédent de l'annuité de l'indemnité de la Tripolitaine, excédent qui ne suffirait même pas pour couvrir les intérêts de ladite avance, mais remboursable, avant l'échéance du prochain coupon de l'Unifiée, sur la part du Trésor dans le capital de l'indemnité, capital que le Gouvernement italien s'est engagé à payer à la Dette dès que la demande en serait

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faite. La part revenant au Trésor dudit capital ne suffisant pas pour le remboursement de l'avance, il faudrait parfaire l'insuffisance au moyen des revenus généraux de l'État et, en premier lieu, par la part du Trésor dans la surtaxe douanière de 3 pour cent.

Le conseil prend acte, avec satisfaction, des remercîments que lui adresse le Ministère des Finances, et félicite, de son côté, le Gouvernement d'avoir tenu compte, dans la période difficile que traverse l'Empire, des intérêts des créanciers étrangers de la Turquie. Le conseil n'avait jamais d'ailleurs pensé que le Trésor, conscient de ses devoirs, pût adopter une autre attitude que celle que lui commandaient la préoccupation des intérêts et le souci de l'honneur de l'État.

[3346] No. 373.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received January 22.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, January 21, 1913.*

I AM directed by the Board of Trade to advert to their letter of the 10th January, and to transmit to you copies of letters which have been received from Messrs. T. T. Robinson and Co. and the Bradford Chamber of Commerce, enclosing in each case copy of a letter from a M. Jahiel, of Salonica, relative to the levy of customs duties on goods proceeding from that port on reaching territories occupied by the Servians and Bulgarians.

The Board have caused a reply to be addressed to the firm and the chamber in question in similar terms to that of their reply to the London chamber, copy of which accompanied their letter of the 10th January.

I am to suggest, subject to Sir E. Grey's approval, that telegraphic instructions might now be sent to His Majesty's Minister at Belgrade to enquire whether any action has been taken by the Servian Government in consequence of the note which he addressed to them as mentioned in his telegram of the 2nd January, copy of which was forwarded with your letter of the 3rd January, and, further, whether any arrangement could be made (by refund or otherwise) to cover the case of goods which have paid duty at Salonica and are afterwards sent from warehouses in that town to territory occupied by the Servian forces.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 373.

Bradford Chamber of Commerce (Incorporated) to Board of Trade.

Sir, *Exchange, Bradford, January 10, 1913.*

PRIOR to the commencement of the war between the Balkan States and Turkey, Bradford merchants had concluded contracts with the wholesale merchants at Salonica. Some of these contracts have been fulfilled by the Bradford merchants, and the goods have reached Salonica and are now in the possession of the custom-house there. The Salonica merchants had sold these goods to customers residing in the territory which formerly belonged to Turkey, but has now been conquered by the Balkan States (for instance, such places as Monastir, Uskub, Serres, Dramas, and many other places). The merchants in Salonica cannot get these goods and forward them to the places in the former Turkish provinces (now in the possession of the Balkan States) without their being subject to the Servian or Bulgarian customs duties respectively. As the contracts were made and the goods supplied by the Bradford merchants and the orders undertaken by the Salonica merchants on the basis of paying only the Turkish customs duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem* (which duty is payable by the Salonica merchants), to pay the Servian or Bulgarian duty in addition would simply spell ruin, so far as these transactions are concerned, both to the Salonica wholesale houses and to the Bradford houses who have carried out their contracts.

I am informed that a very large quantity of goods is in this position, and that the value of these goods amounts to a very large sum, probably to as much as 150,000*l.*

I enclose herewith, for your information, copy of a letter received from an agent of a Bradford firm which explains the position at Salonica.

In the opinion of our members, it is grossly unjust that the Servian and Bulgarian

authorities should insist upon duties in regard to territories which are not yet ceded to their respective countries, and accordingly goods ought to be allowed to be forwarded to their destination free of such duties.

As the matter is an important one for Bradford merchants, I am desired to express the hope that it will receive the serious consideration of His Majesty's Government, and that negotiations on the point may be opened up with the representatives of Servia and Bulgaria, and the present seems a most opportune time for negotiations in view of the fact that special envoys from these countries are at present in London.

I shall be glad to learn that His Majesty's Government sees its way to take the matter up in the interests of British traders with a view to overcoming the difficulties referred to.

In the opinion of our members, a sufficient time ought to be allowed to enable merchants here to carry out all the contracts they have entered into on the basis of being subject to the Turkish duty only.

I have, &c.
P. ANDERSON, *Secretary.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 373.

Messrs. Robinson and Co. to Board of Trade.

Manchester House, Aldersgate Street, London, January 9, 1913.

Dear Sir,

WE have received a letter from our Salonica agent, of which we send you copy herewith. We think that this calls for energetic action on the part of this country, as it appears to us that otherwise, when the new arrangements of territory come to be settled, British interests are likely to suffer considerably by arbitrary action on the part of the Balkan States.

Yours faithfully
(*Per pro.* T. T. Robinson and Co.),
(Initialled) W. C. T.

Enclosure 3 in No. 373.

M. Jahiel to Messrs. Robinson and Co.

Messieurs; *Salonique, le 2 janvier, 1913.*

LE commerce de Salonique était complètement paralysé déjà par l'invasion des troupes, massacres, pillages, &c., qui ont eu lieu dès l'arrivée "triomphale" des armées balkaniques; l'arrêt complet des communications par chemin de fer rendait, en outre, la situation des commerçants très critique. Maintenant que quelques-unes des lignes de chemin de fer ont été ouvertes au trafic, on espérait que le commerce reprendrait lentement son cours normal.

Mais, malheureusement, une nouvelle, qui s'est confirmée hier officiellement, a jeté la consternation parmi les cercles commerciaux de notre ville: les Serbes et les Bulgares se font payer des droits d'entrée dans les territoires occupés par eux sur toute marchandise provenant de Salonique. Cette mesure des autorités serbo-bulgares, risque de ruiner la plupart des négociants de notre place si elle ne vient pas immédiatement abrogée; l'application d'une telle mesure est, du reste, pour le moment, contraire au droit des gens, car la Turquie d'Europe est occupée par les armées balkaniques, mais elle ne fait pas encore partie intégrante de leurs territoires; il est, par conséquent, arbitraire d'établir des droits de douane entre deux portions quelconques de la Turquie d'Europe.

La mesure prédite, si elle est maintenue, serait désastreuse pour le commerce local; on sait que ce commerce est alimenté par sa vaste zone d'action, qui comprend la Macédoine, l'Albanie du nord et une partie de la Thrace; les acheteurs de ces localités sont presque constamment débiteurs envers les commerçants de Salonique des sommes qui, dans leur ensemble, s'élèvent à un grand nombre de millions de francs. Les barrières douanières qui viennent d'être subitement mises par les Serbes et les Bulgares ne permettent plus aux commerçants de Salonique de desservir les régions

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précités. Il est évident que les débiteurs desdites contrées, qui ne se verraient plus dans l'obligation de recourir au marché de Salonique, se montreront récalcitrants, pour le payement des dettes contractées jusqu'à présent.

Les grossistes de Salonique se trouveront aussi dans l'impossibilité de vendre les stocks de marchandises qu'ils possèdent, car par les mesures douanières prises par les Serbes et les Bulgares le rayon d'activité de la place vient complètement restreinte. Ce commerce si prospéré et qui marchait vers un avenir brillant est voué de la sorte à la ruine. On ne saurait aussi cacher les grands préjudices que ces mesures causeraient à l'exportation européenne dans notre pays.

Les consuls des Puissances représentées sur place ont été saisis de l'affaire et ont promis de faire intervenir leurs Ministères des Affaires Etrangères, pour de l'abrogation de toute mesure douanière dans les pays occupés de la Turquie d'Europe.

Je vous prie, par la présente, de vouloir entretenir de cette question votre Chambre de Commerce, afin qu'elle intervienne aussi et énergiquement, auprès de votre Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, pour que les taxes douanières prélevées par les Serbes et Bulgares soient rapportées.

Je recommande ce qui précède à votre attention spéciale et vous prie de me tenir au courant de vos démarches et des résultats qui seront portés à votre connaissance.

Veuillez, &c.

ISAC J. JAHIEL.

[3331] No. 374.

Council of Foreign Bondholders to Foreign Office.—(Received January 22.)

Sir, *17, Moorgate Street, London, January 21, 1913.*

WITH reference to our letter of the 18th ultimo, respecting the reported intention of the Greek authorities at Salonica to sequestrate the portion of the revenues of the Debt Council which revert to the Ottoman Government, I have the honour to inform you that we understand that the said authorities have carried their intention into effect.

In these circumstances we venture to request that Sir E. Grey will be kind enough to cause the Greek Government to be notified that the Council of Foreign Bondholders, as representing the British holders of Turkish bonds, will claim from the Greek Government compensation for any loss, damage, or prejudice to which the bondholders may be subjected on account of the action referred to.

I have, &c.

JAMES B. COOPER, *Secretary.*

[3367] No. 375.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 22, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 25 of 21st January: Loan to Turkey.

Acting Secretary of State agrees with you as to undesirability of banks securing options for large loans at present stage, and as to the necessity for special financial control when such loans are ultimately made. The Imperial Government will consider question as to what form control should take, and take note of your observation respecting customs increase.

[3374] No. 376.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 14.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 22, 1913*

YOUR telegram No. 26 of 21st January.

Acting Secretary of State tells me that the Imperial Government are doing their best to reconcile divergence of views on Scutari question. Their difficulty is that, notwithstanding their efforts, they cannot obtain a decided expression of views from Vienna. But his personal opinion is that a compromise will be effected.

He told me also that, in view of great importance of keeping the Great Powers

united, the Imperial Government thought that the question of the islands should not be discussed at the Ambassadors' meetings, but should be left at present for settlement between Turkey and the allies. He gave me to understand that view of the Imperial Government was that the islands close to the Asiatic coast should remain Turkish. They were aware of the danger of the islands becoming so many Cretes, but they considered the proximity of Greek islands to the coast of Asia Minor, where Greek influence was predominant in the chief towns, constituted a still greater danger, as there was every chance that the coast would become a hotbed of Greek intrigue. There were quite enough questions before the Powers without a "Greek question" in Asia Minor. Germany had the strongest interest in Turkey remaining a strong Asiatic Power, and in her Asiatic possessions remaining intact. German public opinion was extremely nervous on this subject, and there was no doubt but that Germany would have to take action if the integrity of Asiatic Turkey was threatened, either by Greece in the above-mentioned manner or by any other Power.

[3373] No. 377.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 22, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 29 of 21st January: Proposed war indemnity.

The Imperial Government entirely agree that indemnity is out of the question, and that the idea should be strongly discouraged.

[3382] No. 378.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 22, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 25 of 21st January.

Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that director of Deutsche Bank had just informed him that his bank had agreed with Ottoman Bank to make small advance to Ottoman Government for administrative purposes. Acting Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs had informed him of your views, and suggested that Sir H. Babington Smith should be invited to join.

[3384] No. 379.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Vienna, January 22, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 21 of 15th January and Belgrade telegram No. 11 of 13th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs, to whom I had some days ago communicated substance of above telegrams, told me to-day that he had drawn attention of Servian Government to matters in question, and that they had replied, in a friendly manner, that they would enquire into complaints with a view to giving satisfaction.

[3385] No. 380.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 14. Most Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 22, 1913.*

AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that Turkish Ambassador had hinted to him most confidentially that Turkey desired to emancipate herself economically, which the Minister for Foreign Affairs understood to mean that,

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should Turkey yield with regard to Adrianople. European Powers might be asked to renounce their right to control Turkish customs duties. Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs added that similar hint had been thrown out to Austro-Hungarian Ambassador at Constantinople. He was of opinion that if such demand were made officially it would require careful examination by the Powers before they consented.

[3386] No. 381.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 22, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 30 of 21st January.

I have seen Austro-Hungarian Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon, and communicated substance of above telegram.

He said that this was the first he had heard of a possible demand of the allies for an indemnity [group undecipherable]. He thought that it would be most unfortunate if such a demand were put forward at a moment when the European Powers were pressing Turkey to yield with regard to Adrianople. He considered that should Turkey get wind of this proposal it would have effect of delaying the surrender of Adrianople until Turkey was reassured with regard to what other demands the allies might spring upon her.

His Excellency is evidently opposed to demand of allies, but would prefer to reserve his definite opinion until it is officially made.

[3387] No. 382.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 22, 1913.*

SCUTARI.

In conversations with me this afternoon Minister for Foreign Affairs repeated to me the arguments I have already reported against the cession of Scutari to Montenegro. He told me that he must hold firm on this point.

His Excellency informed me that he had received information that the Servian troops had lately perpetrated serious massacres of Albanians in some twenty villages in the neighbourhood of Dibra.

[3383] No. 383.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January 22, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 29 of 21st January: Indemnity.

Minister for Foreign Affairs entirely agrees with your view and arguments by which it is supported, and will use his influence in this sense.

[3376] No. 384.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 22, 1913.*

I GATHER that negotiations between Danef and Misu are not going well, and there is talk here of transferring them to Bucharest or Sophia. Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday complained to me of the tergiversation of Bulgaria, by which I understood him to mean that Misu can get no definite answer to the offer of assistance of Roumania against Turkey in return for more extensive territorial concessions than Bulgaria has proposed.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[3381] No. 385.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, January 22, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 53 of 21st January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs entirely agrees with your views, and he will speak in that sense if he is officially approached on the subject of a war indemnity.

[3364] No. 386.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 22.)

(No. 37. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 22, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 32 of 19th January.

In the naval engagement between Tenedos and Lemnos the "Messudiyeh" and the "Medjidieh" were practically undamaged. The casualties were caused mainly by a shell which struck the central turret of the "Barbaross," putting both guns amidships out of action. Her guns fore and aft are all right, while neither her armour nor that of the "Turgut" have been pierced, and it is said that both ships can go into action. It is reported that intention is that all four ships, together with the "Assar-i-Tewfik," should go out soon and again try conclusions with the Greek fleet. If this intention is adhered to, a definite and final reply to the collective *démarche* may not be given pending result at sea.

Among the ninety-eight wounded reported in my telegram No. 32 were seven officers.

(Sent to Sophia, Athens, Bucharest, and Belgrade.)

[3576] No. 387.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 30.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 22, 1913.*

THE German Ambassador informed me to-day that Herr Bassermann was going to refer in the Reichstag to a report that England, France, and Russia had come to an agreement about the division of spheres of interest—Armenian, Arabian, and Syrian—in Asia Minor, and was going to ask what the German Government proposed to do in face of this. The Ambassador said that his Government intended to give a reply, which he told me. It was of a negative character, implying that the report was not true.

I said that there was no truth in the report. A division of spheres of interest in Asia Minor had not even been discussed between France, Russia, and ourselves. Nothing had passed that was even remotely relevant to this subject, except what I had said to the French Ambassador denying the reports of our having political designs in Syria, and what I had said to the Italian Ambassador when he suggested a possible fresh guarantee of the Turkish dominions in Asia Minor.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3575] No. 388.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 22, 1913.*

AT the meeting of Ambassadors to-day, the French Ambassador gave us the following *rédaction* from M. Poincaré, with regard to the principle of the Ottoman debt:—

"Toute cession de territoire, stipulée par le présent traité, comportera pour l'État cessionnaire l'obligation de respecter les droits que le Gouvernement Impérial ou les

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 54), Sir E. Goschen (No. 29), Sir R. Rodd (No. 24), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 37).

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autorités ottomanes compétentes auraient constitués au bénéfice de tiers. Ledit Etat assumera une part de l'ensemble de la dette générale de l'Empire ottoman proportionnelle aux revenus du territoire cédé.

"Les modes d'application et d'exécution de la disposition ci-dessus seront élaborés par une commission internationale où seront représentées les six Grandes Puissances; les procès-verbaux et les protocoles de cette commission seront annexés au présent traité."

The German Ambassador said that he would transmit this formula to his Government. In his personal opinion it seemed to correspond with the principle of the German proposal.

I said that I saw no difference in substance between this formula and the German one, and I was prepared to accept either.

The other Ambassadors said that they would refer it to their Governments.

I gave the Ambassadors copies of the following memorandum:—

"M. Skouloudis called on Sir Arthur Nicolson on the 18th January to express, on behalf of the Greek delegation, the hope that in questions like that of Mount Athos they should be allowed to give an *avis*.

"He said that Mount Athos was in Greek occupation, and was naturally a locality of great interest and importance to Greece and the Orthodox Church. The Greek delegation consequently deprecated that decisions should be taken in regard to its future without the Greeks being in any way consulted.

"M. Skouloudis added that in one of the papers of that day there appeared an account of what passed at the meeting of the Ambassadors, and it was extremely embarrassing to the Greek delegation not to be in a position to inform their Government as to whether this account was or was not correct.

"He said, further, that the allies were discussing, or about to discuss, the limits of Albania, and again they were quite ignorant of the decisions at which the Powers might arrive in regard to that question. Consequently, complications and contradictions might ensue. He said that it was unfortunate that the allies were not kept informed more or less of the decisions of the Ambassadors."

It was agreed to make the following observations upon the memorandum:—

"La réunion des Ambassadeurs n'a d'autre objet que d'examiner les questions intéressant les Grandes Puissances, et les Ambassadeurs se bornent à faire connaître leurs vues à leurs Gouvernements respectifs. Il ne paraît donc pas possible de discuter avec les délégués à la conférence les points sur lesquels Sir E. Grey et les Ambassadeurs sont appelés à délibérer sans avoir des décisions à prendre."

I said that I did not propose to reply, except verbally, to M. Skouloudis, and only if he raised the question again.

The Russian Ambassador stated that his Government accepted the reserve formulated by the Russian Government with regard to Mount Athos, "à condition que l'administration du Mont-Athos conservera le droit d'exercer la police de ses côtes à l'aide de bâtiments légers."

I told the Ambassadors briefly what had passed at the interview which Sir Arthur Nicolson and I had with the Turkish Ambassador and the two Turkish delegates on Monday last, the 20th instant.

It was agreed that we must wait for the reply from the Turkish Government to the collective note of the Powers.

At the beginning of the meeting I observed that I thought that the discussion of the Albanian question should be tentative. If there was a difference of view that could not be reconciled this afternoon, we should put it on record, but not make up our minds that it was irreconcilable. It should be referred to the Governments for consideration. I also impressed the great need of secrecy on this question, and suggested that, as we were discussing also some other things this afternoon, if the Ambassadors were pressed on the subject of our discussion, they might let it be understood that, though the Albanian question was discussed from time to time, we had not yet concentrated our attention wholly upon it.

A discussion of the question of Albania then took place, mainly on the point of Scutari.

The French Ambassador drew up the following résumé of the discussion, which he read to us, and which was agreed to:—

"La réunion, sans aborder encore dans son ensemble la question de délimitation de l'Albanie, s'occupe de la question de Scutari.

"L'Ambassadeur de Russie dit que le Gouvernement Impérial a les plus graves objections à formuler contre l'abandon à l'Albanie de la ville de Scutari à cause de la question dynastique. Le peuple monténégrin réclame cette ville, qui est le vrai débouché économique du pays et constitue au point de vue politique et stratégique une défense des plus sérieuses.

"D'après des informations sûres parvenues à Saint-Pétersbourg, il paraît avéré que le Roi de Monténégro serait menacé de perdre son trône si, après l'effort militaire de son peuple, il était obligé de lui imposer une aussi grave déception. Malgré les appuis diplomatiques que ce Souverain peut trouver auprès de certaines Puissances, il ne pourrait lutter contre le ressentiment populaire, et il est de l'intérêt général d'éviter une révolution dont les conséquences pourraient être graves pour le maintien de la tranquillité dans les Balkans.

"L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie répond que Scutari est une ville essentiellement albanaise; qu'au point de vue politique, économique et spirituel elle est considérée par les Albanais du nord comme leur capitale; que toute la région est albanaise et catholique; que le protectorat exercé depuis un siècle et demi par l'Autriche-Hongrie sur ces populations catholiques lui impose l'obligation d'insister pour que l'Albanie ne perde pas un point aussi important; que si l'on veut constituer une Albanie autonome viable il ne faut pas la décapiter; que le Gouvernement austro-hongrois ne désire certainement pas la chute de la dynastie monténégrine, mais que les prétentions du Roi Nicolas sur Scutari ne paraissent justifiées ni par des titres légaux ni par des succès militaires ni par le vœu des populations albanaises.

"L'Ambassadeur de Russie réplique qu'en ce qui concerne le protectorat catholique, les catholiques établis au Monténégro n'ont jamais eu à se plaindre du Gouvernement; que le Traité de Berlin a stipulé la liberté des cultes et qu'il a été scrupuleusement observé; que le Gouvernement de Cettigné est le seul de cette région qui ait conclu un concordat avec le Saint-Siège.

"L'Ambassadeur d'Italie se rallie au point de vue autrichien, en ajoutant qu'il y lieu de tenir compte du sentiment de la population de Scutari, qui ne comprendrait pas qu'au moment où l'autonomie albanaise est créée la ville en fût distraite.

"L'Ambassadeur d'Allemagne appuie également les vues du Gouvernement austro-hongrois.

"Sir Edward Grey et l'Ambassadeur de France se rallient à celles du Gouvernement russe.

"La réunion décide d'ajourner la discussion pour consulter les Gouvernements."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3632] No. 389.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Elliot.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 22, 1913.*

M. SKOULOUDIS called on the 22nd January to draw Sir A. Nicolson's attention to a statement which had appeared in the "Times" to the effect that Greece had agreed to certain islands being left under the suzerainty of the Sultan, and he wished to say that there was no truth whatever in the statement. Sir A. Nicolson told M. Skouloudis that we had heard nothing from any source which could afford ground for such a report.

M. Skouloudis dwelt at some length on the question of Salonica, and lamented the fact that M. Danef would not break the silence he maintained as to Bulgarian views. Sir A. Nicolson told M. Skouloudis that I would communicate to the Ambassadors on the 22nd January the communication which he had made to him in respect to Mount Athos. M. Skouloudis expressed his thanks.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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[3147] No. 390.

Memorandum communicated to Six Ambassadors.

M. SKOULOUDIS called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 18th January to express, on behalf of the Greek delegation, the hope that in questions like that of Mount Athos they should be allowed to give an *avis*.

He said that Mount Athos was in Greek occupation, and was naturally a locality of great interest and importance to Greece and the Orthodox Church. The Greek delegation consequently deprecated that decisions should be taken in regard to its future without the Greeks being in any way consulted.

M. Skouloudis added that in one of the papers of that day there appeared an account of what passed at the meeting of the Ambassadors, and it was extremely embarrassing to the Greek delegation not to be in a position to inform their Government as to whether this account was or was not correct.

He said further that the allies were discussing or about to discuss the limits of Albania, and again they were quite ignorant of the decisions at which the Powers might arrive in regard to that question. Consequently, complications and contradictions might ensue. He said that it was unfortunate that the allies were not kept informed, more or less, of the decisions of the Ambassadors.

Foreign Office, January 22, 1913.

[3423] No. 391.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 8. Treaty.)
Sir, *Salonica, January 17, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, copy of a despatch addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Belgrade, concerning the alleged arrangement between the Greek and Servian authorities in regard to the collection of duties on goods forwarded from here to the interior.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 391.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir R. Paget.

Sir, *Salonica, January 17, 1913.*

I HAD the honour to receive your telegram of the 13th instant, communicating to me the explanations tendered by the Servian Minister for Foreign Affairs in regard the illegal exaction of duty, &c., by the Servian customs officials at Ghevgheli on merchandise forwarded from Salonica to Uskub or other stations on the Oriental Railway line, to which I had ventured to call the attention of His Majesty's Government and of yourself.

The New Year holidays have somewhat interfered with my following up of this question, but I was able yesterday evening to telegraph to you that the Greek authorities here appear to have no knowledge of the proposals alleged to have been made by the Servian Government.

As regards the proposals themselves, the first naturally calls for no remark. Goods manifested as in transit for Servia should continue to pay at Salonica only 1 per cent. transit duty as heretofore.

Proposal No. 2 appears to me utterly impracticable. It might be possible to arrange that, under a system of joint control, the Greek authorities should refund direct to the Servians the 11 per cent. (or 8 per cent.) duty levied here on goods subsequently forwarded into the territories in Servian occupation, but that the original importer should be expected to run to the Greek authorities for a refund every time that one of his customers, or of their clients in the interior, attempted to send a piece of calico or a bag of sugar up the line is too absurd to be considered for a moment.

As for the third proposal, it seems to me that it would be perfectly futile if the second, or anything corresponding to it, were admitted. Neither the original importe nor the re-exporter would have any inducement to waste time in hunting for a certificate of previous importation so long as it was understood that the Greek authorities were, in default of it, to refund the duty originally collected.

I have been unable to obtain any fresh information during the past few days as to what procedure is actually being followed at Ghevgheli. When I visited that place on the 10th, the official in charge of the custom-house there informed me, as I had the honour of reporting in my despatch of the following date, that he was no longer collecting the import duty, but only the octroi. The local papers have since stated that exactly opposite is the case.

The merchants most directly interested are themselves unable to tell me from one day to another how the matter stands, and, in view of this uncertainty, are naturally hesitating to forward further consignments of goods.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[3424] No. 392.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 9. Treaty.)
Sir, *Salonica, January 17, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith for your information copy of a despatch which I have this day addressed to His Majesty's Legation at Athens, on the subject of the attitude of the Greek authorities towards the Imperial Ottoman Bank.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure in No. 392.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir F. Elliot.

Sir, *Salonica, January 17, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch of the 31st ultimo, and to your No. 11 to the Foreign Office of the 13th instant, of which you have been good enough to forward me a copy, I have the honour to state the Greek authorities here have not proceeded any further in the matter of the books, &c., of the Ottoman Bank, beyond sending an official to the director to ask him the reason of his unwillingness to further disclose the accounts of his establishment.

I do not find anything which calls for remark on my part in the memorandum addressed to you by Mr. Coromilas.

As regards the discrepancy in the figures to which you call attention in the last paragraph of your despatch, I imagine it is due merely to clerical errors in frequent recopying. The figures given by myself in the enclosures to my despatch above quoted, having been taken from the protocol itself (with which they have been again compared) are scarcely likely to be incorrect.

I am sending a copy of this despatch direct to the Foreign Office, and I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

[3564] No. 393.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Athens, January 13, 1913.*

ON the receipt of your telegram No. 316 of the 24th ultimo, I left with M. Coromilas a memorandum in French to the following effect:—"It appears possible that a conflict may arise between the Greek authorities and the Ottoman Bank at Salonica with regard to the verification of the accounts of the bank with the Ottoman Government. Complicated legal issues may be raised, and His Majesty's Government

would like to receive detailed information as to the books and accounts which the Greek authorities wish to verify and what they have confiscated—ingots, gold coins, bank notes, bills of exchange, or securities payable to bearer." I also, as instructed, consulted His Majesty's consul-general at Salonica.

I have now the honour to enclose copies of the replies which I have received from Mr. Lamb and from M. Coromilas. The two statements are not irreconcilable, and the important point appears to be that the Minister states that the Greek authorities have not proceeded to any verification of the bank's books and accounts (leaving it to be inferred that they do not propose to do so), and that the sums declared by the bank as belonging to the Ottoman Government or local services, and taken over by the Greek authorities, are to be lodged on deposit at the Banque d'Orient, not actually confiscated for the present.

There is a discrepancy in the figures given for these sums, the items in the enclosure to Mr. Lamb's letter adding up to £T. 8,915·29 and 19,193·30 piastres, while M. Coromilas's memorandum gives the totals as £T. 8,195 and 17,913. In the first case, at least, a clerical error of the transposition of a figure would account for the difference.

I am sending a copy of this despatch to Mr. Lamb, and asking him to forward to you direct any comments he may have to make on it.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 393.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir F. Elliot.

Sir, *Salonica, December* 31, 1912.

I HAVE to thank you for having kindly communicated to me a copy of your despatch No. 208 of the 14th instant on the subject of the representations made by yourself and the French Minister at Athens on the subject of the seizure by the Greek authorities of certain funds deposited at the Imperial Ottoman Bank in this place.

In reference to this subject, I have the honour to inform you that five days after the entry of the Greek troops into Salonica (*i.e.*, on the 1st (14th) November) M. Ractivan addressed a letter to the director of the bank, calling upon him to furnish a statement of the accounts of the Customs Administration and the Agricultural Bank, together with a detailed list of all sums deposited by other branches of the Ottoman administration.

The bank complied with this request in a letter dated the following day, but it appears that the sums disclosed fell considerably below what the Greek financial authorities had hoped to discover, for on the 3rd (16th), M. Ractivan addressed a second letter to the director of the bank, asking him to refrain from making any further payment out of the funds in question, and at the same time requesting him to proceed to a fresh examination of his books, with a view to assuring him that no error had occurred in the list presented.

The director was naturally somewhat annoyed at the doubt thus apparently thrown upon the good faith of his administration, but he confirmed his previous declaration, and added that he consented to make no payment out of the funds in question pending receipt of instructions which he would not fail to apply for to the Direction générale in Constantinople.

The instructions received in due course were to comply with the request of the Hellenic authorities if compelled, reserving all rights. Accordingly, the funds in question, amounting to under £T. 10,000, were handed over on the 3rd instant in virtue of a protocol, copy of which is hereto annexed for your information.

The Greek authorities, however, seem still to have entertained doubts as to the accuracy of the accounts presented, especially in regard to the sums received "on deposit" by the Customs Administration, which they appear to have fancied must necessarily remain as a cash deposit in Salonica, though, as a matter of fact, I understand that they were habitually remitted to Constantinople with the other daily receipts, the distinction between the two accounts being purely a matter of book-keeping.

Further correspondence passed between M. Ractivan and the bank, until on the 23rd December, the former demanded copies of "all the accounts" on the books of the establishment. This demand was somewhat too comprehensive not to be vague, and its very vagueness seemed to imply a hidden reservation. From this, and from other information which reached me from a confidential source, I was inclined to fancy that

the authorities contemplated resorting to an examination of the books of the bank, a measure which even the Ottoman Government had never claimed the right to enforce. Anticipating that in such an eventuality the director of the bank would inevitably appeal to my French colleague and myself for advice and protection, I thought it advisable to telegraph to His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs a request for instructions as to how far I should be justified in treating the Imperial Ottoman Bank (which claims to be "banque d'État") as a British or Anglo-French institution. It was this telegram which the Foreign Office repeated to yourself.

The eventuality contemplated on the 23rd has not yet presented itself, but the matter does not appear to have been finally disposed of.

I annex duplicates of this despatch, in case you desire to forward copies to the Foreign Office, and have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 393.

Copies of Letters addressed by M. Ractivan to the Director of the Imperial Ottoman Bank at Salonica.

(1.)

M. le Directeur, *Salonique, le 1er (14) novembre*, 1912.

J'AI l'honneur de vous prier de vouloir bien me faire remettre, dans le plus bref délai possible, un relevé du compte de la Direction des Contributions indirectes et de la Banque agricole ottomane, ainsi qu'une liste détaillée des dépôts d'argent appartenant à d'autres administrations publiques ottomanes.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Ministre de la Justice, représentant le
Gouvernement hellénique,
C. D. RACTIVAN.

(2.)

M. le Directeur, *Salonique, le 3 (16) novembre*, 1912.

J'ai l'honneur d'accuser réception de votre lettre datée du 15 courant.

En prenant note des déclarations contenues dans cette pièce, je vous prie de tenir à la disposition de l'État hellène les sommes y énoncées, comme dues à des administrations publiques ottomanes, et, dans tous les cas, de vous abstenir de tout payement sur ces sommes et de tout dessaisissement, sans une entente avec mon département.

Je vous prie, en outre, M. le directeur, de faire procéder, en temps utile, à un nouvel examen de vos livres, qui puisse vous mettre à même de m'assurer qu'aucune erreur ne s'est glissée dans la liste que vous avez bien voulu me faire parvenir.

Veuillez, &c.
Le Ministre de la Justice, représentant le
Gouvernement hellénique,
C. D. RACTIVAN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 393.

Protocol.

LES autorités helléniques de Salonique, ayant enjoint à la succursale de la Banque Impériale ottomane de cette ville de leur délivrer les valeurs suivantes déposées chez elle :—

£T. 4,510 au nom des Administrations des Domaines Impériaux ;
£T. 353·92 au nom de la Commission de Constructions d'Églises et d'Écoles ;
£T. 2,750·46 au nom de la Caisse des Orphelins ;
£T. 42·15 au nom de la Caisse de l'Instruction publique ;
£T. 58·50 au nom de la Caisse de l'Evkaf ;
£T. 910·17 au nom de la Direction des Dépôts de la Gendarmerie ;
£T. 70 au nom du Tribunal des Affaires religieuses ;
£T. 94·09 au nom de la Commission pour la Flotte nationale ;
£T. 74·50 au nom de la Caisse des Travaux publics ;
19,193·30 piastres medjidié au nom de la Caisse des Travaux publics ;
£T. 51·50 au nom de la Direction des Haras ;

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Au nom de la Caisse provinciale :

Soixante-trois sacs scellés déclarés contenir de la monnaie de nickel pour une somme de £T. 1,800 ;

Au nom de la Direction principale des Postes et Télégraphes :

Un sac scellé déclaré contenir du numéraire en colis postaux pour une somme de £T. 390 ;

déclarent avoir reçu les susdites sommes et les susdits sacs scellés de ladite succursale de la Banque Impériale ottomane, qui les leur a remis contrainte et forcée et en faisant toutes réserves que de droit.

Le Ministre de la Justice, représentant le
Gouvernement hellénique,
C. D. RACTIVAN.

Banque Impériale ottomane
(Succursale de Salonique) :
Le Directeur,
L. VITALIS.

Le Sous-Directeur,
P. PAPPAGEORGES.

Salonique, le 3 (20) *décembre*, 1912.

Enclosure 4 in No. 393.

Note communicated to Sir F. Elliot.

LES autorités grecques à Salonique n'ont procédé à aucune vérification des comptes et livres de la Banque ottomane. Le représentant du Gouvernement Royal s'est borné à faire savoir à la direction de la banque qu'il revendique tous dépôts appartenant au Gouvernement ottoman ou à d'autres services locaux. La banque, en réponse, a déclaré les sommes qu'elle détient de ce chef. Le représentant du Gouvernement s'est contenté de cette déclaration et prit livraison de ces sommes consistant en £T. 8,195, en 17,913 piastres et 63 sacs de monnaie de nickel d'une valeur de £T. 1,800, ainsi que d'un sac contenant des groupes postaux d'une valeur déclarée de £T. 390 ; il a été dressé procès-verbal de cette remise. Le tout sera déposé à la Banque d'Orient.

Athènes, le 29 *décembre*, 1912 (11 *janvier*, 1913).

[3397] No. 394.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 13.)
Sir,

Athens, January 17, 1913.

A ROYAL decree, dated the 31st December and published in the "Official Gazette" of the 13th instant, extends to the island of Crete the jurisdiction of the first permanent military tribunal.

Another Royal decree, dated the 11th instant, appoints Mr. Ch. Vozikis "general administrative commissioner" of the islands of the Ægean captured by the Greek navy and army, with residence at Mitylene.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[3399] No. 395.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 15.)
Sir,

Athens, January 17, 1913.

THE newspapers give the following list of villages in Epirus which have suffered recently at the hands of Mussulman Albanians :—

Vukovo, in southern Khimara : the priest and a notable murdered, the schoolmaster wounded; 100 houses and shops looted, goats, sheep, oxen, and merchandise to the value of 4,000*l.* carried off.

Hagios Vasileios : buildings to the value of 5,000*l.* burnt, 5,000 okes of oil, 70,000 okes of wheat, 4,000 goats and sheep, and 600 oxen carried off.

Niditsa : 15,000*l.* worth of buildings, and 8,000*l.* worth of furniture destroyed, 35,000 okes of oil, cheese, and wheat valued at 80,000 drachmas, and 8,000 goats and sheep, and 1,200 ploughing animals carried off.

Mendipé : 20,000 sheep and goats, 300 oxen, and all the baggage of a caravan of Christians on the way to Khenadies stolen by Vlakh shepherds.

Khontitsovo, a hamlet of twenty houses : looted.

Diasia and Metokhi in the district of Delvino : looted.

Funiti : all the houses burnt, 1,200 ploughing animals, and 500,000 okes of wheat stolen.

Kera Hadji, Vromoro, Vryoni, Mavropouli, Sopiki, Hadir Aga, Vangalates, Hodja, and Kuluritsa : entirely destroyed with their churches. Three persons were blinded and then murdered, and two were burnt alive in their houses.

Twelve villages between the river and Vrovilani : burnt. Four villages beyond the river towards Khimara : looted. These had hitherto escaped.

Keranitsa : burnt and looted. Thirty women and children were killed in a cave where they had taken refuge. Six other persons, not including ten women, were tortured and then killed. Five girls and three children were carried off. Eight persons escaped to Corfu. Damage estimated at 30,000*l.*

Fortsota : looted, three men killed.

Lipovo : looted, three men killed.

Plestvitsa : thirty houses burnt.

Arakhova, Khlomo, Maluko, Lithari-Kokkino, Reveni, and Aliko : looted, the fate of the inhabitants unknown.

Muri : looted and partially destroyed.

Sarra : looted, and all the houses but two destroyed.

Meminshi : looted.

Kainouryo : looted, and two notables killed.

Karalibey : looted, and five persons murdered.

Alkioi : looted, twenty houses burnt, and five persons murdered.

Chaoushi : looted, fifteen houses burnt, four persons killed.

Kavmalabey : six persons murdered.

Kuluratus : three persons murdered, three houses looted and burnt.

Roumanja Farm : entirely looted, its fifteen houses burnt, two peasant women murdered.

Libyloi : a general conflagration. Thirty houses destroyed, and many persons killed.

Yerma and Khaliki : general looting and incendiarism, two villagers killed.

Ardasova : five houses burnt.

Trenoli : entirely burnt, fourteen inhabitants, including the priest, were cut to pieces.

Kalyvia, Sussi, and Paspa : savagely plundered, most of the peasants and their women and children massacred.

Dibri : One house saved out of 160.

Lazates, Skalisa, and Dornisi : entirely destroyed by fire.

Hagios Andreas : Fifteen houses burnt, two men murdered.

Tsarkovista : general looting, five houses burnt, two men killed.

Meltsani : plundered and half destroyed, two inhabitants murdered.

Grapsani : savagely plundered, the women dishonoured, and two men killed.

Trava : entirely burnt, five men killed.

Komnati : plundered, three men killed.

Kesorati : all the Christian houses burnt.

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Tsoutsa and Sminitsi: destroyed, six peasants killed.
Yannitsates: plundered and burnt.
Pikermi: plundered and destroyed.
Santi Quaranta is said to have been almost entirely destroyed, but this was already reported some time ago.
Ten thousand persons are said to have escaped from Epirus to Corfu in a destitute condition.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

[3392] No. 396.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 36.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 22, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 36 of 21st January.
General sense of proceedings at the Palace to-day was in favour of peaceful solution. After a few opening words by the Grand Vizier, Ministers of War and Foreign Affairs set forth military and political situation. Minister of Finance gave long, unvarnished, and very telling *exposé* as to the deplorable state of the sinews of war, while Sheikh-ul-Islam and some Ulemas spoke at length in a moderate, [group undecypherable], and convincing strain. Mahmoud Shevket Pasha did not assist at assembly. Ministers subsequently met at the Porte and submitted to Imperial sanction their decision in favour of peace and a favourable reply to the Powers concerning Adrianople and islands. They meet to-morrow at the Porte to draw up reply, which will probably be given to-morrow evening. I shall use my best endeavours to ensure its being as unequivocal and as free as possible from usual Turkish ambiguities. It may contain some stipulations as to economic liberty and as to raising of no further conditions by the allies.
(Sent to Sophia, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Cettinjé.)

[3535] No. 397.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 39.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 23, 1913.*

WHILE Cabinet was sitting this afternoon, Enver Bey, at the head of some forty armed men, appeared and called upon the Cabinet with threats of violence to resign owing to their having given way to the advice of the Powers. This they agreed to do, and Enver Bey, proceeding to the Palace, returned with a chamberlain, who, by order of the Sultan, demanded the seals of office.
Enver Bey was accompanied by Talaat, and demonstration gradually increased to about 2,000.
Mahmoud Shefket has become Grand Vizier, Izzet Pasha Minister of War, and Talaat Minister of the Interior.
Enver Bey is said to have declared that he was [group undecypherable: ? commissioned] by the whole army at Chataldja, who demanded continuation of the war. The troops who were detached to guard the Porte declined to act. The reply to collective note was actually being drafted.
It is reported that Nazim, Minister of War, was killed.
(Sent to Sophia, Bucharest, Athens, Belgrade, and Cettinjé.)

[3534] No. 398.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 23, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 11 of 13th January.
The Servian Government have now heard from the Greek Government, and I am informed that arrangements are almost completed with a view to duties being levied at Salonica only.
(Sent to Salonica.)

[3434] No. 399.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 23.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, January 23, 1913.*

CESSION of Adrianople.
Prime Minister asks me to send you his warmest and most grateful thanks for your unwearied and successful efforts in the cause of peace.
I would also venture to add my own most sincere congratulations.

[3374] No. 400.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 35.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 14 of 22nd January.
I agree with German Government that question of islands should not be discussed by us till necessary. I should be glad if discussion could be avoided altogether, but reply of Turks to collective note may make discussion necessary. My difficulty is the practical one that islands with a Greek population cannot be kept Turkish except by force, and that it is undesirable for either Turkey or the Powers to use force for this purpose, but some conditions might be imposed on Greek administration of some islands that would be a safeguard to Turkey and perhaps preserve Turkish suzerainty. I agree that it is most undesirable to make trouble for Turkey in Asia Minor, and I have told German Ambassador that there is no truth in rumour, which he mentioned, that England, France, and Russia had come to an agreement to divide Asia Minor into Arabian, Armenian, and Syrian spheres of interest. We have not even discussed any such project.
I am much gratified by what the Chancellor said, as recorded in your despatch No. 15, about conversations of Ambassadors. He may rely upon it that I shall use all my efforts to minimise and overcome difficulties, and I feel that German Chancellor is doing the same. The Albanian frontier question is very difficult, and it will need all our efforts to get it settled.

[2201] No. 401.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 208 of 11th December.
I am still awaiting a reply to my telegram No. 316 of 24th December.
I am, however, led to believe that the funds of a "Turkish Government account," referred to in your despatch, must in effect be certain revenues deposited in the Ottoman Bank by the Ottoman Public Debt. These revenues are ordinary receipts, and cannot in any case now be regarded as a surplus accruing to the Turkish Government; any surplus to which the Turkish Government was at one time entitled has long since been assigned to various creditors; moreover, that surplus is calculated on the product of the total revenues collected throughout the whole Ottoman Empire, and not from the revenues in any one district at any moment in the financial year.
You should point this out to the Greek Government, and express the hope that all interference with the revenues of the Ottoman Debt Administration may be at once abandoned.
Your German colleague has received instructions to point out that territories occupied by Greece do not yield any surplus revenue which could accrue to the Porte, and to request the removal of the sequester imposed by the Greek authorities.
(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 52; Berlin, No. 32; Salonica; Sophia, No. 13; and Belgrade, No. 22.)

[3331] No. 402.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 8 of 23rd January.

Council of Foreign Bondholders inform me that Greek authorities at Salonica have definitely sequestered portion of the revenues of the Debt Council.

You should enter an energetic protest against this action, and you should inform the Greek Government that His Majesty's Government will afford the council full support in claiming from the Greek Government compensation for any loss, damage, or prejudice which this step may occasion to the bondholders.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 34; Salonica; and Constantinople, No. 51.)

[3346] No. 403.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 21 of 21st January.

Board of Trade enquire whether any arrangement could be made, by refund or otherwise, to cover the case of goods which have paid duty at Salonica and are afterwards sent from warehouses in that town to territory occupied by the Servian forces. This case would, however, be covered by arrangement proposed in my telegram No. 21, to which you should try to induce Servian Government to adhere.

Inform consuls at Uskub and Salonica of above.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 36; Rome, No. 31; St. Petersburgh, No. 57; Berlin, No. 33; Vienna, No. 31; Sophia, No. 15; Constantinople, No. 53; Athens, No. 9; and Cettinjé, No. 7.)

[1777] No. 404.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Lamb.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.*

YOUR despatch No. 3 of 7th January.

Have you any confirmation of the information that Bulgarians are levying customs duties on imports viâ Salonica to occupied territory?

Please telegraph full details as to place and amount of such levy if made.

(Repeated to Sophia, No. 14.)

[3858] No. 405.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 55.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.*

M. CAMBON spoke to me to-day of M. Sazonof's opinion that it was not opportune to raise the Armenian question at the present moment. M. Cambon himself thought this.

I said that I agreed. The first thing which should be done was to bring about peace between the allies and Turkey. When this had been done, we should have to occupy ourselves with putting Turkey on her feet as regards her Asiatic possessions, and there might then be an opportunity of dealing with the question of reforms in Asia Minor.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3858] No. 406.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 56.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.*

I TOLD M. Cambon to-day what the German Ambassador had said to me yesterday about the report as to a proposed division of Asia Minor by France, England, and Russia into Armenian, Arabian, and Syrian spheres of interest. I had explained to the Ambassador that there was no truth in the rumour.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3855] No. 407.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 23, 1913.*

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day that M. Cambon had suggested that the only way of making progress with the Albanian question would be that the Austrian Ambassador should make some proposal about the Scutari question, and that the Italian Ambassador might be useful in this connection. I proposed, therefore, to see the Italian Ambassador and to urge him that either he or the Austrian Ambassador should make some proposal at our next meeting. They could, of course, say nothing different from what they had already said about the town of Scutari, but they might make suggestions as to other things which might be given to Montenegro, in connection, for instance, with the plain of Scutari, the draining of the lake, irrigation, and so forth.

Count Benckendorff agreed that this would be useful. If such suggestions were made, he would say that he had no instructions with regard to them, but would be prepared to enter upon some discussion with a view to referring the suggestions to his Government.

I then said to Count Benckendorff that, in the last resort, if the outstanding point was, as it might be should Scutari not be given to Montenegro, an irreconcilable difference between Austria and Russia as to the eastern line of the frontier of Albania, it seemed to me that an impartial arbitrator would probably say, after hearing the arguments on both sides, that the ethnological and geographical conditions on which the arguments were based were such as could not be settled in a room over a map, and that it would be necessary to have some commission to travel in the country and draw up a report from information acquired on the spot. Would not it be possible to propose an international commission, on which the parties directly interested should be represented, with also some representation of parties not directly interested—a Frenchman or an Englishman, for instance, and a German? I saw the difficulties of the proposal, and the report of the commission might not be satisfactory to either side; but it would be more easy to accept a settlement arrived at in this way. I thought of this proposal, however, only as one to be made in the last resort if a deadlock had been arrived at and the resources of diplomacy had been exhausted. I mentioned it to him now because the time might come when I should like to sound the Austrian Ambassador about it. I had not as yet mentioned the idea to any of the Ambassadors of the Triple Alliance, and I should not do so unless I found that it was one which Count Benckendorff could entertain. I told him of it in order that he might consider it in case of eventualities. It was a thing which perhaps neither he nor the Austrian Ambassador might like to propose, but which it might be possible for them both to accept if it was proposed by someone else. I repeated, however, that it was not necessary, even if he thought it possible, to put it forward yet.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[3857] No. 408.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1913.

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day what the German Ambassador had said to me yesterday, about the report as to a proposed division of Asia Minor by France, England, and Russia into Armenian, Arabian, and Syrian spheres of interest. I had explained to the Ambassador that there was no truth in the rumour.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4299] No. 409.

Sir Edward Grey to M. Grouitch.

Dear M. Grouitch, *Foreign Office, January* 23, 1913.

I AM desired to give you the following observation that was agreed to by the Ambassadors after considering the communication from you, which I laid before them. The observation drawn up by the Ambassadors has been approved by their Governments, and was agreed to by me:—

"Les Puissances prennent acte de cette déclaration. Elles considèrent que la Serbie sera tenue d'évacuer le littoral et le territoire de l'Albanie après sa délimitation par les Puissances dès que lesdites Puissances lui auront notifié leur décision."

Yours very truly,
E. GREY.

[3577] No. 410.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Salonica, January* 17, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith for your information copy of a despatch which I have addressed to His Majesty's Embassy in Constantinople this day, concerning the desire of the population of the island of Thassos to be incorporated with Greece.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 410.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Salonica, January* 17, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that a deputation of five persons, representing the population of the island of Thassos, arrived here yesterday viâ Athens and were received by the King, as well as by M. Ractivan and other officials, to all of whom they expressed the desire of their fellow-islanders to be incorporated in the kingdom of Greece.

This morning they went the rounds of the principal foreign consulates in Salonica and handed in a declaration to that effect for transmission to their respective Governments. A copy of this memorandum is annexed hereto for your information.

The question of Thassos might conceivably become a delicate and important one. The geographical position of the island renders its occupation a matter of very considerable interest to whatever Power may be in possession of Cavalla; but, on the other hand, its cession to Bulgaria would be unjustifiable on any but purely strategical grounds, and would be a certain source of strife between her and Greece. Its population, amounting to some 20,000 souls, is exclusively Greek. A few Bulgarian workmen formerly found temporary employment in the Speidel mines, but the last of these were murdered shortly previous to the revolution of 1908, while the few Turkish

employés and gendarmes were removed to Athens on the occupation of the island by the Greeks in November last.

The resources of the island, though undeveloped, are not inconsiderable. It is well wooded and capable of exporting timber, olives, wine, and tobacco. It also contains valuable mineral deposits, though the working of the Speidel mines has not proved so remunerative as was anticipated, and has now been practically suspended.

A copy of this despatch, together with the original copy of the declaration above alluded to, has been forwarded home direct.

I have, &c.
HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 410.

Declaration.

LA population de l'île, entièrement grecque, de Thassos, assemblée, à des réunions unanimes, par ses primats, le vicaire et le maire de Thassos,

Déclare :

1. Elle exprime son désir ardent de s'unir à sa mère-patrie la Grèce.

2. Elle déclare qu'elle ne considère comme équitable aucune autre solution que celle mentionnée ci-dessus, et que cette union seule pourrait lui garantir son avenir.

3. Elle a l'espoir que les Grandes Puissances européennes, ayant toujours agi avec bienveillance envers les Hellènes se trouvant sous le joug ottoman, voudront encore donner, avec la même bienveillance, une solution à la question, qui n'est pas seulement celle de l'île de Thassos, mais de toutes les autres îles de l'archipel que les efforts récents de nos connationaux ont délivrées du joug ottoman.

4. Elle charge une commission constituée de MM. le maire de l'île de Thassos, Georges Thomaïdes, et Anastase Lambiri, Nicolas Yamaki, Démétrius Colonaris et Auguste Théologhitis de se rendre à Salonique et de soumettre la présente déclaration à Sa Majesté le Roi des Hellènes, à MM. les consuls d'Allemagne, d'Autriche-Hongrie, de France, de la Grande-Bretagne, d'Italie et de Russie, ainsi qu'à son Excellence le Ministre hellène et procureur général du Gouvernement hellénique en Macédoine.

5. Elle charge cette même commission d'envoyer par dépêche la même déclaration, traduite en français, aux Ambassadeurs des Puissances réunis à Londres, à son Excellence Sir Edward Grey, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères de la Grande-Bretagne, et à son Excellence M. El. Vénizélos, Président du Conseil de Grèce.

6. Une copie de cette déclaration sera remise à qui de droit, dûment signée par tous les habitants de l'île ayant pris part à cette assemblée.

Faite à Thassos le 1er (14) janvier, 1913.

La Commission :
(Cinq signatures.)

[3541] No. 411.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January* 23, 1913.

MY telegram No. 39 of 23rd January.

I have received message from Talaat Bey, who says that he has been named Ottoman Minister of the Interior *ad interim*, to assure me that every possible measure has been taken to assure that internal order will be preserved, and guarantees that there will be no danger for life and property of foreigners.

The messenger, who is ex-Turkish Minister at Athens, added that, although he had no authority to say so, change of Government did not necessarily imply continuance of hostilities.

He confirmed death of Minister of War and two others during affray at the Porte.

Many of the opponents of the Committee are taking refuge, and several arrests are being made.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[3678] No. 412.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 24, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 40 of 23rd January.

Mahmoud Shevket for the present retains Ministry of War as well as Grand Vizierate. Ahmet Mouktar, late Minister at Athens, is Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs; Hadji Adil Minister of the Interior. Talaat and Djavid are not in this combination, which some believe will not be lasting. Cabinet has a distinct German colouring, and the Grand Vizier called on the German Ambassador late last night.

I understand that view is that war should not be continued provided that Adrianople remains to Turkey with the fortifications razed. The idea seems to be the convocation of last Parliament, which the present Government regard as the only legal assembly.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[3684] No. 413.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 24, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I have good reason to believe that at a Cabinet Council on Wednesday some of the Ministers pronounced themselves in favour of putting an end to the tergiversation of Bulgaria by taking immediate military action.

The serious developments at Constantinople will strengthen those in favour of this course, and in any case it is to be feared that Roumania will take advantage of the prospect of the renewal of hostilities between Turkey and the allies to attempt to drive a harder bargain with Bulgaria.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[3663] No. 414.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 9.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 15th January: Taxation of goods imported into Turkish territory occupied by allies.

The French Government share your view, and French representatives at Belgrade, Sophia, and Athens are being instructed to join with their colleagues in representations to the allied States in the sense of your proposal.

[3664] No. 415.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Paris, January 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 18 of 15th January.

Closing of shops at Uskub.

French representative at Belgrade has received instructions to make a representation to the Servian Government identical with that made by His Majesty's Minister.

[3681] No. 416.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 24, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that Bulgarian Minister had asked him for advice as to what his Government should do in view of altered situation in

Constantinople, and that he had urged them to do nothing for the present, as a counter-revolution was always possible.

His Excellency spoke to me with some bitterness of Austria. He complained of fact that she had not yet begun to demobilise, although political situation, so far as Servia was concerned, was completely altered, and he accused her of carrying on revolutionary propaganda in Poland. He had received convincing proofs of this from Cracow. He had, he said, in conversation with German Ambassador, pointed out that Russia was bound to Germany by so many ties of common interest and traditional friendship that Russian Government had always regarded a war with Germany as almost out of the question, more especially as they believed that it was Germany who controlled policy of the Triple Alliance. It would now appear that Austria and not Germany was assuming the leading role in that alliance, and this would entirely alter the case.

On my enquiring whether reports published in press of strong pressure which Russian Government had recently brought to bear at Constantinople were correct, his Excellency said that they had reference to language which he had held to Turkish Ambassador a month ago, as reported in my telegrams No. 488 of 16th December and No. 492 of 22nd December last.

[3686] No. 417.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 24, 1913.*

I HAVE just seen Minister for Foreign Affairs with regard to events at Constantinople. He told me that it was too early for him to express a definite opinion as to what should be attitude of Powers with regard to situation in Turkey. He thought it best for the Powers to abstain from taking any immediate action, but to wait until the new Turkish Government had replied to their note. In this way some time would be gained for reflection. If negotiations can be dragged on until Adrianople falls, Minister for Foreign Affairs thinks that it is just possible that hostilities may not be renewed. He is opposed to a naval demonstration as both a dangerous operation in itself and dangerous to European residents in Constantinople. Any separate action by a single Power would, in his opinion, be most regrettable.

His Excellency told me that he had been somewhat struck by a statement contained in a telegram from Austrian Ambassador at Constantinople to the effect that committee was apparently supplied with considerable sums of money.

[3666] No. 418.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, January 24, 1913.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 39 of 23rd January.

Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs believes *coup d'État* was personal rather than political, and that the Young Turks are ready to conclude peace on the basis of the cession of Adrianople. What he most fears is delay leading to financial exhaustion of allies, and he is inclined to favour the resumption of hostilities as accelerating a definitive solution.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[3682] No. 419.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, January 24, 1913.*

I SPOKE to Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs this morning in the sense of your telegrams Nos. 8 and 10 of 23rd January. He said that he thought that facts could

not be as alleged by the Council of Foreign Bondholders, and asked for statement in writing, which I am sending him.

My despatch No. 11 of 13th January on the subject should have reached you before this.

[3685] No. 420.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 24, 1913.*

ACTING Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking of events which might arise out of the new situation, states that Germany is determined to observe the strictest neutrality, and that Government are convinced that this attitude, if observed by all the Powers, will avoid all danger of general conflict.

They consider that the Powers should continue to be as united as possible, and that it is of the highest importance that no isolated initiative of any side should imperil this unity.

[3683] No. 421.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 23 of 23rd January: Duties at Salonica, &c.

Case mentioned is being provided for in arrangement under discussion with Greek Government (see my telegram No. 16 of 23rd January).

[3690] No. 422.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, January 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of 21st January in an unknown cypher, repeated 23rd January.

I had taken your second telegram of the same date, consisting of the same number of groups, to be its repetition.

Servian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs appears ignorant of nature of trade. Proposals of Servian Government might be practicable if the goods sent to the interior were the original packages which were reforwarded by their original importer, but in practice they are generally miscellaneous consignments which are frequently purchased retail from various sources, and original importer has no interest in claiming refund.

My position, however, is that Servian Government has no right to levy duty again in the occupied territory previous to annexation.

[3689] No. 423.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 24.)

(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, January 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegram of 23rd January.

British consular officer at Cavalla reports that Bulgarians are levying there 11 per cent. on the goods sent from Salonica by sea, but the same is being done at Turkish ports.

As the goods traffic on the junction railway has not been resumed yet, only small parcels can be sent by rail to the territories in Bulgarian occupation, and the merchants at Salonica have no positive information as to the levy of duties.

[3535] No. 424.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 30 of 23rd January.

You must telegraph if you think it desirable for us to send any ships to Besika Bay to be ready for emergencies as before.

[2104] No. 425.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 8 of 10th January.

What action have local authorities taken in consequence of your protest? Have goods confiscated been restored?

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[831] No. 426.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

OTTOMAN Public Debt.

What is result of representations reported in your despatch No. 154 of the 31st December, 1912?

[4260] No. 427.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 31.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

SPEAKING to the German Ambassador to-day, I said that we should some time have to consider our commercial interests in the Turkish territory which was to be transferred to the Balkan States. At present we had all the rights of the Capitulations: freedom from internal taxation and extra-territorial jurisdiction, as well as the comparatively low Turkish tariff. Extra-territorial rights and freedom from internal taxation, of course, we could not expect to keep, but it was a question whether, in giving up all the rights of the Capitulations, we should not ask for something in the nature of a satisfactory commercial treaty. I had no proposal to make at present, and it might not be found practicable to do anything, but after the settlement our commercial interests would wish to know whether the point had been considered, and if nothing was done why it had been impossible to do anything, and I supposed that German commercial interests would do the same.

The Ambassador admitted that German commercial interests were considerable. If anything was done, he assumed that it would mean new commercial treaties not only as regards the Turkish territory conquered, but the whole territory of the States which annexed Turkish territory. He believed that his Government now had the question under consideration.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4261] No. 428.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

THE German Ambassador informed me to-day that his Government had no objection to guaranteeing the integrity of Asia Minor; indeed, they were in favour of doing so. Their interests were purely commercial, such as the Anatolian railways.

I asked whether it would not be rather inconvenient if Turkey failed to keep order in Asia Minor, and some German engineers on the railways were killed. What would Germany do then?

Prince Lichnowsky asked why anything of that sort should happen? Even if it did happen, he thought that Germany would not land troops.

I said that, in any case, we must first see peace made between the allies and Turkey before we could form an opinion as to what was likely to happen in Asia Minor.

I gave him the accompanying copy of the words which I had used to the French Ambassador.*

On his remarking that the "Times" here had already pointed out that our "désintéressement" in Syria did not mean the recognition of a sphere of interest, I again said that, in consequence of what the French press—at any rate, the "Temps"—had said in this connection, I had observed to M. Cambon that what I had said about Syria did not imply a disturbance of the *status quo*, which it was our object to preserve.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

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* Reports having appeared in the French press to the effect that British agents were working for the annexation of Syria either to Great Britain or to Egypt, I told M. Cambon that His Majesty's Government had neither the intention of taking any action there nor any design nor political aspiration of any sort.

[4?58] No. 429.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 33.)
Sir *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day that the only method which occurred to me of making any progress with the Albanian question was that the Austrian Ambassador or the Italian Ambassador or himself should, leaving the town of Scutari where it was left at the last discussion of the Ambassadors, make some proposal as to concessions which might be made to Montenegro in the plain of Scutari, as regards the lake, the irrigation, the drainage, and so forth. If these concessions were substantial, I thought that the Russian Ambassador would say that, though he had no instructions, he would refer them to his Government.

The German Ambassador informed me that the Austrian Government had been immovable with regard to the plain of Scutari—in fact they were as stiff about the whole of the Scutari district as about the town. He had urged his Government to do what they could as regards these points, but they had found the Austrian Government immovable.

I said that, in that case, I was afraid that what Count Mensdorff might be prepared to offer might be so little that Count Benckendorff would say that it was not worth while referring it to his Government. With regard to the regulation of the water, for instance, if that was to be worth anything it must be in the hands of Montenegro, and not in Albanian hands. All I could suggest was that Count Mensdorff should put forward the best offer he could of concessions to be made if the town of Scutari went to Albania.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4262] No. 430.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 19.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

DR. DANEF asked to see me to-day, and Sir Arthur Nicolson and I saw him this evening.

He said that, personally, he had come to the conclusion that there was nothing for it now but to continue the war and take Adrianople. After that was done, the

Young Turks who had made the revolution might make peace even more readily than the previous Turkish Government; but till Adrianople fell there was no chance whatever of their giving way or sending a favourable answer to the note of the Powers.

I said that I could not well give advice, as all the risks of whatever course was taken fell on him and not on us. But I assumed that the new Turkish Government would send an answer to the note of the Powers, and it was possible that it might not be so unfavourable as was expected. As yet, it was true, we could know nothing: the situation was very obscure; but we must know in two or three days what sort of answer the new Government would make to the Powers.

Dr. Danef explained that the Governments of the allies would have to decide about denouncing the armistice. This could presumably not be done before Tuesday, the 28th instant, and there would then still be four days before hostilities began. So that even this course would give plenty of time to see what the disposition of the new Turkish Government was. This he said they would do.

I said that this was an important consideration. I repeated that I could give no advice, but I hoped that he and his colleagues would remain here till the situation was more clear.

Dr. Danef said that if the Turkish Government made peace directly after Adrianople fell it would be all right, but if they delayed after that Bulgaria would go on, and there would be other questions, such as the Straits, which must inevitably be raised, and he feared that these would complicate the situation.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4259] No. 431.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 27.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

I HAD spoken to the Italian Ambassador earlier in the day in the same sense as I spoke to the German Ambassador about Scutari to-day

He had replied to my observations in the same way, stating that the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had worked very hard in Vienna, but had found the Austrian Government immovable.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1841] No. 432.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

I HAVE received your despatches No. 157 of the 24th October, and No. 182, Confidential, of the 15th November last, relative to the financial situation in Greece, with special reference to the means at the disposal of the Greek Government for carrying on the war with Turkey.

In reply to these despatches, I have to request you to inform the British delegate on the International Financial Commission that I do not propose to make any communication at present to the Council of Foreign Bondholders on the points raised, and that in the absence of any concrete proposal on the part of the Greek Government, the question is one which cannot properly be considered.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[2201] No. 432*.

Sir Edward Grey to Prince Lichnowsky.

SIR E. GREY presents his compliments to the German Ambassador, and, with reference to his Excellency's communication of the 14th instant respecting the sequestered revenues of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, has the honour to state that instructions have been issued to His Majesty's Minister at Athens to make an energetic protest against the action of the Greek authorities, and to request that all interference with the revenues in question may at once be abandoned.

Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.

[1459] No. 433.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir N. Helme, M.P.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

THANK you for your letter of the 9th January. I have delayed answering it before, as I wished to know the result of a protest I had instructed our Minister to make at Belgrade, pointing out that His Majesty's Government could not admit that duties above 11 per cent. *ad valorem* are justifiable in territory which is Turkish and merely in military occupation. I am in hopes that an arrangement may now be made by which duties will be levied at Salonica only.

The general effect of possible definite transfers of territory from Turkey is one for international consideration, and is being borne in mind, but hitherto the grave political difficulties arising out of the war and the efforts to bring it to an end have needed all the attention of the Powers.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[1554] No. 434.

Foreign Office to Manchester Chamber of Commerce.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant on the subject of British trade interests as affected by the war in the Near East.

I am to inform you that the duties imposed by some of the allies on British imports have already led to a protest from His Majesty's Government, who cannot admit that such duties are justifiable in territory which is Turkish and merely in military occupation by the allies.

The general effect on foreign trade of possible transfers of territory from Turkey is one for international consideration, and is being borne in mind, but hitherto the grave political difficulties arising out of the war and the efforts to bring it to an end have needed all the attention of the Powers.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[2201] No. 434*.

Foreign Office to the Council of Foreign Bondholders.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 24, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 21st instant respecting the action of the Greek authorities in regard to the revenues of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.

I am to inform you that His Majesty's Minister at Athens has been instructed to enter an energetic protest against this action, and to inform the Greek Government

that His Majesty's Government will afford the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt full support in claiming from the Greek Government compensation for any loss, damage, or prejudice which this step may occasion to the bondholders.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[3768] No. 435.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 14.)

Sir, *Belgrade, January 18, 1913.*

IN conversation with the Austrian Minister yesterday I enquired why his Government considered it necessary still to maintain their military precautions on the Servian frontier, notwithstanding that the Servians had declared their readiness to evacuate Albania.

M. d'Ugron replied that Count Berchtold probably thought it would be best not to slacken precautions until evacuation was an accomplished fact, as the Servians were not to be trusted and might easily seize some pretext to remain in occupation of certain places if no means were at hand of bringing immediate pressure to bear upon them.

He then went on to say that, although their relations with Servia had considerably improved in the last few weeks and he had absolutely no fault to find with M. Pashitch's attitude, there unfortunately existed, and there had existed since the crisis in 1908-9, a very considerable current of public opinion, encouraged by some of the members of the present Government and a great number of prominent men of all parties, which always keeps in view the possibility of the eventual annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Servia. So long as this existed it would be impossible for the relations to be thoroughly satisfactory. If only Servians would recognise this fact and give up their scheming they would find the Austrian Government only too willing to adopt a conciliatory policy and to give them most liberal concessions in the matter of commerce.

I mentioned to M. d'Ugron that you had recently told Count Mensdorff you would use all the influence you could to persuade Servia that she should behave as a good neighbour to Austria (Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Cartwright, No. 104, December 19, 1912).

He appeared much pleased, and said that just at present Great Britain had more influence here than any other Power. Russian influence was suffering under the effects of the disappointment caused by the failure to support Servian pretensions, whilst France never counted for much because the Servian Government felt that, on account of the Treaty of Alliance, where Russia led France must follow, and, moreover, French advice would always be influenced by financial considerations. On the other hand, Great Britain was entirely independent, and Servians felt that her advice was altogether disinterested.

M. d'Ugron is not the first person to speak to me in this sense, and although, as I have reported previously, there has been some disappointment at the fact that Great Britain also was not more ready to back up the Servian claims, there is no doubt that the Servian Government are very susceptible to advice given by His Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[3769] No. 436.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 15.)

Sir, *Belgrade, January 18, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 117 of the 16th ultimo, reporting some of the petty annoyances to which the Servian Government were being subjected by their northern neighbour, such as the constant approaching of the Servian shores by Austrian monitors, and the nightly playing of searchlights from Semlin upon Belgrade, I have the honour to state that on the 14th instant a Servian barge proceeding down the Danube, along the Servian shore, was fired upon some 3 kilom. from Semendria by an Austrian patrol. None of the five men on board were injured, but ten bullet holes

were subsequently found in the barge. The Servian Government have made representations to the Austro-Hungarian Government on the subject.

Speaking of the incident, M. Stefanovitch, the Secretary-General of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, said that the Servian Government had taken every precaution to avoid any hasty retaliatory action, which might under such circumstances be taken by hotheads, and for that reason they had for some time past withdrawn their frontier guards further inland.

As a further instance of military activity on the part of the Austro-Hungarian authorities, M. Stefanovitch stated that a pontoon bridge had lately been thrown by them over the Save, opposite Ratcha, thus connecting Croatia to Bosnia, in close proximity to the Serbo-Bosnian frontier. This bridge apparently is not for public use, but reserved for military purposes only. He also mentioned the fact that there was now not a single pontoon belonging to Austrian or Hungarian Shipping Companies left along the Servian banks either of the Save or of the Danube.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

[3755] No. 437.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 46.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 18, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to enclose herewith copy of an extract from the *procès-verbal* of the sitting of the Council of the Ottoman Public Debt held on the 28th December last, in which a discussion was held as to the interests of the Tobacco Régie in the provinces at present occupied by the allied forces.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 437.

Extract from Procès-Verbal of Meeting of Ottoman Public Debt held December 28, 1912.

Lettre de la Régie des Tabacs du 8 (21) *décembre*, 1912.

LA Régie des Tabacs communique au conseil, en le priant de vouloir bien appuyer ses démarches, copie de la lettre identique par elle adressée aux Ambassadeurs de France, d'Allemagne et d'Autriche-Hongrie pour leur signaler les difficultés que rencontre l'exploitation du monopole sur les territoires occupés par les armées bulgare, grecque et serbe.

De la lettre en question il ressort que les opérations de la Régie ont été interdites dans la région d'Uscub, où a été institué le monopole des tabacs serbes, et entravées également dans la zone occupée par l'armée bulgare, où dans certaines localités on s'apprête à ne laisser vendre que des tabacs expédiés de Bulgarie et munis de la banderole de cet État. Il est vrai qu'à Salonique le représentant du Gouvernement hellénique a donné des ordres pour assurer le fonctionnement régulier du monopole, mais il a soumis au payement d'un droit de douane les matières et fournitures que la manufacture de la Régie en ladite ville reçoit du dépôt central de Constantinople.

Il résulte de cette situation, poursuit la Régie, ainsi que des déclarations faites par les autorités serbes, bulgares et grecques, que si les États alliés entendent sauvegarder les droits de la Dette publique, ils interprètent différemment le caractère de la Régie. Or, celle-ci n'étant qu'une société chargée de gérer, aux lieu et place de la Dette publique, le monopole du tabac, qui constitue un des revenus concédés à cette administration, on ne saurait entraver sous une forme quelconque la marche normale de l'exploitation dudit monopole sur tous les territoires faisant partie de l'Empire ottoman jusqu'à la conclusion de la paix, sans léser gravement non seulement les intérêts des actionnaires de la société fermière, mais encore ceux de la Dette publique et des créanciers étrangers de la Turquie.

En terminant, la Régie prie lesdits Ambassadeurs de vouloir bien, s'il leur est

possible, intervenir en vue de faire valoir le point de vue ci-dessus énoncé auprès des Gouvernements alliés.

M. le président déclare que, dès la réception de cette communication, il s'est empressé d'écrire aux Ambassadeurs de France, d'Allemagne et d'Autriche-Hongrie, pour appuyer, au nom du conseil, la demande de la Régie.

Le conseil prend note de ces renseignements.

[3756] No. 438.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 19, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at the Dardanelles, reporting the good behaviour of the 30,000 troops under Fahri Pasha.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 438.

Vice-Consul Harris to Consul-General Eyres.

(No. 13.)
Sir, *Dardanelles, January* 15, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that placards have been posted up in this town and in the villages around severely censuring the officers of the Turkish fleet for their inactivity. It is said that notices of an inflammatory nature, directed against Christians, have also been seen. This latter I am inclined to attribute to the fertility of Greek imagination.

I have been pursuing my enquiries as to the behaviour of the Turkish troops, having heard lately that some Greeks had been killed at Kyrta. I made careful enquiries, and this resolved itself into one man missing, probably a deserter in hiding somewhere.

Fahri Pasha has in this immediate district some 30,000 men, and not a single complaint, which would stand the test of a careful investigation, has yet reached my ears of any oppression or misdeed on their part. These troops are largely composed of what are generally considered the most unruly elements of the Turkish Empire—Arab, Laz, and Kurd. So far their behaviour has been exemplary; it would indeed be hard to find such tranquillity in a country occupied by any European army.

Several concrete instances of the clemency of Fahri Pasha towards Greek miscreants have recently been brought to my notice.

In view of the contradictory rumours that are maliciously spread abroad, I feel bound to call your attention to these facts, in justice to the Turkish army and to Fahri Pasha.

I have, &c.
M. E. HARRIS.

[3757] No. 439.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 49.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January* 19, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the acting British vice-consul at Cavalla, reporting on the situation at that place.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 439.

Acting Vice-Consul Morgan to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1.)

Sir, *Cavalla, January* 11, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to report that, on the 31st December last, the Greek war-vessel "Kanaris" arrived here coming from Leftera Harbour (west of the Gulf of Cavalla).

Its arrival caused great enthusiasm among the Christian inhabitants of Cavalla, who are almost exclusively Greek. The Bulgarian authorities at first would not permit any communication between the vessel and the shore, and it was only after a delay of two hours that the captain of the vessel was able to land. During this time the Greek crowd waiting at the custom-house gates became exasperated at the action of the Bulgarians, and finally, headed by the Greek Metropolitan, rushed the custom-house gates. The captain's passage through the town was the cause of great excitement, and for several hours the crowd yelled itself hoarse outside the Greek club where the captain stayed. His reception was certainly a more popular one than that given to the Bulgarian princes.

The "Kanaris" left the same evening for Leftera, where a large Greek transport arrived next day. Greek troops were landed and Bulgarian troops were at once hurried there from Cavalla. At the time of writing the Greek transport is still at Leftera and Bulgarian and Greek troops face one another on shore.

The object of the Greek action is not quite clear. It may be that they wish to establish a claim on Leftera on the basis of occupation and possession, or it may be that they are of opinion that their presence near Cavalla will prevent the Bulgarians from treating the Greeks of Cavalla too harshly.

The sub-prefect of Drama has arrived here. He is touring the district, investigating the complaints made of murder, pillage, and violence on the part of komitajis and others. He will shortly leave for Serres, where the Bulgarian Governor of Macedonia has taken up his residence.

Up to the present the local Bulgarian officials have shown themselves anxious to meet the wishes of foreigners living here, and foreigners have very little cause of complaint against them. The native population, however, complain of many vexatious restrictions on commerce and the liberty of the subject which are now in force, of the continual requisitioning of food, &c., by all and sundry, who requisition without payment all sorts of goods, which they then proceed to sell in other towns and villages, and finally of the baksheesh system which seems to be in full vigour. Their opinion seems to be that in Macedonia they have exchanged King Log for King Stork.

Foreigners complain of the closing of the local foreign post-offices—the French and the Austrian—whereby communication with Europe is rendered difficult, and with Constantinople and Turkey in Asia almost impossible. A week has elapsed since the authorities forbade the foreign post-offices to work, and it is hardly probable that they will be reopened.

I have, &c.
JAMES MORGAN.

[3718] No. 440.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 18.)

Sir, *Athens, January* 19, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch from His Majesty's consul at Syra, reporting the raid of the Turkish cruiser on that port on the 15th instant. The damage inflicted by the "Medjidieh" upon the Greek auxiliary cruiser "Macedonia" appears to have been much more serious than is admitted in the Greek official account.

I have, &c.
F. ELLIOT.

Enclosure in No. 440.

Consul Saliba to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 3.)

Sir, *Syra, January* 16, 1913.

CONFIRMING my telegram of yesterday's date, I beg the honour to inform you that at about 11.30 A.M. yesterday a Turkish cruiser appeared coming at full speed through Mikoni channel. She passed behind Light House Island, and nearing Syra threw a few shells towards the local gunpowder factory without doing any damage. Then she came in closer, signalled to the British steam-ship "Alexandria" to leave harbour, and, as soon as the latter moved out, the Turkish cruiser started shelling the "Macedonia," which was soon set on fire.

The Turkish cruiser's name is not known, but no doubt her sole object was the "Macedonia," as immediately she saw her on fire she left at full speed, and has not been seen since.

The "Macedonia" was burning all day and night, and is still smouldering. There were some heavy explosions on board between 11 P.M. and early morning.

The electric-light power station has been damaged, and the town was in total darkness last night. One or two more houses, which were also in the line of fire, were more or less damaged.

One of the Eastern Telegraph clerks, an Italian subject, while leaving his house, which was also in the line of fire, with his family was seriously injured, by a shell exploding near, in his left arm, which had to be amputated; his wife received one or two slight flesh wounds, but the servant was killed on the spot.

There were also five or six more persons slightly hurt.

There was some excitement in the town while the firing lasted, but by the evening everything was quiet and normal again.

I have, &c.
J. SALIBA.

[3742] No. 441.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 13 Confidential.)

Sir, *Rome, January* 20, 1913.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 11, Confidential, of the 15th instant, I have heard that the Italian Under-Secretary of State has used much the same language here as that attributed to the Italian Ambassador in London on the subject of the equilibrium in the Mediterranean and the possible interest of Italy not to terminate her occupation of the Ægean Islands until it was quite clear that France would not find an opportunity in the present crisis for raising pretensions in Syria. It would therefore appear that the observations of the Italian Ambassador, if he really made them, were not so wholly the outcome of ill-considered verbosity as the Marquis di San Giuliano wished the French chargé d'affaires to believe.

I have, &c.
RENNELL RODD.

[3759] No. 442.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 51.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January* 21, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of the brief official account communicated to the local press of the naval engagement which took place between the Turkish and Greek fleets on the 18th January in the neighbourhood of the island of Tenedos.

I learn from reliable sources that the damage done to the German-built cruisers "Torghut Reis" and "Barbarossa" was considerable, and that the mechanism of the central turret of the latter vessel was wrecked by a shell, and that 4 Turkish officers and 37 men were killed and 98 wounded, including 7 officers. At the same time I

understand that the condition of these vessels is not considered so desperate that they could not, if necessary, proceed to sea again at short notice. The "Messudieh" and "Medjidieh" also went out, but do not appear to have taken any active part in the engagement or to have been extensively damaged.

In the newspapers and in local gossip the jejune official account is plentifully supplemented by tales of great damage inflicted on the Greek ships and by purely imaginary accounts of the insignificance of the losses suffered by the Turks, while the difficulty of getting any reliable information is increased by the fact that telegrams from the Dardanelles are delayed two and three days in transmission, so that I have not yet received any official report from the acting British vice-consul there on the results of the engagement.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 442.

Newspaper Extract.

L'AGENCE ottomane reçoit du Ministère de l'Intérieur le communiqué officiel suivant :

"Un combat naval a eu lieu entre l'escadre ennemie et la flotte ottomane. Des deux côtés il y a eu quelques dégâts.

"Ce combat a duré plusieurs heures et a eu lieu entre les îles de Ténédos et de Lemnos. La flotte ottomane est rentrée sauve. Les blessés sont transportés à Constantinople."

[3770] No. 443.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 16.)

Sir, *Belgrade, January 22, 1913.*

WITH reference to my despatch No. 13 of the 16th instant, in which I stated I had handed in, unofficially, the memorandum on the subject of the atrocities supposed to have been committed by Servian troops and irregulars, I have the honour to transmit herewith translation of a memorandum I have now received from the Servian Government in reply.

I am at a loss to give any opinion on this subject, although I have not failed to make enquiries whenever an opportunity appeared to present itself. I have heard many reports of atrocities, but none that I could vouch for.

I have, &c.
RALPH PAGET.

Enclosure in No. 443.

Note communicated to Sir R. Paget.

(Translation.) *Belgrade, January 8 (21), 1913.*

THE Royal Servian Government thank his Britannic Majesty's Government for the friendly note, by which they were good enough to call their attention to the rumours respecting outrages committed against the Mussulman population in the territory occupied by Servia. These rumours, unfortunately, were first started at the time when the creation of an autonomous Albania was first deemed necessary. All such rumours, which were spread in the foreign press, were contradicted at the time both by the Servian Government and by the foreign correspondents who accompanied the Servian army. Nevertheless, later on, as soon as it was thought that the question of delimitation of Albania would be decided by the Ambassadors' conference, such rumours became more numerous.

It is difficult for the Royal Government to fight against all such tendencious rumours diametrically opposed as they are to actual facts. It has been affirmed that on its way from Egri-Palanka to Istib and Veles the Servian army killed hundreds of Albanians with machine guns, notwithstanding that there are no Albanians in these districts; it has been affirmed that the road from Ferizovitch to Djaktova and Ipek is marked out by a line of gallows; it has been affirmed that in the neighbourhood of Prizrend all the 3,000 inhabitants of a village were killed—the name of the village was, however, omitted; lastly, it has been affirmed that the Servian and Bulgarian armies killed half a million Turks and Albanians. It is evident that it is difficult to combat such rumours which, on being contradicted, are merely replaced by others, equally fantastic, accusing the Servian army of most horrible crimes.

Servia embarked in war with the object of liberating her co-nationals in Turkey; but this war was in no sense a religious war, and her troops paid most scrupulous attention to the rights of humanity, as consecrated by international law and usage. Albanians and bashi-bouzouks fought together with the Turkish army as irregular troops. The Servian army, however, did not take advantage of their right to punish them as *francs-tireurs*, but treated those made prisoners in the same manner as the regular Turkish soldiers, and their wounded were accorded the same treatment as Servian soldiers. These facts alone are sufficient to prove the falseness of the serious accusations levelled against the Servian army. If any isolated cases did occur when soldiers in the excitement of battle committed a crime—an occurrence which cannot be avoided in any war—the offenders have always been punished to the full extent of the military laws, in the same manner as all offences committed by the members of scattered indigenous comitaji bands, which could not be controlled by the military authorities. Furthermore, the Servian authorities severely punished all attempts at personal revenge among the inhabitants of the occupied districts, and extended both material and monetary aid to the Mussulman families victims of this war.

The accusations in question fall all the more heavily on the Royal Government because they are untrue, and because such rumours may alienate from Servia the sympathies of the European Powers. The Servian Government beg His Britannic Majesty's Government to be so good as to take into consideration the full extent of the difficulties of their situation, and not to deprive them of their goodwill because of unjust accusations intentionally made against Servia and her army.

[3836] No. 444.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received January 25.)

Sir, *Board of Trade, January 24, 1913.*

WITH reference to your letter of the 20th January, with its enclosures, relative to the duties levied on goods destined for territory in Servian occupation, I am directed by the Board of Trade to transmit to you herewith, for Sir E. Grey's information, copy of a letter on the subject, with its enclosure, recently received from the London Chamber of Commerce.

I am, &c.
GEO. J. STANLEY.

Enclosure 1 in No. 444.

London Chamber of Commerce to Board of Trade.

Oxford Court, Cannon Street, London, January 18, 1913.

Sir,

ADVERTING to my letter of the 2nd January, and your reply of the 10th, I now beg to enclose a translation of a letter received from the Salonica Chamber of Commerce in further reference to the action of the Servian and Bulgarian authorities in levying duties on goods which have already been subjected to the Turkish duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem* at Salonica, and am desired to express the hope that such further action as may be possible will be taken by His Majesty's Government to prevent this imposition of double duty, which it is considered is contrary to international procedure, and likely to cause a serious injury to British trade.

I am, &c.
CHARLES E. MUSGRAVE,
Secretary.

Enclosure 2 in No. 444.

Salonica Chamber of Commerce to London Chamber of Commerce.

(Translation.)

Dear Sir, *Salonica, January 8, 1913.*

WE have the honour to communicate to you by the present information relative to the customs duties levied by the Servian and Bulgarian authorities on merchandise, having already paid at Salonica the regular duties, and destined for territory occupied by their troops.

At the outset the Servian Government had submitted all the articles cleared at Salonica and sent by our merchants into the region occupied by the Servian army to a customs duty corresponding with the maximum of its general tariff, and equivalent to prohibition of importation into Salonica.

Complaints and protests being formulated on all sides, the Servian Government consented to authorise the importation of goods from Salonica against a customs duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem* to the exclusion of articles which are the subject of monopoly in Servia, such as salt, alcohol, petrol, cigarette papers, and tobacco, the importation of which is prohibited.

We have just learnt that the Servian authorities in the occupied towns have requested instructions to levy on goods coming from Salonica, independently of the customs duty, an octroi duty in conformity with the tariff actually in operation in Servia.

The Bulgarian Government has also levied a customs duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem* on merchandise sent from here into the provinces occupied by its troops. The entry of articles the subject of monopoly in Bulgaria, such as matches, cigarette papers, salt, playing cards, is prohibited. In addition to the customs duty, the Bulgarian authorities levy an octroi and an excise duty such as are in force in Bulgaria.

We estimate that the imposition of customs duties in the countries which are under the military occupation of the allied armies, and not yet annexed on merchandise already cleared at the port of entry, constitutes a measure which is contrary to international rules. It is the same with any other impost which did not exist before the occupation.

Merchandise from Salonica destined for the region occupied by the Servian army has still another serious difficulty to overcome. It is subjected to a transference at Goumendja, a station 50 kilom. distant from Salonica, from the trains of the Oriental Railway Company to Servian railway trucks, which are only dispatched from Uskub to Goumendja with a delay of several days. Merchandise is also subject, in addition to customs duties and octroi, to demurrage charges and expenses of transferring the goods, which are particularly onerous in a country where there is a lack of labour without counting the damage that the goods suffer by this operation.

This state of affairs will have, as an immediate consequence, the effect of considerably diminishing the importation into Salonica to the great detriment of foreign producers.

We therefore beg you in the common interest to kindly take energetic steps with your Government in order to put an end as quickly as possible to this regrettable situation.

I am, &c.
(For the Salonica Chamber of Commerce),
[Signature illegible],
President.

THEKNUT, *Secretary.*

[3891] No. 445.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Sophia, January 25, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 17 of 24th January: Rodosto consulate.

Last paragraph of my despatch No. 154 of 31 December, 1912.

Bulgarian Government informed me on 31st December that instructions had been sent to permit vice-consul to return to Rodosto.

Constantinople informed 14th January.

[3893] No. 446.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 24. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 25, 1913.*

TURKISH *coup d'Etat.*

Prime Minister informs me that M. Daneff and Bulgarian Finance Minister have telegraphed urging him to instruct Bulgarian peace delegates to return home at once.

Prime Minister further states that the King also maintains same view. Cabinet, however, have decided at any rate to wait until Monday before taking such action. They hope that by that day the newly formed Government will have returned reply to the collective note of the Powers. They have instructed M. Daneff in this sense.

Prime Minister assured me that Bulgarian Government would not accept any Turkish proposal which did not include cession of Adrianople.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[3711] No. 447.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 43.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 25, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 55 of 24th January.

Though perhaps too soon to judge, present Committee Government seems unlikely to give satisfactory reply to collective note on the essentials of Adrianople and the islands. As their internal policy threatens to be more violent than that of their predecessors, result may be phenomenal strain where presence of ships would be desirable.

Whereas last Cabinet were favourably disposed to entry of foreign ships, present Government would be likely to raise objections to granting firman, but the presence of two ships at Besika, implying a threat of their arriving here, would have deterrent effect as regards disorders here, while politically strengthening the position.

I am seeing my French colleague, and will telegraph further.

Grand Vizier and Cabinet were detained practically as prisoners until a late hour last night, and Minister of the Interior and Minister of Finance, who are regarded as specially hostile by the committee, are still under detention.

Political arrests continue.

Sir F. Elliot's telegram No. 10 of 24th January.

My views do not agree with those of Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs.

The change is not personal, but distinctly one from non-committee to committee Government.

My German colleague seems very anxious that present Government should be given some concession regarding Adrianople and some financial assistance. This seems of doubtful expediency at the present moment.

(Sent to Athens, Sophia, Bucharest, Belgrade, and Cettinjé.)

[3847] No. 448.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 44.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 25, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 43 of 24th January.

French Ambassador tells me that there is one French ship at Salonica and one at Smyrna ready to start at short notice. Some similar plan would perhaps be advisable for us to adopt instead of sending ships to Besika pending the receipt of reply of Turkish Government to the joint note.

I learn from commander-in-chief that the "Dartmouth" is proceeding to Salonica and His Majesty's ship "Yarmouth" to Suda Bay

In view of the size of German and French ships here it would be perhaps advisable, if consistent with naval exigencies, to have a larger unit than the above British ships. As senior admiral here is French, it would perhaps be better to avoid sending an admiral.

[3878] No. 449.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Paris, January 25, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 30 of 21st January.

French Minister for Foreign Affairs informs me that French Government concur in your views in regard to question of any indemnity claimed by Balkan States.

[3899] No. 450.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 13. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, January 25, 1913.*

M. JONNART, whom I have been to see, tells me that he has instructed the French Ambassador at St. Petersburgh to impress on Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs that in dealing with the complications which may result from the Constantinople revolution it is of imperious necessity to proceed with the utmost caution, and to avoid embarking on any such hazardous undertaking as bringing pressure to bear on Turkey in Asia Minor, which might involve questions under the Cyprus Convention and cause difficulties with England.

M. Jonnart has requested that before any measures are adopted by the Russian Government of a nature to endanger the peace between the Powers M. Sazonof will consult the French Government.

[3876] No. 451.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *St. Petersburgh, January 25, 1913.*

SIR R. PAGET'S telegrams Nos. 4, 9, 11, of 5th, 10th, 11th January.

Memorandum from Russian Government states that they have drawn attention of Servian Government to the fact mentioned. They do not, however, think it desirable in present circumstances to join in making representations to the allies as suggested in your telegram No. 37 of 15th January.

[3902] No. 452.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 16.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January 25, 1913.*

THE Italian Government have sent man-of-war already in Ægean Sea to Besika. A second is on the way from Taranto. A third, recently on the Syrian coast, has been diverted to Ægean to be near if wanted.

[3711] No. 453.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 25, 1913.*

SIR G. LOWTHER'S telegram No. 43 of 25th January.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs of first two paragraphs only, and add that I share his views as to observing neutrality, as stated in your telegram No. 18

of 24th January; but I hope German Government agree in opinion that we must be careful to avoid anything that may encourage new Turkish Government to reject advice of the Powers, which their predecessors were on the point of accepting, and that it seems to me to be of doubtful expediency to encourage financial assistance to the new Government at the present moment.

[3711] No. 454.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 42.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 25, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 41 of to-day: Turkish crisis.

In carrying out these instructions you should be careful not to give any ground for supposition that my remarks are prompted by anything which German Ambassador at Constantinople has said to Sir G. Lowther.

[3711] No. 455.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 56.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 25, 1913.*

ADMIRALTY is being requested to send two ships from Malta to Besika Bay. They are not being sent as part of a naval demonstration against Turkey, but in view of considerations set forth in your telegram No. 43 of 25th January. Italian Ambassador informs me that Italian Government is also sending two ships in consequence of similar information received from Italian Ambassador at Constantinople.

(Repeated to Berlin, No. 40.)

[3689] No. 456.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Lamb.

(No. 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Code.* *Foreign Office, January 25, 1913.*

PLEASE telegraph if the Bulgarians are levying duty at Cavalla on goods which have already paid duty at Salonica, or if the duty is imposed only at Cavalla.

[4328] No. 457.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.**

(No. 20.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 25, 1913.*

I TOLD the meeting of the Ambassadors to-day the substance of what Sir Gerard Lowther had said respecting the situation in Constantinople.

The Italian Ambassador said that his Government had received similar information from their Ambassador, and were sending two cruisers to Besika Bay.

The German Ambassador said that he did not know what his Government would do, but they were anxious to avoid any impression of menace or departure from neutrality.

I observed that the question was not one for a naval demonstration, and that there seemed to be nothing for the Powers to do for the moment except to wait for the reply from Turkey.

The German Ambassador said that this was entirely the view held in Berlin.

We then had a long discussion about the district, as distinct from the town, of

* Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 62), Sir E. Goschen (No. 34), Sir R. Rodd (No. 28), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 45).

Scutari; and the following *résumé* was drawn up by the French Ambassador and agreed to:—

"Sir E. Grey dit que, sans aborder la question de la ville de Scutari, il serait possible d'envisager les avantages que pourrait retirer le Monténégro d'une amélioration du régime des eaux dans la région.

"Le Comte Mensdorff fait observer qu'il est difficile de séparer la ville de Scutari des territoires qui l'environnent. Cependant, il est possible, d'après lui, d'envisager une régularisation du cours de la Boïana, ce qui permettrait de dessécher et de livrer à l'agriculture soit du côté albanais, soit du côté monténégrin, des territoires fertiles; ces travaux, qui d'ailleurs ont déjà été étudiés autrefois, pourraient s'opérer de compte à demi entre le Monténégro et l'Albanie.

"L'Ambassadeur de France demande s'il ne serait pas possible de laisser au Monténégro les deux rives de la Boïana. L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie répond que ce serait priver l'Albanie de territoires productifs qui lui sont indispensables, car elle sera à peu près dénuée de ressources, que d'ailleurs la Boïana est le débouché naturel de Scutari sur la mer.

"L'Ambassadeur de France réplique que le vrai débouché de Scutari est le Drin.

"L'Ambassadeur de Russie fait remarquer que ses instructions lui prescrivent de réclamer comme frontière de la future Albanie le cours du Drin en laissant la ville de Scutari au Monténégro, que ce n'est donc que d'une façon très hypothétique qu'il peut officieusement se prêter à d'autres solutions.

"L'Ambassadeur d'Autriche-Hongrie fait observer, à son tour, que ses instructions l'obligent à n'admettre comme frontière de l'Albanie au nord sauf dans la région de Plavna que la limite actuelle du Monténégro, mais qu'on peut trouver des satisfactions à donner à cet Etat du côté du sandjiak de Novi-Bazar.

"Le Comte Benckendorff dit que, de ce côté, c'est affaire à régler entre la Serbie et le Monténégro, et que nous avons décidé de laisser les alliés s'entendre entre eux sur la délimitation des territoires conquis.

"Le Marquis Imperiali pense qu'on doit cependant tenir compte des accroissements de territoires dont le Monténégro profitera du côté du sandjiak.

"Le Prince Lichnowski fait remarquer que l'Autriche-Hongrie, en abandonnant le sandjiak sur lequel elle avait certains droits, a procuré à la Serbie et au Monténégro des avantages dont il convient de tenir compte.

"Le Comte Benckendorff insiste sur la nécessité de ne pas donner au Monténégro des satisfactions aux dépens de la Serbie. Reprenant ses observations précédentes sur l'esprit dans lequel doit être conduite la discussion relative à la limitation de l'Albanie, il dit que ce serait s'exposer à conclure d'une façon erronée que de se livrer à des considérations purement ethnographiques, et qu'il importe de tenir compte du fait que les alliés ont été victorieux et qu'ils occupent des territoires où sont mélangés des éléments très divers, que d'ailleurs tous les Albanais ne sont probablement pas partisans de l'autonomie.

"Quelques observations à ce sujet s'échangent entre l'Ambassadeur de Russie et celui d'Autriche-Hongrie.

"En résumé la réunion se demande s'il n'est pas possible de trouver un terrain de conciliation, chacun se réservant de consulter son Gouvernement sur les solutions qui peuvent être envisagées."

The German Ambassador put in the following formula about the Ottoman debt:—

"*Projets d'Articles.*

"1. Chacun des États signataires du présent traité, qui reçoit cession d'une portion des territoires ayant appartenu jusqu'à présent à l'Empire ottoman, supportera une part de l'ensemble de la dette de l'Empire ottoman proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés. Cette participation sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire, calculés d'après la moyenne des trois derniers exercices financiers.

"La quote-part incombant aux États cessionnaires dans les engagements de l'Empire ottoman sera incessible, insaisissable et ne pourra faire l'objet de compensation; des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés actuelles, dont le maintien sera reconnu impraticable, seront données par les États cessionnaires pour la garantie des créanciers.

"La contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires ci-dessus déterminée sera convertible en capital sur le pied de 4 pour cent.

"2. Les États cessionnaires sont subrogés dans tous les droits et charges du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions ayant leur exploitation sur les territoires cédés par le présent traité; ils s'engagent également dans ces territoires à respecter et à exécuter les contrats valablement consentis par le Gouvernement Impérial ou les autorités compétentes.

"3. Les détails d'application et d'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus seront consignés dans des protocoles, annexés au présent traité et élaborés par une commission internationale, où seront représentées les six Grandes Puissances et qui se réunira à le ."

The German Ambassador said that this formula had been agreed to in Paris.

The French Ambassador explained that it had been drawn up by the Commission of Experts, and that M. Poincaré, not being a member of this body, had not known of it when he proposed his formula.

The French Ambassador was ready to accept it, and we all did the same.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3711] No. 458.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 25, 1913.

I AM directed by Secretary Sir Edward Grey to transmit to you herewith copies of telegrams exchanged with His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople relative to the situation created there by the *coup d'État* of the 23rd instant,* which resulted in the overthrow of Kiamil Pasha's Government and the return to power of the party of the Committee of Union and Progress.

I am to ask that the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty will give urgent instructions for the immediate dispatch of two ships to Besika Bay from Malta, and I am to draw attention to the point noted in the last telegram sent to Sir G. Lowther, that this step is taken solely in view of the considerations set forth in the first two paragraphs of his Excellency's telegram No. 43 of to-day, and is not intended as part of a naval demonstration against Turkey.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[3882] No. 459.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 45.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January* 25, 1913.

I HAVE seen Grand Vizier. His attitude is that he accepted position under pressure of circumstances, and that he fully realised the difficulties. He alleged that the whole of the country and the army were determined that Adrianople should not be ceded; he said that the town could still hold out for some time. Cabinet was engaged in studying the note of the Powers, and an answer would be returned shortly. To one of my colleagues he said that he hoped Monday or Tuesday.

He is evidently experiencing great difficulties in finding a Minister for Foreign Affairs, Hakki Pasha and Osman Nizami having refused.

(Sent to Sophia, Athens, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Cettinjé.)

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* Nos. 424, 447, and 455.

[3883] No. 460.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 46.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 25, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 56 of 25th January.

Italian Ambassador says that two Italian ships will not at present be ordered to Besika, but elsewhere in Turkish waters to be available in case of necessity.

[3884] No. 461.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 47.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 26, 1913.*

GERMAN Ambassador tells me that he has received instructions which he asserts are to the following effect: Change of Government in Turkey evidently means that she will refuse to agree to the cession of Adrianople. This may produce a change of attitude on the part of Russia on the Asiatic frontier. It is therefore necessary for Germany to maintain a strictly neutral attitude, and to abstain from anything that might be interpreted as exercise of pressure in any form.

He was not clear as to whether he meant pressure in the event of an unsatisfactory reply to note, or whether it was to obtain reply.

I understand that Constantinople metropolitan concession, for which outgoing Cabinet refused to complete formalities, was granted last night in favour of the Deutsche Bank, and in return M. Huguenin promised to do his best to procure for the Government advance of £ T. 2,000,000.

[3903] No. 462.

Sir R. Rodd to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Rome, January 26, 1913.*

BULGARIAN representative informs me that Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs had said, and authorised him to telegraph to Sophia, that he knew that if frontier question with Roumania could be settled forthwith latter Power was prepared to dispatch two army corps to assist allies at Adrianople. Austrian Ambassador had though less positively, conveyed to him that Roumanian support could be thus secured.

[3894] No. 463.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Sophia, January 26, 1913.*

PLEASE refer to my telegram No. 24 of the 25th instant.

The following is secret:—

The Bulgarian Government will find themselves in a position of great difficulty if, in their reply to the collective note of the Powers, the Ottoman Government insist on retaining Adrianople while offering to raze the fortifications.

The Servian Government would, probably, in the first instance, according to information received from M. Panas, the Greek Minister here, advise the acceptance of the above-named condition by the allies, and would, if the Bulgarian Government refused, probably put forward, in return for their further active assistance, fresh demands such as the cession of the territory to the north-north-west of Monastir. These demands would include Perlepe and Kuprulu.

The Bulgarian Government will require, in the event of the continuation of the war, the Servian heavy guns, which are much needed at both Adrianople and Chatalja, and at least another Servian division.

No definite decision will be reached in the next two or three days, but I am able to confirm the above information from a second reliable source.

The King has exaggerated fears for the future of his dynasty and insists on the cession of Adrianople as a *sine qua non*, although the Bulgarian nation are less anxious than is generally supposed on this point. The attitude of the King exercises strong influence on the Cabinet.

[3888] No. 464.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 26, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of 24th January.

At a Cabinet Council yesterday, presided over by the King, Ministers in favour of immediate military action were overruled, and it was decided to present a note at Sophia and to M. Danef calling for prompt written reply to Roumanian proposals mentioned in my telegram No. 15 of 22nd January.

Communiqué to the press states that Ministers have agreed upon the course to be followed in order that the negotiations with Bulgaria may have a prompt and satisfactory result.

It is very desirable that Bulgaria should reply promptly and, if she cannot grant all that Roumania demands, that she should make concrete counter-proposals. If she persists in a policy which is regarded here as one of prevarication and evasion, public exasperation here may force the hands of the King (see my private letter to Sir A. Nicolson of 24th January). This danger would be all the greater should hostilities between Turkey and the allies be resumed.

Present Cabinet is not altogether united, and a crisis might bring the Liberals into power. Latter are strongly in favour of energetic policy.

(Sent to Constantinople and Sophia.)

[3887] No. 465.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, January 26, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 25 of 24th January.

Vice-consul telegraphs that confiscated goods have been restored to owners.

[3916] No. 466.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 2. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Salonica, January 26, 1913.*

MY telegram of 26th January, in code.

Information in regard to Bulgarian collection of import duties is contradictory. I am confidentially informed that whole question of transport of goods, including import duties, is a matter of personal bargaining with the officers in charge of railway.

[3919] No. 467.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 21, 1913.*

THE first comments of the local Turkish press on the collective note of the Powers were few and for the most part non-committal. The contents of the note had been widely and so accurately discounted that no section of public opinion was taken by surprise, except that which relying on real or supposed differences between the Triple Alliance and the Triple *Entente* had indulged a rapidly growing hope that the Powers might not agree on any common *démarche*. The only paper from which a violent

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outburst might have been expected was the "Tasvir-i-Evkiar," which under various names had been the open though not avowed organ of the Committee of Union and Progress, and which had distinguished itself by its eagerness for a resumption of hostilities as soon as the London negotiations were "suspended," but this paper was last suppressed a few days before the note was handed in, and it has not yet reappeared. It is only since the afternoon of the 19th instant that the other papers have been expressing anything approaching well-defined views. They are unanimous in upbraiding the injustice of the Powers, whom they accuse of seeking to exercise a one-sided pressure amounting to a departure from neutrality; they tax them with shameless hypocrisy in giving the guise of "friendly" counsel to representations which merely illustrate their determination to ruin Turkey as they have ruined other Eastern countries, and they dwell on the utter disregard now shown for assurances as to the maintenance of the *status quo* given by European statesmen at the outset of the war, when it was supposed that the allies might have the worst of it. The language of the press in these connections is of an extreme bitterness, though hardly so violent as might have been anticipated.

In other respects the attitude taken up by the papers during the last couple of days varies. Of the seven dailies which now appear, the two which are supposed to derive most inspiration from the Government are the "Yeni Gazette" and the "Ikdam."

The former of these in its issues of the 18th and 19th urged its readers most earnestly to leave the whole care of the situation to the Cabinet, and deprecated any attempt to limit the discretion of the Cabinet, either by offering advice or pressing for the publication of documents. In yesterday's issue it went a step further, for, after dwelling on the way in which the note had dispelled all illusions based on alleged disagreements between the Powers, it emphasised the ability of the latter to enforce their views, and insisted that, while the Government would doubtless do everything possible in the circumstances, the guide of Turkish action must be hard fact, not sentiment or imagination. The "Ikdam" has been taking a somewhat similar line. In its issue of the 17th it declared that the gravity of the situation as a whole must be taken into consideration by the Porte. Two courses were open, that of rejecting the advice of the Powers, in which case it must be remembered that Turkey would be face to face not only with the allies but with a Europe no longer neutral but hostile, and that of yielding. If the latter were chosen the diplomatic negotiations must be pushed with the utmost speed, lest Adrianople should actually fall in the interval and the Powers be thus absolved from their promise about safeguarding Moslem interests. Yesterday's "Ikdam" presents the same thesis in a different form. Basing its comments on the general anticipation that the Porte will not yield completely, but will offer to make further sacrifices short of the cession of Adrianople, it urges that the maximum of possible sacrifice should be tendered at once, and that the Porte should then exert itself to obtain the greatest possible *quid pro quo* from the Powers in regard to other questions which Bulgaria is mooting in order to exploit the apprehensions of Europe, notably that of a possible war indemnity.

The "Sibali," a paper, the Armenian editor of which keeps in close touch with high official circles, and was allowed to publish a significant interview with the Sultan last week, is nevertheless careful to avoid expressing any definite view as to what course the Government should pursue, and has confined itself to an academic examination of the international situation as indicated by the note. This is in accordance with the usual practice of the journal in question.

The remaining four papers have been less guarded in their utterances. The "Terjuman-i-hakikat," the only relic of the committee press in Turkish, makes light of the *démarche* of the Powers. On the morrow of its presentation it dwelt on the emasculation of the note as a result of dissensions in Europe, and on the fact that Germany had vetoed any threat of compulsion. In its issue of the 19th it reiterates its conviction that there is no real union among the Powers. The allusion to a possible extension of the hostilities to Asia it takes to refer to action not by the allies but by Russia, and such action, it says, would never be tolerated by Germany. The Porte must stand firm, and the responsibility for the consequences will attach not to Turkey but to Europe itself. A further article in yesterday's issue continues in the same strain. The readers of the paper are adjured not to exaggerate the importance of the note. Its demands are not really definite demands, and its threats are futile, for the withdrawal of the European friendship would only be a thing to fear had any friendship been shown hitherto; and money will always be lent so long as interest can be got for it.

The "Alemdar," the bitterest opponent of the committee, and a paper which a few

days ago insisted that Kiamil and Nazim Pashas were the sole hope of the country, has nevertheless used language far less guarded than that of the "Yeni Gazette" and the "Ikdam," and has, indeed, during the last two days taken a line not greatly different from that of the "Terdjuman." In its issue of the 19th it insists that Adrianople must not be surrendered. Yesterday's issue urges the Government to give serious attention to the references to Asia Minor, but does not recommend any definite line of action. The "Ifham," the organ of the National Constitutional party, and another opponent of the committee, also expresses views much more closely resembling those of "Terdjuman" than those of the Government papers. The note, it says, is the result of an imperfect agreement. Well might the French Ambassador declare in private conversation that it had become ridiculous. Not one but many mountains had laboured to produce the most ridiculous of mice. The threats contained in the note are stage thunder. The only coercion contemplated is coercion by the allies themselves. Turkey has no reason to fear them now that she rules the sea and enjoys a position at Chatalja such that the Bulgarians are more likely to be flung back on Adrianople than to advance on Constantinople if war be resumed. The Powers must not be astonished at a rejection of their proposals; "friends" so true must recognise Turkey's right to appreciate her own best interests.

Lastly, the "Hikmet," a paper when primary appeal is to Moslem religious sentiment, but which is politically an opposition organ, also leans to the side of resistance on the ground that, while that course would doubtless bring Russia into the field as an active adversary, it would thereby provoke a general war, a contingency from which the writer appears to anticipate advantages for Turkey.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[4006] No. 468.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 11.)

Sir, *Bucharest, January 21, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs, at his weekly reception this afternoon, when speaking to me of the negotiations proceeding between M. Danef and M. Misu, complained of the tergiversation of Bulgaria, which, he said, was largely responsible for Turkey's uncompromising attitude in the peace negotiations. I remarked that I had understood that Bulgaria had recently made proposals which were now being considered by the Roumanian Government. His Excellency replied that these were not sufficient, and that M. Misu was trying to obtain better terms, but was unable to extract from M. Danef anything definitive.

His Excellency added that when each Power had said its last word, recourse might be had to mediation or arbitration as a means of bridging the gap between the two. His Excellency, however, evidently did not wish that I should carry away the impression that all danger of a settlement by other than such pacific means was excluded, for he again alluded to the presence of General Torgut Shevket Pasha in Bucharest. He said he had not received him yet, and was avoiding doing so until he could tell him something definite. His Excellency also stated that Sefa Bey, the Turkish Minister in Bucharest, who went to Constantinople a few days ago, had been summoned thither in order to report on the disposition of Roumania.

One of my colleagues, whom saw M. Majorescu after me and with whom his Excellency was more explicit than he had been to me in regard to the negotiations in London, tells me that Bulgaria's tergiversation, of which M. Majorescu complains, consists in the refusal of M. Danef to give a definite answer to the proposals which M. Misu has made comprising the offer of Roumania's assistance against Turkey in return for more extensive territorial concessions than those which Bulgaria has so far proposed.

I have, &c.
G. BARCLAY.

[3927] No. 469.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 27.)

Sir, *Berlin, January 22, 1913.*

WITH reference to my telegram No. 12 of the 19th instant, I have the honour to transmit to you herewith translation of a communication from the Imperial Chancellor in regard to the question of the Albanian frontier and the desirability of representations at Vienna and St. Petersburgh with a view to arriving at a friendly settlement of the question.

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

Enclosure in No. 469.

Note communicated to Sir E. Goschen.

(Translation.)

THE Imperial Government do not overlook the difficulties which might arise from the Russian divergence from Austria-Hungary on the Albanian question, especially on account of Scutari, and are gladly prepared to exercise their influence at Vienna in favour of a friendly understanding. They entirely share Sir E. Grey's view that it is specially important at present to prevent the divergence of views from showing itself with irremediable acuteness at the Ambassadors' meetings, and they therefore welcome with lively satisfaction the efforts made by the British Minister with that object. The Imperial Government think that a word from Sir E. Grey at St. Petersburgh advising a conciliatory attitude would contribute in a specially effective manner to clearing up the situation, and entertain the hope that the trustful co-operation of Germany and England will succeed in bringing about a peaceful solution of the present problem too which may be acceptable to both parties.

Berlin, January 19, 1913.

[3920] No. 470.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 53.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Sir Adam Block, British delegate on the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt, submitting a statement of the manner in which the authorities of the allied Governments have hindered and prevented the officials of the Debt from carrying out their duties.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 470.

Sir A. Block to Sir G. Lowther.

Sir, *Constantinople, January 20, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Excellency a statement of the manner in which the authorities of the allied Governments have hindered and prevented the officials of the Public Debt Administration from carrying out their duties in the territories occupied by the allied armies, and to beg that your Excellency will bring the matter to the attention of His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in order that his Excellency may make such representations as he may think fit to the allied Governments.

For the sake of clearness I have classified the incidents in question according to the regions occupied respectively by the allies.

1. Territories occupied by the Greek army.

At Chio five officials of the Debt Administration were illegally made prisoners of war and are now interned in the Greek island of Halkis.

At Mitylene the inhabitants, under the impression that the island had been definitely occupied by Greece, no longer take out licences for the sale of spirits, oppose the gauging of wines, and delay the payment of the tax on alcohol. All steps taken with the Greek authorities to obtain satisfaction have proved fruitless, and legal action is impossible against the tax-payers as there are at present no law courts in operation. The stamp and salt revenues are no longer producing anything, as the result of the use of Greek stamps in the first case and the insecurity which reigns in the neighbourhood of the only salt pan in the island in the second case. At Mitylene itself the Debt Administration no longer collects the duty on alcohols brought into the town (not including the war tax) or on fish sold in the market. In the village of Caloria the agent of the Public Debt was ill-treated by brigands who, together with some Greek soldiers, took from him the keys of the agency and completely pillaged it.

At Salonica the Greek authorities do not hand over to the Debt Administration the receipts from the 3 per cent. Customs surtax, nor the duties on imported alcohol. M. Rachtivan, moreover, the representative of the Greek Government in Macedonia, alleging that in this region his Government has replaced the Ottoman Government, has requested our agency to pay to the Greek authorities the sums collected for the war tax on salt, and demanded the handing over of the amounts encashed under this heading from the date of the occupation of Salonica up to the 30th November, 1912 (old style).

In addition to this the Greek fleet has seized and landed at Corfu as contraband of war two weighbridges destined for the salt works at Valona which were on board the Austrian ship "Meran."

2. Territories occupied by the Bulgarian army.

At Dedeagatch the Moslem staff of the Debt agency were robbed by komitajis, and the agency was required to supply salt to the Bulgarian troops against receipts the payment of which is postponed to an indeterminate date. On the other hand the Bulgarian authorities supplied themselves with salt at the salt works of Musselim without giving any receipts. The wine dealers have been requested to pay licence duties to the Bulgarian authorities, and the Debt officials have not yet been able to collect the tax on the manufacture of spirits. The Customs surtax of 3 per cent. is paid by the Bulgarian Customs officials together with the Bulgarian Customs duties to the Bulgarian Bank, and the Debt official has had to give up his work.

At Dedeagatch also the local Ottoman authorities having decided to deliver to the flour mill "Protopappas" as part payment of a debt contracted by the Ottoman Government with this establishment, a stock of 36,000 chiniks (decalitres) of cereals in dépot at Dedeagatch and Feredjik, being the product of the tithes affected to the kilometric guarantees of the Constantinople-Salonica Junction Railway Company, the Debt Administration had advised the Ministry of Finance of this in order to prevent the carrying out of this transaction. The Bulgarian army, however, having occupied Dedeagatch a few days later the flour mills "Protopappas" seized the opportunity of taking possession of these cereals in question. The Debt agents protested to the Bulgarian authorities against this illegal seizure, but without result up to the present.

The fisheries of the district which are farmed out on account of the service of the 4 per cent. loan of 1903 are for the moment administered by the municipality of Dedeagatch.

At Serres the Bulgarian authorities have imposed various heavy taxes on the spirits and salt already existing or imported into the town, without authorising the re-establishment of the services of the Debt. The authorities have, moreover, taken the Administration's offices for their customs service, and to the protests of the local director of the Debt Administration they have replied that the measure taken is irrevocable, and that the interests of the Debt will be a matter for discussion between the Bulgarian and Ottoman Governments after the conclusion of peace. It is the opinion of the Debt official specially sent into that region that the Administration will not obtain satisfaction without diplomatic intervention, and even should the Bulgarian authorities permit the Debt to resume operations these will have to be limited, unless order and security is restored in the country, to the agencies in the more important centres.

3. Territories occupied by the Servian army.

The Servian military authorities have taken possession of the salt works of Cavaya (Bash Mudiriet of Durazzo). They have seized a sum of 395·25 piastres at the agency there. At Durazzo itself the authorities have taken on two occasions the funds at the Debt agency amounting to 90,049,19·50 piastres. It is true, however, that they have given receipts for this amount and have ordered our staff to continue operations, and authorised them to pay themselves out of the local receipts, stipulating, however, that the balance must remain at their disposal.

I have, &c.
ADAM BLOCK,
British Delegate on the Council of Administration of the Ottoman Public Debt.

[3922] No. 471.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 23, 1913.*

THERE is little of further interest to report in connection with the language of the Turkish press from the time when my despatch No. 52 of the 21st instant was written up to the announcement of the result of the Grand Council last evening. On the whole, it may be said that such little change as is observable in the journalistic attitude has been in the direction of advocating peace at the cost of yielding to the Powers. Several papers have been giving prominence to reports of a conversation between M. Sazonof and the Turkish Ambassador at St. Petersburgh, and the word "ultimatum" has been used in connection with Russian intimations as to what would happen if war should be resumed. The "Ikdam" of the 21st published the most explicit leading article which has yet appeared in favour of yielding, and that paper and the "Yeni Gazeta" have continued to urge that a decision based on hard fact and not on sentiment should be taken and taken as quickly as possible. The "Sabah," while continuing in its vein of academic study, obviously leans in the same direction.

The remaining papers, with the exception of the "Ifham," have had the appearance of marking time rather than anything else. The "Alemdar" has returned to the note of thanking God for the Kiamil Pasha Cabinet, and urging its readers to place absolute confidence in the Government. The "Terdjuman" has continued to belittle the importance of the note and to insist that the Powers, including Russia, do not really mean business. The "Hikmet" is the only daily paper which as recently as yesterday still explicitly opposed the surrender of Adrianople. Even the "Ifham," which on the 21st had a puerile article maintaining that Turkey could redeem the situation by following up her successes at sea without resuming operations on land, contented itself yesterday with a diatribe on the vagueness of the collective note both in the matter of demands and promises. The writer insisted that the reply to the note should be a demand for more precise details, and gave his own suggestion for an answer, the somewhat undiplomatic language of which may be summarised as follows:—

"Your proposals are vague. You must indicate clearly the financial and natural advantages which the treaty of peace is to assure to us. If you like we will formulate our desiderata in regard to these matters. Perhaps we may consent to further sacrifices in return for those advantages. But we want proposals which will afford a basis of peace without further negotiation. We cannot treat in the dark."

All the papers have agreed that the grand council must be regarded as a purely consultative assembly designed to give moral support and guidance to the Government, but incapable of relieving it of any of its constitutional responsibility. Subject to this limitation nearly all the papers have welcomed it. It is interesting to note that the "Terdjuman" joins in the chorus of approval, but it is, perhaps, a little significant that in an article published last evening, twenty-four hours after the invitations had been issued, it dwelt upon the advisability of making the council representative of all sections of public opinion and of all political parties.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[4011] No. 472.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 12.)

Sir, *Vienna, January 24, 1913.*

ON receipt of your telegrams Nos. 21 and 23 of the 15th instant I addressed a communication to the Imperial and Royal Minister for Foreign Affairs, copy of which I have the honour to transmit herewith, enquiring the views of the Austro-Hungarian Government as to the advisability of identic action by the Powers in the matters of the customs duties levied by the Servian and Greek authorities on foreign goods entering the territory occupied by the allies, and of the compulsory closing of shops at Uskub by the Servian authorities in that town.

I am now in receipt of a communication from Count Berchtold, copy of which is herein enclosed, stating that the Austro-Hungarian Government have already taken action on their own account with regard to the question of Austro-Hungarian rights under the Capitulations, and that they would therefore not be in a position to join in a communication to the allies on that point.

With regard, however, to the questions of the imposition of customs duties at Salonica and of the closing of shops at Uskub, Count Berchtold states that the Austro-Hungarian Government would be prepared to associate themselves in joint action by the Powers.

I have, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

Enclosure 1 in No. 472.

Sir F. Cartwright to Count Berchtold.

Dear Count Berchtold, *Vienna, January 16, 1913.*

YOU will doubtless remember my discussing with you on the 2nd January the question of the customs duties levied by the Servian and Greek authorities on foreign goods entering the territory occupied by the allies. I have to-day received a telegram from Sir Edward Grey stating that it appears to His Britannic Majesty's Government indefensible that any duties should be levied on such imports higher than the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* duty, which is the maximum duty payable by agreement under the Capitulations by foreign imports entering the territory now in military occupation. Sir Edward Grey instructs me to enquire whether your Excellency would be prepared to join in a communication to this effect to the allies, and I should be grateful if you would inform me as soon as may be possible of your views on this matter.

I venture at the same time to bring to your notice a matter of somewhat similar character. The British vice-consul at Uskub has reported that the Servian authorities in that town have obliged all shops, whether Catholic, Moslem, or Jewish, to close during the Christmas holidays (old style), and that the same procedure would probably be followed on the occasion of the Servian New Year. He adds that the Ottoman law contains no provision for the obligatory closing of shops, and that the non-Orthodox population of Uskub regard the action of the Servian authorities as extremely oppressive.

Sir Edward Grey has instructed His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Belgrade to protect in the fullest manner the interests of any British subjects who may suffer either in property or person from the effects of the above-mentioned procedure. Sir Edward Grey has pointed out to Sir Ralph Paget that the Powers have not yet recognised any Servian annexation of territory, and that in consequence the nationals of the Powers in the occupied regions still benefit by the Capitulations, but that no protest can actually be made to the Servian Government until some particular case of injury to British interest occurs.

Sir Edward Grey has instructed me to bring the above to your notice with a view to possible identic action by the Powers in this matter, and I shall be glad to have your opinion on the advisability of such action being taken by the Powers.

I am, &c.
FAIRFAX L. CARTWRIGHT.

Enclosure 2 in No. 472.

Count Berchtold to Sir F. Cartwright.

Dear Sir Fairfax, *Vienna, January 22, 1913.*

IN reply to your letter of the 16th instant, I beg to state, with respect to the duties levied by the Greek and Servian authorities on foreign imports entering the now occupied territory, that our point of view has already been pointed out to the Servian Government during November last, when the question of certain troubles given to our consulates in those parts had arisen.

It was then said that all the habitual rights coming under Capitulation régime, as well as those based more especially on treaties, and enjoyed by Austria-Hungary on Turkish territory, concerning either the immunity of consular officials, their jurisdiction, our commerce, or the so-called "cultus protectorate," must not legally be discontinued while that territory, or parts of the same, are under foreign occupation merely on the strength of arms; that exceptions from this rule could therefore not be regarded as justified, but in case of evident and strict pressure by military necessities and the events of war, properly speaking.

The Servian Government then declared to accept our professed opinion with regard to the Capitulations-rights to be upheld intrinsically. Appropriate orders were at once issued to the competent military authorities and, to give us entire satisfaction, it has been proposed to us that we should give immediate notice were there any new complaints to occur which, then, would certainly be remedied without delay.

The *gravamina* (grievances) concerning our Capitulations rights being thus principally removed, your Excellency will readily understand that we cannot very well join in an action of the Powers with the declared purpose of restoring those rights. We have, however, taken care to reserve our rights to remonstrate occasionally should our interests again be infringed upon or in any way impeached.

Such has already been the case in the question of importation duties, whereupon the Servian Government decided that no other or higher duties may be levied on goods entering the occupied territory than the 11 per cent. Turkish *ad valorem* duty you mention.

The Greek and Bulgarian Governments then proceeded accordingly.

There remains, however, a point to be dwelt upon, viz., the importation of merchandise through the harbour of Salonica. While no duties are levied, on the part of the Greek authorities actually in possession of that town, in excess of those 11 per cent. *ad valorem* aforementioned, all the goods in transition to the interior (the hinterland) are, as a matter of fact, doubly taxed; at first, in Salonica Harbour where the Turkish duty is levied with additional charges that are somewhat in access of those levied under Turkish rule; moreover, when entering upon the newly occupied parts these goods are once more taxed with the 11 per cent. *ad valorem*.

To this another iniquity is added through the habitual over-valuation of goods by the Greek Custom House officials of the port.

The Austro-Hungarian Government would fain be ready to join in any common step assuring the correct estimation of value from the part of the allied Balkan States as well as the much to be desired abolition of the double taxation heretofore explained, and it will be glad to hear eventual proposals of the British Government on the subject.

As far as the second point alluded to in your esteemed letter is concerned, viz., the obligatory closing of shops, as reported by the British vice-consul at Uskub, there is no doubt whatever that the freedom of trade guaranteed by the Capitulations may thereby be deemed to suffer—the more so, as no such case is reported to have occurred under the former rulers.

Provided some particular case of injury to our interests could be cited—no special instance has as yet been reported—we are prepared and willing to take identic action with His Britannic Majesty's Government, or the Powers respectively, and are looking forward to any proposal the same may wish to proffer.

I am, &c.
BERCHTOLD.

[3914] No. 473.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received January 27.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, January 25, 1913.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of a telegram, dated the 25th January, 1913, to the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 473.

Admiralty to Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean.

(Telegraphic.) P. *Admiralty, January 25, 1913.*

BY request of Ambassador, and as a deterrent to possible disorders, Vice-Admiral is to proceed with "King Edward VII" and "Zealandia" to Besika Bay with moderate dispatch. Report anticipated date of arrival. Italy is also sending two ships, but this is not to be regarded as part of a collective demonstration of Powers.

[4005] No. 474.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 37.)

Sir, *Paris, January 26, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my telegram No. 12 of yesterday's date, to transmit to you herewith copy of a note from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs giving the views of the French Government on the question of the payment of an indemnity by Turkey to the allied States.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 474.

Note communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Jonnart.

PAR une note en date du 22 de ce mois, son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique a bien voulu faire connaître au Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, d'ordre de Sir Edward Grey, que le Gouvernement britannique se montrerait défavorable à toute réclamation d'indemnité de guerre de la part des États balkaniques dans le cas où ceux-ci prétendraient en exiger une de la Turquie.

Le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de faire savoir à Sir Francis Bertie que le Gouvernement de la république partage pleinement les raisons qui paraissent, avec raison, à Sir Edward Grey, s'opposer à ce que les États balkaniques réclament de la Turquie une indemnité de guerre. L'action de l'Europe, dans cet ordre d'idées, se trouve, du reste, définie et limitée par la note collective récemment remise à la Sublime Porte par les Puissances. Il n'est pas question d'indemnité de guerre dans ce document. Le Gouvernement de la république ne pourrait donc appuyer les États balkaniques si ceux-ci en demandaient une à la Turquie.

L'Ambassadeur de la république à Londres a été chargé de communiquer ce qui précède au Principal Secrétaire d'État de Sa Majesté britannique.

Paris, le 24 janvier, 1913.

[4151] No. 475.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 26. Very Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 27, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 24 of 25th January.

Bulgarian delegates have just received further instructions, marked secret, permitting them to take definite decision respecting rupture of peace negotiations after agreement with delegates of their allies.

On the other hand, I have been told that the Servian delegates have been told to make no change in their present attitude until the Turkish answer to the collective note has been received. If this answer be considered unfavourable, they are then only to break off armistice, but not peace negotiations. This action, which they are not to take without first consulting you and the Ambassadors of the Triple *Entente*, would, if carried out, place them in the same situation as Greece is at present.

I gather further that M. Danef is personally in favour of complete and immediate rupture.

[4131] No. 476.

Sir G. Louther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 49.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 27, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 45 of 25th January.

The Grand Vizier this morning spoke to my French colleague of sending reply to the collective note before the end of this week.

He appears to have spoken to him with some confidence of Bulgarians abandoning their claim to Adrianople, and even mentioned possibility of resuming hostilities should it become necessary. Prospects of advance from Deutsche Bank, which, according to a committee paper this morning, amounts to 2½ millions, as also stiffening of Roumanian position (see Sir G. Barclay's telegram No. 17 of 26th January), have no doubt encouraged his Highness in this attitude.

(Sent to Sophia, Athens, Belgrade, and Bucharest.)

[4139] No. 477.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 15. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, January 27, 1913.*

THE King of Servia is, according to information received from the agent of Messrs. Creuzot in Servia, in a dying condition.

The above rumour reached me through an official at the Quai d'Orsay.

[4433] No. 478.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 70.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador informs me that Minister for Foreign Affairs has informed German Government, through Russian Ambassador at Berlin, that resumption of hostilities between Turkey and allies may produce serious complications, as Russian opinion will be much moved if the war produces a risky situation.

German Ambassador has lately expressed apprehension that Russia intends some move into Asia Minor, and has emphasised importance that Germany attaches to integrity of Asia Minor, and it is probable that Russian communication at Berlin may increase German apprehension.

I have already told German Ambassador that I had no reason to suppose that Russian Government had any designs on integrity of Asia Minor, but that Russian Ambassador here had impressed upon me that a settlement of Turco-Persian frontier was the thing necessary to remove difficulty between Russia and Turkey. I suggested that German Government might use their influence at Constantinople to this effect.

You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs, in case he thinks it opportune to clear up any misapprehension at Berlin.

[3914] No. 479.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Louther.

(No. 60.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.*

HIS Majesty's ships "King Edward VII" and "Zealandia" will arrive Besika Bay evening of 28th January.

[3876] No. 480.

*Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.**

(No. 15.)
(Telegraphic.) R *Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.*

SIR G. BUCHANAN'S telegram No. 27 of 25th January: Customs in territory occupied by Servia.

There is no need for representations to be collective.

[3573] No. 481.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 17.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.*

COUNT MENSDORFF said on the 21st January that he was anxious as to the settlement of the Albanian question.

I said that I feared that the Austrian and Russian views were some way apart. I hoped, however, that if this proved to be so, we should not, at the meeting of Ambassadors, at once pronounce the views to be irreconcilable, but ascertain the amount of difference and spend some time in trying to find a compromise.

Count Mensdorff cordially agreed that a rupture should be avoided.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4452] No. 482.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 39.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.*

THE German Ambassador told me this afternoon that his Government attached great importance to the integrity of Asia Minor, and that they feared, as Russia was massing troops in the Caucasus and was taking a great interest in Armenia, that she might be contemplating some move. If Russia was to move into Armenia and France into Syria, Germany could not be indifferent.

I said that, only a few days ago, the Russian Ambassador had asked me to impress upon the Turkish Government that a settlement of the disputed Turco-Persian frontier was what Russia really desired, and that, if Turkey would make this settlement, she would find Russia quite friendly. I did not believe that Russia had any designs upon the integrity of Asia Minor, but there were strategic points on the Turco-Persian frontier that Turkey had threatened. I would tell the Russian

* Also to Sir R. Paget (No. 30), Count de Salis (No. 12), and Sir H. Bax-Ironside (No 20).

Ambassador what the German Ambassador had said to me, but if, as I believed, a settlement of the Turco-Persian frontier was the one thing required to produce security, perhaps German influence could be used in Constantinople to impress this on the Turkish Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4454] No. 483.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 40.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.*

THE German Ambassador said to-day that the Roumanian question seemed to be at a deadlock. Dr. Danef was evasive, and the Roumanian Ministers intended to press for Silistria and Balchek as a minimum, which was more than they had previously contemplated. The German Government were afraid that there would be serious tension if Dr. Danef continued to say that he had no instructions. They thought that I might possibly say a word to Dr. Danef.

I said that I was very doubtful of the wisdom of interfering. Roumania was offering Bulgaria two army corps against Turkey if Bulgaria would concede what Roumania wanted on the frontier. On the other hand, she was threatening Bulgaria if no settlement was arrived at. It was really Bulgaria's own business to decide what it was most advisable for her to do. The Bulgarian Minister of Finance, when he came to see me, had pressed me to say a word in favour of Bulgaria in Bucharest. I had told him that Bulgaria had better settle the question without the intervention of the Powers, for, if some intervened in Bucharest, others would intervene in Sophia. As I had said this, it would be a little difficult for me to intervene now. I would see Dr. Danef to-morrow, and ask him some questions about the situation, so that I might explore the ground. If there seemed an opportunity of exercising a favourable influence I would do so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[3633] No. 484.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.*

M. DE ETTER expressed on the 22nd January the wish of M. Sazonof that the requests and complaints of the Armenians in Turkey in Asia should not be examined by the Powers till other questions had been disposed of.

Further, there was every probability that after the peace there would be a considerable emigration of Moslems from Europe into Asia, and the Russian Government considered that, when the moment arrived, the Turkish Government should be advised to abstain from settling these Moslem emigrants in districts inhabited by Armenians, but should transfer them to Mesopotamia.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4453] No. 485.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 45.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.*

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day that, after the last meeting of the Ambassadors, the German Ambassador had told me that, to relieve the deadlock, he had suggested to Count Mensdorff that he (the German Ambassador) and I might propose some compromise about Scutari. Count Mensdorff, though unable to propose one himself, had agreed to this. I had told the German Ambassador that I should be delighted to help in this way, but I must first see Count Benckendorff. The Ambassador said that he had mentioned the idea to Count Benckendorff also, who had received it favourably.

Count Benckendorff said that the German Ambassador had mentioned something of the sort, but not in such specific terms. He agreed to discuss the matter with me on the map to-morrow afternoon.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4455] No. 486.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 46.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 27, 1913.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF sent me this morning the following communication, saying that he was not instructed to propose it to the meeting of Ambassadors, but to consult me about it. He added that he expected the German Ambassador would oppose it:—

"La décision des Puissances d'adresser à la Porte une note collective a été basée sur des intérêts d'ordre général. Leur point de vue nettement exprimé dans cette note ne saurait être modifié par le changement de Ministère à Constantinople.

"D'autre part, c'est le fait que Kiamil Pacha pensait céder aux conseils amicaux de l'Europe qui a motivé sa chute. Il serait utile de faire entendre au nouveau Cabinet que cette circonstance ne peut, aux yeux des Puissances, rendre plus légère la responsabilité qui pèserait sur lui pour le cas d'une réponse pas satisfaisante, et que la nécessité d'obtempérer aux conseils des Puissances incombe au Cabinet actuel dans la même mesure qu'elle incombait à celui que présidait Kiamil Pacha.

"M. Sazonof pense qu'un communiqué de la réunion des Ambassadeurs à la presse pourrait répondre au but qu'il se propose."

On coming to see me this afternoon, Count Benckendorff showed me the following substance of a telegram which had been sent by M. Sazonof to the Russian Ambassador in Berlin:—

"M. Sverkef est chargé de communiquer au Gouvernement allemand les considérations suivantes:—

"La situation créée par le changement de Gouvernement à Constantinople nous inspire de sérieuses appréhensions.

"Dans notre opinion, si le nouveau Cabinet turc est informé avec la précision suffisante qu'il ne peut pas compter sur une modification des dispositions et des vues des Grandes Puissances, telles qu'elles ont trouvé expression dans la note collective, les Ministres actuels devront arriver à la même conviction que celle à laquelle avaient abouti leurs prédécesseurs sur la nécessité d'obtempérer aux conseils de l'Europe.

"Nous ne doutons pas que le Cabinet de Berlin, tout comme nous, est persuadé de la nécessité du maintien de l'accord de toutes les Puissances sur la base de la note collective.

"A notre point de vue, une reprise des hostilités pourrait faire surgir des complications qu'il est de notre plus sincère désir de voir prévenir et écarter, mais qui pourraient mettre le Gouvernement russe dans la situation la plus sérieuse.

"Nous ne pouvons pas ne pas nous rendre clairement compte de l'évolution inévitable qui se produirait dans l'opinion publique russe si les résultats acquis par la guerre devaient encore une fois être rendus douteux."

Having read this, I observed that there was nothing to be done but to wait for the German reply. I told Count Benckendorff, however, of what the German Ambassador had said to me this afternoon, and said that I was sure that Germany was anxious and preoccupied by the apprehension that Russia intended some move in Asia Minor. It seemed to me that the Russian communication, unless it was explained in Berlin, would perhaps strengthen this impression. I told him what I had said to the German

Ambassador, and I suggested that, if this represented the true state of the case, it might be explained to the German Government.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4299] No. 487.

M. Grouitch to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

Dear Sir Edward Grey, 40, *Pont Street, London, January 25*, 1913.

I THANK you for your letter of the 23rd instant, and beg to inform you that I have not failed to transmit to my Government the text of the observation, agreed to by the Ambassadors, by their Governments, and by yourself, which you have kindly forwarded to me.

Yours very sincerely,
S. Y. GROUITCH.

[4168] No. 488.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 38. Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, January 27*, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith, a despatch which I have received from Lieutenant-Colonel Yarde-Buller, military attaché to this embassy, giving an account of a conversation with M. Stanciof, the Bulgarian Minister in Paris, on the present situation in the Balkans.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 488.

Colonel Yarde-Buller to Sir F. Bertie.

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Paris, January 26*, 1913.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I was asked yesterday to meet M. Stanciof, the Bulgarian Minister in Paris, who has recently returned from the seat of war, and had a very interesting talk with him and General de Castelnau, 1st sous-chef of the French General Staff, on the present situation in the Near East.

It will be remembered that M. Stanciof left his post in Paris for Sophia on the outbreak of the war, and though it was given out officially that being a reserve officer he was returning to his regiment, he went in reality to occupy an important appointment, and practically to act as an advisor to King Ferdinand, with whom he is on terms of personal friendship; consequently his words carry weight, and may be a correct prediction of the lines on which the Bulgarians are prepared to carry on the war. I therefore give the principal points which I gathered from the interview.

M. Stanciof told us that the advance of the Bulgarians had been quicker than had been anticipated notwithstanding that the chief difficulty they had to contend with had been the muddy condition of the country which was the cause of much delay, not only to guns and transport, but also to the troops.

On my asking his opinion as to the resumption of the war, he said, "it will not be war, but hostilities will in all probability recommence," and I gather that he does not consider that they are likely to be of long duration.

Talking of the Tchataldja lines, M. Stanciof affirmed that the Bulgarian army would not deliver a direct attack but, whilst holding them, would carry on a campaign in Galipoli, and by means of sea transport would eventually turn the lines. In connection with this movement by sea, he deplored the fact that national egotism would prevent any arrangement being made with Greece for the transport of the troops, but seemed quite confident that sufficient craft could be bought or hired for the purpose.

When questioned as to the rôle Roumania is playing, M. Stanciof stated that prior to the war Roumania had been invited to join the Balkan League, and had replied to the effect that the issue was very doubtful, and that she herself had nothing to gain and a great deal to lose. He declared that the readjustment of the Roumanian frontier, as offered by Bulgaria, will be adhered to by her, and should Roumania attack Silistria the intention is to remove practically the entire male population from that town with the idea that it would lower the prestige and dignity of the Roumanians were they to occupy a town inhabited only by women and children.

I would draw attention to the two opinions expressed by M. Stanciof (1), that hostilities will probably recommence and be of short duration (2), that a campaign in Galipoli, with the eventual transportation of troops by sea, will be the means employed to turn the Tchataldja lines.

The occupation of the Galipoli peninsula, and the requisite guarding of the Dardanelles to enable transportation by sea to be carried out, does not tend to the idea that hostilities would be of short duration; such a campaign must entail very careful preparation, and the destruction of the Turkish navy, so as to obtain the command of the sea of Marmora; all this is a question of time.

I personally am more inclined to take the view that whilst holding the Tchataldja lines, the Bulgarians will devote their energies to the reduction of Adrianople, with the idea that with its fall one of the principal reasons urged by the Young Turk party against the acceptance of the present peace terms, and which was the excuse for the overthrow of the late Government, will have ceased to exist; the Young Turks having reinstated themselves may be glad to seize this pretext to reopen negotiations which it is probable the Bulgarians also would agree to do, as they are aware that even should they occupy Constantinople, any idea of their permanently remaining there would alienate the goodwill of the Powers.

The Bulgarians have profited by the armistice to place their siege guns in position round Adrianople and in front of Tchataldja, and have made large purchases of rifles, ammunition, and supplies, those destined for Tchataldja having been transported chiefly viâ Dedegach. The Bulgarian army is, I am credibly informed, stronger than it was at the commencement of the war and numbers close on 500,000 men; there are four divisions of about 70,000 men investing Adrianople who would be released by the fall of that town, a couple of regiments are at Salonica, and the bulk of the army is spread about the district near Tchataldja in a radius of 10 to 20 kilom. to facilitate the supply and feeding of the troops. I am told that the entire army is now provisioned for two months and has an ample supply of ammunition, and it must also be remembered that when Adrianople falls a direct line of communication will be opened between Tchataldja and Bulgaria.

Under these circumstances, in the event of the Young Turks still remaining truculent after the fall of Adrianople, the Bulgarians will be in a position to choose either (1) the Galipoli campaign referred to by M. Stanciof (2), a direct attack on the Tchataldja lines where it is considered possible to get through in three places, viz., one round the northern flank and two towards the centre, the southern portion of the lines being rendered impassable by a lake and marshes.

I have, &c.
H. YARDE-BULLER.

[4204] No. 489.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 50.)

(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 27*, 1913.

MY telegram No. 47 of 20th January.

German Ambassador tells me that no arrangements have yet been made for advance of money to Turkey [group undecypherable] nothing would be likely to be done without consultation with Paris, French being financially interested in metropolitan scheme. He was, however, of opinion that sufficient sums should be advanced to pay salaries and provide food for troops.

[4205] No. 490.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 27, 1913.*

OPPONENTS of Committee Cabinet are hinting at possibility of counter *coup d'État* within ten days to a fortnight, and it is rumoured that bodies of troops in the Chatalja lines are indignant at assassination of ex-Minister of War, and that encounters have taken place accompanied with loss of life. These have not yet been confirmed.

(Sent to Athens, Sophia, Bucharest, and Belgrade.)

[4346] No. 491.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 27. Very confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 28, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 25 of 26th January: Servian claims.

Difficulties are thickening around Bulgarian Government. I have reason to believe that Russian Government have also decided to have a *quid pro quo* in return for their continued support of Bulgarian policy of territorial claims. This compensation will take the form of a military convention between the countries (my despatches Nos. 88 and 138 of 1911).

No request has as yet been made by Russian Government to sign military convention, but this may be done at any moment. Real reason of such action is to present a possibility of Bulgaria remaining neutral in any future war between Austria and Russia. If all Bulgarian demands and aspirations are now fulfilled, she might, if not absolutely bound to take the offensive, remain quiescent in the event of such a war.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[4345] No. 492.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 28, 1913.*

BUCHAREST telegram No. 17 of 26th January.

The Roumanian question will be fully discussed by the Cabinet to-morrow.

If information contained in my telegrams Nos. 25 of 26th January and 27 [? 26] of 27th January reaches the Bulgarian Government prior to the meeting of the Cabinet it is likely to have some effect on their action in the sense of Sir R. Rodd's telegram No. 17 of 26th January.

(Sent to Constantinople and Bucharest.)

[4347] No. 493.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 28, 1913.*

CONSTANTINOPLE telegram No. 50 of 27th January.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs informed me this evening that there is no question of any advance to Turkey at the present moment.

[4333] No. 494.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 28, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 37 of 22nd January.

I am informed that the Turkish fleet received instructions to go out to-day.

(Sent to Athens, Sophia, and Bucharest.)

[4342] No. 495.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 53.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 28, 1913.*

FOLLOWING received from His Majesty's consul at Bussorah to-day, No. 4, repeated to Cairo:—

(Secret.)

I have received a visit from Taleb Bey, who referred to the fall of the Cabinet, and stated in strict secrecy that the Arabs of this vilayet had unanimously resolved to resist the restoration of the committee régime, and were supported in this resolution by the population and the troops at Bussorah. They wanted no more party Government, and both clubs had been closed; while anxious to uphold the constitution as faithful Ottoman subjects, they absolutely declined to accept a vali sent by the committee, who were so notoriously hostile to their interests. My informant anticipated serious trouble if one was sent and gave me friendly warning beforehand. They propose to appeal to the Turkish Government in the first instance to meet their wishes, but would not shrink from resorting to force if all the other means failed. He hinted that they aimed at limited autonomy with foreign support like Egypt and begged his views as to representing that united wishes of the Arabs of this province might be laid before His Majesty's Government privately and reply granted.

I did not encourage him, and remarked that it seemed to me quite impossible for His Majesty's Government to help them for obvious reasons.

I transmit his statement in strict confidence. The movement appears to be genuine and universal, and they seek our advice. Can you suggest any?

[4343] No. 496.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 54.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 28, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.

I have told His Majesty's consul at Bussorah that he should tell him that officials of His Majesty's Government cannot interfere in internal affairs of Ottoman Government.

[4344] No. 497.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *St. Petersburgh, January 28, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 70 of 27th January.

As I am indisposed Mr. O'Beirne saw the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs to-day and made a communication as instructed. Minister for Foreign Affairs showed himself disinclined to give any explanations at Berlin, but said that if the German Ambassador in London reverted to the subject you might inform him that Russia had no intention whatever of moving into Asia Minor. There were only two contingencies in which Russia contemplated taking military action:—

1. Resumption of hostilities between Turkey and the allies, followed by a repulse of the Bulgarians.
2. Resumption by the new Turkish Government of the policy formerly pursued by the Young Turks on the Persian frontier.

Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he had instructed the Russian Ambassador at Berlin to enquire whether there was any truth in the rumour of an advance by the Deutsche Bank to the Turkish Government, and in that case to express his (Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs') extreme astonishment.

[4337] No. 498.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Decode.* *Salonica, January 28, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 2 of 27th January, asking whether goods are paying duties both at Salonica and Cavalla.

The reply is in the affirmative in accordance with my latest information, but in present condition of means of communication with Cavalla it is quite impossible to declare that measure is actually being enforced. Last vessel which left here for Cavalla was unable to disembark cargo at all.

[4139] No. 499.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 28, 1913.*

SIR F. BERTIE'S telegram No. 15 of 27th January: Illness of King of Servia. Have you any confirmation?

[4479] No. 500.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 61.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 28, 1913.*

ITALIANS, according to our information, are sending ships to Besika. French consider that sending ships to Besika may seem like an abortive naval demonstration, and are sending their ships to be within reach at Salonica or Smyrna, but not at Besika. You may use your discretion when our ships arrive at Besika as to whether they should stay there. I am asking Admiralty to instruct senior naval officer to move on to Smyrna, or some other convenient place, if he hears from you that this would be politically desirable.

[4622] No. 501.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 50.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 28, 1913.*

COUNT BENCKENDORFF came to see me to-day, and M. Cambon was present at the interview.

I expressed the opinion that it was of no use to give further advice to the Porte unless it was given with unanimity, and this would take some time to obtain. Indeed, I doubted whether it could be obtained before the answer of the Turkish Government to the collective note of the Powers was received.

M. Cambon was of the same opinion.

Count Benckendorff said that he would give this to his Government as the answer to the communication which he had made to me on this subject yesterday.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4623] No. 502.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 51.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 28, 1913.*

TO-DAY I had with Count Benckendorff some conversation, during which M. Cambon was present, on the German Ambassador's private suggestion to me that he and I should put forward some compromise about Scutari.

I found that Count Benckendorff was quite favourable to this being done, if it would secure to Montenegro the greater part of the lake, the whole of the Boyana, and some territory to the south of it, and also territory to the east of the lake, including as much as possible of the River Kiri.

I said that there could be no question of this being proposed at the meeting to-morrow. I must first find out what the views of the German Ambassador were. But if it was found that I could put forward something which the German Ambassador would openly support, and which was not disagreeable to Count Mensdorff or to Count Benckendorff, a considerable advance would have been made.

Both Count Benckendorff and M. Cambon agreed warmly in this.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[4624] No. 503.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 52.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 28, 1913.*

IN the course of my conversation to-day with Count Benckendorff and M. Cambon as to a compromise about Scutari, I impressed upon Count Benckendorff how strong was the German apprehension of a Russian move in Armenia. I thought that this was already beginning to affect the German attitude in Constantinople, and it would react unfavourably upon the German attitude in the Albanian question. If, as I had been told by Count Benckendorff, the settlement of the Turco-Persian frontier was Russia's one anxiety, I did not see why she should not have a frank explanation with Germany about it, and it would be very desirable that she should do so.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4625] No. 504.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 3.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 28, 1913.*

THE first two Montenegrin delegates asked to see me to-day, and impressed upon me the impossibility for the King of Montenegro of giving way about Scutari. It was absolutely essential that he should get the town.

I said that unfortunately the language of Austria was equally strong in this sense on the subject of Scutari.

The delegates said that, if Austria marched against Montenegro, Russian opinion would be very strongly moved.

I observed that this meant that, if Austria marched against Montenegro, Russia would march against Austria; Germany would then march against Russia, and France would march against Germany: all this on account of Scutari. It would be intolerable.

The Montenegrins laughed a good deal in a way which showed that they appreciated the situation.

Finally, I said that the question of Scutari was a bomb which might set the whole of Europe on fire, and we must prevent it from bursting. I know very well how strong Montenegrin feeling was about it. But others also had strong feelings, and we must find some way of reconciling the various people who were interested. Montenegro would gain a considerable amount of territory in any case, and it would be a pity for her to press the question of Scutari to the point of a European war.

The Montenegrin delegates said that their country would not gain so very much without Scutari. The Montenegrins would take nothing in the sanjak because it was valueless. All they would get would be Ipek and Djakova.

I asked whether they had an arrangement with Servia that they were to get these places.

They replied that they had no special arrangement, but these places were occupied by them, and it was understood that they would keep them.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4303] No. 505.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 11. Treaty.)

Sir, *Salonica, January 23, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, for your information, copy of a despatch, with its enclosure, which I have addressed to His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Belgrade on the subject of the impediments placed in the way of the trade of this place by the Servian authorities, as already reported in my despatches Nos. 1, 2, 3, and 8, Treaty, of the 2nd, 6th, 7th, and 17th instant, respectively.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 1 in No. 505.

Consul-General Lamb to Sir R. Paget.

Sir, *Salonica, January 22, 1913.*

WITH reference to your telegram of the 20th instant concerning the Servian customs difficulties and to my replies of yesterday and to-day, I have the honour to report that it is correct that some parcels of monopolised articles, including the cases of cigarette paper which formed the subject of my despatch of the 8th instant, have been allowed to pass the station of Ghevgheli, though I am without information as to what may have happened to them on arrival at Uskub.

For the past week, however, all goods traffic on the Uskub line appears to have been suspended, owing to the refusal of the Servian authorities to provide waggons for the reception of goods at Ghumendjé. Seventeen waggon-loads of general merchandise, six of which were dispatched by the British company "Fils de G. A. Errera (Limited)," are reported to be detained at that station, and a considerable number of others are awaiting dispatch at Salonica itself. It is, however, possible that the deadlock is the fault of the Oriental Railway Company at least as much as of the Servian authorities, the attitude of both being marked by the same mutual suspicion and ill-will and the same complete indifference to all considerations of public interest or welfare.

A conference was held here yesterday afternoon by the local merchants, at which delegates of the railway company and the Greek Government were present, and at which it was decided that one of the latter should proceed in person to Ghumendjé in the hopes of being able to come to some understanding between the two. I enclose an extract from the local paper "Indépendant," which gives a fairly full and accurate account of the proceedings.

I have, &c.

HARRY H. LAMB.

Enclosure 2 in No. 505.

Extract from the "Indépendant" of January 22, 1913.

LE TRANSBORDEMENT À GHUMENDJÉ.

LA gare de Ghumendjé étant encombrée par treize wagons chargés et aucun arrangement n'étant pas intervenu avec les autorités serbes pour que celles-ci donnent, aux fins de transbordement, un nombre suffisant de wagons vides, le trafic marchandises entre Salonique et Ghumendjé a été complètement suspendu.

Pour mettre fin à cette situation fort préjudiciable au commerce de Salonique avec toutes les régions avoisinant la ligne d'Uscub, nos commerçants ont adressé une lettre à la chambre de commerce, la priant de faire les démarches nécessaires pour apprendre les motifs réels et sérieux des difficultés éprouvées à Ghumendjé et de s'efforcer d'obtenir, si possible le règlement d'une question qui est en train de tuer lentement les transactions de Salonique avec la partie la plus riche de son hinterland.

La chambre de commerce a adressé une lettre, dans le sens demandé par nos négociants, à la direction des Chemins de Fer orientaux.

La chambre de commerce a eu en outre dans l'après-midi d'hier une séance, à laquelle ont assisté M. Grégoriadès, inspecteur Royal des Chemins de Fer orientaux, et M. Cohen, fonctionnaire supérieur de cette compagnie.

Après un long échange de vues, M. Grégoriadès a promis de se rendre sur les lieux, à Ghumendjé pour liquider toutes les questions en litige afin que les opérations de transbordement deviennent régulières à la station de Ghumendjé. M. Grégoriadès a demandé toutefois de la chambre de commerce que le corps commercial lui-même prenne les dispositions nécessaires pour qu'il y ait constamment à la station de Ghumendjé de la main-d'œuvre en nombre suffisant.

Nous croyons savoir qu'un entrepreneur de notre ville s'est engagé à assurer le travail de transbordement à Ghumendjé moyennant un tarif convenu, pourvu toutefois que les autorités serbes mettent à sa disposition autant de wagons vides qui lui seront indispensables. Comme M. Grégoriadès s'est fait justement fort d'obtenir cette concession des autorités, il semble que nous soyons à la veille de la solution de la question du transbordement à Ghumendjé d'une façon régulière et normale. Si tout va bien, a dit M. Grégoriadès, la petite gare de Ghumendjé pourra assurer le transbordement de vingt wagons par jour. Ce nombre est plus que suffisant pour les transactions actuelles entre Salonique et la ligne d'Uscub.

Comme il l'avait promis hier, M. Grégorindès, accompagné de l'entrepreneur qui s'est engagé à assurer Ghumendjé le travail matériel du transbordement, sont partis ce matin à destination de cette localité. Il est à espérer que sous peu la question du transbordement à Ghumendjé sera résolue et définitivement close.

[4355] No. 506.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 58.)

Sir, *Constantinople, January 24, 1913.*

THE Grand Council summoned to consider the situation met in the hall of the Ambassadors in the Palace of Dolma Bagtche on the 22nd January under the presidency of the Grand Vizier, Kiamil Pasha. It was only at the meeting of the Council of Ministers, held on the previous day, that it was finally decided to summon the Grand Council, and the invitations to attend were only issued late that evening. In the Cabinet itself there was considerable misgiving as to what the collective opinion of such an assembly might prove to be, and it was decided that former Ministers should not be summoned *ex officio* since it was thought that if this were done criticism of the decision of the Government might become acute. The invitations were consequently limited to the senators, a few of the highest civil dignitaries, the chief generals and admirals, and the principal ulemâ.

Most of those summoned attended, to the number of between eighty and ninety; but it is notable, in view of subsequent events, that among the very few who sent an excuse was Mahmoud Shevket Pasha. Hakki Pasha, the former committee Grand Vizier, also excused himself, but Prince Said Halim, the secretary-general of the Committee of Union and Progress, was present in his quality of senator.

The Sultan sat in a separate room, and was kept informed from time to time of the proceedings, while the Imperial Princes were also present in an adjoining apartment.

Elaborate police arrangements were made at the Palace, and these were under the charge of Dr. Nolan, the former Egyptian official, who was recently appointed adviser to the police department.

Proceedings were opened by the president at about 1:30, and a Turkish translation of the collective note of the Powers to the Ottoman Government was then read to the assembly. From information which has reached me, Nazim Pasha, the Minister of War, then spoke as to the excellent condition of the army, and assured the assembly that it was fully prepared to do its patriotic duty. But, unfortunately, armies required other things besides *morale*, and the general situation, moreover, was extremely delicate.

The Minister of Finance, Abdurrahman Bey, next gave a gloomy picture of the financial condition of the country, and declared that it was impossible to raise revenue from any source.

The speech of the Minister for Foreign Affairs was then read to the assembly by the Grand Vizier's secretary, this form of procedure being adopted presumably owing

to Noradunghian Effendi's inadequate command of the Turkish language. I understand that his speech contained unmistakable references to Russian threats of intervention.

A general debate followed. It appears to have been conducted on moderate and sensible lines, and very few of the speakers adopted an uncompromisingly warlike attitude.

The proceedings, which lasted till late in the evening, ended with a vote of confidence in the Government, and an expression of belief in the just intentions of the Powers.

I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of the official communiqué issued by the Sublime Porte on the subject.

One notable feature which is much commented on in the press was the treatment accorded by Kiamil Pasha to his old rival and enemy, Said Pasha. Kiamil is said to have called him to a place at his side and to have shaken hands with him. This reported reconciliation has created almost as much sensation as the results of the Council itself.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 506.

Newspaper Extract.

AUJOURD'HUI s'est réunie au Palais Impérial une assemblée générale composée d'honorables sénateurs, d'ulémas, d'officiers généraux et de fonctionnaires civils.

Au nom du Gouvernement, le Grand Vizir, le Ministre de la Guerre, celui des Affaires Etrangères et celui des Finances ont fourni des explications sur la situation actuelle du pays. Sur quoi, une discussion approfondie et un très sincère échange de vues s'en survient. Finalement, l'assemblée a approuvé le point de vue du Gouvernement. Elle exprima sa confiance dans les sentiments équitables des Grandes Puissances. L'assemblée a confié au patriotisme du Gouvernement le devoir de travailler à mettre à profit le secours promis par elles ainsi que d'assurer le salut futur du pays et ses intérêts financiers.

[4356] No. 507.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 59.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 25, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a despatch from the military attaché to this Embassy reporting various military movements in the Turkish army.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

Enclosure in No. 507.

Lieutenant-Colonel Tyrrell to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 1.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 22, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to report that during the past month the principal military feature has been the formation of the Xth Army Corps from the 31st and 32nd Nizam divisions and the Kharput Redif division, and the transport of these units from the Black Sea to Ismid and Panderma.

The 31st division (9 battalions, 1 machine-gun company, 4 Q.F. field batteries) is now at Ismid and in the neighbourhood of that place, under the command of Liva Ali Riza Pasha.

The 32nd division (8 battalions and 3 machine-gun companies) is around Panderma, under the command of Liva Neshad Pasha.

The Kharput Redif division is still *en route*, and the bulk of it has probably been by now disembarked at Panderma.

I am told that each of these divisions is to have four batteries of Q.F. artillery, which will probably be completed by the new Creusot mountain batteries.

Kaimakam Enver Bey, lately returned from Tripoli, has been appointed Chief of the Staff of this Army Corps, the direction of which is allowed to remain in his hands owing to the omission to appoint a Commander.

The Sivas Redif division (10 battalions, general officer commanding Liva Mehmed Salim Pasha) was shipped from the ports of Kerasund, Ordu, and Samsun towards the end of December, and was forwarded in the early days of January by the new Soma-Panderma railway to Menemen, where it presumably comes under the command of Jemil Pasha at Smyrna.

From the 24th December to the 6th January, 6,000 men, 1,800 Mauser rifles, 5,200 cases of Small Arms ammunition, and 20 wagon loads of artillery ammunition were forwarded from here to the Chatalja lines.

During the same period 48 field and 27 siege and fortress guns are reported as having been forwarded by the railway. The number of guns which have been sent up to Chatalja since the beginning of the armistice is to a large extent explained by the fact that they have been gradually sending guns down from the lines to be cleaned and repaired in the arsenal here, but some new batteries have been formed with old pattern Krupp field guns.

Lately, movements in the direction of Chatalja have been insignificant, and the Turks now seem to be satisfied with the extent of their preparations at the lines.

I can get no confirmation of the rumoured arrivals of arms and ammunition from Germany. All that I have been able to ascertain is that a battery of four Q.F. howitzers (probably 15 cm.) has been bought from Krupp, but that delivery is not expected till April, and that a large order for Mauser ammunition was on the point of being signed a few days ago.

I have, &c.
G. E. TYRRELL, *Lieutenant-Colonel.*
Military Attaché.

[4358] No. 508.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 62. Confidential.)
Sir, *Constantinople, January 24, 1913.*

IN confirmation of my telegrams Nos. 39 and 42, of yesterday and this morning respectively, I have the honour to report that a *coup d'État* was carried out here yesterday afternoon which has resulted in the overthrow of the Cabinet and the appointment of a new Ministry under Mahmoud Shevket Pasha as Grand Vizier.

According to my information the Cabinet had met in council in the morning to draw up their reply to the collective note of the Powers regarding the conclusion of peace, and had actually agreed upon the French text of this reply. The Turkish translation was, however, considered unsatisfactory, and it was accordingly decided to adjourn for luncheon while a more accurate translation was being made. The new version had just been produced and was being examined when, at about 3 P.M., Enver Bey, accompanied by Talaat Bey and some forty armed men, of whom only four, apparently, were officers, appeared at the entrance of the Sublime Porte, followed by a small rabble, demanding the overthrow of a Cabinet which was preparing to make so ignominious a peace on the advice of the Powers. The Cabinet had taken the precaution to have the Porte guarded by troops, but on the appearance of Enver Bey, who is said to maintain that he has behind him the whole of the army now at Chatalja, the officer commanding the detachment seems to have placed himself at his disposition. At this point Nazim Pasha emerged from the council chamber to ascertain what the trouble was about, and on being informed of the insurgents' object, ordered them off the premises in expressive language. Enver Bey and his friends advanced notwithstanding, and according to the account given by the party now in power, Nafiz Bey, chamberlain of the Grand Vizier, fired his revolver at them, killing one of their number. Enver's friends immediately returned the fire, wounding Nafiz mortally and accidentally killing Nazim Pasha. They then proceeded to the council chamber, where they called upon the Cabinet to resign. Kiamil Pasha refused to hand over the seals of office without express orders from the Sultan. Enver Bey accordingly motored to the palace, obtained from His Majesty the necessary authorisation, and returned with one of the Imperial Chamberlains, to whom Kiamil Pasha duly handed over his insignia as Grand Vizier.

Meanwhile, outside the Porte attempts were being made to work up some show of excitement and enthusiasm among the crowd which had gradually collected, largely out of curiosity. The demonstrators were mostly paid orators and hodjas, who denounced the iniquities of the late Cabinet and of the proposed terms of peace, intoned patriotic dirge-like chants, and distributed broadcast printed manifestos declaring the nation's determination not to conclude an unworthy peace nor to accept the Bulgarian's further demands of a large war indemnity. The crowd did not respond very heartily to the efforts of these orators, and the entire demonstration presented a most artificial and unspontaneous appearance; but the Minister for Foreign Affairs, who unwisely endeavoured to leave the precincts of the Porte during the afternoon, was set upon by one of the paid desperados and badly mauled. Otherwise no untoward incident has been reported as a result of the demonstration. Towards 8 P.M. Mahmoud Shevket arrived in a motor at the Porte, and shortly afterwards the Imperial Iratt (of which I enclose a copy)* proclaiming him Grand Vizier was read aloud amid a certain show of enthusiasm on the part of the small crowd which still remained there, and which presently melted away.

The ex-Ministers had been kept prisoners at the Porte during the interval, but most of them were released and permitted to retire to their homes before night. During the course of the evening several arrests were made, among them being the editor of the "Ikdam," and Ismail Hakki Bey, ex-deputy of Gumuldjina. The offices of the "Sabah" and "Ikdam" were closed, and a number of the adherents of the late Government came to this and other embassies, seeking protection from the pursuit already imagined by the new Committee Government.

Late last night I received a visit from Moukhtar Bey, ex-Minister at Athens, dispatched by Talaat Bey, who styled himself Minister of the Interior *ad interim*, to assure me and my other colleagues that all the necessary measures had been taken to ensure the preservation of order in the capital and provinces, and to declare that Talaat Bey guaranteed the lives and property of foreigners to be perfectly safe. Moukhtar Bey added, on his own authority, that a continuance of hostilities was not necessarily implied by the change of Government.

As regards the constitution of the new Government there have been various reports current. Talaat Bey's return to the Ministry of the Interior, where he was to be found yesterday afternoon seated at work as though he had never left the post, was of short duration. In the latest combination arrived at, which is not considered to be likely to last long, neither Talaat nor Djavid Beys have at present any place. Gabriel Effendi Nouradounghian, it appears, received an offer of the portfolio of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the new Cabinet and refused it; and Izzet Pasha, who was mentioned yesterday evening as Minister of War, does not figure in the new Ministry, which is constituted as follows:—

Grand Vizier and Minister of War, Mahmoud Shevket Pasha.
Minister for Foreign Affairs (acting), Ahmed Moukhtar Bey (ex-Minister at Athens).
President of the Council of State, Prince Saïd Pasha Halim.
Minister of the Interior, Hadji Adil Bey.
Minister of Marine, General Tchurouksoulou Mahmoud Pasha.
Minister of Justice, Ibrahim Bey (formerly Governor-General of Constantinople).
Minister of Finance, Rifaat Bey (president of the Board of Audit).
Minister of Public Works, Batzaria Effendi.
Minister of the Evkaf, Hairi Bey.
Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, Djelal Bey (formerly Vali of Aidin).
Minister of Posts and Telegraphs, Oskhan Effendi (Inspector of Finance).
Minister of Public Instruction, Shukri Bey (formerly Governor of Saroukhan).

This Cabinet does not give any impression of permanency. The new Minister for Foreign Affairs is unlikely to remain in office long; he is very chauvinistic and violent, and a strong committee partisan.

Prince Saïd Halim, Rifaat Bey, Hairi Bey, and Djelal Bey have figured in previous Cabinets.

The Minister of Marine, Mahmoud Pasha, went in 1909 to England for manœuvres, and was reported in my despatch No. 627 of the 4th August of that year.

Batzaria Effendi, a senator, is a Koutzo-Vlach of rather violent views, who has latterly been writing in the "Jeune Turc."

* Not printed.

At the same time the Cabinet has a distinctly German colouring. It is said that Enver Bey has been in communication with the German Embassy, and Mahmoud Shevket Pasha called upon the German Ambassador late last night. I understand his attitude to be that the war should not be continued, but that Turkey should be allowed to keep Adrianople on the condition that she engages to raze the fortifications.

The new Government's internal policy seems to be to tend towards the convocation of the old Parliament of last July, whose dissolution, as well as everything that has happened since, the committee regarded as illegal. The chauvinist members of the party seem inclined to disregard the new Government's desire for peace on what they consider honourable terms, and are clamouring for the resumption of hostilities. They have lost none of their powers of "brag," and talk of beating the Bulgarians with ease provided Europe does not interfere, and of laying down the lives which they have been hitherto very careful not to expose unduly to dangers, for their country in order to save it from dishonour.

The funeral of Nazim Pasha took place this afternoon. It was only attended by the foreign military attachés and a few stray people who joined the cortège in the streets.

I have, &c.
GERARD LOWTHER.

[4618] No. 509.

Memorandum communicated by M. Grouitch, January 29, 1913.

À CÔTÉ des autres questions concernant la voie ferrée qui reliera la Serbie, par l'Albanie, à un port de mer sur la Mer Adriatique, se présente de suite celle de la nécessité de garantir à la Serbie le droit d'exercer la police sanitaire et d'organiser le service vétérinaire sur tout le territoire par lequel passera cette voie ferrée internationale, des frontières du royaume à la mer.

En vue d'obtenir une liberté complète pour l'exportation de son bétail, il n'est pas suffisant pour la Serbie que des conditions sanitaires satisfaisantes existent dans le pays lui-même, mais il est également nécessaire que la Serbie puisse garantir que même en dehors de ses frontières, dans les territoires que le bétail exporté doit traverser, il n'y a pas d'épizooties. C'est pourquoi le service vétérinaire doit être organisé dans ces territoires de telle sorte que toujours y soient prises les mesures nécessaires pour prévenir l'introduction et la propagation des épizooties. Comme preuve à l'appui de cette nécessité, il suffit de citer que la Serbie n'a retiré aucun avantage du fait, reconnu par les autorités égyptiennes, qu'il n'y avait pas d'épizooties en Serbie, et cela pour l'unique raison que dans la Turquie d'Europe—que le bétail serbe devait traverser pour se rendre en Egypte—régnait la peste bovine. Après cette expérience, la Serbie doit insister pour que des difficultés ne soient pas créées à sa libre exportation par un port sur la Mer Adriatique, du fait que la future Albanie autonome ne sera pas en état d'exercer un service vétérinaire strict et basé sur les enseignements de la science moderne.

Ces difficultés seront inévitables si la Serbie doit dépendre, dans cette question, d'une bonne volonté étrangère. En effet, il est impossible à un conseil international de santé ou de quarantaine d'organiser un service sanitaire satisfaisant dans un pays qui n'est pas capable de le faire lui-même. Car, partout où des conseils ou comités pareils existent leur rôle se borne à un service de contrôle; ils suspendent la circulation du bétail et établissent des quarantaines en cas d'épizootie déclarée; mais, précisément à cause de leur composition internationale, ces autorités ne peuvent pas être en état de prendre, dans un pays étranger, toutes les mesures positives contre l'introduction des épizooties pour les empêcher de s'étendre et surtout pour les supprimer.

Il faut ajouter qu'aucun État étranger n'aura d'intérêt à donner à l'organisation du service sanitaire sur le territoire albanais en question autant de soins que la Serbie.

En outre de ces garanties, il est nécessaire que les autorités serbes aient aussi le droit de police sur la voie ferrée et dans le port et qu'à la Serbie soit garanti le droit de posséder dans la ville maritime et le port lui-même des propriétés immobilières et d'y élever des entrepôts et autres bâtiments nécessaires au commerce.

Légation Royale de Serbie, Londres,
le 29 janvier, 1913.

[4719] No. 510.

Letter communicated by Servian Chargé d'Affaires, January 29, 1913.

M. le Secrétaire d'État, *Londres, le 29 janvier*, 1913.

NOUS avons l'honneur de communiquer à votre Excellence copie de la note par laquelle les plénipotentiaires des États alliés viennent de déclarer à leurs Excellences les plénipotentiaires ottomans, qu'à la suite des événements survenus à Constantinople ils doivent, à leur grand regret, considérer les négociations de la paix comme rompues.

Au moment où des circonstances, indépendantes de notre volonté, nous imposent la grave mesure que nous venons de prendre, nous prions votre Excellence de bien vouloir être auprès de Sa Majesté le Roi l'interprète de notre respectueuse reconnaissance, et nous tenons à exprimer à votre Excellence et au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique, les remercîments sincères de nos Gouvernements, et notre profonde gratitude personnelle pour l'hospitalité très cordiale et pleine de prévénances, dont les délégués des États alliés ont été l'objet dans la grande et belle capitale du Royaume-Uni.

Nous saisissons, &c.

DR. ST. DANEFF.
M. Z. MADJAROFF.
GÉNÉRAL S. PAPRIKOFF.
E. K. VENISELOS.
STEPH. SKOULOUDIS.
J. GENNADIUS.
G. STREIT.
L. MIOUCHEKOVITCH.
CTE. L. VOINOVITCH.
J. POPOVITCH.
STOJAN NOVAKOVITCH.
AND. NIKOLITCH.
MIL. R. VESNITCH.

Enclosure in No. 510.

Note.

A leurs Excellences MM. les Délégués plénipotentiaires de la Sublime Porte à la Conférence de la Paix,

LES plénipotentiaires des États alliés, ayant, depuis la suspension des travaux de la Conférence de la Paix, attendu en vain, pendant trois semaines, une réponse des plénipotentiaires ottomans à leurs dernières demandes, et les événements survenus à Constantinople leur paraissant écarter l'espoir d'arriver à la conclusion de la paix, se voient, à leur grand regret, obligés de déclarer que les négociations entamées à Londres le 16 décembre dernier sont rompues.

Pour la Bulgarie :

DR. ST. DANEFF.
M. Z. MADJAROFF.
GÉNÉRAL PAPRIKOFF.

Pour la Grèce :

E. K. VENISELOS.
STEPH. SKOULOUDIS.
J. GENNADIUS.
G. STREIT.

Pour le Monténégro :

L. MIOUCHEKOVITCH.
CTE. L. VOINOVITCH.
J. POPOVITCH.

Pour la Serbie :

STOJAN NOVAKOVITCH.
AND. NIKOLITCH.
MIL. R. VESNITCH.

Londres, le 28 janvier, 1913.

[4895] No. 511.

Note communicated by Count Benckendorff, January 29, 1913.

M. SAZONOF tient à attirer l'attention de Sir Edward Grey sur les nouvelles de Bucharest. Elles nous inspirent la crainte que le Gouvernement roumain pourrait passer à un ultimatum et peut-être même à une action militaire contre la Bulgarie. Il nous semble qu'une action énergique conciliante de la part des trois Puissances de l'Entente pour hâter la solution d'un différend, qui en elle-même ne saurait être difficile à trouver, est de toute nécessité pour éviter des complications, qui doivent être prévenues en temps utile pour ne pas présenter les plus sérieux dangers.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 29 janvier, 1913.

[4467] No. 512.

Admiralty to Foreign Office.—(Received January 29.)

(Confidential.)

Sir, *Admiralty, January 29*, 1913.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, paraphrase of telegrams, dated the 28th instant, relative to the movements of ships in the Eastern Mediterranean.

I am, &c.
W. GRAHAM GREENE.

Enclosure in No. 512.

Copy of Telegrams communicated by Admiralty.

(1.)

January 28, 1913.

SHOULD Ambassador inform him that it is desirable, for political reasons, that "King Edward VII" and "Zealandia" should proceed to Smyrna or elsewhere in convenient reach of Besika, Vice-Admiral should comply. Instruct him accordingly.

(2.)

Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean to Admiralty.

January 28, 1913.

Vice-Admiral reports arrival Besika Bay with "King Edward VII" and "Zealandia." "San Marco" and "Pisa" are there with Rear-Admiral Cito Felonarino on board the latter.

[4391] No. 513.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 5.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cettinjé, January 28*, 1913.

WITH reference to the memorandum communicated to you by the Montenegrin delegates on 17th January, I cannot confirm the impression which they have attempted to convey to you with regard to the attitude of the Albanian population in question. Malissors, who took leading part in the attack on Tuzi, withdrew from operations in November, and have, as regards the siege of Scutari, maintained attitude of neutrality. Reports, which I cannot confirm, have now reached me that at a recent meeting they have, with the exception of Grudas, decided to have nothing more to do with Montenegro.

I doubt whether the Archbishop of Scutari was ever in favour of annexation to Montenegro, even when the sole alternative was Turkish rule of some sort; in any case, the situation is now entirely different. I have no reason to think that he or his clergy would welcome Montenegrin rule; all I can learn indicates the contrary. I may mention that the present Albanian population in Montenegro are dissatisfied at the refusal to allow any instruction in their language, and that religious toleration is far from complete. Other statements in the memorandum appear to me to be highly controversial, but relate to points of small importance compared to the probability of opposition of the Albanians to an administration, which, it must be feared, would be very incompetent.

[4463] No. 514.

Count de Salis to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 6.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Cettinjé, January 29, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 12 of 27th January: Customs duties in occupied Turkish territory.

The Italian Minister is authorised to join his colleagues in representations. No other Minister has received instructions. Do you wish me to make a representation? The question can scarcely have practical importance here in the present circumstances.

[4496] No. 515.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, January 29, 1913.*

RUSSIAN Ambassador has, under instructions, informed Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that Russian Government hold that Powers should adhere to principles laid down in collective note, and maintain the necessity of the cession of Adrianople.

Secretary of State replied that German Government would not depart from those principles, but would also not go beyond them, that they would refuse to join in any action not in accordance with strict neutrality, and that they were strongly opposed to any isolated action on the part of any Power. Secretary of State added that in his opinion it was most important that nothing should be said or done by the Powers as regards Adrianople which might render position of the new Government in Turkey impossible, for if this Government fell also, chaos would result, and there would be no one in Constantinople with whom the Powers could deal.

In repeating the answer he had given to the Russian Ambassador, Secretary of State observed to my French colleague that he was somewhat doubtful as to whether the terms of the collective note could be maintained, as he thought that Italy would refuse to give up the islands which she now held if they were to be handed over to the Greeks.

Secretary of State also wondered whether it might not be possible to make some arrangement with regard to Adrianople such as had facilitated peace in the case of Tripoli, namely, that a Turkish functionary should be left at Adrianople who, in eyes of the allies, would be something like a Turkish consul-general, but who would be regarded by the Turks as a representative of the Caliph and an emblem of Turkish suzerainty. This was only a personal suggestion and not a proposal.

The Chancellor, who met my French colleague at dinner last night, accentuated this suggestion, and, while also saying that it was not a definite proposal, hinted that, if such an arrangement could be made, the Imperial Government would on their side do all in their power to facilitate matters as regards Scutari.

[4497] No. 516.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, January 29, 1913.*

NAVAL attaché hears from good source that negotiations are proceeding for sale to the Turkish Government of a German cruiser, name unknown, believed to be 4,000 tons.

[4494] No. 517.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 29, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 61 of 28th January.

It would seem politically expedient that the two ships should remain at Besika Bay pending developments, provided that their presence there is compatible with naval exigencies elsewhere.

Should the necessity for their coming up here arise, and should the present Cabinet raise objections as stated in the second paragraph of my telegram No. 43 of 25th January, we could base our demand on grounds of parity of treatment, as the Russians have two ships here in addition to their two ordinary stationnaires. As the "Imogene" is proceeding to Malta for repairs, we could claim to have a "second stationnaire" in the shape of one of the ships at Besika.

[4472] No. 518.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, January 29, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 33 of 28th January [not printed]: Reported illness of King of Servia.

There is no confirmation.

The King of Servia, who is suffering from arterio-sclerosis has been in feeble health for some months past, but there is no cause for particular anxiety at this moment.

He had an attack of rheumatism a short time ago which may have given rise to this rumour.

(Figures by post to Paris, 29th January.)

[4473] No. 519.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 20.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 29, 1913.*

I HEAR that Montenegrins have now applied to Servians for assistance against Scutari. Servians are sending some siege guns, also provisions.

Greeks have likewise applied for assistance against Janina.

[4495] No. 520.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, January 29, 1913.*

I AM requested by Prime Minister to inform you that, in case of the Servian delegates leaving London, M. Vesnitch will still remain in a semi-official capacity so as to be on the spot if it is desired to consult him regarding Albanian delimitation or any other matter.

[4500] No. 521.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 29, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs said to me to-day that the situation at Constantinople was less hopeless than he had at first anticipated. The new Turkish Government apparently did not desire a renewal of the war, and, according to his information, the reply to the Powers would be couched in conciliatory language and would leave the door open to further conversations. In his opinion, the Powers

should not abandon their attitude of neutrality, but should hold together and deprecate any solitary action by any one of them. He was still opposed to a naval demonstration and would abstain from sending ships to Besika Bay. Two war-vessels are, however, being kept ready to be sent to Turkish waters in case of emergency. He thought that the Powers should use their influence to persuade Balkan delegates to abstain from recommending denunciation of armistice by their Governments.

[4501] No. 522.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 20. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 29, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs has told me that he has seen Turkish Ambassador to-day, who had informed him that he was receiving pressing messages from Constantinople for him to return there. Turkish Ambassador seemed disinclined to do so, and gave Minister for Foreign Affairs to understand that he preferred to reserve himself and keep in the background until peace was concluded, when he aspired to become Grand Vizier again.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[4502] No. 523.

Sir F. Cartwright to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 29.)

(No. 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Vienna, January 29, 1913.*

AUSTRIAN Minister for Foreign Affairs informed me to-day that Italy and Austria-Hungary were practically in agreement in regard to question of Scutari. Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs is opposed to suggestion which has been made that the plain north of town should be ceded to Montenegro, this plain belonging to Malissors, who would strongly object to be included in Montenegro Austrian Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that land behind Mount Tarabosh and on the Boyana might be given to Montenegro, and that further compensation to her should be sought in the direction of Ipek. His Excellency seemed hopeful that a solution would be found to this question.

[4463] No. 524.

Sir Edward Grey to Count de Salis.

(No. 13.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 29, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 6 of 29th January.

If no additional duties are being imposed in Turkish territory occupied by Montenegrins, you need not make representations.

(Repeated to Rome, No. 44.)

[4467] No. 525.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 62.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 29, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 61 of 28th January.

Admiralty have sent instructions in the sense of last paragraph.

[3512] No. 526.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 41. Confidential.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1913.*

M. DE ETTER communicated to Sir A. Nicolson on the 22nd January the annexed paper regarding alleged designs on the part of the King of Montenegro for ceding a portion of the sanjak to Austria-Hungary in order to have a buffer between Montenegro and Servia. M. Sazonof trusted early and serious attention should be given to this question.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

Enclosure in No. 526.

Memorandum communicated by M. de Etter, January 22, 1913.

(Très Confidentiel.)

D'APRÈS des renseignements provenant de différentes sources, le Roi du Monténégro serait très vivement préoccupé par la situation qui serait créée pour lui-même et pour sa dynastie du fait que son pays se trouverait limitrophe d'un autre pays de même race, ayant acquis tout récemment une importance nouvelle. Ces préoccupations seraient d'autant plus vives que le Roi se rendrait compte de son impopularité dans le pays et de celle de son héritier, rendus tous deux responsables des quelques revers que ses armées ont eu à essuyer au cours de la campagne actuelle.

En vue de parer à ce danger, le Roi aurait l'intention de céder à l'Autriche la partie du sandjiak de Novi-Bazar qui serait attribuée au Monténégro; il se formerait ainsi une enclave partant de la Bosnie et se continuant dans la direction du sud-ouest.

Des pourparlers à ce sujet seraient déjà engagés à Cettigné au sein de la Famille Royale. Il se pourrait qu'à Londres M. Miouchekovitch n'y fût pas étranger, mais par crainte de quelque intervention étrangère la conclusion de l'accord avec l'Autriche à ce sujet serait retardée jusqu'après la signature de la paix et la liquidation définitive de la situation par les Grandes Puissances.

Le Gouvernement Impérial a chargé son représentant à Cettigné d'attirer l'attention du Roi et de son Gouvernement sur le danger qu'il y avait pour la dynastie à opposer ses propres intérêts à ceux du pays au sujet d'un point stratégique comme Lovcen, d'importance vitale comme dominant la baie de Cattaro. M. de Giers devait également faire comprendre au Roi que, si Sa Majesté comptait sacrifier les intérêts de son peuple à l'Autriche, afin de s'assurer à ce prix l'appui de cette Puissance, il risquerait de compromettre sans retour sa situation.

Le Gouvernement Impérial considère qu'une des conséquences essentielles de la présente guerre est la redistribution des territoires dans les Balkans, qui rend la Serbie limitrophe du Monténégro. Ceci met fin à la situation désavantageuse créée par le Traité de Berlin, en vertu duquel les deux peuples congénères se trouvaient séparés par une enclave confiée à l'occupation militaire de l'Autriche; cette dernière se trouvait par là en mesure de mettre obstacle à l'union et au concours mutuel des deux États slaves.

Actuellement, la Serbie et le Monténégro se trouvant limitrophes, constitueront une barrière solide contre toute expansion de l'Autriche vers le sud et contre ses aspirations vers Salonique.

Il n'en est pas moins certain que la situation nouvellement créée pourrait faire naître dans les deux États une tendance toute naturelle à l'union, et c'est évidemment ce qui inquiète le Roi Nicolas.

C'est justement en vue de la situation menacée de la dynastie des Njegus, et en vue de raffermir cette situation, que le Gouvernement Impérial s'applique à assurer l'annexion de Scutari au Monténégro, d'autant plus que dans cette question l'Autriche ne paraît pas pouvoir compter, à la conférence des Ambassadeurs, sur l'appui de ses alliés.

Pour ce qui est de la cession de Lovcen à l'Autriche le Gouvernement Impérial estime qu'en outre des arguments ci-dessus, cette cession apparaît comme inadmissible en raison de la décision des Puissances concernant le désintéressement territorial. En effet, l'Autriche, en refusant tout l'abord la proposition de M. Poincaré au sujet de cette décision, spécifiait que c'était par suite de l'absence du terme "territorial" dans la

formule employée, et le Comte Berchtold avait, dans la suite, pleinement admis le principe de la proposition.

D'ailleurs, le Ministre de Russie à Cettigné ne croit pas aux négociations relatives à la cession de Lovcen à l'Autriche. Il se peut que l'Autriche ait convoité cette position, redoutant de la voir passer aux mains des Serbes au cas d'une fusion des deux États slaves. Mais le peuple monténégrin attache un prix tout particulier à cette position qui apparaît comme faisant partie du patrimoine national, et le Roi peut ne pas se rendre compte que toute tentative de transaction à ce sujet amènerait fatalement une catastrophe pour lui, d'autant plus que la région où sont situées ces hauteurs est justement habitée par des populations connues pour leur loyalisme envers la dynastie.

Le Gouvernement Impérial tiendrait à procéder à un échange de vues très confidentiel avec les Cabinets de Paris et de Londres au sujet de ce qui précède, afin de combiner à l'avance l'action commune des trois Gouvernements au cas où, la paix conclue, le Roi Nicolas se déciderait à conclure avec l'Autriche quelque arrangement que le Gouvernement Impérial considérerait inadmissible et dès lors de nature à amener de graves complications internationales.

Ambassade Impériale de Russie, Londres,
le 22 janvier, 1913.

[3512] No. 527.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 63. Confidential.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 29*, 1913.

I TRANSMIT herewith to your Excellency copy of a despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at St. Petersburgh,* enclosing copy of a memorandum communicated by the Russian Councillor of Embassy to Sir A. Nicolson respecting the alleged designs of the King of Montenegro to cede a portion of the sanjak to Austria-Hungary.

Your Excellency should consult the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, in order to obtain his views on this subject.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4786] No. 528.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.†

(No. 21.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 29*, 1913.

THE text of the note from the plenipotentiaries of the allies at the Peace Conference to the Turkish plenipotentiaries, which I had just received, was read at the meeting of the Ambassadors to-day.

We had some discussion, in which it appeared that the German Ambassador was averse to any combined attempt in Constantinople to urge the new Turkish Government to send a favourable reply, his argument being that they must know perfectly well what the situation was, and there should be no departure from neutrality. But he suggested that, instead of the Ambassadors being instructed to say something separately in Constantinople, I might say something to the Turkish Ambassador here.

I said that all I had thought of doing was to tell Sir Gerard Lowther to point out to the Porte that a denunciation of the armistice would presumably follow the rupture of negotiations, and that, unless the Turks contemplated with equanimity a resumption of hostilities, they had better send a favourable reply to the note of the Powers as soon as possible. There would be no pressure or breach of neutrality in this.

Finally, I decided that I would see the Turkish Ambassador here, and tell him that, owing to the rupture of negotiations, the Powers could now do nothing to prevent a resumption of hostilities unless a favourable reply was sent to their note.

* No. 526.

† Also to Sir F. Bertie (No. 73), Sir E. Goschen (No. 45), Sir R. Rodd (No. 33), and Sir G. Buchanan (No. 64).

The Austrian Ambassador put in the following amendment to the last draft of the financial formula as to the Ottoman Debt :—

"2. Les États cessionnaires sont subrogés dans tous les droits et charges du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions des chemins de fer et autres ayant leur exploitation sur les territoires cédés par le présent traité ; ils s'engagent également à remettre les compagnies intéressées en possession immédiate des lignes exploitées par elles avant la guerre, nonobstant tout règlement qui pourrait être envisagé pour l'avenir d'accord entre les intéressés ; ils s'engagent en outre dans ces territoires à respecter et à exécuter les contrats valablement consentis par le Gouvernement Impérial ou les autorités compétentes."

The Austrian Ambassador also put in the following amendment of the draft respecting Mount Athos :—

"Pour exercer la police maritime et sanitaire le long de la côte appartenant au Mont-Athos, la communauté pourra entretenir des bâtiments à exclusion de sous-marins, d'un tonnage qui ne dépassera pas 300 tonneaux chacun, armés de canons d'un calibre de 7 centim. au maximum, mais sans installations pour lancer des torpilles ou pour poser des mines. Le nombre de ces bâtiments de service ne devra pas excéder deux."

The Austrian Ambassador also pointed out, with reference to a remark by the French Ambassador at a previous meeting that the Drin might form the outlet for Scutari, that some two or three hours beyond Scutari the Drin divided into two branches, of which the left one was not navigable and the right one went into the Boyana and had a common mouth with it ; the conclusion being that the Boyana alone provided an outlet for Scutari.

With reference to a previous decision, that the allies should be left to settle amongst themselves the delimitations of the conquered territory, the Austrian Ambassador recalled "que son Gouvernement se réserve le droit de donner son adhésion à la totalité des changements territoriaux."

The Italian Ambassador observed on this that the assent of the Italian Government was equally necessary to these changes.

I am, &c
E. GREY.

[4787] No 529.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 17.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 29*, 1913.

M. VENIZELOS came to see me to-day, and Sir Arthur Nicolson was present.

M. Venizelos said that the arguments of Dr. Danef for declaring the peace negotiations broken off were very strong. The Balkan States were poor ; they could not let the war drag on. They must bring it to an end, and it was necessary to make the Young Turks understand that things could not continue indefinitely in an uncertain state.

I said that I was sorry that the negotiations were broken off, but that, as I had told Dr. Danef, there were grave risks in taking a decision, and, as the risks were his and not mine, I could not give advice.

M. Venizelos himself was obliged to return to Greece for matters which required his attention as Prime Minister.

I said that it would be desirable to leave enough delegates here to continue the negotiations in case the reply of the Turkish Government to the note of the Powers was favourable.

M. Venizelos agreed, and said that some of his delegates would stay.

He expressed some anxiety about the delimitation of Albania on the south. But on my saying that the important point there was that the Bay of Vallona should be left to Albania, he said that Greece had made up her mind to this when she realised how strong Italian feeling on the point was. Epirus was the thing which caused his anxiety. It would be unreasonable that, where, in a mixed population, the majority was Greek, this majority should be placed in a new State under the rule of the minority.

He asked about the Ægean Islands.

I told him that the Powers had not discussed the islands for some time. It seemed useless to do so until we knew whether the Turkish Government were going to decide to leave the islands to the decision of the Powers. I thought that very likely we would not discuss the question of the islands further until after the conclusion of peace.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4783] No. 530.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 42.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1913.*

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day the substance of Sir George Buchanan's telegram No. 28, explaining to him what I had instructed Sir George Buchanan to say in St. Petersburgh. I observed that this information was satisfactory, and I again emphasised the advantage it would be if Germany could impress on the new Turkish Government the importance of not resuming a chauvinistic policy on the Turco-Persian frontier, and of coming to a settlement about it.

The Ambassador said that he had already put this point before his Government.

I pointed out to the German Ambassador that I understood the situation to be that, if the Balkan war began again, Russia could not sit still and see Bulgaria beaten; but, if this contingency arose, it would not be the same thing as designs on Asia Minor on the part of Russia, and it might merely imply that Russia would take action to help Bulgaria on the European side.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4784] No. 531.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 43.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1913.*

I TOLD the German Ambassador to-day of the enquiry which the Russian Government intend to make in Berlin about a financial advance to Turkey, and of the satisfactory information which I had received from Berlin on this point in your Excellency's telegram No. 19.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4785] No. 532.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 44.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1913.*

I HAD some talk to-day with the German Ambassador as to a possible compromise about Scutari.

The Ambassador thought that all the territory up to and including the right bank of the Boyana might be given to Montenegro, and also territory north of a line starting from some point on the Lake of Scutari running east, and giving all the Castratis to Montenegro.

I said that I feared this would not go far enough. The whole of the Boyana would be claimed for Montenegro, that she might control the regulation of the water and the outlet, and a considerable portion of the plain of Scutari was necessary to make Antivari of any use as a commercial port. East of the Lake of Scutari Montenegro should have as much as possible of the River Kiri.

The Austrian Ambassador, who was present for a short time while we were discussing this subject, said that his Government could not agree to give the Castratis, who were Catholics, to Montenegro.

I remarked that I was afraid we were still a long way from a possible compromise. The German Ambassador must discuss this point with the Austrian Ambassador, and I would see the Russian Ambassador.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4071] No. 533.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 16.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1913.*

M. VENIZELOS called on the 24th January, and told Sir A. Nicolson that the allies were to meet that afternoon at 5 P.M., and he added that he thought that the meeting would decide to await the Turkish reply to the collective note before breaking off negotiations definitely. Sir A. Nicolson said that this seemed to him to be the wisest course to pursue. No one could foretell what would be the immediate development of the situation at Constantinople. M. Venizelos said that he had heard that the new Turkish Cabinet was composed of comparatively unknown persons, and that Talaat Bey was not a member.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4479] No. 534.

Foreign Office to Admiralty.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 29, 1913.*

I AM directed by Secretary Sir E. Grey to transmit to you herewith, to be laid before the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, copy of a telegram which he has addressed to His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople,* respecting the dispatch of war-ships to Besika Bay, and the possible desirability of the ships remaining at Smyrna or some other convenient port rather than at the first-named place.

Sir E. Grey would be obliged if their Lordships would instruct the senior naval officer in the sense of the last paragraph of the telegram in question.

I am, &c.
LOUIS MALLET.

[4524] No. 535.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 35.)
Sir, *Berlin, January 25, 1913.*

THE following question was put in the Reichstag on the 23rd instant by Herr Ledebour, a Socialist member:—

"Is the Imperial Chancellor prepared to furnish information as to whether and how far consular reports from the Balkan countries have confirmed the assertions repeatedly brought forward in European newspapers that the troops of the allied Balkan States have been guilty of acts of cruelty against the Turkish, Albanian, and Jewish population, which have, it is alleged, assumed in places the character of a systematic extermination of those sections of the population?

"Further, does the Imperial Chancellor intend to propose the dispatch by the Great Powers of a commission to investigate these proceedings and the conditions resulting therefrom?"

The reply given was as follows:—

"To the first question it must be observed that the reports of our consular officers have mentioned excesses of this nature. They deal, however, mainly with reports received from third parties which could not be verified. Further reports based upon

* No. 560.

personal observation have shown that the responsible commanders of the allied Balkan Powers and authorities have always opposed such excesses with energy and success. The reply to the second question is in the negative."

I have, &c.
W. E. GOSCHEN.

[4509] No. 536.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 43.)

Sir, *Paris, January 29, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour, with reference to my despatch No. 17 of the 15th instant, to transmit to you herewith copy of a memorandum from the French Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the safeguarding of the interests of the foreign creditors of Turkey as affected by territorial cessions to the Balkan States.

M. Jonnart states that the German Government have given their adhesion to the draft articles dated the 10th January, forwarded to you in my despatch above mentioned, and that the French Ambassador in London has been instructed to recommend their adoption at the meeting of Ambassadors there. The French representatives at the capitals of the Balkan States have also been instructed to concert with their colleagues with a view to urging the respective Governments concerned to accept the proposals embodied in the draft articles.

No. 2 of the draft articles in question has been supplemented in consequence of the observations of the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in London, by a mention of the obligation of the States concerned to replace certain railway companies in immediate possession of their lines.

M. Jonnart encloses an amended copy of the draft articles, and expresses the hope that His Majesty's Government will adopt the views of the French Government, both during the negotiations in London and as regards the instructions furnished to His Majesty's representatives in the Balkan capitals.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure 1 in No. 536.

Memorandum communicated to Sir F. Bertie by M. Jonnart.

POUR faire suite à la communication de son prédécesseur en date du 14 de ce mois, le Ministre des Affaires Étrangères a l'honneur de porter à la connaissance de son Excellence l'Ambassadeur de Sa Majesté britannique que le Gouvernement Impérial allemand a bien voulu donner son adhésion aux propositions françaises contenues dans le projet d'articles portant la date du 10 janvier, dont l'insertion dans le traité de paix doit assurer la sauvegarde de tous les intérêts légitimes des créanciers de l'Empire ottoman qui pourraient se trouver affectés par les cessions territoriales envisagées.

A raison de l'accueil qui a été réservé aux propositions françaises, l'Ambassadeur de la république à Londres a reçu pour instructions de recommander à la réunion des Ambassadeurs l'adoption de ce projet d'articles, qui laisse d'ailleurs à une commission internationale, qui se réunirait ultérieurement, le soin d'en régler les détails d'application et de mise en vigueur.

D'autre part, le Gouvernement de la République française a donné pour instructions à ses représentants auprès des États balkaniques de s'entendre avec leurs collègues pour insister auprès des Gouvernements alliés pour l'acceptation des propositions inscrites dans le projet d'articles portant la date du 10 janvier, cette nouvelle démarche ne faisant que préciser et compléter celle déjà faite dans le courant du mois de novembre dernier, et dans le même sens, par tous les représentants des Puissances intéressées.

Pour faire droit aux observations présentées par l'Ambassade d'Autriche-Hongrie à Londres, le projet original d'articles du 10 janvier a été complété à l'article 2 par la mention que les États cessionnaires s'engagent à "remettre les compagnies intéressées en possession immédiate des lignes, dont l'exploitation leur a été concédée, nonobstant

tout règlement qui pourrait être envisagé pour l'avenir d'accord avec les intéressés," ainsi que cela figure au projet d'articles rectifié, dont ci-joint copie.

Le Gouvernement de la république se plaît à penser que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté britannique voudra bien s'inspirer de ces mêmes vues tant à Londres que dans ses instructions à ses représentants auprès des États balkaniques.

Paris, le 27 janvier, 1913.

Enclosure 2 in No. 536.

Projet d'Articles.

[Projet du 10 janvier, modifié le 27, après adoption d'un amendement austro-hongrois.]

CHACUN des États signataires du présent traité qui reçoit cession d'une portion des territoires ayant appartenu jusqu'à présent à l'Empire ottoman supportera une part de l'ensemble de la dette de l'Empire ottoman proportionnelle aux revenus des territoires cédés. Cette participation sera arrêtée d'après le rapport existant entre les revenus de ces territoires et le revenu global de l'Empire, calculés d'après la moyenne des trois derniers exercices financiers.

La quote-part incombant aux États cessionnaires dans les engagements de l'Empire ottoman sera incessible, insaisissable et ne pourra faire l'objet de compensation; des sûretés équivalentes aux sûretés actuelles dont le maintien sera reconnu impraticable, seront données par les États cessionnaires pour la garantie des créanciers.

La contribution annuelle des États cessionnaires ci-dessus déterminée sera convertible en capital sur le pied de 4 pour cent.

2. Les États cessionnaires sont subrogés dans tous les droits et charges du Gouvernement Impérial ottoman en ce qui concerne les concessions de chemins de fer et autres ayant leur exploitation sur les territoires cédés par le présent traité; ils s'engagent également à remettre les compagnies intéressées en possession immédiate des lignes dont l'exploitation leur a été concédée, nonobstant tout règlement qui pourrait être envisagé pour l'avenir d'accord avec les intéressés; ils s'engagent en outre dans ces territoires à respecter et à exécuter les contrats valablement consentis par le Gouvernement Impérial ou les autorités ottomanes compétentes.

3. Les détails d'application et d'exécution des dispositions ci-dessus seront consignés dans des protocoles, annexés au présent traité et élaborés par une commission internationale, où seront représentées les six Grandes Puissances et qui se réunira à , le

Le 27 janvier, 1913.

[4572] No. 537.

Council of Foreign Bondholders to Foreign Office.—(Received January 30.)

Sir, *17, Moorgate Street, London, January 29, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Sir W. Langley's letter of the 24th instant, respecting the action of the Greek authorities in connection with the revenues of the Ottoman Public Debt administration.

The Council beg to tender to Sir E. Grey their grateful thanks for the steps he has taken to protect the bondholders' interests.

On the 25th instant we received a letter from the president of the Debt Council, in which it was alleged that the Bulgarian and Servian authorities have committed various acts which appear to be even more indefensible than those committed by the Greek authorities.

We believe that a copy of M. Boulinière's letter has been communicated to the Foreign Office through His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, so that it does not seem necessary for us to go into details.

We venture to ask that Sir E. Grey will cause the same protest and notification as has been sent to the Greek Government to be conveyed to the Governments of Bulgaria and Servia.

I have, &c.
JAMES P. COOPER, *Secretary.*

[4647] No. 538.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, January 30, 1913.*

IT has been reported in the press that "Disconto Gesellschaft and Bleichroeder" have taken over 150,000,000 fr. of Roumanian three-year Treasury Bills. I have ascertained that the report is correct, but that only 50,000,000 fr. are to be advanced immediately.

[4670] No. 539.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 30, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 25 of 21st January: Advances to Turkey.

German Government share your opinions and concur that exchange of views should first of all take place between England, France, and Germany. They welcome advice to Sir H. Babington Smith to keep in close touch with Deutsche Bank, and have given a hint to latter in the same sense. In spite of considerable German interests involved, German Government have, in deference to your views, induced Deutsche Bank to abandon for the present [group undecypherable] scheme for advance, in conjunction with French and British groups, of £T. 1,500,000 with option on £T. 13,000,000 Treasury bonds. German Government agree with you as to the desirability, in the event of larger advances, of establishing some control over Turkish expenditure, but they consider method by which this end can be attained cannot be settled until political situation has become clearer.

Translation of communication from Imperial Foreign Office sent by post.

[4657] No. 540.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 58.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Constantinople, January 30, 1913.*

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs informs me that Turkish commander-in-chief at Chatalja to-day received notification from General Savof, denouncing the armistice, and intimating that hostilities will be recommenced in four days.

[4504] No. 541.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 29. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 29, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 28 of 28th January: Roumania.

Prime Minister informs me that a protocol for resuming the negotiations in Bucharest is to be signed to-night in London between Messrs. Danef and Misu.

It has been found impossible to continue negotiations there as M. Danef has been instructed to leave London on Saturday, 1st February.

Prime Minister has received no formal note from Roumanian Government as to their demands, but request from Roumanian Minister, urging him to give the matter his serious attention. He informs me confidentially that Bulgarian Government cannot see their way to granting demands in their entirety, but that signature of protocol will be immediately followed by interchange of opinions. His Excellency is

instructing the Bulgarian Minister at Constantinople, who is now on leave, to proceed to Bucharest to negotiate. Prime Minister is very anxious that this information should not be divulged prematurely, as it might injuriously affect the position of the Bulgarian Minister at Bucharest.

Prime Minister is evidently very nervous respecting Roumanian demands being presented as they are at so unfavourable a moment.

(Repeated to Constantinople and Bucharest.)

[4556] No. 542.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 30.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 30, 1913.*

TURKISH war.

The Prime Minister is evidently still hopeful that peace may be concluded. He asked my opinion as to how peace negotiations could be resumed if once broken off in London.

The Prime Minister believes that, even if the war is renewed, the Ottoman Government will wish to conclude peace after the fall of Adrianople.

The military preparations are being actively pushed forward.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[4656] No. 543.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 31.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 30, 1913.*

IN case of the resumption of hostilities, the Bulgarian military authorities have decided to commence immediate sustained assault on Adrianople.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[4665] No. 544.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 32.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 30, 1913.*

I AM informed that armistice has been denounced. Hostilities are accordingly liable to recommence on Monday evening.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[4664] No. 545.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 22.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, January 30, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 17 of 24th January.

Notwithstanding almost daily representations made by myself to Servian Government, customs authorities at Uskub and Ghevgheli continue vexatious interference with trade, either by refusing entry, confiscating, delaying, or imposing unjustifiable duties goods.

The complaints of consular officers at Salonica and Uskub are continuous, and just now a cargo of sugar has been stopped at Ghevgheli.

Servian authorities here profess to entirely agree with our views, and have repeatedly assured me that the necessary instructions have been sent; but as these produce no result I suspect that the real aim of Servian Government is to hinder importation under the present conditions as much as possible. They look upon importations under the Turkish tariff as a loss to the exchequer, and they are also influenced by

pressure exercised by Belgrade merchants, who cannot compete with goods paying duty at the Turkish rate only.

In the circumstances I have put in a note reserving all our rights in case any losses are incurred by British subjects, but as my representations have been ineffectual, I venture to submit that a sharp remonstrance sent through Servian representative in London might be timely.

[4728] No. 546.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Belgrade, January 30, 1913.*

MY immediately preceding telegram of to-day.
Following from consul at Salonica to-day :—

"British Errera Company complain that the Servian authorities at Ghevgheli detain 100 cases of sugar and of fruit dispatched from Salonica 17th January. Three waggon-loads of sugar dispatched 13th January seem to have been allowed to reach Uskub, but are reported to have been confiscated by Servians there. There are three more waggons of sugar, petroleum, and matches on the line.

"Company protesting against loss, but would be grateful for any possible assistance in view of heavy demurrage."

(R.) Following from Uskub :—

"Yesterday customs authorities at Ghevgheli confiscated one railway waggon loaded with matches and cigarette paper imported [group undecypherable : ? by] British company, giving no reason for action."

[4496] No. 547.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 83.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.*

I HAVE informed Bulgarian Ambassador of substance of last two paragraphs of Sir E. Goschen's telegram No. 20 of 29th January, and have expressed to him my personal opinion in favour of the suggestion about Adrianople. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[4344] No. 548.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 51.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.*

MY telegrams Nos. 49 and 50 of to-day's date : Balkan situation : Asia Minor.

I have informed German Ambassador of substance of these telegrams, and you should take an opportunity of telling Minister for Foreign Affairs that we have neither entertained nor countenanced any project for infringing integrity of Asia Minor.

[4496] No. 549.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 52.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 29th January.

If peace can be secured by cession of Adrianople to Bulgaria with some conditions such as Italy has given in Tripoli as Minister for Foreign Affairs suggests, I think we ought to do all we can to support this solution.

(Repeated to St. Petersburgh, No. 81.)

[4660] No. 546*.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 30.)

(No. 12.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Athens, January 30, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 15 of 27th January.

Customs duties on imports into occupied territories.

I am not clear whether I am instructed to make a representation, and, if so, exactly in what sense.

[PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON]

[4011] No. 550.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Cartwright.

(No. 41.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1913.

YOUR despatch No. 12 of 24th January.

As our latest news from Belgrade is that Servian Government are arranging with Greek Government for customs duties to be levied at Salonica only, and not to exceed 11 per cent. *ad valorem*, on goods destined for occupied territory, no further representations seem called for at present. Please inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[4343] No. 551.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 68.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 54 of 28th January.

I approve.

[4337] No. 552.

Sir Edward Grey to Consul-General Lamb.

(No. 3.)
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1913.

YOUR telegram No. 3 of 28th January: Customs duties.

Can you send someone to Cavalla to enquire?

[5144] No. 553.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir H. Bax-Ironside.

(No. 22.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1913.

I ASKED Dr. Danef to come to see me to-day.

I said that the peace delegates of the allies had sent me a note, which was very pleasant in what it said about ourselves, but I regretted the information contained in it that the negotiations were broken off.

Dr. Danef did not expect the armistice to be denounced for two or three days.

I urged that it should not be denounced till the reply of the Porte to the Powers was known. If that reply opened the way for further negotiations, I supposed that sufficient delegates would be left here to enable the conference to be reconstituted.

Dr. Danef said that this would be so, and he himself was not going away for a few days.

In reply to an enquiry from me, he said that the situation was still the same as I had stated: Bulgaria would not discuss any proposal which excluded the cession of Adrianople, but she was ready to discuss the conditions on which Adrianople should be ceded.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4897] No. 554.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 30, 1913.

THE Turkish Ambassador called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 30th January, to enquire whether we had received a proposal emanating from the Italian Government for the appointment of an international commission of enquiry into the misdeeds alleged to

have been perpetrated by Bulgarian and Servian bands on Moslems. Sir A. Nicolson said that we had received as yet no such proposal.

Tewfik Pasha said that when the Turkish reply was received to the collective note, he trusted that the Powers would examine it with a view of ascertaining if it comprised proposals susceptible of forming a basis for a settlement. In the affirmative case it would be as well if the Powers were to agree among themselves as to the broad lines on which a settlement should be made, and then inform all the belligerent parties that such lines represented the decisions of the Powers and must be accepted by the belligerents, who would then be allowed to work out the details. If the peace conference were reopened without any such positive declaration on the part of the Powers, Tewfik Pasha was convinced that further delays and disagreements would arise.

Sir A. Nicolson told Tewfik Pasha that he would communicate what he said to me.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5143] No. 555.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Lowther.

(No. 34.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.*

THE Turkish Delegates came to see me to-day at my request.

I said that the attitude of the Powers would be one of neutrality, and they could not do anything now to prevent a recommencement of the war, unless the Porte sent a favourable reply to their joint note.

The delegates explained the difficulty in Constantinople: to give way meant revolution, and they pointed out the risks which Bulgaria might run by continuing the war. But they had no information from Constantinople.

I said that it was for Bulgaria to calculate her own risks, and the Powers could do nothing but wait for the answer to their note from the Porte.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4436] No. 556.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 32.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador informed Sir A. Nicolson on the 27th January that the Italian cruisers "San Marco" and "Pisa" had been ordered to Besika Bay at the request of the Italian Ambassador at Constantinople. There was no political object in the dispatch of the vessels, they were merely held in readiness in case of danger to lives and properties of foreigners.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5141] No. 557.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No 37.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador spoke to me strongly to-day about the danger of European interference in Asia Minor. Some people thought that the armistice was only an *entr'acte* between the liquidation of European Turkey and Asiatic Turkey. In this case, moral as well as material responsibilities would be imposed on some of the Powers. The Italian Ambassado in Paris and the Minister for Foreign Affairs in Rome had had their apprehensions aroused by persistent articles in the "Temps" about Syria.

I said that no one would be more annoyed than I if the question of Asia Minor was raised by the action of any of the Powers. I had no reason to anticipate that it

would be. The only danger was internal revolution in Asia Minor itself, and we had neither entertained nor countenanced any design for breaking up Asia Minor.

The Ambassador pressed me very much to get assurances from other Powers, especially France.

I said that I had expressed my views on the subject to every one. Italy was on very good terms with France, and she could make enquiries for herself in Paris.

The Ambassador replied that the Marquis di San Giuliano would prefer that I should get these assurances from France.

I answered that I saw no reason why Italy should not get them direct. I could not do everything for every one, and I had already spoken more than once to M. Cambon about the articles in the "Temps."

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5142] No. 558.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Rodd.

(No. 38.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.*

THE Italian Ambassador told me to-day that the policy of his Government was: First of all neutrality; secondly, that the Powers must wait for an answer from the Turkish Government to their joint note; and thirdly, that union should be maintained amongst the Powers and separate action amongst them avoided.

I said that I agreed in all this, but we must be careful not to construe neutrality so as to encourage the Turks to expect that, if they held out and continued the war, the Powers, or any of them, would intervene to help them.

In this the Ambassador agreed.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

[4435] No. 559.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 10.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.*

MM. NOVAKOVITCH and Nicolitch, the two Servian delegates, called on Sir A. Nicolson on the 27th January to state that the allies had decided to break off negotiations, and that they would meet on the 28th January to draw up a note notifying the rupture for communication to the Ottoman delegation. The allied Governments would then decide as to whether they would or would not denounce the armistice. This latter measure was not within the competency of the peace delegates. They asked if Sir A. Nicolson had any advice to give. Sir A. Nicolson replied in the negative, and said that I had informed M. Danef on Friday that I could give no advice as the risks were not with us but with them.

M. Nicolitch remarked that it was a very serious matter for Servia having to recommence hostilities, and intimated that she could gain nothing at all by a resumption. Sir A. Nicolson did not discuss this matter.

They asked when I would be able to give them a reply. Sir A. Nicolson told them that there was no reply to give—they had made a communication stating what were the decisions of the allies.

This communication Sir A. Nicolson said he would transmit to me, and I would probably inform the Ambassadors. But Sir A. Nicolson did not think any reply would be sent; he had taken act of their communication. They said they understood that, and that they would not expect a reply.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5140] No. 560.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan.

(No. 55.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.*

I TOLD Count Benckendorff to-day that Austria would agree to Montenegro having the right bank of the Boyana, except Tarabosh. She would also agree to irrigation and control of the water, so as to lower the level of the Lake of Scutari and be of advantage to Montenegro. I assumed that she would agree to the control of the water being placed in the hands of an international commission, and not merely under Austrian or Albanian control. In addition, she would give up Ipek if the question of Scutari was settled; and I supposed that she would give up Prizrend. Germany, I thought, would press very hard that Austria should also agree to Montenegro having the territory which included the Castratis, a line being drawn from the Lake of Scutari to the east to give this to Montenegro. About Djakova and Dibra there would be great difficulty; Austria was not prepared to give way about them. This was the utmost progress which I had so far been able to make with regard to a compromise.

Count Benckendorff was very strong on the point that, if Scutari did not go to Montenegro, Djakova and Dibra must go to Servia. He would, however, report to St. Petersburgh what I had said, and he took a note of it for that purpose.

I told him that, from all the information which I received from independent sources—members of Parliament who know the country, and so forth—it seemed that the Albanians would resist being handed over to Montenegro, and it would be difficult to draw the frontier line of Albania. Tribes in the mountains depended for their flocks upon pasture at a distance, and, unless great care was taken, some tribes would be in one territory and their pasture in another, and there would be endless confusion. All this made me feel more and more that some sort of commission would have to enquire into the question of the frontier, and report upon it.

Count Benckendorff said that the Servians had never had any difficulty with their Albanian subjects, and he did not think that they would have any now, even if a good many Albanians were included in places which the Servians obtained. He admitted the usefulness of a frontier commission, but said that it could hardly decide the large questions.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4437] No. 561.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 71.)

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 30, 1913.*

M. CAMBON read to Sir A. Nicolson on the 27th January two telegrams from M. Louis.

M. Sazonof had categorically declared that since the warning given five weeks ago to the Porte, in regard to the dangers attending disturbances near the Russo-Asiatic frontier and the difficulty in which Russia would then find herself of guaranteeing her neutrality, no warning or threat had been addressed by the Russian Government to that of Turkey, and that all the reports which had been circulated in connection with such threats or warnings were without foundation. Russia would not take any isolated action and was anxious to preserve the European concert in respect to the attitude to be observed towards Turkey.

M. Sazonof had also spoken seriously to the German Ambassador in regard to the flaccid attitude Germany was assuming in view of the pretensions of Austria-Hungary. The Emperor of Austria was aging, Count Berchtold was weak and uncertain, and the military party and the Archduke Franz Ferdinand were dictating Austrian policy and compelling Germany to follow in their train. Count Pourtalès had remarked that the dream of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand was the revival of the Three Emperors' Alliance. M. Sazonof had impressed on Count Pourtalès the necessity of Germany taking a more independent line and exercising more influence at Vienna. He said that the intimate and close commercial relations between Germany and Russia rendered it most desirable that no disturbance of them should arise. M. Sazonof said that Austria was encouraging an active movement at Cracow for the purpose of creating a revolution or disturbances in Russian Poland, which would have repercussion in the Polish provinces of Prussia. He drew the serious attention of the German Government to this matter.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[4675] No. 562.

Sir F. Bertie to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 49.)

Sir, *Paris, January 30, 1913.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith an extract from the account of an interview between M. Theodoref, Bulgarian Minister of Finance, and M. Tardieu, foreign editor of the "Temps," which appears in this afternoon's issue of that newspaper.

M. Theodoref strongly insisted on the necessity of Turkey paying a war indemnity, and apparently expressed himself as being in favour of making the partial taking over of the Ottoman Public Debt by the allies depend on their receiving satisfaction on the indemnity question.

I have, &c.
FRANCIS BERTIE.

Enclosure in No. 562.

Extract from the "Temps" of January 31, 1913.

J'AI demandé alors à M. Théodoref comment il envisageait les questions financières qui sont plus particulièrement de sa compétence, c'est à savoir la question de l'indemnité de guerre et la question de la reprise par les États balkaniques d'une partie de la dette turque.

Le Ministre des Finances m'a répondu ce qui suit :—

"On s'est étonné que nous n'ayons pas encore parlé avec précision de l'indemnité de guerre. La raison en est bien simple. Nous ne pouvions parler de l'indemnité avant d'avoir résolu la première question posée, c'est à savoir la question territoriale. Or, c'est sur cette question que la rupture se produit. Il n'y avait donc pas de possibilité matérielle de discuter l'indemnité.

"Cette indemnité nous est due et nous la réclamerons avec ténacité, d'abord parce qu'il est de règle après toute guerre que le vaincu en paye les frais, de même que dans un procès le perdant est condamné aux dépens.

"Nous la réclamerons aussi parce que nous en avons besoin, nous et nos alliés. Pour ne parler que de nous, nous avons dans cette guerre pénible perdu plus de 25,000 de nos compatriotes tués sur le champ de bataille. De ce seul fait nous aurons pendant vingt ou trente ans 10,000,000 de pensions à payer par an. Est-il juste que la charge en retombe sur nous?

"Nous aurons à refaire notre matériel de guerre, qui à la fin des hostilités sera en majeure partie détérioré. Nous avons perdu la moitié de notre bétail.

"Enfin veuillez remarquer que si les charges résultant de la prolongation de la guerre sont considérables pour les États alliés, ce ne sont pas ces États qui sont responsables de cette prolongation. La guerre elle-même a duré un mois jour pour jour. Depuis lors, depuis la conclusion de l'armistice, six semaines ont passé, et avec la rupture des négociations, ce sera des semaines encore, des mois peut-être, qui vont s'écouler sans qu'on puisse revenir au pied de paix.

"C'est donc la Turquie qui par ses lenteurs nous impose cette dépense. Parce qu'il a plu à Mahmoud Chevket Pacha de prendre le pouvoir et de faire tuer le généralissime, est-il juste que nous soyons obligés de porter le poids de ces dépenses sans espérer de compensations? Évidemment non.

"Nous avons 550,000 hommes sous les armes. Il faut les nourrir et les payer. C'est à ceux qui nous obligent à maintenir ces forces sur le pied de guerre que cette charge doit incomber.

"On dit que la Turquie ne peut pas payer. Ce n'est pas exact. 75 pour cent des excédents de la Dette publique sont annuellement versés au Trésor ottoman. C'est pour lui une ressource importante.

"D'autre part, il faut se garder de croire que la perte des provinces d'Europe doive rendre plus mauvaise la situation budgétaire de l'Empire turc. Les provinces d'Europe coûtent plus cher qu'elles ne rapportent. Elles représentent sur les recettes de la Turquie 18 pour cent, sur les dépenses 26 pour cent. Faites le calcul. La Turquie ne perd rien financièrement.

"Quant à la question de la reprise partielle de la dette ottomane par les États alliés, nous acceptons en principe cette reprise, mais nous ne saurions admettre une évaluation arbitraire.

"J'estime, pour ma part, que les États balkaniques en bloc peuvent reprendre, sur les trois milliards en chiffres ronds qui constituent la dette publique ottomane, 400,000,000. A ces 400,000,000 s'ajouteront des dettes qui ne sont point des dettes proprement dites, mais des engagements spéciaux comme les garanties kilométriques des chemins de fer dans les provinces annexées par nous.

"Il va de soi que les 400,000,000 dont j'ai parlé tout à l'heure ne peuvent représenter que des dettes garanties, administrées par l'Administration de la Dette publique.

"Ai-je besoin enfin d'ajouter, le 'Temps' l'a déjà fait remarquer, que la question de l'indemnité de guerre et celle de la reprise partielle de la dette ne peuvent pas se séparer l'une de l'autre?

"Pour l'indemnité de guerre, nous accepterons des délais. Mais nous demanderons des garanties. Quoi de plus naturel que de trouver ces garanties sur les excédents de la dette ottomane que consolidera notre participation même à cette dette? En outre, la Turquie peut affecter de nouvelles garanties au service de la dette. Ainsi par les soins de l'Administration de la Dette s'établira une compensation qui donnera toute sûreté aux porteurs et qui en même temps procurera aux États balkaniques des garanties sérieuses et à la Turquie des commodités appréciables.

"La détresse financière de la Turquie est une légende qu'on exploite habilement. Nous ne pouvons pas la laisser s'accréditer. De plus, il est équitable et salutaire que la guerre ait une sanction et il n'est pas admissible que la Turquie échappe aux responsabilités financières qu'elle a prises."

J'ai enfin demandé à M. Théodoroff s'il pouvait me donner quelques renseignements sur les négociations bulgaro-roumaines. Comme je m'y attendais, le Ministre m'a répondu que non.

"Les négociations," a-t-il ajouté, "sont engagées. M. Danef est chargé. Il ne m'appartient pas de formuler une appréciation à ce sujet, ni d'exprimer d'opinion sur la nature des demandes roumaines et la réponse qu'elles peuvent recevoir de nous."—A. T.

[4708] No. 563.

Sir H. Babington Smith to Mr. Parker.—(*Received January* 31.)

121, *St. James's Court,*
Buckingham Gate, January 30, 1913.

My dear Alwyn,

I ENCLOSE the papers you gave me. I have written a memorandum on the question, which is being copied and will be sent to you to-morrow.

I go to Scotland to-morrow morning for two days, so I am having another copy sent to me there. If I find it wants corrections, I will send a corrected copy to you to be substituted for the one you will receive to-morrow.

Yours, &c.
H. BABINGTON SMITH.

Enclosure in No. 563.

Turkish Debt and Territories to be ceded by Turkey.

IT is desirable to have a clear view of the various kinds of Debt which are secured, to a greater or less extent, on revenues received in the territories to be ceded by Turkey to the allies (which, for brevity, I call the ceded territories).

I attach (annexe A) a classified list of the various kinds of Debt thus secured.

It is generally agreed that the allies must assume, in respect of the territories ceded to them, a portion of the charge of the Turkish Debt. It appears also to be

assumed, and I think rightly, that the obligation must be expressed in the form of annual payments, and not in the form of a capital sum, though the annual payments may be commuted subsequently by a capital payment.

There is difference of opinion as to how the payments should be fixed, and how they should be secured.

One proposal which has been put forward may, perhaps, be set aside at once.

The scheme proposed (apparently as one of two alternatives) in the "Premier Avant-Projet de Protocole" prepared by the Council of the Debt, contemplates that the Ottoman Debt administration should continue to act in the ceded territories, and that the existing laws and regulations should remain applicable to the ceded revenues, unless modified by common consent.

Although the Council of the Debt has an international character, it is expressly laid down in the decree of Moukarrem that it is an Ottoman administration. It contains a Turkish representative, and the Government names an Imperial commissary to attend its meetings. The allies will certainly wish to modify the fiscal system of the ceded territories, and they will not be willing to accept the restrictions which apply to the Turkish Customs. It seems certain that hopeless friction would result from any attempt to maintain the machinery of the Ottoman Public Debt in the ceded territories, or to tie the allies down to the observance of Turkish laws and regulations in fiscal matters.

How, then, is the contribution of the allies to be assessed?

Two methods are suggested: (1) a sum based on the actual receipts of one year, or an average of several years previous to the war; (2) a sum to be determined by means of the ratio which the general revenues of the ceded provinces bore to the general revenues of the Ottoman Empire.

Sir Adam Block and the Council of the Debt prefer the first system for the revenues received under the decree of Moukarrem; but they accept the second for the rest of the Debt, which enjoys a guarantee on revenues of the ceded provinces. The French Government prefer the second system throughout; and the German banks accept the second system, with the limitation that the sum thus fixed should not be less than the revenues actually received.

As a question of principle, the first system might be held to rest upon a more secure foundation, but its application presents most serious difficulties.

It would be impossible to carry it out, in certain cases, except by a method of proportion. For instance, certain loans are guaranteed by the assignment of a certain sum from the "excédents" of the Debt revenues. In order to calculate the part of these "excédents" which should be considered to belong to the ceded provinces, it would be necessary to consider the proportion between the revenues received in those provinces and the revenues received elsewhere.

There are other loans the annuity of which is paid from the receipts of certain customs houses; some of those customs houses being in the ceded territories, some in the territories which remain to Turkey. The portion of these annuities arising from the ceded territories could only be determined by a method of proportion.

Again, there are other cases in which the revenues assigned for the service of a particular loan arise partly in the ceded provinces, and partly elsewhere. The total receipts from these revenues may exceed considerably the annuity required for the loan, and in that case, the surplus belongs to the Government (except so far as it is pledged, either separately or as part of a number of similar surpluses, for the service of some other section of the Debt). In a case such as this, the calculations necessary to determine what amount of revenue should be considered to be received in the ceded provinces would be complicated in character, and of doubtful accuracy in their result.

The above instances will suffice to show that the question is not a simple one, and that an assessment could not be based on the amount of revenue actually received without calculations of a very elaborate kind and of a nature to give rise to many differences of opinion.

Having regard to these difficulties, and also to the fact that all Turkish loans have the general guarantee of the revenues of the Empire, as well as the special revenues assigned, it seems desirable to endorse the principle advocated in the French memorandum.

The proviso suggested by the German banks (viz., that the payments to be made by the Allied States towards the service of the Turkish Debt must not be smaller than the yield of the revenues (of the ceded territories) which have been pledged as special security for different parts of the Turkish Public Debt) is desirable. The only objection to it is the difficulty, which has been already pointed out, of ascertaining the amount of that yield.

The proposal to take into account the Floating Debt, in assessing the charge to be borne by the allies, is criticised by the Debt, on the ground that the character of this Debt is doubtful, and that its amount has not been ascertained, although a special commission was at work on it for some years..

The French commission was, however, probably thinking, not of the old Floating Debt to which this criticism justly applies, but of the Treasury bills and other short-dated obligations, which have been issued recently on the guarantee of assigned revenues and with perfectly well defined conditions. Some of these bills are secured on revenues arising in the ceded territory; and there is every reason for including Debt of this character in the settlement of the allies' contributions. The old Floating Debt, to which the criticism of the Debt refers, could be omitted without injustice.

The consideration of these short term obligations raises a question of some importance, which is not touched by any of the memoranda, viz., the period for which the annuity to be charged on the Allied States should run. The various loans of the Ottoman State have many various periods of currency. In some cases (*e.g.*, the Unified Debt) the period can only be estimated, since it depends on the yield of the revenues. It is clear that the annuity must be for a single and uniform period. This period will have to be fixed as an average. In the case of the short term Debt, the assessment of an annuity is not directly applicable. In this case, it would appear that the charge should be assessed in the shape of a share of the capital liability, and not an annuity This capital obligation can, if it is more convenient, be converted into an annuity for the given period.

In any case, it appears to be essential, as suggested in the German memorandum, that the method of distributing the allies' contributions between the various loans, &c., should be determined beforehand, and not left merely for settlement by the Debt Council.

The experience of the past shows that difficulties will arise in securing the continued payment of the contributions. Additional security would be given if, as proposed, definite revenues are assigned by each of the allies as security for their contributions, and if these revenues are encashed by the organs of control which already exist in these States.

But the difficulty will be avoided (so far as the creditors of Turkey are concerned) if the annuities are capitalised, as soon as possible, in the form of new loans. The new loan would, in each case, be an obligation solely of the Balkan State issuing it. The proceeds would be applied (through the Council of the Debt) in discharging a corresponding portion of the Turkish Debt. There would thus be a real transfer of Debt, and not merely the charge upon the Allied States of a portion of the Turkish Debt.

January 30th 1913. H. BABINGTON SMITH.

ANNEX "A."

I. DEBT under the Decree of Mouharrem and the Décret Annexe, viz., the Unified Debt and the Lottery Bonds (lots Turcs).

This Debt is secured by the revenues assigned by the decree of Mouharrem. Some of these (salt, spirits, stamps, &c.) are collected by the Debt administration in the ceded territories, as elsewhere in Turkey. The tobacco monopoly is farmed by the Régie. The additional customs duty of 3 per cent. is collected by the customs administration and paid over to the Debt. When the net proceeds exceed a fixed sum (£ T 2,157,599) 25 per cent. of the surplus is retained by the Debt and applied as additional sinking fund; the remainder (75 per cent.) reverts to the Government.

II. LOANS secured on the surplus of the revenues under the Decree of Mouharrem (*i.e.*, on the above-mentioned 75 per cent. of the excess over the fixed annual sum),

Four per cent. Loan of 1904;
Bagdad Railway Loan: Second Series;
Bagdad Railway Loan: Third Series.

III.—LOANS Secured, in whole or in part, on Revenues arising in the Ceded Territories and received by the Debt.

—	Total Annuity.	Assignment in Ceded Territories.
5 per cent. loan, 1896 ..	£ T. 180,000	Annuity of £ T. 40,000 on Aghnam (sheep tax) of Salonica.
4 per cent. loan, 1903 ..	138,000	Fisheries and silk tithes in certain localities.
4 per cent. Tedjhizat-Askerie, 1905	118,800	Surtax of 6 per cent. on tithes and other revenues encashed by the Debt.
4 per cent. loan, 1901–5 ..	238,800	Annuity of £ T. 30,000 on certain duties collected by customs. Surtax of ½ per cent. on all tithes encashed by the Debt.
4 per cent. loan, 1908 ..	212,000	Assignment of £ T. 122,000 on customs of Smyrna, Beirout, Adrianople, Salonica, Broussa. £ T. 130,000 on customs of Smyrna, Beirout, Adrianople, Salonica, Broussa. £ T. 40,000 from surplus of tithes, &c., encashed by Debt administration.

In the case of several of the above loans there are also assigned revenues which have no connection with the ceded territories. It has not been thought necessary to enumerate these.

IV.—LOANS Secured, in whole or in part, on Revenues in the Ceded Territories not received by the Debt.

—	Total Annuity.	Assignment on Ceded Territories.
4 per cent. Customs Loan, 1902	£ T. 390,000	£ T. 390,000 on revenues of customs of Smyrna, Beirout, Adrianople, Salonica, Broussa.

V.—FLOATING Debt Secured, in whole or in part, on Revenues of the Ceded Territories.

—	Amount.	Date Due.	Assigned Revenues.
Treasury Bills (National Bank of Turkey)	£ T. 1,650,000	March 14, 1913 ..	Customs of Smyrna, Beirout, Adrianople, Salonica, Broussa (after meeting previous charges).
Treasury Bills (Imperial Ottoman Bank)	2,835,000	April 16, 1913 ..	Surplus of tithes and other revenues encashed by the Debt.
Treasury Bills (Imperial Ottoman Bank)	1,250,000	September 5, 1913	Certain Aghnams. £ T. 175,000 on surplus of tobacco tithe. £ T. 365,000 on customs of Bagdad, Alexandretta, Preveza, and Constantinople.

In addition, there are the kilometric guarantees. The revenues assigned for these (usually the tithes of the districts through which the railways pass) are encashed by the Debt, and any surplus paid to the Government. But there are certain charges on this surplus.

It should be noted, in passing, that the above lists do not include the whole of the Turkish Debt, whether funded or floating, since there are other loans and advances which are not charged on revenues arising in the ceded territories.

[4661] No. 564.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 59.)
(Telegraphic.) *En clair.* *Constantinople, January 30, 1913.*

FOLLOWING is text of reply to collective note handed by Minister for Foreign Affairs to Austrian Ambassador this afternoon :—

"Le Gouvernement Impérial ottoman n'hésite pas à reconnaître que la conclusion de la paix répond aux vœux et aux intérêts de tous, et il se rend compte qu'il convient de mettre le plus tôt possible un terme à une lutte qu'il n'a nullement provoquée.

"Dans leur communication les Grandes Puissances ont jugé utile de conseiller au Gouvernement Impérial de consentir à la cession de la ville d'Andrinople aux alliés balkaniques et de s'en remettre à elles du soin de statuer sur le sort des îles de la mer Égée.

"Le Gouvernement Impérial croit devoir relever qu'il a déjà donné des preuves irrécusables de son esprit de conciliation en consentant à d'immenses sacrifices. Andrinople étant une ville essentiellement musulmane et la seconde capitale de la Turquie, et se trouvant conséquemment avoir des attaches indissolubles avec l'Empire, la rumeur même de sa cession a provoqué un sentiment de réprobation dans tout le pays et une effervescence telle qu'elle a amené la démission du précédent Cabinet.

"Néanmoins, pour donner un suprême témoignage de son esprit pacifique, le Gouvernement Impérial est disposé à s'en remettre aux Grandes Puissances en ce qui concerne la partie de la ville d'Andrinople qui est sise sur la rive droite de la Maritza, en conservant la partie située sur la rive gauche. Les mosquées, mausolées et autres souvenirs historiques et religieux se trouvant dans la partie de la ville sise sur la rive gauche de la Maritza. La conservation de cette partie sous la souveraineté directe ottomane est pour le Gouvernement Impérial une nécessité dont il ne peut ne pas tenir compte sans exposer le pays à une commotion qui pourrait entraîner les plus graves conséquences.

"Quant aux îles de la mer Égée, le Gouvernement Impérial se permet de faire observer que tandis qu'une partie de ces îles sont, à cause de leur voisinage aux détroits des Dardanelles, indispensables à la défense de la capitale, les autres, faisant partie intégrante des possessions asiatiques de l'Empire, n'en sont pas moins indispensables à la sécurité de l'Asie Mineure. Toute solution qui tendrait à amoindrir l'autorité du Gouvernement Impérial dans ces îles aurait pour résultat de les transformer en autant de foyers d'agitation, qui étendraient leur action sur le littoral avoisinant. La conséquence en serait la création d'un état de perturbation analogue à celui qui existait en Macédoine et qui a menacé, et menace, encore la tranquillité de l'Europe. Indépendamment de l'effet déplorable qu'elle produirait sur l'opinion publique ottomane, une pareille solution irait à l'encontre des vues des Grandes Puissances elles-mêmes, qui ont à cœur l'établissement d'une paix durable et la consolidation ainsi que la prospérité de l'Empire.

"Par conséquent, la Sublime Porte pourrait adhérer à ce que les six Grandes Puissances voudront bien statuer sur le sort des îles occupées par les alliés balkaniques en tenant compte des considérations qui précèdent et du soin qu'il faut apporter à l'intégrité de la position des Dardanelles, ce que la Sublime Porte estime être une question du plus haut intérêt européen. Le Gouvernement Impérial est persuadé que les Grandes Puissances, dans leur esprit de justice et d'équité, voudront bien reconnaître l'étendue des sacrifices déjà consentis et convenir que la Sublime Porte serait en droit de rejeter toutes nouvelles exigences ou prétentions qui éventuellement pourraient être soulevées par les alliés balkaniques.

"La Sublime Porte prend acte avec une réelle satisfaction des dispositions et promesses bienveillantes des Grandes Puissances en ce qui concerne leur appui moral et matériel pour réparer les maux de la guerre et mettre en valeur les ressources naturelles de l'Empire. A cet effet il est indispensable que les Puissances reconnaissent d'ores et déjà le droit à la Turquie de procéder en toute liberté à l'adoption d'un tarif autonome de douane, à la conclusion de traités de commerce sur la base des principes du droit moderne et à l'application à l'égard de leurs sujets des lois fiscales ottomanes auxquelles sont et seront soumis les sujets ottomans, et qu'elles consentent en attendant à la majoration de 4 pour cent des droits de douane.

"La Sublime Porte croit qu'il est non moins indispensable d'arriver à l'abolition des bureaux de poste étrangers existant en Turquie, à des conditions qu'il serait

facile de déterminer en vue d'offrir au commerce toutes les garanties de célérité et de sécurité nécessaires au point de vue postal.

"Elle estime en outre qu'une déclaration des Puissances sur le désir de mettre fin au régime des Capitulations dans l'Empire ottoman, et l'ouverture, après la conclusion de la paix, de négociations pour étudier en commun les moyens propres à réaliser ce but, formera, avec les matières économiques ci-dessus énumérées, un ensemble de mesures permettant la réalisation des promesses des Puissances exposées dans leur note susmentionnée."

[4807] No. 565.

Sir G. Lowther to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 60. Confidential.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, January 31, 1913.*

THE Porte's reply.

As will be noticed, the proposal of present Committee Cabinet in the matter of Adrianople and the islands does not differ much from that which their predecessors intended to make, and it is consequently difficult to divine their bringing off such a violent *coup d'Etat*.

The tendency seems to be to focus attention internally and externally on the islands rather than on Adrianople, which, according to the date given in my telegram No. 26 of 17th January, ought to succumb about 5th February. There is good reason to believe that the expression "occupied by the allies" was prompted by the Triple Alliance with the idea of precluding the discussion of islands occupied by Italy, and of thus dividing the Powers.

The "indispensable" demand for 4 per cent. customs increase, customs freedom, and liberty to tax foreigners seems to be an attempt to make the Great Powers, and especially those of the Triple *Entente*, to pay a "war indemnity" for Adrianople and the islands, while the demand for the abolition of foreign post-offices and the Capitulations in judicial matters seems to be so preposterous in a country governed during the last four years by martial law that they can scarcely be seriously meant, even allowing for customary elements of bluff.

Should the delegates of the allies actually leave London, there may be some chance of the adoption of a more reasonable attitude, unless the Committee's real intention is to risk what is left of the Ottoman Empire. Cabinet, although it has just ousted the Peace Cabinet, seems distinctly perturbed at the news of the Bulgarian commander-in-chief's denunciation of the armistice, and they are not strong in the army or the country, which latter is really opposed to continuance of the war, and possibility of a counter *coup d'État* in the not distant future is not excluded.

The Committee has styled the present Government as that of "National Defence," and has organised Special Committee of National Defence on the French Communist lines, and is attempting to work up a Chauvinistic feeling, as at the outset of the Italian war.

(Sent to Sophia, Athens, and Bucharest.)

[4797] No. 566.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Berlin, January 31, 1913.*

ADRIANOPLE.

Your telegram No. 52 of yesterday's date.

Suggestion of Chancellor and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs with regard to Adrianople was only made tentatively in the course of private conversations with French Ambassador, so that I do not well see how I can at present move in the matter. M. Cambon has not as yet received the views of French Government with regard to these conversations, which he reported to them.

PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE, LONDON

[4820] No. 567.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 25.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 31, 1913.*

YOUR telegram No. 51 of 30th January.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs thanks you for your communication. As regards Turco-Persian frontier he gave me to understand that on conclusion of peace the Imperial Government would use their best endeavours at Constantinople to remove difficulty between Russia and Turkey.

[4821] No. 568.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 26.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Berlin, January 31, 1913.*

SECRETARY of State for Foreign Affairs tells me that immediately on receipt of Turkish note, which surprised him by its conciliatory tone, he instructed German representative at Sophia to make a friendly representation to Bulgarian Government, pointing out that terms of note showed that on Turkish side there was every desire to settle matters, and asking whether, on their side, they could not see their way to making a few concessions such as would make the position of the new Turkish Government, who seemed well disposed, easier, and help them at all events to save their face.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs seemed very indignant with Bulgarian Government for denouncing armistice before receipt of Turkish note.

[4822] No. 569.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Berlin, January 31, 1913.*

MY telegram No. 24 of to-day: Adrianople.

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs put same idea before me and authorised me to telegraph it to you. So I propose acting on your telegram No. 52 of 30th January to-morrow.

[4796] No. 570

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 33.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, January 31, 1913.*

THE Prime Minister informs me that the offer made by the Ottoman Government to cede portion of town of Adrianople is not acceptable to the public.

(Sent to Constantinople.)

[4818] No. 571.

Sir R. Paget to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 24.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Belgrade, January 31, 1913.*

MILITARY attaché has received the following information from the Minister of War:—

If reinforcements are sent to Bulgarians, they will probably consist of two divisions and some heavy artillery, which latter will go to Adrianople. No movements will take place before 3rd February at 7 P.M. At present no definite arrangements have been made, but probably one division will be sent from Monastir viâ Salonica to Dedeagatch by rail and the other viâ Sophia.

The Minister of War added that, as compensation for Servian assistance, Bulgaria would have to concede Monastir, Prilep, and Kuprulu, thus bringing the Servian eastern frontier up to Vardar. This is in contradiction to the information recently given to me by the Bulgarian Minister to the effect that his Government had no intention of asking for reinforcements; but, should necessity arise for doing so, these would certainly not form the subject of a bargain, as unlimited mutual help had been stipulated for in military convention. Servia could therefore claim nothing for her assistance.

No reinforcements are being sent to Greeks, who have themselves to thank for their present difficulties about Janina owing to their untimely eagerness to occupy Salonica instead of participating in field operations at Monastir.

Two batteries of field artillery are being sent to assist Montenegro. Should the further reinforcements be dispatched, there will be four Servian divisions in Thrace, or nearly half the field army.

(Sent to Sophia.)

[4712] No. 572.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *Bucharest, January 31, 1913.*

BERLIN telegram No. 22 of 30th January.

I have reported by messenger.

It is given out that the issue of Treasury bonds is for the purpose of relieving the gold stringency, which is causing great inconvenience to trade and is due to stagnation of exports.

[4898] No. 573.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 55.)
(Telegraphic.) R. *Foreign Office, January 31, 1913.*

GERMAN Ambassador informs me that the view of German Government of Porte's reply is that Turkey claims to retain only the part of Adrianople on the left bank of the Maritza which is to be dismantled and where the mosques and holy places are; that this is a practical acceptance of the collective note, as Adrianople, which Bulgaria claims essentially from a strategic point of view, will be practically in her power, so that sovereignty of the Sultan over the holy part reserved will in practice be fictitious; that the reserve made by Turkey is practically without importance and to save her face, and that German Government think Bulgaria ought to make this concession.

The German Minister at Sophia is to advise the Bulgarian Government to accept this, and it is hoped that His Majesty's Government, to avoid further bloodshed, will give the same advice.

My first impression of Porte's reply was that it provided a basis for discussion by Bulgaria, and therefore a reason for prolonging the armistice, but that any advice given must be that of the Powers as a whole. I had therefore, before receiving German Ambassador's communication, requested each of the Ambassadors to telegraph for instructions that I might know the views of other Governments.

But German view goes much beyond my first impression, and I have the following observations to make upon it:—

1. According to maps, practically the whole of the town of Adrianople is on the left bank, and is therefore still claimed by Turkey.

2. It is not clear that Turks engage to dismantle fortresses, and the reply of Porte makes no mention of this.

3. The whole question of the line of the frontier is left unsettled. If the Maritza is to be the boundary up to Bulgarian frontier it excludes all possibility of a line

ending at Midia. It has hitherto been assumed that line would begin at Enos and end at Midia, though it would be deflected to pass near Adrianople.

All these points require investigation before proposal of Porte could be recommended by the Powers as satisfactory. I have not yet heard the views of any other Power. You should inform Minister for Foreign Affairs.

[5146] No. 574.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Bertie.

(No. 80.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1913.

I HAD some talk with M. Cambon to-day about the Turkish reply to the collective note of the Powers.

I found him unfavourable to it. He considered it a refusal of the advice of the Powers. He agreed with me in thinking that the German suggestion, thrown out to the French Ambassador in Berlin, of what I called the "Tripoli solution" respecting Adrianople would be satisfactory; but that, before pressing it, Germany should be asked to promise her help about Scutari, as she had said that she would give it.

M. Cambon spoke very earnestly of the danger to the Government in Russia of the unsatisfactory state of things there. Public opinion would be made dangerous if the Albanian question was not settled satisfactorily.

I said that I feared the German offer with regard to Scutari merely meant help to secure, not the Russian solution of the question, but a compromise, such as the German Ambassador had suggested to me, which would be quite insufficient for Russia.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5148] No. 575.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir R. Paget.

(No. 11.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1913.

I SPOKE to the Servian delegates to the Peace Conference, who came to take leave of me to-day, in the same way as I had spoken this morning to M. Venizelos, about the Turkish reply to the collective note of the Powers, and I found on their part the same adverse view to a prolongation of the armistice.

They expressed great gratitude for the kindness shown to them here.

M. Vesnitch was being left in London, and the other delegates would return if the negotiations were continued. They thought this should not happen till a new armistice had been signed on more advanced conditions than the present one.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5147] No. 576.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir F. Elliot.

(No. 18.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1913.

I SAW M. Venizelos this morning.

He was strongly of opinion that the armistice ought not to be prolonged because of the Turkish reply to the collective note of the Powers, as to prolong the armistice would only encourage the Turks to play for delay, and so exhaust the allies. He said this in answer to a remark of mine that the Turkish reply seemed to provide a basis for discussion.

I said that, till this crisis was over, I could not discuss any political questions of the future; but we looked forward to being always on the best of terms with Greece and good friends.

I am, &c.
E. GREY.

[5145] No. 577.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir E. Goschen.

(No. 48.)
Sir, *Foreign Office, January* 31, 1913.

I HAD some further discussion to-day with the German Ambassador about the Albanian question.

He said that he went beyond the instructions of his Government in suggesting that the Castrati district might be given to Montenegro, but he still thought that he could carry this point if it was absolutely essential, though Austria would not give way upon it at present. He drew for me on the map a line which left Djakova and Dibra to Albania. He was quite firm that Dibra, as well as Djakova, must go to Albania, as otherwise Albania would be too narrow.

I said that Mr. Bourchier, who knew the country well, informed me that Dibra was half Bulgarian, and therefore not really an Albanian town.

I told the Ambassador what I had said to Count Benckendorff; that the utmost progress which I had yet made towards a compromise was to get for Montenegro the right bank of the Boyana, excluding Tarabosh; that Ipek and Prizrend would also, I considered, certainly be conceded; that irrigation and control of the water would be conceded and, I assumed, would be placed under internation control and not under purely Albanian or Austrian control; that the Castrati district, I thought, might be obtained, and that Germany would be willing to use her influence to get it though Austria so far would not concede it; and that about Djakova and Dibra there would be great difficulty, as Austria was not willing to give way.

The German Ambassador agreed that this was a correct description of the situation as it was at present.

I said that the Russian Ambassador had informed his Government of this situation, and I must wait to hear their opinion.

I am, &c.
E. GREY

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